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Few 8ubject8 are !Ilore fraught wi也 e!Ilotionand le88 under-
etood也anthe right8 of private property and the Con8titutional 
lilIlit8 to public control of th08e right8. If thi8 i8 a highly 
charged e!Ilotional i88Ue， it i8 no le88 8eriou8 a !Ilatter of 
national concern， a8 evidenced by the current debate over land 
U8e legi81ation in也eCongre88 and in State legi81ature8也 rough-
out位1ecountry. 
In a continuing effort to encourage infor!Iled public debate 
on land U8e refor!Il，也eCouncil cO!Il!IlI88ioned the following 
8tudy， "The Taking 188ue." It i8 a natural 8equel to the author8' 
earlier report to位1eCouncil entitled "The Quiet Revolution in 
Land U8e Control，" which 8Xa!Ilined a nU!Ilber of innovative State 
land U8e control initiative8. Since publication of "The Quiet 
Revolution..." a nU!Ilber of State8 have pa88ed new land U8e 
legiolation --Florida， Ca1ifornia， New York and Oregon， for 
8X&!Ilple --whi1e 0'出 er8，8uch a8 Maryland， have confronted ・eriou8ob8tacle8 to 8uch refOr!Il8. At the heart of !Il08t con・
1乙I(~♂ 
51。
trover8ie8 over prop08ed State land U8e legi81ation i8 a f咽 d&!Ilen-
tal legal que8tion: What are也eCon8titutional li1Ilit8 to也econtrol 
of private land? That is the iosue which thi8 report addreose8. 
It offero an infor!Ilative inoight into也epo1itical and legal hi8tory 
of our Conotitutional pOWer8 affecting land，也evariOu8 court 
interpretation8 of也 08epOWer8， and OptiOn8 open to future 
judicial and legi81ative action. 
We are hopeful that位1i88tudy of "The Taking Iosue" will 
8erve to clarify and infor!Il public debate， in order that Arnerica' 8 
future can be better 8erved by a !IlOre rational 8y8te!Il of land 
u8e policie8 and control8. 
五!I~
Executive Office of the Pre8ident 
Council on Environ!Ilental Quality 
Wa8hington， D. C. 
July 9， 1973 
Chair!Ilan 
Digitized by Google 
PREFACE 
This book has been written in response to the 
concern of the Counci1 on Environmenta1 Qua1ity about 
the interre1ationship between environmenta1 qua1ity 
and constitutiona1 1aw. As the regu1ation of 1and 
use bec佃 lesan increasing1y important component of 
programs for enhancing environmenta1 qua1ity the con-
stitutiona1 parameters within which 1and use regu1a-
tion must operate become increasing1y important. 
A1though 1and use regu1ation can raise issues 
under a variety of constitutiona1 c1auses this study 
focuses on the c1ause of the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution that poses by far the most 
significant restraint on the regu1ation of 1and use， 
the "taking c1ause": 
" .• nor sha11 private property 
be taken for pub1ic use without just 
compensation." 
This report traces the distinction between a va1id re-
gu1ation of the use of 1and and a "taking" that requires 
compensation， showing the history of the distinction 
and projecting probab1e future trends in this area of 
the 1aw. 
明lereport is divided into four parts: 
Part 1 presents an overview of current 1and use 
prob1ems， showing the way in which the taking issue is 
affecting 1and use decisions in a11 parts of the country. 
1t is entit1ed "The Pervasiveness of the Taking 1ssue." 
Part 11 traces the concep七 of"taking" from its 
origins in Medieva1 Eng1and， down through British and 
Co1onia1 American history， to the adoption of the 
・takingc1ause" in the United States Constitution. 1t 
fo11ows the deve10pment of the taking c1ause through 
Supreme Court decisions of the Nineteenth Century to 
the major judicia1 expansions of the taking c1ause in 
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七heear1y Twentieth Century. This part is en七itled
"Taking and Regu1ation Through Seven and a Ha1f 
Centuries." 
Part 111 examines the current United States case 
1aw on the taking issue. The cases are ana1yzed from 
three different perspectives: 1) according to the 
simi1arity of their under1ying facts~ 2) according to 
certain genera1 princip1es suggested by 1ega1 scho1ars~ 
and 3) according to the date of decision. This Part 
is entit1ed "The Regu1atory Taking in Current Law." 
Part rv projects possib1e future trends in the 
interpretation of the taking c1ause as it affects the 
regu1ation of 1and use， and proposes a series of four 
a1ternative strategies for dea1ing with the issue， 
ranging from fronta1 attack to comp1ete capitu1ation. 
This Part is enti.t1ed "The Future of the Taking 1ssue." 
This study is an outgrowth of !he Quiet Revo1ution 
in Land Use Contro1， an examination of new regu1atory 
techniques which we wrote for the Counci1 on Environ-
menta1 Qua1ity in 1971. Observation of these techniques 
in action convinced us of the importance of the taking 
issue. The reader is referred to七hatvo1ume for more 
detai1ed background information on new types of 1and 
use regu1ation. 
This work was made possib1e by a research grant 
from the Counci1 on Environmenta1 Qua1ity. We wou1d 
1ike to express our deepest appreciation to the members 
and s七affof the Counci1， not on1y for their financia1 
assistance but for the creative he1p in defining this 
project and ana1yzing its conc1usions. 
We wou1d a1so 1ike to acknow1edge and express our 
appreciation to Stan1ey Katz， professor of Lega1 History 
at the Universi七Yof Chicago Law Schoo1， J. F. Garner， 
Professor of pub1ic Law at the University of Nottingham， 
Professor and Mrs. A1bert Kira1fy， University of London， 
and Sir Desmond Heap， President of the Law Society， a11 
of whom were of great assistance to us in deve10ping 
the historica1 ana1ysis in七hisreport， but none of 
whom bears any b1ame for the conc1usions derived there-
from. We wou1d a1so 1ike to express our appreciation 
ii. 
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to the London Library (St. James Square)， the University 
of London ・s1nstitute for Advanced Lega1 Studies， and 
the Library of the House of Co町田lons，for making their 
norma11y-private faci1ities avai1ab1e七o us. 
Research assis七ancein the preparation of Part 1 
was provided by 1rene Ho1mes and Robert Snyder: in 
Part 11 by Victor Bass， James Deen， James Friedman， 
Norden Gi1bert， Scott Reznick and Merideth Wright: in 
Part 111 by Dona1d Rickertsen， a11 studen七s in 1aw or 
history at the University of Chicago. Much of the 
historica1 research necessary for this report required 
examination of origina1 sources and the he1p of these 
students proved particu1ar1y va1uab1e. 
Count1ess persons responded gracious1y to our 
inquiries about current prob1ems under the taking issue 
that provided the materia1 for Part 1. Listing their 
names wou1d be impossib1e but we are very thankfu1 for 
their va1uab1e assistance. 
The Task Force on Land Use and Urban Growth of 
the Citizens・AdvisoryCαrumittee on Environmenta1 Qua1ity 
provided a very va1uab1e sounding board for sαne of 
our ideas. We wou1d 1ike to express our appreciation 
to the chairman， Laurance Rockefe11er， and to the 
executive director， Wi11iam Rei11y. 
Fina11y， the study of Eng1ish 1aw necessary for 
this report was great1y aided by a trave1 and study 
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INTRODUCτ'ORY NOTE 
A CONSTITUTIONAL SL工CETHROUGH THE ENV工RONMENT
"Each of these separate views of 
the environmenta1 system is on1y a 
narrow slice through the comp1ex who1e. 
Whi1e each can i11uminate some features 
of the who1e system， the picture it 
yie1ds is necessari1y fa1se to a degree. 
For in 100king at one set of re1ation-
ships we inevitab1y ignore a good dea1 
of the rest; yet in the rea1 wor1d every-
thing in the environment is connected to 
everything e1se." 
Barry Co訂unoner，
The C10sinq Circ1e 
23 (1971) 
The comp1exity of environmenta1 issues is 
notorious. Why， then， have we chosen to pay such 
c10se attention to a sing1e point of 1aw that we must 
examine over 700 years of 1ega1 history and ana1yze 
hundreds of court decisions? 工s the issue rea11y that 
important? 
Just as the ana1ysis of environmenta1 prob1ems 
demonstrates their interconnectedness， so the search 
for solutions a1so invo1ves the fusing together of 
disparate e1ements. A solution must make economic 
sense， have po1itica1 acceptabi1ity， avoid harmfu1 
side effects， a110w efficient administration • • • 
and on and on. Solutions to environmenta1 prob1ems 
are 1ike chains with many interconnected 1inks. 
The taking issue is the weak 1ink in many of these 
chains. A11 over the country， as Part I demonstrates， 
attempts to solve environmenta1 prob1ems through 1and 
use regu1ation are threatened by the fear that they 
wi11 be cha11enged in court as an unconstitutiona1 
taking of property without compensation. 
1V. 
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When these challenges occur it is not enough to 
respond that everything is interconnected. While breadth 
of judicial vision is to be encouraged， response to the 
legal challenge must still be made in the framework of 
traditional legal concepts. This constitutional slice 
through the environment will be the field on which the 
battle is fought. 
We do not claim that the strengthening of this 
one link is a quick cure for all environmental issues. 
Land use regulation is only one of many tools， suitable 
for some but not all environmental problems， and the 
chain of land use regulation has many other links， con-
stitutional and otherwise. Nevertheless， if the challenge 
posed by the taking issue can be overcome we believe it 
will make a very significant impact on environmental 
quality. 
If this book seems technical and detailed， it is 
because it is designed to assist government officials 
and attorneys who seek to fashion solutions to environ-
mental problems. They are not seeking catchy cliches 
but detailed documentation from which they can work. 
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North. east. south and west --debates over land 
use are heard in all parts of the country. And when-
ever problems are severe and strict regulations are 
suggested. the taking issue is likely to rear its head. 
Any new regulation brings charges by landowners and 
developers that their property is being taken without 
compensation. 
One can appreciate the importance of the taking 
issue only when one sees the tremendous variety of 
disputes regarding the use of land which are affected 
by the taking issue: such varied programs as.阜.......g，晶，
wetlands protection. development timing. and historic 
preservation. all raise issues under the taking clause. 
The nature of these issues is remarkably similar 
throughout the country. Although regional accents 
vary. the picture of new regulatory programs facing 
claims under the taking clause can be duplicated in 
almost every state of the union. A review of some of 
these current issues will provide an overview of the 
impact of the taking issue. 
We were not surprised to find the taking clause 
a pervasive problem. We were surprised. after the 
hundreds of interviews that formed the basis of this 
Part 1. to find the fear of the taking clause as power-
ful as it appears to be. 
Many people seriously believe that the Constitu-
tion gives every man the right to do whatever he wants 
with his land. Foreign concepts like "environmental 
protection" and "zoning" were probably sneaked through 
by the Warren court! 
Many more people recognize the validity of land 
use regulation in general. but believe that it may 
never be used to reduce the value of a man ・sland to 
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the point where he can't make a profit on it. After 
all， what good is land if you can't make a profit on 
it. 
The courts have never adopted either of these 
philosophies， as Part III demonstrates. Yet they are 
so influential with the thousands of local government 
officials who play the major role in regulating the 
use of land that these philosophies have an independent 
existence above and beyond the law. 
The right to make money buying and selling land 
is a cherished American folkway， and one that cannot 
be lightly ignored. But in an increasingly crowded 
and polluted environment can we afford to continue 
circulating the myth that tells us that the taking 
clause protects this right of unrestricted use regard-
less of its impact on society? Obviously not， yet we 
must not let concern for the environment blind us to 
the fact that regulations have real economic impact 
on real people， and we must search for solutions that 




THE ATLANTIC COAST GRAPPLES WITH ITS ENVIRONMENT 
From the rocky hi11s and shores of New Eng1and to 
Chesapeake Bay， as e1sewhere， "land" is bec叩 lingmore 
and more crucia1 as an issue， before 1egis1atures， in 
the courts and among the public at 1arge. Termed "the 
issue of this [1973] 1egis1ature" in Maineよ/and "in 
jeopardy" in the Christian Science Monitor， y 1and 
had become the focus of attention in a11 of the At1antic 
States. Each state is responding in its own way t。
the new concern over the use of its 1ands. 
Connecticut， which has shown a specia1 concern for 
its tida1 wet1ands， Y and questions "of the p曲 lic
trust in the air， water and other natura1 resources of 
the state，"企/provides good examples of the type of 
controversy generated by these new regu1ations. 
The Great Sa1t Marsh， 1ying between Stratford and 
Bridgeport， Connecticut， has gradually decreased in 
size due to fi11ing for industria1 development， 
inc1uding the Bridgeport airport. Rykar工ndustrial
Corporation has 10ng owned a piece of the marsh as a 
site for future industria1 deve1opment. 21 Un1ike many 
of its neighbors however， it fai1ed to undertake its 
deve10pment before the adoption of the new Connecticut 
Wet1ands Statute. 
Rykar's parce1 adjoins a tida1 estuary where marine 
fisheries are again commercially viab1e after dredging 
activities which ended some 20 years ago， and it a1so 
1. Haine Times， Harch 2， 1973， at 8， Co1. 1. 
2. Chan， "Land in Jeopardy，" ~hristian Science Monito;:.. 
January 18， 1973， at 1， Co1. 1. 
3. Connecticut Genera1 Statutes， Section 22・27(1969 
P.A. 695). 
4. Environmental Protection Act of 1971 (1966 P.A.96)， 
Section 3. 
5. Interview with Alexander Goldfarb， October 6， 1972. 
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adjoins a popular beach and recreation area. Now 
Rykar finds that plans to fill portions of this remnant 
of the tidal marshes， whose yellow grasses， salt hay 
and myriad forms a plant and animal life support fin 
and shell fishes in the adjoining sound， are stymied. 
As a result the firm has brought suit demanding over 
宇75mi11ion in compensation for a taking of their 
1and.主/
工n another Connecticut controversy， environmental 
groups are asserting the "pub1ic trust" in preserving 
the water supp1y， f100d protection and natura1 ecolo-
gical resources to prevent the owner of a portion of 
an in1and swamp from operating a drag1ine and fi11ing 
the 1and. The Redding Conservation Commission a1leges 
that fi11ing would resu1t in the destruction of the 
swamp and its va1ue as a f100d plain， and in the pol田
lution of the Saugatuck River and pub1ic 1ands through 
which it f1ows. 11 The owner， Mr. Bonsignore， argues 
that any 1aw which would prevent his fi11ing of the 
property is an unconstitutiona1 taking.旦/
Since the ear1y 1960・s，Massachusetts has enforced 
simi1ar 1aws cal1ing for the protection of public inter-
ests in wet1ands. 21 Developrnent proposa1s require a 
permit which may be accompanied by an order setting 
standards or specia1 procedures to protect the eco1ogy. 
Whi1e acute1y aware of the prob1ems under the 
taking c1ause， the Department of Natura1 Resources and 
1oca1 conservation commissions have continued to enforce 
the growing array of state and 1oca1 regu1ations which 
are avai1ab1e to them inc1uding successive amendments 
6. Rvkar 1ndustrial Corporation v. Commissioner of Agricultural 
Resources， Superior Court， Hartford County， Conn. No. 170229， 
filed April 2， 1971. The tract involved measures 277 acres 
and is one of the few ren温 iningundeveloped waterfront sites 
suitable for a deep water port between Boston and New York City. 
The taking issue is considerably complicated since much of the 
land may be submerged at high tide and thereby be subject to 
ancient doctrines regarding state ownership of land under the 
seas. 
7. Redding Conservation Commission. Environmental Defense Fund 1nc. 
v. Armondo Bonsignore et a l. Superior Court， Fairfield County 
No. 145379， filed March 10， 1972. The land in question measures 
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of the Wet1ands Act and. a Scenic Rivers Act adopted in 
1971.旦/ Protracted 1itigation has made 1oca1 commi-
sioners and the Massachusetts Department of Natura1 
Resources wary of extreme1y strongprotective orders.1lI 
Nonethe1ess. Dr. Henry Foster. Massachusetts・Secretary
of Environmenta1 Affairs. states that "the Wet1ands 
Act seems to have survived despite the taking issue."旦/
Tida1 wet1ands in New Hampshire find their officia1 
defenders among the members of the state's Water Resources 
Board.1lI who have become increasing1y vigi1ant as 
ear1ier wet1ands protection acts have been updated to 
meet contemporary standards. Dona1d W. Stever Jr.. 
an Assistant Attorney Genera1 in the Environmenta1 Pro-
tection Division. points to 1itigation brought by the 
Sibsons， 1andowners in Rye. New Hampshire， as evidence 
of the 1ega1 10ngevity of the taking issue.当/ The 
Sibsons had app1ied for permission to fi11 a portion of 
the Hampton-Seabrook Marsh in Rye， and contend that the 
denia1 of such permission amounts to a taking of their 
property without compensation， since it effective1y 
denies them the right to use their 1and.旦/ The Sibsons 
have taken their case to the State Supreme Court twice 
and were again before a 1oca1 court at the end of 1972.当/
9 acres in area. 
8. .!豆.， Answer to amended comp1aint， August 1， 1972. 
9. Coasta1 Wet1ands Dredge and Fi11 Law of 1963， !5 amende~， 
M.G.L.A. Ch. 130， Sec. 27A (1973 Supp.)j Coasta1 Wet-
1ands Protection Act of 1965， !5 amende~， M.G.L.A. Ch.130， 
Sec. 105 (1973 Supp.)j In1and Wet1ands Dredge and Fi11 
Law of 1965， !5 amende~， M.G.L.A. Ch. 131， Sec. 40 
(1973 Supp.)j In1and Wet1ands Protection Act of 1968， 
a5 amende~， M.G.L.A. Ch. 131， Sec. 40A (1973 Supp.). 
10. M.G.L.A. Ch. 43， Sec. 17B (October 6， 1971). 
11. Te1ephone interview with Dr. Henry Foster， Massachusetts' 
Secretary of the Envlronmenta1 Affalrs， August 9， 1972. 
12. ld. 
13. New H団mpshlreR. S. A. 483 (former1y under the juris-
diction of the New Hampshire Port Authority). 
14. Last reported in 110 N.H. 8 (1969) and current1y before 
the Rockingham County Superior Court. 
15. .!昼.， Comp1aint， paragraph 6. 
16. Te1ephone intervlew with Dona1d W. Stever， Jr.， 




Upper New England is short on tidal marshes but 
long on tourists. As the New York Times recently put 
it: 
"That 'little place in the country' 
may become a fading dream for many urban 
residents because of reaction to the 
explosive pressures for land development 
in the Upper New England states." !V 
Vermont adopted a comprehensive program of develop-
ment regulation designed to control the mushrooming 
facilities for invaders from the South. Officials 
administering the program appear to be acutely sen-
sitive to the danger that their decisions could be 
enshrined in legal precedent as an unlawful taking. 
Significantly， recent amendments clarifying the 
standards and procedures applicable to both the plan-
ning and review process and adopting a capability and 
development plan also make access to the lower state 
courts possible as an avenue of appeal from initial 
environmental review decisions.当/
A proposal to drain and dredge a beaver pond， Ryder's 
Pond near Wilmington， to create a recreational lake in 
the midst of an approved vacation home development was 
one in which the District Commission's original position 
specified that the pond must be left in its natural 
state as a "rare and irreplaceable natural resource."よ21
After what was characterized as a "rough fight on the 
taking issue" at the district level， both the state and 
the developer retreated. from their original positions.~ 
The revised development application called for tempor-
arily lowering the water level about five feet， clearing 
out some dead trees and "muck，" and the creation of two 
small beaches at its ends.註/ A large peat bog which 
harbored several rare species of plants and wildlife 
17. New York Times， Saturday， December 16， 1972， at p.1， co1. 4. 
18. 1973・ H.326amending 10 U.S.A.Sections 6001，6025，6043，6046(b)， 
6085(c)， 6086(a) and 6089; 32 U.S.A. Sec. 3481 and to add 
3 U.S.A. Sec. 805(e). 
19. Haynes Brothers， Inc.， App1ications #700001 and #2W0060， 
District Environmenta1 Board No. 2. 
20. 12 M. R. S. A. Sec. 685・A.3.
21. The pond measures rough1y 40 acres in area. 
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would be preserved under this plan.盆/ Schuyler 
Jackson， Associate Director of the environrnental 
agency noted that he felt the case never reached the 
"nuts and bolts economic issues，" but that the com-
promise reached at the state level did avoid the 
"close" taking question.主v
In another action， a District Commission denied 
7. 
a Mobil Oil Company application for a permit to con-
struct a gas station on a prime scenic interchange.~ 
The state granted the permit subject to design standards. 
For example， instead of installing a neon sign， Mobil 
agreed to install a wooden sign with a low level of 
illumination. Certain other concessions were also made 
with respect to the design of the station ・sexterior. 
The state agreed to this compromise for fear that denial 
of all development would not stand up against a court 
challenge based on the taking issue.詰/
In Maine， the Land Use Regulation Commission is 
drafting land use regulations for the vast unincor-
porated and unorganized areas of northern Maine. Assist-
ant Attorney General Steve Murray notes that standards 
for districts in which timber companies have long been 
engaged in timber-cutting operations are considered 
particularly likely to give rise to constitutional 
challenge. 主主/ When a timber company finds it could 
sell or subdivide portions of its land for residential 
purposes instead of making an estimated宇3.00per acre 
net profit from its timber-cutting operations， it is 
likely to protest against any regulation that prevents 
it from developing the land. ~ 
22. Te1ephone interview with Peter Zi1iacus， Chairman， District 
Environmenta1 Board No. 2， August 28， 1972. 
23. Te1ephone interview with Schuy1er Jackson， Associate Director 
of the Environmenta1 Agency， who indicated that the com-
promise was dictated by the c10se constitutiona1 issues 
invo1ved， August 30， 1972. 
24. Mobi1 Oi1 Company， App1ication #300008 and #4C0040， District 
Commission No. 4. 
25. Te1ephone interview with Schuyler Jackson， August 30， 1972. 
A1though a compromise ~as felt to be necessary in view of the 
fact that the initia1 permit denial was based on "merely" 
aesthetic grounds， the compromise had the incidenta1 advantage 
of setting a "standard of regu1ation" for the next 1andowner 
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Sears Island， proposed as a site for a deep draft 
oi1 termina1 in an app1ication by Maine C1ean Fue1s 
(M.C.F.) before the Maine Environmenta1 Improvement 
Commission， poses another situation where a major 
industria1 group is cha11enging state regu1ation as a 
taking of property rights. The M.C.F. proposa1 was 
rejected in Ju1y of 1971 and is now pending before the 
Maine Supreme Court.包/
New Jersey・s farmers have been comp1aining about 
tough f100d contro1 measures which recently passed the 
state 1egis1ature. As Arthur West， President of the 
state's Farm Bureau Federation argued: 
"Now， the state wants to stop 
a11 deve10pment of f100d p1ains 
through zoning， without any thought 
of compensation • • • [This] law 
shou1d make c1ear that its purpose 
is not to confiscate property or 
property rights through zoning， 
which is unconstitutional."担/
The new statutes give the state direct contro1 over 1and 
use in floodways (natural run-off areas which channe1 
f100d waters downstream) with power to b10ck most deve1op-
ment there.辺/ They a1so mandate loca1 contro1s over 
other f100d hazard areas.主ν
who seeks to introduce deve10pment into the area. 百lUS.
when another deve10per seeks to construct a competing 
faci1ity at this interchange， the state wi11 be in a 
position to argue that in fairness， the newcomer shou1d 
be put in no better competitive position than that occupied 
by Mobi1. 
26. Interview with E. Stephen Murray， September 15. 1972. 
27. 旦 Asimi1ar argument was made by the City of New York 
in the Grand Termina1 case， 
28. Interview with E. Stephen Murray， September 15， 1972. 
29. Arthur H. West， President， New Jersey Farm Bureau. 
WCBS・TVRep1y Editoria1， August 11， 1972， 6:55 p.m. 
30. New Jersey Assemb1y Bi11s 572 and 596 (1972). 
31. New York Time~， November 28， 1972， at 1. co1. 1. 
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The transition to cornprehensive contro1s for flood 
plains is especia11y annoying for ho1ders of undeve10ped 
land in New Jersey because of the arnount of unrestricted 
residentia1 and cornrnercial construction which had pre-
vious1y taken p1ace in f100dway areas. Terrned "a specia1 
type of insanity" by State Environrnenta1 Cornrnissioner， 
Richard J. Su11ivan， ~ such deve10prnent nonethe1ess 
causes other 1andowners to consider the new contro1s an 
unjustifiab1e pena1ty on those who chose not to current1y 
deve10p 1and.主/
In New York， the furor generated over two rnassive 
vacation horne proposa1s which wou1d be carved out of 
eastern portions of the Adirondack park prornises future 
disputes over the lirnits on regu1atory power over private 
land use. Horizon Corporation， with tentative p1ans 
for 24，000 acres and another deve1oper， Louis Paparazzo， 
with p1ans for 18，500 acres， are on1y two of severa1 
hundred ho1ders of 1arge tracts of private 1and 10cated 
within the park's boundaries.当/ Supported by 1oca1 
governrnents eager to share the fruits of boorning growth， 
they are the first to propose rnassive high intensity 
vacation deve1oprnents.主/
A drastic reduction in permitted residentia1 density 
proposed for these and other sections of the park area 
is the source of current controversy. Park Agency 
p1anners show the bulk of the two ho1dings as a "rura1 
use area，" in the p1an， re1eased for pub1ic hearing late 
in Dec四 Iber，1972.差/ Deerned "those areas where signif-
32. Richard J. Su11ivan， State Department of Environmenta1 
Protection， !!ew York Time!， November 28， 1972， at 49， co1.3. 
33. WCBS-TV Rep1y Editoria1， August 11， 1972. 
34. New York Time!， November 27， 1972， at 32， co1. 1. 
35. Chan， "Batt1ing the Bu11dozer -The Big Land Threat，" 
Christian Science Monito~， Thursday， January 18， 1973， 
at 7. co1. 1. 
36. Pre1iminary Private Land Use & Deve10pment P1an， Adirondack 
Park. Ne岬 YorkAdirondack Park Agency (draft for pub1ic 
hearing purposes -December 21， 1972). Note that pro-
visions in the 1egis1ation may have removed Paparazzo・s
proposa1 from these contro1s. 
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"This week's hearings to determine 
the 1andmark ・sfate go far beyond the 
obvious considerations of art， history 
and sentiment to a broader concern with 
the city's pattern of growth and change， 
its econornic and functiona1 hea1th， and 
to what degree and by what rneans the 
city can， or shou1d， contro1 the gargantuan 
benefits and disasters that its deve10pers 
heap upon it." 些/
Cu1rninating severa1 years of negotiation and debate 
before the city 1andmarks and p1anning bodies， denia1 
of deve10prnent permission for a 59-story tower on the 
Grand Centra1 site reached a New York tria1 court in 
the fa11 of 1972. 
Dea1ing with va1uation issues which Jarnes Nespo1e， 
one of the city's attorneys， characterized as "extrerne1y 
difficu1t frorn a tria1 strategist's point of view，" the 
city worked to justify a regu1ation which preserved the 
existing terrnina1 on the choice rnid-town site. The pre-
servation 1aw does this by preventing any change in the 
exterior without a certificate of "no exterior effect，" 
and the denia1 of such a certificate caused Penn Centra1 
to argue that the city had condernned the deve10prnent 
potentia1: 
"Depriving p1aintiffs of the 
privi1ege to rnake rni11ions of do11ars 
per year， and at the sarne tirne having 
forced Penn Centra1 which is bankrupt， 
to rnaintain an aging and deteriorating 
termina1 at a deficit， is a regu1ation 
which undeniab1y goes so far that it 
arnounts to a taking for which cornpen-
sation rnust be provided." 坐/
45. New York Tim哩!， Apri1 11， 1969， at 28， c01. 4. 
46. P1aintiffs Pretria1 Memorandum， fenn Centra1 Transportation 
C0.， et a1. v. City of New York. et a 1.， Supreme Court of 
the State of New York， County of New York， No. 14763/69 fi1ed 
October 7， 1969; the taking issue is comp1icated by the existence 
of "deve10pment rights" transfer provisions which arguab1y 
diminish the burden of historic preservation by a110叩ingunused 
deve10prr氾ntpotentia1 to be transferred to other sites. 
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Corresponding 5ゆ urbandemands for 1and and housing 
generated by the growth of Metropo1itan New York have 
brought varying responses， most tinged with the strong 
inf1uence of the taking issue. Experiences in two 
counties may serve as examp1es. Suffo1k County has 
pursued a vigorous bipartisan program of 1and acqui-
sition to preserve park and conservation 1and. A recent 
proposa1 by Joseph K1ein， Suffo1k County Executive， con-
temp1ated expanding the program to inc1ude the immediate 
purchase of three thousand acres of threatened potat。
crop1ands to prevent housing deve1opment. The tota1 
cost of over宇30，000，000 for the twe1ve thousand acres 
that might be acquired wou1d be on1y partia11y borne by 
a lease-back program.生1/
工nRock1and County， the West Branch Conservation 
Association has reacted to deve10pment pressures by 
urging that two proposed new sewer trunk1ines not be 
bui1t. Martus Granirer， President of the Association 
argued in November， 1972: "We' re not obstructionists 
and we don't 10ve our cesspoo1s， but we have something 
here that rea11y works. You bui1d a sewer first and 
al1 the other things are going to fo11ow." The principa1 
concern of the Association is unrestricted growth of 
subdivisions. They were supported in their stand by 
the neighboring town of Ramapo， itse1f recent1y victorious 
in a court batt1e over growth contro1s.担/
The Suffo1k and Rock1and County examp1es pose both 
sides of the taking issue， the high cost of re1ying 
on1y on purchase of 1and to preserve va1uab1e agricul-
tural or other uses， and the "taking・ hardships imposed 
on new or potentia1 subdivision by the denia1 of sewers， 
and perhaps denia1 of any permission to develop land. 
Martha's Vineyard and the Is1and of Nantucket ar( 
other areas where explosive growth had led to c1ashes 
between those who wish to restrict access to protect 
47. New York Time~， January 3， 1973， at 1， co1. 5. 
48. New York Time~， October 23， 1972， at 35， co1. 4. 
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the existing environment and those who favor deve1opment. 
"Today， Nantucket and Martha's 
Vineyard stand on the brink. If un-
checked deve10pment continues its 
current course， then there wi11 be 
no turning back， and generations 
which fo11ow us wi11 find these off-
shore is1ands， in the years to come， 
1itt1e different from today's spraw1ing 
suburbs. "笠/
A bi11 introduced before the 92nd Congress wou1d estab1ish 
a "nationa1 Trust" to administer the unincorporated areas 
of the is1ands and estab1ish strict 1and use contro1s. 
Advocates of such contro1s are aware of the taking issue 
and the 1972 version of the Is1and Trust Bi11 provided 
for a 宇25mi11ion， three-year appropriation "for acqui-
sition of 1and and interests therein，" which was under-
stood to inc1ude partia1 compensation for high1y re-
strictive federa1 zoning.旦/ Since 1and prices on the 
is1ands are continua11y rising in the rush to acquire 
summer sites， there is some question as to the sufficiency 
of the proposed fund， not to mention the cost of court 
proceedings to deter官linewhat regu1ations require com-
pensation.旦/
P1ymouth， Massachusetts， one of the oldest communities 
in the United States has recent1y adopted new zoning 
by-1aws after unanimous1y rejecting a moratorium approach 
to growth contro1 in December of 1972. provisions de-
fining and mapping wet1ands within the town and subjecting 
them to vigorous regu1ation pose questions simi1ar to 
those seen with state regu1ations which prohibit most 
fi11ing and re1ated types of deve10pment in wet1ands. 
Since the historic areas of the town wrap themse1ves 
49. 5.3485， 92nd Cong. 2d 5ess.， 5ection 17 (1972); Fink1er， 
"Can a Trust Turn the Tide on the Is1and?，" 38 P1anning 
263 (November， 1972). 




around the water areas， these regu1ations are important 
for both historic and environmenta1 reasons. 
John Loupos， Chairman of the Loca1 Conservation 
Commission， indicates that the Commission and the P1an-
ning Commission as we11， were both primari1y concerned 
with technica1 and engineering detai1s such as accurate 
mapping of wet1ands areas and soi1s characteristics for 
the purpose of the new regu1ations. 2lI Such concern， 
however， may ref1ect imp1icit concern with Massachusetts 
court decisions inva1idating 1ess carefu11y drawn regu-
1ations. 
Nearby the town of Narragansett， Rhode Is1and， im-
posed a moratorium on mu1ti-fami1y residentia1 deve1op-
ment. ~ James McGwin， one of the town's attorneys， 
indicated that because of the sma11 size of the city， 
mu1ti-fami1y uses cou1d have engu1fed virtua11y a11 free 
1and within about six months.旦/
The City Counci1 found that 1and was being over-
crowded by a great number of bui1dings "for occupancy 
by 1arge numbers of persons disproportionate to the 
capacity and abi1ity" of the town to provide necessary 
water and sewer services. They comp1ained of financia1 
"hardship" in accomodating an abnorma1 inf1ux of persons 
and an "excessive trend of bui1ding activity . • • not 
caused by the necessity for housing or bui1ding space 
for the inhabitants of said town but • • . brought about 
by rea1 estate deve10pers which or who are deve10ping 
1and for sa1e or rent to such an extent that it is 
excessive in re1ation to the order1y deve10pment of the 
Town of Narragansett... " 
52. Te1ephone interview with John Loupos. Chairman， P1ymouth 
Conservation Commission， March 13， 1973. 
53. Ordinance of Ju1y 19， 1972， Narragansett， Rhode Is1andj 
Sec. 4 of the Ordinance prohibits construction of a11 but 
sing1e fami1y dwe11ings in C1ass A， C1ass B， or C1ass C 
Residentia1 Districts. 
54. Te1ephone interview with James E. McGwin， Assistant 
So1icitor， September 19， 1972. 
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During the first stages of the moratorium， one 1and-
owner has cha11enged its va1idity on constitutiona1 
grounds. 22/ David Rubin owned 1and zoned C1ass C 
Residentia1， a designation which wou1d have permitted 
construction of apartments， and he had submitted an 
app1ication to bui1d before the first enactment of the 
ordinance. This app1ication was rejected as incomp1ete， 
and by the time he had resubmitted the comp1eted app1i-
cation the moratorium had been imposed. 
Throughout the At1antic states， both short四 1ived
1oca1 regu1ations and carefu11y-designed state programs 
repeated1y pose the same basic issue: When has regu-
1ation gone far enough to become a taking of private 
property? 
55. Ehrlich. et al. v. Morett~， Providence County 




THE SOU賢iSEEKS TO SAVE明王OSE"DOWN HOME" QUALIT工ES
B1essed with prime estuarine areas， 1arge and 
accessab1e coa1 deposits， fine beaches and some of the 
nation's most historic monuments， the south and south-
east find governmenta1 concern for fragi1e sectors of 
the environment growing apace with deve10pment pressure. 
In some areas， such pressures are 1oca1ized near popu-
1ation centers， as in Texas and the Centra1 South， whi1e 
a10ng the south At1antic coast， and particu1ar1y in 
southeastern F1orida， regiona1 environmenta1 prob1ems 
of crisis proportions are being created by rapid urban 
growth. 
In the 1920's F10rida was notorious as the home 
of the underwater 1ot. Since then the state has con-
tinued to strugg1e with increasing pressure to accom-
modate more peop1e and give each newcomer his s1ice of 
paradise. Now some municipa1ities are considering tota1 
bans on a11 deve10pment for varying periods due to criti-
ca1 prob1ems with water and sewerage capacity. Joe1 
Kuperberg， Director of the State ・s Interna1 Improvement 
Trust Fund which contro1s state-owned 1ands， character-
izes the situation: 
"With no mountains or gorges， 
F10rida has no natura1 impediments 
to man-made changes. F10rida is 
1ike a big bag of si11y putty， and 
it is being reshaped irreversib1y 
in the hands of the big subdivision 
deve1opers." よ/
1. Quoted by Robert Cahn in "Batt1ing the Bulldozer -The 
Big Land Threat，" 1:he Christian Science Monito!:.， 
January 18， 1973， at 7， co1. 3. 
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Facing projections of the nation's highest growth 
rate， the state has become increasing1y concerned about 
the preservation of her fragi1e environment. In 1972 
the 1egis1ature passed Governor Askew ・sEnvironmenta1 
Land and Water Management Act ~ which provides that 
1arge deve10pments and deve10pments in critica1 areas 
must obtain regiona1 impact statements and be subject 
to state review. 
The bi11 authorizes the state to designate "areas 
of critica1 state concern" which wi11 be subject t。
state supervision. 11 These areas are on1y to be re-
gu1ated， not acquired， but because of concern aroused 
by the specter of strict regu1ation the draftsmen 
added the f0110wing c1ause: 
Protection of Landowner's Rights. 
(1) Nothing in this chapter authorizes 
any governmenta1 agency to adopt a ru1e 
or regu1ation or issue any order that is 
undu1y restrictive or constitutes a taking 
of property without the payment of fu11 
compensation， in vi01ation of the consti-
tutions of this state or of the United 
States. 
(2) If any governmenta1 agency authorized 
to adopt a ru1e or regu1ation or issue any 
order under this chapter sha11 determine 
that， to achieve the purposes of this 
chapter， it is in the pub1ic interest to 
acquire the fee simp1e or 1esser interest 
in any parce1 of 1and， such agency sha11 
so certify to the State Land P1anning 
Agency， the Board of Trustees of the 
Interna1 Improvement Trust Fund， and 
other appropriate governmenta1 agencies. 
生/
2. F1a. Stat. Anno. Sec. 380 ~三三旦・ (1972 Supp.). 
3. !呈.， Sec. 380.05. 
4. !昼" Sec. 380.08. 
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This 1anguage was quoted extensive1y in speeches by the 
chief sponsor of the 1egis1ation， 5enator Robert Graham， 
to reassure 1andowners that their rights under the taking 
c1ause wou1d be observed. 
The 1973 session of the F10rida 1egis1ature is 
debating the need for additiona1 1egis1ation to protect 
wet1ands. Again the taking issue is being raised by 
opponents. F1orida's pro1ific wet1ands have been prime 
targets of deve10pers who have used the dredge and fi11 
technique to create many new residentia1 areas. OWners 
of prime sites for dredge and fi11 are concerned that 
new regu1ations wi11 reduce the demand for their 1and 
from specu1ators. 
Dade County and the City of Miami are under enor-
mous pressure to contro1 growth because of difficu1ties 
with basic services， particu1ar1y sewers. The 5tate 
Po11ution Contro1 Board mandated a moratorium on sewer 
hookups on a11 1ines which were not receiving 90% treat-
ment in 1ate 1972. Whi1e variance procedures now a110w 
hookups when a p1an for improved sewerage has been 
approved， many areas have suffered under severe strains. 
For examp1e， prob1ems with the North Dade Outfa11 1ine 
1ed to an order of the 5tate Board on December 19， 
1972， prohibiting 1，000 new connections which had been 
otherwise approved. ~ Interim measures such as a 
ho1ding 1agoon for raw sewage are meeting community 
opposition since 10ng term re1ief is probab1y five 
years away. ~ The Federa1 Environmenta1 Protection 
Agency is a1so in the position of facing possib1e suits 
for fai1ure to enforce sufficient1y stringent regu1a-
tions for ocean outfa11s which remain the principa1 
method of disposing of sewage in the area. 
Dade County has a1so been emp10ying two to four 
month bui1ding moratoriums for endangered areas of the 
County enab1ing the County Commission to review out-
moded zoning regu1ations. County Commissioner Harvey 
Ruvin points to Key Biscayne as an i11ustration of the 




prob1em of high-rise-zoned densities which were beyond 
the actua1 capacity of the community to absorb. A 
bui1ding moratorium was dec1ared and zoned densities 
reviewed to identify those areas where cutbacks wou1d 
be appropriate. 21 The se1ective moratorium i11ustrates 
an approach to temporary growth contro1s which seeks 
to minimize taking issues and has been approved in 10cal 
court cha11enges. 
Growth contro1s are emerging in other areas of the 
state as we11. At a recent conference sponsored by the 
F10rida Defenders of the Environment sixty 1eading 
scientists and professiona1s ca11ed for a ha1t to state 
efforts to attract new residents and studies to determine 
the 1imits of desirab1e growth in the state. Arguing 
that the citizens of the state a1ready have an "environ-
menta1 debt we have incurred by not paying the fu11 
cost of growth in the past [whichJ takes the form of 
po11uted water， decrepit streets， and over10ad of schoo1s，" 
the group expressed particu1ar concern about environ-
menta11y sensitive areas of the state.旦/
The St. Petersburg region has a1so been trying to 
moderate growth pressures. Municipa1ities and counties 
have been active1y exercising their zoning powers t。
reduce density in an effort to contro1 the boom. One 
deve10per is now suing the City of St. Petersburg over 
restrictions which 1eave the company with about 30 per-
cent of the 10，000 units origina11y projected for its 
deve10pment. The company demands宇15，000，000 in dam-
ages or permission to proceed at a higher density. 21 
Tempers have f1ared on both sides. One city counci1 
member describes the 1itigation as "a prime examp1e 
of the 1ega1 maneuvering the bui1der-deve10per， fast 
buck guy wil1 go through to continue the rape of the 
1and. .よQj
7. Telephone interview with Harvey Ruvin， Dade County Commissioner， 
Apri1 17， 1973. 
8. Miami Heral!!， Apri1 1， 1973， at lB， col. 6. 
9. St. Petersburg Time~， January 3D， 1973， at lB， col.3j 
February 1， 1973， at lB， co1. 1. 
10. James Mason， St. Petersburg Times， Janu唱ry3D， 1973， 
at lB， co1. 5. 
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Nearby Collier County has made a tentative response 
to speculative land sales with a six month moratorium 
on zoning changes on a 500，000 acre tract in the "Big 
Cypress・ area. The moratorium only prevents changes in 
zoning classifications in what the County・sattorney 
describes as "a statement of policy." Environmental 
groups have been concerned about sales by Miami real 
estate firms where purchasers were allegedly instructed 
"to erect a small shack so that when the government 
buys it [the land] a high price must be paid."よレr
The state has been making an effort to control 
coastal construction and excavation.旦/ An integral 
part of the state regulations is a coastal "construction 
setback line" along the sand beaches of the state fronting 
on the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico. Established 
on a county by county basis， the line is for "the pro-
tection of upland properties and the control of beach 
erosion."且/
In St. Lucie County the Florida Bureau of Beaches 
and Shores moved the setback line from its original 
position to one closer to the beach， in response to a 
substantial outcry from property owners， developers 
and real estate people.当/ Although one official 
stated that the decision to move the line seaward was 
based on a determination that a line closer to the 
beach would protect the shoreline substantially as well 
as the original line，よ島Ian attorney for the State 
Department of Natural Resources stated that he had 
advised the Bureau that the original line would con-
stitute an unreasonble and arbitrary exercise of the 
police power. よ岳/
ll. St. Petersburg Time~， December 7. 1972， at 10B，c01. 1. 
12. F1a. Stat. Anno. Sec. 161.053 (1973 Supp.). 
13. Id. 
14. Te1ephone interview with Mary Lou Stursa， August 10， 1972. 
15. Te1ephone interview with Wi11iam T. Car1ton， Director， 
F10rida Bureau of Beaches and Shores， August 28， 1972. 




An effort by State Senator Warren Henderson during 
the 1973 1egis1ative session to have the bu1khead 1ine 
moved back to the 1ine of mean high tide a1so brought 
a sharp rep1y from representatives of the bui1ding 
industry. A11eging that the measure wou1d prevent 
bui1ding on hundreds of feet of previous1y bui1dab1e 
shore1and， homebui1der representative perry Odom argued 
that， "It wou1d provide for outright confiscation with-
out compensation or due process of 1aw."よ1/
A1though a foca1 point， F10rida isn't the on1y 
state suffering under deve10pment pressures in the 
Southeast. Simi1ar growth pressures are found through-
out the south and southeastern coasta1 region. 
Georgia enacted a Coasta1 Marsh1ands Protection 
Act in 1970 setting up a Coasta1 Wet1ands Protection 
Agency as a division of the state's Game and Fish Com-
mission.当/ The Agency administers a permit review 
system for any dredging， fi11ing or other a1teration of 
Georgia marsh1ands and severa1 disputed cases have 
arisen under these regu1ations. 
In the summer of 1971， the Hercu1es Powder Company 
requested permission to dispose of dirt washed from 
pine tree stumps used in powder manufacturing in a 
10ca1 marsh in Brunswick， Georgia. The Company had 
previous1y been giving away much of the soi1. Nonethe-
1ess， a substantia1 amount had begun accumu1ating at 
the p1ant forcing an a1ternate solution.立/
In negotiation with the Agency， Hercu1es brought 
both practica1 and po1itica1 pressure to bear， threatening 
to shut down the p1ant if the permit was denied， and 
seeking 1egis1ative re1ief through modification of the 
ru1es.包/ The Agency resisted， instead suggesting a 
search for a1ternate sites， and the Company apparent1y 
found non-marsh high ground suitab1e for dumping a11 of 
its excess soil. 
17. Miami HeralQ， April 7， 1973， at 22A， col. 5. 
18. Ga. Code Annot.， Sections 45， 136; 45， 147. 




In another situation the Agency was p1aced in a 
di1emma when the Brunswick Pu1p and Paper Company p1anned 
to despoi1 protected marsh1and in an effort to carry 
out the mandate of the State Water Qua1ity Contro1 Board. 
The Board had ordered the company to bui1d a treatment 
p1ant and cease dumping untreated water from its manu-
facturing operation into estuarine waters. Brunswick 
Pu1p and Paper had 10ng been 10cated on the marsh and 
the paper company representatives argued that because 
they were forced to bui1d the p1ant， they shou1d be 
granted a permit. 
The Agency disagreed and proposed an a1ternative 
p1an which used a nearby site in the marsh which had 
a1ready been disrupted by dredging activity. A1though 
this required Brunswick Pu1p and Paper to acquire or 
1ease the proposed site， they agreed to the compromise.註/
In a11 of these cases the State of Georgia has 
taken a firm position on the taking issue. For examp1e， 
the Attorney Genera1， Arthur K. Bo1ton， has taken the 
position that the state is the "lega1 owner of much， 
if not a11， of the coasta1 marsh 1and now being private1y 
c1aimed，" and that "the deve10pment of the 1ega1 rami-
fications surrounding the State ・sownership has indicated 
the existence of a pub1ic trust administered by the 
State. "盆/
Another thorny subject of 1and use contro1s in 
Georgia is surface or strip mining， regu1ated by a 
Surface Mining Board created under the Georgia Surface 
Mining Act of 196B.主主' ⑦'0 get a 1icense to strip mine， 
property owners and operators must submit a 1and use 
p1an showing how they wi11 mine， rec1aim and protect 
the 1and. 明leymust regrade the 1and into ro11ing topo-
graphy so that it wi11 b1end into the existing 1and-
scape.話/
21. ld. 
22. Statement by Arthur K. Bo1ton， Attorney Genera1 of Georgia， 
re1eased March 16， 1970， and tit1ed "Legal Ramifications of 
Various App1ications and Proposa1s Re1ative to the Deve10pment 
of Georgia' s Coasta1 Marshes，" page 1. 
23. Te1ephone lnterview with Sanford Darby， Georgia Department of 




Sanford Norby， former1y with the Mining Board， 
indicates that the 1arger nationa1 companies have been 
very cooperative. 工n two or possib1y three cases， how-
ever， "stubborn individua1s have refused to cornp1y. ・
These rnay eventua11y require court action a1though no 
cases are current1y pending. ~ 
North Car01ina has joined Georgia in rnaintaining 
the state's right to regu1ate activity which rnight ruin 
rnarsh1and. 主主/ In 1971， the 1egis1ature adopted a 
Dredge and Fil1 Act to regu1ate such activities "in or 
about estuarine waters or state-owned 1akes ・"立/
The state is atternpting to estab1ish their position 
by rneans of an action to quiet tit1e to certain sub-
rnerged 1ands and tide1ands in Brunswick County.認/
In its cornp1aint dated March 20， 1972， the state a11eges 
that these 1ands (which inc1ude rnarsh1ands， oyster beds 
and rnud f1ats) are be10w the 1ine of ordinary high 
water笠/ and that the state is according1y吋 heowner 
in fee sirnp1e • • • and entit1ed to irnrnediate possession" 
thereof.認/ As to 1and to which the state cannot c1airn 
outright ownership， or in cases in which the ownership 
arg叫nent is rejected， the state wi11 argue a1ternative1y 
that the pub1ic trust doctrine is app1ica~1e. 込/
25. Id. 
26. Te1ephone interview with Vic Barfie1d， Secretary， North Caro1ina 
Department of Natura1 and Economic Resources， August 10， 1972. 
27. An Act to provide for the Contro1 of Beach Erosion and for the 
Protection and Conservation of Coasta1 Areas， Sand Dunes and 
Estuarine Areas. N. C. Gen. Stats. Ch. 113， Sec. 299 (1971 Supp.). 
28. State v. Chadwic~， Sup. Ct.， Brunswick Co.， No. 72 CVS・139.
29. .1昼.， Comp1aint， Para. 4. 
30. .1豆.， Comp1aint， Para. 5. North Caro1ina apparent1y has two distinct 
ru1es for determining state ownership of submerged 1ands. Under 
the first ru1e， it has been he1d that the state owns a11 
1ands on the At1antic Coast which 1ie be10w the mean high 
water 1evel. Caro1ina Beach Fishing Pier. Inc. v. Town of 
Carolina Beac~， 227 N.E. 297 (1970). As to a11 other sub-
merged 1ands， it has been he1d that state ownership is de・
termined by whether the streams that f100d them are navigab1e 
in fact. The law with respect to the second rule apparent1y 
is somewhat confused. Te1ephone interview with Thomas Kane， 
Ocean Law Consu1tant， August 11， 1972. 
In the Chadwick case and another quiet tit1e action brought 
by a 1andowner， ~rooks. et.a1. v. Stat~， Sup. Ct.， Brunswick 
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In one case in ear1y 1972 where the deve10per fai1ed 
to app1y for a permit， sand dunes were being bu11dozed 
into marshes， a1so cutting off navigab1e creeks. 明le
courts granted a mandatory injunction pending permit 
app1ication and the project was dropped. ~ About two 
hundred such app1ications had been fi1ed by 1ate 1972. 
Very few had been denied and on1y three appea1s were 
taken. One of the few denia1s was an app1ication in 
New Hanover County which proposed a "Venetian" sty1e 
trai1er park in a marsh. The owner had wanted to dredge 
a comp1icated system of cana1s and site trai1ers on them. 
Because the depar匂nentwou1d on1y a110w modification of 
an existing stream to provide a navigab1e channe1 the 
owner apparent1y abandoned the project.ュν
Loca1 action to provide deve10pment contr01 is a1so 
in the works in Currituck County in the northeastern 
part of the state. County cαnmissioners there imposed 
an eight month moratorium on a11 deve10pment unti1 a 
county p1an is prepared.当 /
Efforts to regu1ate strip mining in the hi11s of 
West Virginia have a1so drawn fire from mining interests. 
Eight p1aintiffs brought suit l2I cha11enging the con-
stitutiona1ity of West Virginia's 5urface Mining and Re-
c1amation Act.当 / The overriding issue appears to be 
whether， in requiring present h01ders of surface mining 
permits to bring their operations into comp1iance with 
new1y adopted standards， W the state wou1d "take" 
the p1aintiffs ・propertywithout compensation.旦/
Co.， No. 72CVS・284.however， there are indications that the 
"1andowners" may be unab1e to estab1ish satisfactory record 
tit1e. Te1ephone conversation with Thomas Kane. September 7，1972. 
31. Te1ephone conversation with Thomas Kane， August 11， 1972. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Te1ephone interview with Vic Barfie1d. Secretary North 
Caro1ina Department of Natura1 and Economic Resources. 
August 10. 1972. 
35. AJ.lderson & Anderson Contractors， Inc. v. Director of Rec1amatio!!. 
Cir.Ct.. Kanawha Co.. W.Va. Civi1 Action No.11. 567. June 6.1972. 
36. W.Va. Code. Ch. 20. Art. 6. as amended (1971). 
37. Re伊 1ation3.01. Rec1amation Commission (May 1. 1972). 
38. Te1ephone interview with Benjamin Greene. Chief of Rec1a冒祖tion
West Virginia Department of Natura1 Resources， September 7. 1972. 
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Alleging that they have invested a combined total 
of over宇20，000，000 in surface mining equipment， the 
eight plaintiffs contend ・thatthere is a possibility" 
that one or more of them will be "forced out of business・
if the Act and regulations are enforced.立I They con-
tend that Reclamation Commission Regulation 4.02， "as 
it is threatened to be applied" by the Commission， is 
an unconstitutional taking in that the Commission "has 
been and threatens to continue to deny prospecting per-
mits within sight of certain highways， public parks 
and other areas on the basis that surface mining within 
such sites would impair the aesthetic value of such 
highways， public parks and other areas. • • .包/
Embedded in the Constitution of the State of Loui-
siana is one of the oldest programs for historic pre-
servation in this country: 
"Hereafter and for the public 
welfare and in order that the quaint 
and distinctive character of the Vieux 
Carre・Sectionof the City of New 
Orleans may not be injuriously affected， 
• whenever any application is made 
for permit for the erection of any new 
building or whenever any application 
is made for a permit for alterations 
or additions to any existing building， 
any portion of which is to front on 
any public streets in the Vieux Carre' 
Section， the plans [relating] to the 
appearance， color， texture of materials 
and architectural design of the exterior 
thereof shall be submitted by the owner 
to the Vieux Carre・Commission. " 
盆/
The Vieux Carre・Commissionnotes proudly that there 
are only four cities in the United States that have 
39. Comp1aint， page 13. 
40. Comp1aint， page 21. 
41. Louisiana Constitution， Art. XIV， Sec. 22A. 
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who1e cαnmunities of bui1dings dating from Co1onia1 or 
pre-civi1 war days. Of these， New Or1eans Vieux Carre' 
is by far the 1argest， "in an area comprising 100 city 
b10cks . • . a who1e city almost as it was in the days 
when cotton was king and New Or1eans was the great 
ernporium of the West."坐/
Even though embedded in the state's constitution 
since 1935， the preservation requirernent must meet the 
continuing scrutiny of citizens eager to invoke the 
Federa1 Constitution in defense of their property. 
Thus， Morris Maher， a resident of the Vieux Carre・has
conducted sαne eight years of 1itigation in the state 
and then the federa1 courts arguing that his property 
has been irnproper1y restricted by the Vieux Carre・
Cornmission. Under the terrns of the Vieux Carre・Ordi-
nances， Maher cannot destroy the bui1ding without a 
perrnit and he is subject to fines and pena1ties if he 
fai1s to rnaintain certain parts of the property. 
Maher's 1atest complaint a1leges， "the effect of 
[the Cornmission'sJ action on the p1aintiff . . • has 
been to force him to maintain for the benefit of the 
pub1ic the property . • . because said property has 
'architectura1 ・and/or 'historica1' va1ue. P1aintiff 
has received no compensation whatsoever for maintaining 
the said property."包/ He argues that this economic 
burden combined with the rising cost for the construc-
tion of his more profitab1e proposed deve10prnent wi11 
cause him "irreparab1e harrn" and amount to a regulatory 
taking. Thus he asks that the Ordinance be declared 
unconstitutiona1 and that the Cornmission be ordered 
not to interfere with his proposed demolition and re-
cons truc tion.坐/
42. "The Vieux Carre' Commission. Its Purpose and Function." 
descriptive brochure. 
43. Comp1aint， Morris Maher v. The City of New Or1ean~， Civil 
Action No. 71・119，U. S. District Court， Eastern District 




Residentia1 and tourist deve10pment of the Fajardo 
area of Puerto Rico， termed "unique in eco1ogica1 char-
acteristics" by the loca1 P1anning Board， was given a 
green 1ight by a recent decision of a tria1 court in 
the Commonwea1th. This capped a fifteen year dispute 
over issuance of bui1ding permits which the P1anning 
Board had denied. A1though the permits had been re-
quested in 1958， the Board he1d the request for years. 
Repeated discussion of expropriation of the 1and for 
pub1ic use resu1ted in further inaction. The judge 
ru1ing on the matter acknow1edged the right of the 
P1anning Board to contro1 p1anning in Puerto Rico， but 
he he1d that this right did not inc1ude the power "t。
administrationa11y destroy individua1 rights guaranteed 
by the Constitution." 主主/
Texas， with thirty bi11s addressed to shore1and 
or wet1and protection before the current 1egis1ature， 
is moving cautious1y in the estab1ishment of 1and use 
contro1s in critica1 areas of the state. Concern is 
evident over shore1ands， tida1 wet1ands and coasta1 
subsidence from ground water extraction.坐/ One of 
the major areas of concern has been the protection of 
pub1ic rights in the use of the beaches. The state 
has had a 10ngstanding po1icy of treating the beaches 
as pub1ic property， but prevai1ing doctrines now re-
quire the estab1ishment of pub1ic rights on a case by 
case basis to avoid the direct taking issue. The State 
Attorney Genera1・soffice notes， "Before one can say 
the pub1ic has an abso1ute right of use or easement 
over a11 Gu1f Coast Beaches， 1itera11y thousands of 
cases must be tried . . . There can be no abso1ute 
pub1ic right to use Texas ・beachesunti1 vast sums of 
money are a110cated to sue under the Open Beaches Act 
to estab1ish pub1ic easement or right of use."主v
45. San Juan Sta~， February 10， 1973， at 3， co1. 1. 
46. ~主主 Texas Resources 地 nagementprogram， "Report of the 
Interagency Counci1 on Natura1 Resources and the Environ-
ment，" (December， 1972). 
47. Louis NeWlT凶n，Assistant Attorney Genera1， "The State's View 
of Pub1ic Rights to the Beaches，" Conference on the Beaches: 
Pub1ic Rights and Private Use， Texas Law Institute of 
Coasta1 and Marine Resources， January 15， 1972. 
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The question of subsidence is a1so a 1ike1y candi-
date for state intervention. A recent report notes 
that "severe subsidence in certain coasta1 areas can 
on1y be stopped by the curtai1ment of groundwater with-
drawa1s."担/ Professor John Mixon of the University 
of Houston Law 5cho01 notes that this cou1d raise con-
stitutiona1 issues before the 1egis1ature.担/
The state has a1so shown concern over the protec-
tion of submerged 1ands. 5tate 5enator A. R 5chwartz， 
a 1eading advocate of the protection of beach 1and， 
notes that restrictions on deve10pment of private1y 
owned wet1ands wi11 require cαnpensation under the taking 
c1ause un1ess competing aquatic uses such as commercia1 
fishing justify protection of the food chain for the 
economic we11 being of the state. The Governor of the 
state has a1so indicated he wi11 be concerned with the 
constitutiona1 1imitations imposed by the taking c1ause 
in his review of 1egis1ative action. Nonethe1ess， John 
Foshee， 1ega1 director of the 5tate's Genera1 Land Office 
notes that， "the peop1e of Texas are not aware of 1and 
use prob1ems. With so much open space and 1and， and 
not as much fragi1e environment， the taking issue just 
has not yet arisen in the context of 1and use regu1a-
tion." W 
48. Report of the Interagency Counci1， 呈旦2主主 note46 at page 5. 
49. Interview with Professor John Mixon. February 22， 1973. 
50. Interview with John C. Foshee， Director Lega1 Division， 
Genera1 Land Office， February 22， 1973. 
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OPEN SPACE AND THE URBAN ENV工RONMENTIN THE 
CENTRAL STATES 
Historically less densely populated， the central 
part of the nation has only recently become aware that 
land may not be an endlessly renewable resource. At 
the present time， scenic rivers， airports， historic 
preservation， and the control of subdivisions are all 
Sl必 jectsbeing actively contested in various parts of 
the central United States. Growth controls and signi-
ficant public sentiment for "non-growth" in some com-
munities suggest future problems as well. 
In the midwest， federal encouragement has resulted 
in a variety of responses for the protection of scenic 
or particularly valuable river corridors. Ohio・sbill 
imposes relatively mild controls administered by the 
State Depar回 entof Natural Resources. 11 The Director 
of Natural Resources may designate wild， scenic and re-
creational river areas if they possess "water conser-
vation， scenic， fish， wildlife， historic， or outdoor 
recreation values which should be preserved." y The 
Act goes on to prohibit state or municipal actions 
such as channelizing or highway construction without 
the permission of the Director. 11 
The Ohio legislature， displaying particular sen-
sitivity to the taking issue， included the following 
proviso in the Act: 
"Declaration by the Director that 
an area is a wild， scenic， or recreational 
river area does not authorize the Director 
or any governmental agency or political 
1. Ohi(' R~v. f;ode， Sections 1505.16 ~三三1・ (1971). 




subdivision to restrict the use of 1and 
by the owner thereof or any person acting 
under his authority. or to enter upon such 
1and. "。全/
Whi1e this 1anguage wou1d appear to forec1ose any cha1-
1enge on constitutiona1 issues. two 1andowners are none-
the1ess arguing that the 1aw deprives them of their prop-
erty rights. 
Whi1e the Ohio Attorney Genera1 points to the specia1 
restriction a1ready quoted in his contention that the 
Act cannot resu1t in a taking of private property. 2/ 
Wa1ter Vrbancic and Anthony Simonic thought otherwise. 
bringing suit against the state to quiet tit1e to their 
riverfront property proposed for designation.主IArguing 
that the Act is "vague. arbitrary and confiscatory and 
unconstitutiona1 on [its] face" they urge that it be 
inva1idated. Since it grants authority (in their view) 
"to regu1ate and restrict the use of private 1ands: to 
supervise. operate. protect and maintain private 1ands 
in accordance with his [the Director's] design: t。
exercise his d叩 inionand contro1 • • . These acts con-
stitute the taking of private property for pub1ic use 
wi廿loutpayment of just compensation and are contrary 
to and in vio1ation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments of the Constitution of the United States.. • ."11 
This comp1aint is being heard by a three-judge Federa1 
Court. indicating the respect the constitutiona1 issue 
draws. 
Proposed designation of the TWo-Hearted River in 
Michigan's Upper penninsu1a has a1so stirred contro-
versy over a simi1ar 1aw in Michigan. Designation hear-
ings schedu1ed for December of 1972 pursuant to the 
State ・sNatura1 Rivers Act were to have considered a 
4. Id. 
5. Te1ephone interview with Frank Josse1son. January 9， 1972. 
6. Vrbancic et a1. v. Wi11iam B. Ny~， No. C72・1114，U. S. 
District Court. Northern District of Ohio， fi1ed 
October 19， 1972. 
7. Co咽p1aint，yrbancic v. Nve， at page 4. 
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400 foot wi1derness zone on each side of the river through-
out its 41 rni1e 1ength. No new bui1ding wou1d be per-
rnitted within 300 feet of the river and other restrictions 
wou1d app1y to uti1ity 1ines in the area.旦/
The state owns about 46% of the 1and which wou1d 
be affected by the regu1ations. Loca1 owners of the 
ba1ance oppose the regu1ations because they regard them 
both an infringernent of private property rights， and a 
depressant on the tax base of the county.島/
Because of the opposition， the state has now de1ayed 
hearings unti1 June of 1973. The State ・sDepartrnent of 
Natura1 Resources hopes this wi11 ・givethe 10ca1 zoning 
cornrnittee and other interested parties rnore tirne to work 
with D.N.R. in an effort to deve10p a rnutua11y acceptab1e 
wi1derness river p1an."旦/工n the rneantirne srna11 property 
h01ders， who h01d on1y a 1itt1e rnore than one third of 
the 1and， are watching the actions of the state and a 
rnining cornpany h01ding the rnajority interests. 
Michigan is a1so easing the irnp1ernentation of a 
new Land Sa1es Act under which tough regu1ation of 1and 
cornpanies and sa1esrnen had been proposed. Exerting 
pressure to s10w down the State Attorney Genera1・s
office and de1ay the effective date of the Act， bankers 
and rea1tors had argued that a11 1and sa1es and even 
horne sa1es cou1d be stopped if the regu1ation went into 
effect as p1anned. Legis1ators said that the new October 
1， 1973， effective date wou1d give affected 1and corn-
panies tirne to cornp1y with the regu1ations， a1though 
others suggest that sorne 1and cornpanies hope to use 
the period to persuade the 1egis1ature to weaken the 
act.斗/
Airport-area zoning regu1ations， such as restric-
tions on the height or density of construction on 1and 
8. New York Time!， January 28， 1973， at p.47， col. 3. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 、
11. 0etroit Free Pres!， March 30， 1973， at 3， co1. 7. 
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within f1ight paths， have often brought forth charges 
that 1and has， in effect， been taken. 
The community surrounding Wright Patterson Air 
Force Base in southeastern Ohio has 10ng expressed 
concern that increasing urban deve10pment in the area 
surrounding the base wou1d eventua11y cause so many 
comp1aints about noise and dangers that pressure wou1d 
be brought on the Air Force to c10se down the base. 
As a resu1t the four surrounding counties obtained the 
passage of specia1 1egis1ation creating an airport 
zoning board.旦/ The first set of regu1ations adopted 
by the board was he1d unconstitutiona1 by the Ohi。
Appe11a te Court担/but continuing efforts are being 
made to devise a workab1e set of airport zoning regu-
lations. 
Current1y the regu1ations are being tested by a 
deve10per who seeks to bui1d apar包nentsat fifteen 
units per acre at the edge of the danger zone surround-
ing the airport. The 1andowner sought a variation from 
the Board's regu1ations a11eging that the 10w-density 
deve10pment required by the regu1ations wou1d constitute 
a taking of his property by depriving it of its va1ue 
for high-density deve1opment. County Prosecutor Lee 
Falke is defending the regu1ations in court， arguing 
that the 10ng-range benefits to the pub1ic that are 
created by the presence of the air base in the com-
munity far outweighs the 10ss in va1ue to the individ-
ua1 property owner.当/
The demise of Louis Su11ivan ・sfamed Chicago Stock 
Exchange may provide yet another examp1e of the effect 
of the taking issue on officia1 behavior. City officia1s， 
given the opportunity to designate the bui1ding as an 
officia1 1andmark， rejected any such action. According 
12. Ohio Revised Code Sections 4563.01 三~・
13. Hageman v. Trustees of Wayne Townshi~， 20 Ohio App.2d 
13， 251 N.E. 2d 507 (1969). 
14. Interview with Lee Fa1ke， County Prosecutor， 
Hontgom峰ryCounty， Ohio， March 28， 1973. 
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to the chairrnan of the City Council's Committee on 
Economic and Cultural Development， fear that delay in 
demolition would give rise to a suit for compensation 
for a "taking" was among the reasons why the committee 
declined to recommend that the Stock Exchange be desig-
nated as an official city landmark.主/ Frank G. 
Sulewski， Assistant Corporation Counsel and counsel to 
the Commission on Chicago Historical and Architectural 
Landmarks， said that while no one as yet has brought 
suit on the taking issue private attorneys have "made 
suggestions" along these lines.当/
The tiny Village of Franklin， Michigan， undeterred 
by such constitutional arguments， went ahead and adopted 
an ordinance creating a historic district to preserve 
its old town center. A lot long used for commercial 
purposes was reclassified into residential and then 
historic residential status by the two ordinances 
implementing the village plan. The old building occupy-
ing the site had been abandoned and the owner wanted 
to destroy it and build a modern commercial building. 
Complaining that these ordinances amounted to ・con-
fiscation" of his property without just compensation，立/
plaintiff sought to have the Village enjoined from pre-
venting demolition of the existing structure and use 
of the property for commercial purposes.よ皇I Noting 
that the Village of Franklin "is locally known as the 
town that time forgot，" Circuit Judge Clark Adams 
held that the ordinance creating the historic district 
and the statute granting the authority therefor were a 
proper exercise of the police power since "the history 
of the state， as found in writing and display of ancient 
15. Interview with Alderman Fifie1ski. September 18. 1972. 
Fifielski said that an important factor in the Com-
mittee's decision was the fact that interested parties 
had undertaken contractua1 obligations with respect to 
the site before land町田rkdesignation was even proposed. 
16. Interview of September 8. 1972. 
17. 0wen E. Hal1 v. Village of Frankli~. et.al.. case file 
and cite from No. 69・52580;second amended complaint. 
para. 8. page 2. fi1ed April 5. 1972. 
18. !.昼. pages 3 and 6. 
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objects， is essential to a full and adequate education 
of the people."旦/
Ann Arbor， home of the University of Michigan， is 
a moderate-sized town in southeastern Michigan which 
now finds itself on the outskirts of Detroit ・sgrowth 
area. Finding the rapid growth of the last decade a 
strain on city services， the city was nonetheless 
surprised when a ban on building per官lIts due to over-
taxed sewerage facilities was imposed in January of 
1972. While the city council lifted the ban a week 
1ater when it was determined that a new interceptor 
sewer would meet near term growth needs， it sparked a 
special growth study by the city planning department 
to explore the causes of growth， and particularly the 
economic factors involved in growth.担 /
One product of the study was to have been a multi-
sector econometric model. In the words of the study 
proposal: 
". . • We hope to be able to show 
the effect on police expenditures， fire 
expenditures， etc.， of building one 
more unit of either low-income multiple-
family or high-and moderate-income， 
single-family housing. Adding up all 
the tax and expenditure categories will 
give total tax and expenditure changes 
induced by the extra housing. By 
combining the tax and expenditure totals， 
one may see which of the various housing 
types・payfor themselves' in the sense 
of producing revenues equal or greater 
than expenditures. •• " w 
19. 0wen E. Ha11 v. Vi11age of Frank1in. et. a !.. No.69・52580;
Circuit Court for the County of Oak1and. Michigan. 
Unp叫b1ishedopinion of C1ark J. Adams. Jr.. February 10. 
1972 at page 3. 
20. P1anning Advisory Service. ASPO Report No. 283. September. 1972. 
21. quoted in ASPO Report No. 283. September. 1972. 
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Any findings would be pure1y advisory. Not on1y 
is the city counci1 concerned with the reactions of 
1andowners who might cha11enge any regu1ation based 
on such a study， but an issue a1so exists with respect 
to 1oca1 revenues. With annua1 deficits regu1ar1y 
occurring in the 1oca1 budget， the city government is 
extreme1y hesitant to take any action which wi11 penalize 
residents by decreasing revenues and the qua1ity of 
urban services. 
The disapproval of three major 1and deve10pment 
proposa1s in metropolitan Detroit presents more tangible 
evidence of sentiment against sprawling growth in the 
area. Citizens of Frank1in Vi11age， whose historic 
ordinance has a1ready been noted， voted to stop a pro-
posed retail-commercial deve10pment for the vil1age 
by a margin of more than 2 to 1 in March of 1973. 工n
another suburb， a major regional shopping center was 
disapproved. The sentiments of a resident， "We want 
peace: we want quiet: we want our country atmosphere，" 
were apparent1y ref1ected in the decision at the pub1ic 
hearing. ~ Voter rejection of financing for sewer 
improvements which opponents al1eged wou1d bring urban 
spraw1 further i11ustrates the sentiment which has yet 
to find articu1ation in official state or regional 
po1icies.主.v
Another suburban town， Napervi11e，工11inois，is 
batt1ing with subdividers over mandatory 1and dedication 
requirements for schoo1 purposes. The city， as have 
many others， had 10ng engaged in "horsetrading" with 
developers over annexation agreements in which such 
arrangements were worked out on an individual basis. 
Napervil1e， opting for the predictabi1ity of a 
specified formu1a， abandoned the old system and wrote 
a formu1a into the vi11age subdivision ordinance simi1ar 
to those used in other states. Although such regulation 
for open space has been accepted by a variety of state 
courts， it appears that the issue wi11 be relitigated 
in 工11inoisas well， with the taking issue p1aying a 




major ro1e in the arguments.当/
In Wisconsin， Governor Lucey and former Governor 
Know1es have both voiced support for the reco古田¥endations
of the state Land Resources Cornmittee which recent1y 
cornp1eted severa1 years of study of 1and use contro1s 
in the state. Acknow1edging the prirnari1y 10ca1 nature 
of rnost 1and use decisions， the report encourages the 
state 1egis1ature to rnove forward and estab1ish uniforrn 
standards for deve10prnent in five areas of regiona1 or 
state-wide concern， such as critica1 environrnenta1 regions 
and very 1arge-sca1e deve1oprnent. The Cornmittee suggests 
that these regu1ations shou1d be irnp1ernented and enforced 
at the 10ca1 1eve1 with the possibi1ity of appea1 to a 
state review board by interested parties， inc1uding 
environrnenta1 or state agencies.主/
These 1egis1ative efforts have been encouraged by 
the recent court approva1 of sirni1ar zoning stapdards 
for shore1and areas of the state. This rejection of 
taking arg凶nentsby the Wisconsin Suprerne Court in 
the context of the shore1ine zoning ordinance has 1arge1y 
e1irninated constitutiona1 chal1enges to that ordinance 
and has forced 1andowners into conventiona1 adrninis-
trative channe1s to gain approva1 of deve10prnent which 
requires a specia1 perrnit.話 /
A suit cha11enging Minnesota's statute requiring 
rernova1 of sorne advertising devices (rnain1y bi11boards) 
a10ng state highways after a four year arnortization 
period again indicates the durabi1ity of the "taking" 
issue and its pecu1iar re1ationship to the facts of 
each particu1ar case. A1though they had uphe1d a three 
year arnortization period in 1968， the Minnesota Suprerne 
Court found that the constitutiona1 issue required a 
fu11 hearing on the facts and it reversed a 10wer court's 
disrnissa1 of the suit.辺/
24. Homebui1ders Association of Greater Chicago. et.al. v. Napervi11~， 
Circuit Court， Dupage County， 111inois， No.72・2628・G，filed 
September 11， 1972. 
25. Te1ephone interview with Roger Schrantz， Apri1 17， 1973; 
Fina1 report~ Wisconsin Land Resources Committee， February，1973. 
26. Te1ephone interview with Maurice Van Susp卑ren，Lega1 Bureau， 
Wisconsin Departn槍 ntof Natura1 Resour多~S ， Apri1 17， 1972. 





CALIFORN工AAND THE WEST: REGULATORY FRONTIER 
In the West， as e1sewhere， the major growth areas 
are a1so the areas most sensitive to constitutiona1 
prob1ems with 1and use regu1ation. Land use prob1ems 
within Ca1ifornia are an a1rnost universa1 phenomenon， 
but areas as diverse as Bou1der， C010rado， Boise， Idaho， 
and Scottsda1e， Arizona are witnessing sirni1ar strugg1es 
over the effect of popu1ation growth on traditiona1 
va1ues. 
Bou1der， C010rado is a prorninent exarnp1e of a town 
where concern over growth has been growing. 工nNovernber， 
1971， a res01ution was subrnitted to voters asking them 
to approve an u1tirnate popu1ation 1irnit of 100，000 resi-
dents. Whi1e the initiative fai1ed， it 1ead the City 
Counci1 to recornrnend preparation of an interirn prograrn 
for h01ding "the rate of growth • . . to a 1eve1 sub-
stantia11y be10w that experienced in the 1960・s. ..よ/
Described as a "1aboratory in growth contr01" in 
a recent pub1ication of the Arnerican Society of P1anning 
Officia1s， Bou1der has a1ready purchased 2，740 acres 
of green 1and， raised sewer and water hookup fees， 
reeva1uated its high density and industria1 zoning 
c1assifications with a view to ・discouragingnew prirnary 
ernp10yrnent centers in the Bou1der Va11ey，" and enacted 
a genera1 height 1irnit.三/ Deve10pers have threatened 
to cha11enge a nurnber of the city・sactions in court. 
In Idaho， the Boise area spent the 1atter part of 
1972 debating a1ternate growth p1ans for the rnetrop01itan 
area.τhe rnore controversia1 p1an wou1d have denied 
construction perrnits to sites not served by rnetrop01itan 
sewers and wou1d have provided for regu1ated growth of 
1. Fink1er "Non-Growth as a P1anning Alternative，" ASPO P1anning 
Advisory Service. Report No. 283 (September，1972) at 33. 
2. 1.昼.at 83，84. 
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the metropo1itan area into surrounding agricu1tura1 
areas through the imp1ementation of a sewage treatment 
p1an. Termed the "urban boundary concept，" in effect 
"circ1es wou1d be drawn around cities in the county， 
and on1y agricu1tural growth wou1d be permitted outside 
the circ1es." y The goa1 was to provide for most 
efficient urban services for the popu1ation center. 
po1ice and fire protection service as we11 as water 
and sewerage wou1d be extended shorter distances at 
1ess expense than in the more typica1 suburban 1eap 
frog pattern. Boise deve10pers who noted that aspects 
of the proposa1 sounded good a1so suggested that there 
"were a few bugs" in the program as presented in the 
discussion prbposa1s.会/
工n the fina1 ana1ysis， Boise， which is the major 
city in the Counci1 of Governments considering the 
proposa1s， recommended "that services be provided as 
rapid1y as federa1， state and 10ca1 funds are avai1able. "21 
They thus rejected the more drastic growth constraints， 
due in part to questions raised regarding the taking 
issue under more stringent urban boundary approaches. 
Simi1ar sentiments were a1so evident in Scottsdale， 
Arizona where plans were recently presented for a 53 
square mi1e area to the north of the city projecting 
popu1ation growth from rough1y 80 thousand residents 
to 176 thousand residents. ~ The issue of the news-
paper announcing the growth p1ans a1so carried a ful1 
page ad by the local homebui1ders・associationasking 
"the 1ast resident 1eaving Scottsdale [to] please turn 
out the light! Do you .E旦且ヱ wanta no growth policy?"1I 
The homebui1ders・reactionwas spurred by a proposed 
charter amendment asking as a matter of municipa1 policy 
that newcomers be required to pay their fair share of 
the costs of growth. Arguing that such a policy "wi1l 
stop a11 bui1ding，" the homebuilders unsuccessfu1ly 
3. The ldaho Statesme~， October 15， 1972， at 10・D，co1.1.
4. Id. 
5. Recommendation of Boise City Counci1， November 29， 1972. 
6. Arizona Republi~， Apri1 1， 1973， at 27・A，co1. 1. 
7. 旦.， at 10-L. 
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fought the voter initiative which passed on Apri1 10， 
1973.旦/
To dea1 with prob1ems equa11y a11-encompassing， 
but spreading over two states and numerous sma11 com-
munities， the states of Nevada and Ca1ifornia have 
formed the Tahoe Regiona1 P1anning Agency (TRPA) through 
a compact approved by Congress and the two states t。
deal with deve10pment pressures. The deve10pers of 
Fleu du Lac， a small parce1 on the western shore， have 
found their app1ication for sixty condominium units 
blocked through the imp1ementation of area wide con-
tro1s imposed by the TRPA. The owners have fi1ed a 
c1aim with the TRPA pursuant to Ca1ifornia statute， 
a11eging宇4.5mi11ion in damages. Their c1aim is the 
first of over宇150mi11ion of fi1ed c1aims to reach 
courts in the area.島/
The TRPA's 1and capabi1ity studies conc1uded 
that ground water 1eve1s and soil capabilities in the 
area were such that there was a possibi1ity of soi1 
1iquification during an earthquake as we11 as drainage 
prob1ems due to a high water tab1e. Because of the 
1and capabi1ity problems， the agency denied the request 
for the condominium deve1opment.担/
The 1andowners in this case argue that the present 
c1assification of their 1and amounts to an unconstitu-
tiona1 taking requiring compensation. They a11ege that 
the use and density restrictions imposed by TRPA are 
based on a factua1-engineering judgment which invo1ves 
a value judgment regarding the most desirab1e over-a11 
popu1ation 1evel for the basin， and that insofar as the 
l幻nitationson the use of their property are the resu1t 
of a pub1ic decision to maintain the 1and at an artifi-
ca11y 10w development density， the 1andowners must be 
compensated. 
8. Id. Te1ephone interview with Ear1 Fink1er. Apri1 16. 1973. 
9. James J. Viso， et.a1. v. State of Ca1ifornia et.a!.. P1acer 
County. No. 38938. fi1ed August 31. 1972. 
10. TRPA， Minutes of Meeting， May 25， 1972， at 68. 
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The San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development 
Commission is another regional agency sanctioned by the 
Ca1ifornia Legislature， this time to deal with ecological 
problems associated with land use and development in 
and immediately adjacent to the Bay. The Commission 
has strong powers of review over both public and private 
development within the Bay and adjoining wetlands， 
including undiked marshes. Applications for shoreland 
development， however， must provide on1y "maximum feasible 
access • • • to the Bay and its shoreline" to gain Com-
mission approval.よν
The Candlestick Properties case， finally decided 
in 1970，詰/was the first major test of the Commission's 
police power authority to prevent filling of the Bay. 
四lelegislative mandate approved in that case has a110wed 
the Commission to take a firm stand in several cases 
where wetlands or the Bay have been endangered by develop-
ment proposa1s. Clement Shute， head of the State 
Attorney General ・sEnvironmental Unit notes that the 
"BCDC's exercise of discretion is controlled by a watch-
ful and concerned public which would sue if there were 
an abuse of discretion， and also by full media coverage 
of its meetings."よ11
Working within its narrow regulatory mandate， the 
Commission works to reach an accommodation whenever 
possible. 明lestaff Legal Counsel notes that it has 
used one statutory exception allowing minor filling to 
facilitate trade-offs in negotiation with permit appli-
cants. An agreement a110wing fill of four acres in 
the Suisun Marsh in the northwest part of the Bay in 
exchange for dedication of 365 acres to the Conservation 
11. 主主 F.Bosselman and D. Callies， The Quiet Revolution in 
Land Use Control， Council on Environmental Quality (December， 
1971) at 108・135.
12. Candlestick Properties. Inc. v. San Francisco Bav C & D 
Conmissio~， 11 Cal. App. 3d 557， 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 
(1970). 
13. Interview with Cleo槍ntShute， Assistant Attorney General， 
September 13， 1972. 
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Foundation for preservation is one of the more successful 
agre凹 entsreached in this manner.当/
The 100 acre Hurt Marsh in Marin County is one 
area where the Commission is current1y taking a stronq 
stand in an effort to prevent the 10ss of one of the 
few 1arge marshes in that section of the Bay. After 
proposing severa1 industria1 uses to be 10cated on a 
proposed 1and-fi11， the 1andowner is now proposinq a 
marina which meets the "water re1ated use" requirement 
for Bay deve10pment on fi11. However， recent amendments 
provide that such deve10pment must be bui1t substantial1y 
on existing 1and， a qua1ification which has prevented 
approva1 of even the revised proposa1. 121 The property， 
if avai1ab1e for commercia1 deve1opment， may be worth 
as much as宇5.5mi11ion d011ars， keeping the takinq 
issue a1ive unti1 the permit app1ication is fina11y 
reso1ved. 
The state， supported by the Save San Francisco Bay 
Association， has fi1ed suit to b10ck deve10pment of a 
2.3 mi1e strip a10ng the southwest side of the Bay.よ岳/
A1though Westbay Community Associabes owns the submerged 
1and invo1ved， the state urges that the pub1ic trust 
for navigation， commerce and fisheries wou1d be infrinqed 
if Westbay is a110wed to fi11. The Association a1so 
argues that there has been 10ng standing pub1ic access 
to the area estab1ishing prescriptive rights in the 
public.よジ
The voters 1iked the concept of the BCDC so much 
they voted in favor of proposition 20 at the November， 
1972 e1ections， thereby estab1ishing a simi1ar contr01 
program a10ng the entire coast. The Coasta1 Zone Act迫 /
14. Interview with Mike Wi1mar， September 14， 1972. 
15. Id. 
16. "Bay Watchers，" Save San Francisco Bay Association， 
February， 1970. 
17. Id. 




creates state and regiona1 conservation commissions and 
directs thern to prepare p1ans for the coasta1 zone.よY
Whi1e the p1ans are being prepared perrnits are required 
for a11 deve10prnent in an area extending in1and 1，000 
yards frorn the 1ine of rnean high tide throughout the 
length of the zone. A special two-thirds rnajority vote 
is required in the fo11owing cases: 
(a) Dredging， fi11ing or otherwise 
a1tering any bay， estuary， sa1t rnarsh， 
river rnouth， slough， or 1agoon. 
(b) Any deve10prnent which would 
reduce the size of any beach or other 
area usab1e for pub1ic recreation. 
(c) Any deve10prnent which wou1d 
reduce or irnpose restrictions upon 
pub1ic access to tida1 and subrnerged 
1ands， beaches and the rnean high tide-
1ine where there is no beach. 
(d) Any developrnent which would 
substantia11y interfere with or detract 
frorn the 1ine of sight toward the sea 
frorn the state highway nearest the 
coast. 
(e) Any deve10prnent which wou1d 
adversely affect water quality， existing 
areas of open water free of visib1e 
structures， existing and potentia1 
commercia1 and sport fisheries， or 
agricu1tural uses of 1and which are 
existing on the effective date of 
this division. 主Q/
19. !.昼.， Section 27104. For p1anning purposes the coasta1 zone 
extends back to the ridge 1ine of the first mountain range 
except in the Los Ange1es area where it extends back 5 mi1es. 
20. Id.， Section 27401. The 1egis1ation permits四 emptionof 
"stabi1ized" areas deve10ped to a density of at 1east four 




A suit in Los Ange1es' Superior Court charges that 
this measure is a "confiscation of property for pub1ic 
use" without compensation. Five Los Ange1es attorneys 
fi1ed a c1ass action seeking five hundred bi11ion 
do11ars damages on beha1f of a11 1andowners in the 
coasta1 zone. 
Other recent suits have cha11enged interim growth 
contro1s in the cities of Livermore and P1easanton. 
Ca1ifornia. These cities have been groping for solutions 
to sewage. water supp1y and schoo1 prob1ems of their 
own as city services are straining to accommodate new 
residents moving east from San Francisco and Oak1and. 
The cha11enged contro1s were cei1ings on bui1ding 
permit issuance enacted in ear1y 1972. 切leceilings 
were quick1y exhausted. Al1eging inverse condemnation 
or taking. the developers in these cases typically 
argue that "p1aintiff has been deprived of a11 beneficial 
use of its property and said property has been severe1y 
reduced in va1ue. taken and damaged. •• 11 邑/
Both cities had justified their moratoria with 
voter initiatives providing that "no further bui1ding 
permits are to be issued" unti1: (1) doub1e sessions 
in the schoo1s are ended; (2) sewerage faci1ities meet 
the standards of the Regiona1 Water Quality Control 
Board; and (3) no rationing of water with respect to 
human consumption or irrigation and adequate water 
reserves for fire protection exist.盆 /
In both cases a major issue was the existence of 
a duty upon the cities to accommodate newcomers. Bond 
issues for municipa1 improvements which wou1d partially 
a11eviate the "emergency" conditions referred to in the 
referendums had fai1ed at recent e1ections. ~ 
21. S tandard Pacific Corp. v. City of P1easanto!l， No. 423602， 
Superior Court， A1ameda County， Ca1ifornia， fi1ed May 1， 1972， 
Comp1aint at 8. 
22. Initiative Ordinance re Bui1ding Permits. City of Livermore， 
Apri1 1， 1972. The Livermore City Counc.i1 earlier adopted 
an ordinance a10ng simi1ar 1ines 1imiting bui1ding permits 




1n nearby Pa10 A1to， open space and municipa1 service 
considerations 1ay behind a sharp density ro11back in 
1arge areas of the pa10 A1to foothi11s. Forming the 
sky1ine to the west of the city， the rugged ground 
inc1udes many thousands of acres of raw undeve10ped 
1and. After a p1anning report suggested that higher 
intensity residentia1 deve10pment on these sites wou1d 
p1ace a disproportionate burden on services， particu1ar1y 
schoo1s， the city decided on the density ro11back in 
partia1 imp1ementation of the proposed 1and use p1an. 
City attorneys note that simi1ar physica1 circumstances 
"may not be found in more than one or two other cities 
in the country. 11 They be1 ieve tha t the carefu1 p1anning 
studies the city has undertaken in deve10ping this pro-
position wi11 be an important e1ement of their defense 
of the new zoning regu1ations. 
Water and sewerage a1ready exists in much of the 
area， and at 1east one property owner has cha11enged 
the new regu1ations as a regu1atory taking of his property. 
A1though his is a re1ative1y sma11 parce1， the arguments 
raised in his cha11enge cou1d a1so be app1ied in much 
of the foothi11s region and had resu1ted in some宇20
mi11ion in c1aims by ear1y 1973.自 /
The County of Santa Cruz has enacted a specia1 
forty-acre minimum 10t size zoning c1assification which 
has been cha11enged by the deve10pers of a proposed 40 
year， mu1ti-mi11ion do11ar deve10pment p1anned to eventua11y 
house 33，000 persons. 三~ The deve10pers argue that 
their 1ands are now used for margina1 agricu1tura1 and 
1imited grazing purposes， and that the ordinance's 
c1assifications "wou1d cause p1aintiff 10ss and damage 
without compensation • • . [andJ be a taking and damaging 
of property for pub1ic use without just compensation. .• " 
w 
24. Harry ".r' Beyer v. City of Palo AltQ， No. P.22974， Superior 
Court， Santa Clara County， California， fi1ed October 4， 1972. 
主主Thorwa1dson，"The Palo A1to Experience，" fry California 
(Spring， 1973) at 5. 
25. M:oroto Investment Comφany Limited v. The County of Santa Cru~， 
No.48607， Superior Court， Santa Cruz County， Ca1ifornia， fi1ed 
September 12， 1972. 
26. !豆.， Comp1aint at 7. 
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The owners of grave1 rights in P1acer County， 
Ca1ifornia are a1so cha11enging what they ca11 an 
"abso1ute prohibition" by the county denying them per-
mission to quarry， remove and process their grave1. 
The state had purchased the 1and from the p1aintiffs 
in 1967 without providing specia1 compensation for the 
grave1 10cated in the bed of the Bear River. Rather， 
they a110wed a reservation in the deed conveying the 
property which provided that the former owners had: 
"The right to remove and process 
grave1 from exposed grave1 bars in the 
stream bed to a depth not to exceed 20 
feet from grade. A11 remova1 of grave1 
sha11 be subject to state 1aws pertaining 
to such grave1 extraction." 立/
County zoning authorities nonethe1ess denied permission 
to operate the processing p1ant and the quarrying opera-
tion in the river. Arguing danger to the eco1ogy of 
the river， a county road and other nuisance factors， 
the county's Board of Appea1s and Board of Supervisors 
both rejected the zoning administrator's grant of per-
mission to mine. The owners of the grave1 mining rights 
which otherwise expired December 31， 1972， have pursued 
their case on appea1 for severa1 years and it is now 
before a court where they demand compensation for this 
"taking of property without due process of 1aw.“些/
A11 this 1itigation has not stopped other Ca1ifornia 
communities from adopting a variety of new techniques 
to contro1 growth. The head1ine "New Mayor at Helm of 
Po1itica1 Effort to Determine Pace of Housing Deve1opment，" 
~ signa1s a syst佃 aticprogram initiated by Mayor 
Pete Wi1son to match growth to urban services in San 
Diego. The city is withho1ding bui1ding permits if a 
27. P1aintiff's Opening Brief. L. J. Lorang et a1. v. Norman B. 
Livermore. et a 1. No. 35379， Superior Court， P1acer Co叫nty.
Ca1ifornia， fi1ed September 25， 1972. 
28. 1.昼.， Argument 1 at page 25. 
29. 1.os Ange1es Time~， November 25， 1972. 
Di日l凶 byGoogle
47. 
pub1ic hearing resu1ts in a finding of "emergency" con-
ditions regarding pub1ic faci1ities. Further contro1 
has resu1ted from the rezoning of some 40，000 acres on 
the outskirts of town for agricu1tura1 uses on1y， forcing 
deve10pers to approach the city with deve10pment proposa1s 
and discouraging 1eapfrogging deve1opment.旦/
Whi1e most of these actions have been hearti1y 
supported by constituents， an effort to sta11 deve1op-
ment through a moratorium in the city's Mira Mesa District 
resu1ted in a Superior Court ru1ing that the city had 
exceeded its statutory powers. There has been no court 
test of the San Diego programs which reached the consti-
tutiona1 issues.込/
On the subject of bi11boards， another somewhat con-
troversia1 issue in urban aesthetic contro1s， Mayor Wi1son 
notes that "Sometimes you can't accommodate [competing 
pub1ic and private interestsJ~ 1I San Diego had come to 
a decision point as it has on some growth issues and 
decided to e1iminate bi11boards. Mayor Wi1son goes 
on however， "In order to be fair， and to be constitu-
tiona1， we estab1ished a schedu1e to amortize the invest-
ment of each bi11board owner." This San Diego effort 
did meet constitutiona1 cha11enge in the courts. 主主/
Po11s in Pa1m Springs a1so indicate that substantia1 
voter sentiment supports that city's growth contro1 
efforts. The City Counci1 initiated its first action 
on November 22， 1972， when a 120 day moratori凶non con-
dominium and apartment construction was enacted. The 
Mayor noted， "We aren・t in a stop growth po1icy. A11 of 
us on the Counci1 fee1 that for a community to be viab1e 
it has to have a certain amount of growth and progress. 
So we're not ta1king about stopping growth. We're ta1king 
about contained growth."主/ The program has not met 
a major court test， but discussion of zoning changes 
possib1y envisioning a ro11back to bring zoned density 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. Cry Ca 1iforni~. (Fa11. 1972) at 19. 
33. Ho岬ardH. Wiefe1. quoted 1n 1os An宜e1esTime!. December 4. 1972. 
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into line with planned growth projections make constitu-
tional limitations a factor in future municipal decisions. 
Oregon， codifying what residents have customarily 
recognized， now has a legislative declaration "that the 
public may have the free and uninterrupted use" of the 
ocean shore in its "beach bill." 1.全/ Overcoming initial 
questions based on the taking issue， it now has met 
general acceptance and court approval， officials suggest， 
in part because of its minimal economic impact. The 
beach area is not suitable for structures and has long 
been used by the public. OWnership of the property east 
of the vegetation line， however， is not affected by the 
bill.主/
Because the beach bill does not provide for public 
access across adjoining property， recent litigation h担
been initiated by the state. In the first such suit， 
the state has argued that where longstanding public use 
of private land has been tolerated， public rights of 
access exist. The landowners have resisted， raising 
the familiar constitutional objections to public appro-
priation of private land without compensation.当/
Oregon's Scenic Waterways Act 111 was also carefully 
drafted to avoid constitutional issues over the taking 
question. It provides that certain development in des-
ignated zones requires one year's notice to the State 
Highway Commission. 工f the Commission finds that the 
proposal would substantially impair the natural scenic 
quality: it may then acquire the property within the 
one year waiting period: otherwise the landowner may 
proceed.主/
34. Ore. Rev. Stats. Section 390.605豆L三三1・
35. Interview with Ray Wi1son. Oregon State Department of 
Highways. October 24. 1972. 
36. Id. 
37. Ore. Rev. Stats. Section 390.805 己~・
38. Id.. Section 390.845. 
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A court ho1ding in 1970 which apparent1y prohibited 
any construction in or over the tide1ands of the State 
of Washington provided a significant impetus for a shore-
1and manag四 entprogr四 inthe state. 121 In May of 
1971， the state became the first to adopt a program of 
comprehensive shore1ine management with imp1ementation 
beginning in June of 1971.坐/ Presented to the voters 
as one a1ternative in an initiative referendum in November 
of 1972， the 1egis1ative program a1so received voter 
approva1.坐/
The Shore1ine Act out1ines a p1anning program which 
identifies shore1ines subject to its protection. Loca1 
governments have the primary responsibi1ity for the 
inventory of shore1ines and preparation of master programs 
for their area. Whi1e they may reject this ro1e and 
cast the burden on the state， the counties have genera11y 
accepted their ro1e in the program， particu1ar1y after 
voter approva1 of the measure in 1ate 1972. ~ A1though 
the state retains a specia1 interest in "shore1ines of 
statewide significance，" primary jurisdiction for p1anning 
and permit issuance 1ies with the 1oca1 governments. 
Whi1e po1icy differences in interpretation of the 
Act 1ed the Shore1ines Hearings Board to dead10ck on an 
appea1 from an ear1y app1ication for deve10pment in Lake 
Washington， prob1ems have been ironed out in 1ater pro-
ceedings. Likewise， having survived attack through 
voter referendum， 1oca1 permit procedures are proceeding 
re1ative1y smooth1y. One of its draftsmen notes that 
whi1e "it has imperfections， in the bigger context it 
has worked quite we11， the e1ectorate supported it and 
1oca1 officia1s are going a10ng with the program."包/
39. "i1bour v. Gal1ahe~， 77 Wash. 2d 306， 462 P.2d 232 (1970). 
40. 主主監理旦且~， E. Brad1ey and J. Armstrong， ~ Description 
and Ana1ysis of Coasta1 Zone and Shore1and ManagemeTI! 
Pro~rams in the United State~， at 267 (1972). 
41. Te1ephone interview with Char1es Roe， Senior Assistant 





Whi1e strict regu1ation of uses in shore1ine areas 
cou1d pose constitutiona1 issues simi1ar to those seen 
in other states， no such 1itigation has yet arisen. A 
f100d p1ain regu1ation， however， has raised the issue 
in a case pending in the 10ca1 courts. Map1e Leaf In-
vestors went before the State Po11ution Contro1 Hearinqs 
Board in 1ate 1972 to protest a denia1 of permission to 
construct a sing1e fami1y subdivision on property on 
the Cedar River in King County， Washington. The state 
argued that about 70 percent of the property was in the 
f100dway and the remainder in the f100d fringe as defined 
by the United States Army Corps of Engineers. 切lestate 
urged the Board to find the denia1 of the permit "a 
reasonable exercise of the po1ice power." The state's 
f100d contro1 act had been adopted in 1935， a fact which 
the state cited in support of its argument regarding the 
reasonableness of the regu1ation.坐/
These repeated cha11enges， either by the state to 
estab1ish protective standards or by private parties 
seeking to inva1idate regu1ations comp1ete the survey 
of the taking issue both in terms of action and reaction. 
Whi1e nuances may shift depending on particu1ar state 
doctrines， the pattern remains consistent with the 
cha11enge raised against 1egis1ation which in some cases 
has been enforced and accepted for severa1 decades. 
44. Memorandum of Respondent， !n The Matter of Maple Leaf 
Investors. Inc. v. State of Wash_ingto!LQe~artment of 





SEVEN AND A HALF CENTURIES 
Introduction 
Having obtained a general perspective on the ways 
the taking clause is influencing current efforts t。
control the use of land， the user of ordinary English 
may be puzzled by the meaning of the concept of "taking." 
The word ・take"ordinarily refers to the act of obtaining 
possession or control of property， and although there 
are many other usages of the word none of them seems 
descriptive of governmental regulation of the use of 
land. 
How then did the language "nor shall private prop-
erty be taken for public use without just compensation" 
become a limitation on the regulatory power? Curiousity 
on this subject made us examine legal history back t。
the Magna Carta. 
We found that the concept of "taking" originally 
referred to the seizure of lands by the government， and 
that it retained this meaning through the time it was 
incorporated into our constitution and for a century 
thereafter. Only around the turn of the Twentieth 
Century --a period of conflict between freewheeling 
growth and expansion and an emerging concern that govern-
mental regulation was needed --did the courts begin t。
expand the meaning of "taking" beyond the original con-
ception. 
Until this period the law recognized two separate 
rules regarding governmental powers over land: a duty 
to pay compensation if land were seized for public use: 
and a right to regulate the use of land as long as the 
regulation was reasonably related to a public purpose. 
The historical background prior to the merger of 
these two concepts is of interest not only to those with 
an abstract curiousity about the original intent of the 
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founding fathers. 明lestudy of history may suggest the 
possibility of a return to the admittedly unsophisticated. 
but in retrospect farsighted， idea that the founding 




TAK工NGAND REGULATION: ~盟 ENGLISH HERITAGE 
1. Seizure of Land bv the Kinq 
In Medieva1 Eng1and ho1ding 1and was a chancy 
thing at best. The King was entit1ed to 1evy on all 
landowners 11 such charges for the defense of the rea1m 
and certain other royal purposes as he saw fit， and if 
it was not readi1y forthcoming the King literal1y seized 
the offender ・s 1and in forfeiture. It is out of the 
early attempts of English 1andowners to resist these 
levies and assert their property rights against the 
King that our modern constitutiona1 doctrine was born. 
prior to the Norman conquest in 1066 the Ang1o-
Saxon King of Eng1and was e1ected by a council of nob1es. 
While the counci1 fo11owed a pattern of e1ecting linea1 
descendants of the previous king to the extent this was 
consistent with the need for a strong king for protection 
of the rea1m， the nob1es a1so sought to preserve their 
own rights frαn that same strong monarch in times of 
peace. Therefore， it became common practice for the 
nobles to extract some sort of guarantee from the King 
at his coronation in the form of a charter. 
1. Technical1y of course the English nobles did not "own" 
1and in the sa官a sense that we would use the term today. 
Each noble単担 land，physica11y occupying it， by virtue 
of a series of feuda1 obligations owed his "grantor" who 
in turn held of his land by virtue of simi1ar obligations 
to a yet higher 10rd. Highest in a11 chains was the King. 
Each nob1e's right in 1and was basica11y a ri酔 tto possession， 
and to subinfeudate --to give 1and to others in return for 
feuda1 ob1igations. No one盟主主豆 1and，and indeed it was 
some time before one's descendants were recognized as having 
r~酔ts to one' s "h01ding" at one' s death. 主主些些旦旦:t...，
A.W.B. Simpson， ~n Introduction to the History of the l.and 
忌些 (1967). For our purposes most of these distinctions 
are irre1evant and we wi11 treat the nobles as 1andowners 
except由 erethe nature of their tenure is of specific 





to fight the French，ユIhad become particu1ar1y burden-
some under King John. &1 Whi1e probab1y no worse an 
administrator or taskmaster than his brother and pre-
decessor Richard 1， he 1acked the heroic aura which 
surrounded a crusader司 king. In fact， John had 10st 
a disastrous war on the Continent whi1e attempting t。
regain those very French provinces over which Wi11iam 1 
had origina1ly ruled as Duke of Normandy. 
And whi1e Richard ・s co11ection of feuda1 dues was 
seen to by Ministers (he being in Eng1and for on1y a 
few months of his e1even-year reign) in his absence， 
upon whose heads pub1ic opprobri凶nwas heaped， John， as 
a resident monarch， found the disp1easure of nob1es and 
peasant a1ike visited direct1y upon himse1f. 11 
When "the necessities of King John drove him to 
severities that had been unknown in the preceding century，・1
~ the nob1es， having on1y recent1y been financia11y -
burdened by the raising of ransom for Richard， fina11y 
revo1ted in November of 1214. 21 They drafted a 1ist of 
demands， (the "Artic1es of the Barons" of Apri1， 1215) 
and proceeded to march on London.辺/
5. HcKechnie，担足三 Car旦!!:!.区三 atp.60. Crown tenants ー
those h01ding direct1y of the King， apparent1y found their 
estates appropriated by the King in the form of escheats， 
王室.， at 483. 
6. Care， ~旦込些 L些旦且主主，型庄三， p.9: John "made use of so 
many i11ega1 devices to drain them of money" and make 
frequ邑ntencroachments on the Liberties of the peop1e. 
7. H01dsworth， 呈旦E主， V01. 11， page 207. 
8. Samue1 E. Thorne， "What Magna Carta Was" in Thorne， Dunham， 
Kur1and & Jennings， The Great Charte!. 3，11 (1965). 
9. HcKechnie，!!:!.巴!" 72・74; 主主主註2.by the same author， "Magna 
Carta (1215・1915)，加 AddressDe1ivered on its Seventh Centenary 
to the Roya1 Historica1 Society and the Magna Carta Ce1ebration 
COllli t tee，'・ fromMa~na Carta Commemoration Essav!!.， pp. 1三L三塁1・
(Henry E11iot Ma1den， ed.， for Roya1 Historica1 Society， 1917). 
10. 1t wi11 be reca11ed that it was Henry 1， being pressed by 
riva1 c1aims to the throne叫10had been forced to accede to 
the strongest coronation charter to date --and that the 
succeeding one by the powerfu1 Henry 11 reneged on many of 




To a 1arge extent Chapter 39 represents one of the biggest 
sets of grievances which the barons had against the King 
ーー "arbitrary infringments of persona1 1iberty and rights 
of property."且/
Whi1e it is often assumed that the Magna Carta was 
immediate1y and continuous1y regarded with highest esteem， 
in fact its ear1y history was stormy. John had probably 
never meant to abide by the Charter and， fo11owing the 
issuance of a Papa1 Bu11 by 1nnocent 11工 excommunicating
the barons， he renounced his signature. Civi1 war then 
broke out， but John convenient1y died in October of 1216 
and the first of many "confirmations" of Magna Carta 
was made by the regent (a trusted rebe1 baron) in the 
name of the infant Henry 111， John's son. 1n 1225， 
Henry 111， needing both money and support from his barons， 
again confirmed the Charter in a shortened and conso1i-
dated form， and it is this version of Magna Carta --
with c1ause 39 becoming c1ause 29 -- that was fina11y 
enro11ed in the Statutes at Large of Eng1and. よ全/
Magna Carta was born of necessity， foisted upon an 
unwi11ing monarch. But immediate1y after the death of 
13. Ho1dsworth. 呈旦~， Vo1. 11 at 215. The Magna Carta contained 
other 1imits on roya1 power as we11. 主主，位里旦旦ェ， G. M. 
Treve1yan， !!istorv of Eng1an~， Vo1. 1， at 228. One commentator 
has suggested that Artic1e 28 ・・ "Noconstab1e or other bailiff 
of ours sha11 take grain or other provisions of any one without 
lmmediate1y paying therefore in money.・・・"-was the basis 
of the fina1 c1ause of the Fifth Amendment， at 1east with respect 
to eminent domain. Zechariah Chafee， Jr.. !low Human Rights 
Got Into the Constitutio~， (1952) at 45. We did not find this 
thread picked up by any of the other sources we examined， however. 
14. Vill1am S. McKechnie. "Magna Carta (1215・1915)， 加 Address
De1ivered on Its Seventh Centenary to the Royal Historica1 
Soclety and the Magna Carta Ce1ebration Committee，" from 
Magna Carta Comme百IOrationEssays • 呈旦E主主， pages 1・8;McKechnie. 
Magna Carta: A CommentarY.. 呈旦E主主~ pages 1・112;Theodore F. 
T. P1ucknett. ~ Concise History of the Common La~ (2d Ed).London 
Butterworth & Co. (Pub1ishers) Ltd.. 1936. pages 20・24.
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John and the coronation of Henry I工工， there is 1itt1e 
evidence of bad faith concerning Magna Carta's terms. 
よV 工twas not unti1 1223 that the government under 
Henry 1I工， being financia11y in need， again ignored 
rights set out in Magna Carta in seizing of nob1e 1ands. 
This was soon brought to a ha1t by the 1225 reconfirma-
tion of the Charter.当/
From 1225 unti1 the ear1y years of the Fourteenth 
Century -- the reigns of Henry III and Edward I --Magna 
Carta was confirmed five more times， and it appears that 
whi1e they were not so arbitrary as John， both ru1ers， 
being often financia11y pressed， wou1d vi01ate many of 
the specific "1iberties" of the Charter by means of ar-
bitrary exactions.!1/ But there is no mention of the 
seizure of 1ands against which Chapter 29 inveighs.当/
The Magna Carta as a wh01e is treated very 1itt1e 
over the next 75 years or so， as Eng1and was invo1ved 
in a series of foreign and interna1 conf1icts (the 100 
Years ・War，the War of the Roses)， with various factions 
seizing each others 1ands for treason as power shifted. 
Repititious confirmations of Magna Carta by the 
King --especia11y during the reign of Edward I工I in the 
1atter part of the Fourteenth Century --acted as more 
of a "ta1isman" of permanence for enacted 1aws in troub1ed 
times， indicating the "evanescent qua1ity of sovereign 
15. 百lompson，呈旦旦玉三， page 5. 
16. .!昼.， at pages 5・6. This 1225 version became the "definitelr 
one with 37 c1auses， as noted ~旦pra ・ Henry 111 began to 
press for the return of cast1es and 1ands into the king's 
hands --main1y by escheat --"earlier than strict right 
allowed." 
17. 1d.， at 16. Often such exactions took the form of knights 
fees again， but increasing1y these resemb1ed主主主主呈， on 
such as persona1 property， more than feuda1 incidents， 
services or aids. 1d.， at 18・19.
18. .!且.， at pages 15・64. 1t is interesting that this one com-
mentator purports to treat fair1y， exhaustive1y the "first 
century of Magna Carta，" even cross ・referencingin a con-
venient chart materia1s in her book on each section --yet 




Periodica11y Chapter 29 was made the basis for a 
petition against seizure of 1ands simp1y on petition or 
suggestion to the King or his counse1 by powerfu1 indi-
vidua1s. 辺/ Thus， it is reported in 1352， that petitions 
appea1 to Chapter 29 of the Charter， insisting that 
except on indictment or presentment of a jury， no man 
sha11 be ousted of his freeho1d by simp1e petition to 
King and counci1， and the King agrees. ~ In fact， 
the King was persuaded in a statute of 1352 to agree 
that such proceedings， in accordance with Artic1e 29 
of Magna Carta， wou1d henceforth be dea1t with outside 
the King and Counci1. ~ 
19. Vi11iam F. Swind1er. ~agna Carta. Legend and Legacy (1965) 
at page 141. The reported confirrr凶 tions--at 1east thirty 
by the time of Henry V can be treated as proof of Eng1and's 
monarchs' tendency to disregard the Charter when convenient. 
confirming it on1y when their need for money required them 
to once again come to terms with a11 of their nob1es. on 
the other hand. it is possib1e to view such confirmations 
on1y as additiona1 guarantees. to the nob1es. the merchants. 
and eventua11y. Par1iament ・ a sort of re-adoption of basic 
princip1es. for it is true that many of the confirmations 
counted by Coke carr槍 inthe reign of Edward 111. during 
前lichthere is very 1itt1e evidence of comp1aint about roya1 
vio1ations. See a1so. Haze1tine. H. D. "The 1nf1uence of 
ーーー ・ーーーーー"
Magna Carta on American Constitutiona1 Deve10pment" (printed 
in Ma且naCarta Commermoration Essav~. ed. by Henry E11iot 
Ma1den for the Roya1 Historica1 Society. 1917) at pages 10・11;
McKechnie. ~agna Carta. A Commentar~. !旦E主主.at pages 165・193;
Faith Thompson. 1he First Centurv of Magna Carta: Why it 
Persisted as a Documen~ (1925) at page iii. 
20. Thompson. 主主主主主. page 63. 
21. (Bishop) Wil1iam Stubbs. The Constitutiona1 Historv of Eng1an~. 
(Vo1. 11. 1929) at 637・638. Simi1ar petitions were fi1ed 
again in 1362 and 1363. During this time there was much 
popu1ar dissatisfaction with the autocratic behavior of the 
nob1es on the part of the common peop1e. 1t is a1so during 
this period that the House of Commons as a separate de1iberative 
body was germinating. Again in 1391 and 1392 comp1aint was made 
that the cOlII¥on peop1e were being made to "answer for their 
freeho1ds" before counci1s of 10rds， contrary to the King's 
right and the common 1aw. 旦..at 639. 
22. Swind1er. 呈旦E.E三， at 145・148. 1t was during this period --the 
reign of Edward 111 --that Magna Carta was confirmed no 1ess 
than twenty times. 
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But during the Tudor period from the 1atter part 
of the Fourteenth Century to the end of the Fifteenth 
Century， virtua11y nothing 由ー not even a confirmation --
is reported about Magna Carta. 
2. Ear1y Enq1ish Land Use Requ1ations. 
The pattern of Eng1ish 1and use regu1ation began 
gradua11y. Magna Carta itse1f dea1t with another griev-
ance which resu1ted in considerab1e restriction on land 
use. At 1east since the time of King Canute in 1018， 
Eng1and's monarchs c1aimed the privi1ege of designating 
1ands in the kingdom as forests to be used for the 
King・shunting.~ Such forests had 1itt1e va1ue be-
cause of restrictions on any use which wou1d make it 
unfit for hunting --1ike fencing， or cu1tivating， or 
the erection of any bui1dings except perhaps a dwe11ing. 
Chapter 47 of the Magna Carta attempted to 1imit 
the "wide and i11-defined" right of the monarch t。
"afforest" who1e districts， or to p1ace riverbanks "in 
defence" (kept c1ear for fow1ing and hawking): 
"A11 forests that have been made 
such in our time shall forthwith be 
disafforested: and in a simi1ar course 
sha11 be fo11owed with regard to river-
banks that have been p1aced 'in defence' 
by us in our time." 笠/
For the next 100 years --unti1 the confirmation 
of this Charter by Edward 1工 in the Fourteenth Century --
Eng1and・smonarchs attempted to renege on their promises 
to "disafforest" and en1arge their private preserves， 
much to the chagrin of their nob1e tenants who were 
thus unab1e to get much profit therefrom. By the reign 
23. Henry Care， ~nglish Liberties. or the Freeborn Subject's 
Inheritance (4th Ed; 1719) at pp. 39-58. 
24. McKechnie， Magna Carta， 呈旦旦玉三， p. 507. This provision was 
amplified in a separate Forest Charter (Carta de Foresta) 
issued by the young Henry 111 in 1217. 
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of Henry VIII the nob1es had apparent1y won， as it is 
reported that when that monarch afforested 1and around 
Hampton Court in 1540 he not on1y did so with the express 
approva1 of Par1iament， but a1so paid compensation t。
a11 who suffered damage.話/
切lenob1es regu1ated the growing of crops by their 
tenants from ear1iest times. 工n the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Centuries， a nob1e ・sbai1iff or steward 
might， as a matter of administration， simp1y呈堅担玉三
what crops were to be grown by the tenants that year. 
It wou1d not have occurred to anyone to question the 
authority， or view it as a "taking"ー-after a11， every-
one "he1d of" that nob1e in that area --their Itit1e" 
was inferior to his， to that extent. ~ 
Twe1fth Century custuma1s 11I a1so record provisions 
forbidding the se11ing of 1and without first offering 
25. McKechn1e. 豆旦E主主. at 509・511. 百leStuarts apparent1y tr1ed 
to rev1ve the old forest rights unsuccessfully 1n the Seventeenth 
Century・1t1s reported that when Char1es 1 created the 
Forest of R1ch 目、ond1n 1634， 1t was done on1y after cornpensa-
t10n was prornised to those dan凶ged.
26. Interv1ew w1th Professor and Mrs. Albert K1ra1fy on Decernber 28， 
1972 1n 1ρndon. Rerned1es d但veloped，l1ke 11 d1stressρ ・ the 
seizure of crops or catt1e until the serv1ce or 1nc1dent 
was perforrned， -or the wr1ts of旦盟主主主 around1278， by 
wh1ch 1f one fa11ed to perform one's feuda1 serv1ce within 
a certain tirne --usual1y 2 years --the next-super1or 1ord， 
or the K1ng， was entit1ed to repossess1on. Actua11y a form 
of escheat. To refuse a feuda1 service had former1y been a 
felony， conv1ct1on for由 ichautomat1ca11y 1ed to escheat 
to one ・slord. 蜘 en1t ceased to be a fe1ony， escheat ceased 
to follow， and the 10rd was techn1ca1ly rernedy1ess， unt11 
passage of the Statute of Gloucestor 1n 1278. 
27. Genera11y the recording off1c1al would atternpt to discover 
the oldest remembered pract1ce in the Vi11age before recording. 
Th1s custon温 ry1aw was regarded by Coke as one of the three 
冒凶jorsources of Eng1ish 1aw， after cornrnon and statutory 
law. This branch of law carne to be known forrna11y as the 
Custornary I.aw of the boroughs of the United Kingdorn. 主i生旦
Societv -Borough Custom!， Vo1. 1 (ed. by Mary Bateson) 
(Vo1. 18) London: Bernard Quaritch， 1904， pp. 1x -xvi11. 
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it to the 10rd "for such reasonab1e price as another 
wou1d give him for the same."担 /
"When a burgess receives his burgage 
p1ot， if it is not bui1t on， the reeve sha11 
order hむnto bui1d on his burgage within 
forty days on pain of forfeiture: if he 
does not he sha11 be amerced 12d." 笠/
More detai1ed 1and use regu1ations were found in 
urban areas. 工n 1189 neighbors were required to give 
1-1/2 feet of their 1and each and to construct thereon 
a stone party wa11 three feet thick and sixteen feet 
high. Other provisions of the same date protected 
views and access to 1ight. References to ear1ier wood 
construction and severa1 E1eventh Century and Twe1fth 
Century fires indicate c1ear1y the reasons for these 
regu1ations.辺/Again in 1297 it was additiona11y 
ordered that everyone must keep the front of his own 
house c1ean， that ・10wpentices" were to be removed 
and that pigsties were to be kept from the streets.-lよ/
By the midd1e of the Fourteenth Century detai1ed bui1ding 
regu1ations required roofs to be covered with stone， 
tiles or 1ead.主/
"In 1302 one Thomas Bat being hai1ed 
before the Mayor on a charge of neg1ect-
ing to put ti1es instead of thatch on his 
houses offered to idemnify the city in 
case of any fire happening by reason of 
his thatch. The offer was accepted， on 
the understanding that the thatch was t。
be removed by a certain time. The naivete 
of Mr. Bat in offering and the city accepting， 
an indemnity in case of fire is tru1y re-
markab1e. What wou1d Mr. B~t have done， 
how far wou1d his persona1 estates have 
gone， if a quarter of the city had been 
burned down by reason of his thatch." 旦/
28. Se1den Society -Borough Custom~， Vol. II (Vol.21，ed. hy Mary 
Bateson)London: Bernard Quaritch， 1906， page 60 (cf. pp.60・72)• 
29. Se1den Society -Borough Customs， Vo1. 1.， 互旦E玉三， p. 278. 
30. Know1es and Pitt， 呈旦旦玉三， at pages 6・7.
31. Besant， 呈ど旦E三， at p. 226. 
32. Sir Wa1ter Besant， Medieval Londo~. Vol. 1 (1906). 
33. Besant. 豆旦E玉三， page 230. 
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Then， as now， London was not an organized city as 
we wou1d conceive of a city. 1t consisted of a mu1ti-
p1icity of jurisdictions， each of which constituted a 
separate interest group and often had its own separate 
p01ice force.当/ So jea10us were the citizens of their 
prerogatives that even主主主主主 1066no non-citizen was 
permitted to remain within the city overnight for more 
than two days without the surety of a citizen.詰/
1t was the ear1y lexc1usion" of non-citizens -ー
usua11y foreign craftsmen with whom the citizens chose 
not to compete --that 1ed to the growth of sett1ements 
just outside the wa11s of the city. These ear1y suburbs 
(popu1ated by commuters as most of the residents of 
these sett1佃 entsworked within the city)品 I1ed to 
an increase in the popu1ation of metrop01itan London. 
1n the Sixteenth Century London was both the com-
mercia1 and inte11ectua1 center of Eng1and. As H01dsworth 
put it: 
"The increase in the size of London 
. was no doubt part1y caused by the 
fact that the centra1ized government of 
this period was making it the p01itica1， 
the inte11ectua1， and the fashionab1e 
centre of Eng1and. A11 who had ambitions 
of any kind f10cked to London and the 
Court. . . • Frequent proc1amations were 
issued directing the nobi1ity and gentry 
to 1eave London and to return to their 
countyseats， and sometimes threatening 
them with punishment and 10ss of office 
in the event of disobedience." 辺/
34. C. C. Know1es and P. H. Pitt， !he !Iistory of Building Regulations 
in London. 1189 ・ 197~. (1972) at pp.7・8.
35. Michae1 Harrison， 1ondon Gro岬 inR.The Develoロmentof a 
Metropoli!' Hutchinson & Co. (Pub1ishers) Ltd.: London， 1965. 
Pages 92・95.
36. Harrison， 豆旦E主， page 95. 




Moreover， the spirit of mercanti1ism and the new geographic 
conditions of the Sixteenth Century moved the center of 
the then-existing "wor1d" trade from the Mediterranean 
to seaports on the Atlantic --1ike London.当/
The government's response to the economic conditions 
that forced more and more peop1e to work in London was 
to enact legislation prohibiting the construction of new 
housing on the outskirts of London. 121 In 1580 Queen 
E1izabeth by proc1amation forbade the construction of 
any new housing within three mi1es of the City， a ru1e 
which wou1d prevent many owners of vacant 1and from 
deve10ping it. The Queen's description of the prob1ems 
of urban growth bears such simi1arity to current prob1ems 
that it is worth quoting at 1ength: 
"The Queen ・sMajesty perceiving the 
state of the City of London (being ancient1y 
termed her chamber) and the suburbs and con-
fines thereof to increase dai1y， by access of 
people to inhabit the same， in such amp1e 
sort， as thereby many inconveniences are 
seen a1ready， but many greater of necessity 
1ike to fo11ow， being such as her Majesty 
cannot neg1ect to remedy， having the prin-
cipa1 care， under A1mighty God to foresee 
aforehand， to have her peop1e in such a 
city and confines not on1y we11 governed 
by ordinary justice， to serve God and obey 
her Majesty， (which by reason of such mu1ti-
tudes 1ater1y increased can hard1y be done 
38. 旦.， at 315. Adding to these reasons for the growth of London 
and the problems associated with it was the disso1ution of 
the monastaries by Henry VIII， (1536・1539). Huge areas 
in and just outside London， former1y owned by the Church were 
opened， both officia11y and otherwise， upon which to bui1d 
dwe11ings. To further comp1icate the prob1em of increased 
popu1ation thus caused， the new residents c1aimed the privi1eges 
and immunities enjoyed by the former inhabitants， the monks 
and friars --inc1uding the right to their own system of courts， 
separate from those of the City of London. Harrison，詮国旦
E盟主担&， supra， pages 115・116;Treve1yan，盟主玉三. (Vol. II) at 58・62.




without device of more new jurisdictions 
and offices for that purpose) but to be a1so 
provided of sUhstantiation of victua1， food 
and other 1ike necessaries for man's 1ife， 
upon reasonab1e prices， without no city can 
10ng continue. --And fina11y， to the pre-
servation of her peop1e in hea1th by God's 
goodness， the same is perceived to be in 
better estate universa11y than hath been 
in man' s m回 lory: yet where there are such 
great mu1titude of peop1e brought to in-
habit in sma11 rooms， whereof a great part 
are seen very poor， yea， such as must 1ive 
of begging， on1y worse means， and they heaped 
up together， and in a sort smothered with 
many fami1ies of chi1dren and servants in 
one house or sma11 tenement: it must needs 
fo11ow， if one p1ague or popu1ar sickness 
shou1d， by God's permission， enter amongst 
these mu1titudes， that the same wou1d not 
on1y spread itse1f， and invade the who1e 
city and confines， but that a great morta1ity 
wou1d ensue the same， where her Majesties 
persona1 preserve is many times required: 
besides (by) the great conf1uence of peop1e 
from a11 parts of th~ rea1m， by reason of • 廿leordinary terms of justice there ho1den， 
the infection wou1d be a1so dispensed through 
a11 other parts of the realm， to the manifest 
detriment of the who1e body thereof • • 
型/
The Roya1 proc1amation was fo11owed by an Act of 
par1iament in 1588 which tried a new approach --1arge 
10t zoning. It prohibited the construction of any 
cottage or bui1ding at a density greater than one 
bui1ding to four acres: 
40. Steen Ei1er Rasmussen. 1ondon. The Unique CitY. London: 
Jor鳩山onCape. 1937. At pages 67・68. 主主主担旦，
Harrison， 1ondon Growing， 三旦E互主.at page 115. 
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"After the end of this session of 
Par1iament， no person sha11 within this 
rea1m of Eng1and make， bui1d， or erect， 
or cause to be made， bui1ded or erected， 
any manner of cottage for habitation or 
dwe11ing， nor convert or ordain any bui1d-
ing or housing made or hereafter to be 
made， to be used as a cottage for habita-
ting or dwe11ing， un1ess the same person 
do assign and 1ay to the same cottage or 
bui1ding four acres of ground at the 1east 
• being his or her freeho1d [and] in-
heritance 1ying near to the said cottage， 
so 10ng as the same cottage sha11 be in-
habited. .主v
Since 1and owned by commoners was typica11y divided into 
very sma11 parce1s this Act effective1y prevented any 
but the rich from erecting houses in the affected dis-
tricts.盆/
Four-acre 10ts apparent1y fai1ed to solve the 
prob1em. In 1592 Par1iament returned to the b1anket 
prohibition of new dwe11ings within three mi1es of 
London and added a restraint on the conversion of 
existing houses to mu1tifam~ly dwe11ings. 11/ This . -
41. 31 E1iz. 1 C.7 (Statutes at Large， Vo1. 6 at 409， 三L三三旦・). 
42. Know1es and Pitt， ~玉三， at pages 13・14.
43. 35 E1iz. 1 C.6: This particu1ar statute is only summarized 
in the current Statutes at Large; however， in a subbasement 
of Westminster Palace on the bottom she1f of the store ・
room for old statutory series there is a quaint (and quite 
large) leather-bound volume replete with brass fittings 
(quite sharp， in fact) entitled，百leSecond Volume of the 
s tatutes at Large Conteyning a11 such Acts which at any 
time heretofore have been printed from the first yeere 
of the Raigne of E1izabeth late ~eene of England， & et~.J 
1Jntil the Sixteenth Yeere of the Raigne of our Soveraigne 
Lord James. by the Grace of God Kin昆 ofEngland Scotland 
France and Ireland. Defender of the Faith. & etc.. Together 
with divers necessary Tables newly added thereto. (London: 
Printed by Bonham， Norton， and John Bi11， Deputie Printers 
for the Kings most Excel1ent Majestie. M.D.C. XVIII.) 
Therein the statute may be found in ful1. 
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Act was designed， said Par1iament to prevent the "pester-
ing of houses with diverse fami1ies， harboring of inmates， 
and converting of great houses into severa1 tenements 
or dwe11ings， and erecting of new bui1dings" in the 
London area， "whereby great infection of sicknesse and 
dearth of victua1s and fewe11 have grown and ensued， 
and many id1e， vagrant and wicked persons have harbored 
themse1ves there and diverse p1aces of the Rea1me have 
been disappointed of workmen and dispeop1ed."坐/
ln the ear1y 1600・smore Roya1 proc1amations were 
issued against overcrowding and against the bui1ding 
of houses in and about London， but much new bui1ding 
continued to take p1ace in disregard of the roya1 pro-
c1amations.担/ These roya1 proc1amations seemed to be 
concerned with aesthetics as we11 as safety.笠/ For 
examp1e， the 1604 Proc1amation decreed no new houses 
were to be bui1t in London or within nine mi1es thereof， 
" .• except a11 the utter wa1s and windowes thereof， 
and the fore-front of the same， be made who11y of bricke， 
or bricke and stone. ・ 111 And the 1620 Proc1amation 
estab1ished ru1es for the number and height of stories， 
size of window8， and 80 forth.生皇/
44. 玉三..at page 407. 
45. The response to the proc1amations appeared to be poor. 
Simi1ar proc1amations were issued in 1604， 1605， 1607. 1608， 
1611. 1615， 1618. 1619. 1620， 1622， 1625， and 1630. (Ho1ds-
worth. Vo1. 4 呈旦旦主主， at page 304). Whi1e some proc1amations 
were re-issued because they expired within a given time， 
others were re-issued because the King encountered enforce-
ment prob1ems. 互主主防low1esand Pitt. 主主旦玉三， pages 18・22.
46. Harrison. ~主主， at page 130. 
47. As quoted in Harrison. 三旦旦主主， at page 130. 
48. 玉三..at page 131， 132・133. These roya1 bui1ding regu1ations 
were for the most part ignored. as there simp1y was not a 
sufficient1y-interested body charged with their enforcement. 
For examp1e， in 1627 one Arthur Cunda11 was hau1ed before 
the King and Counci1 for erecting a house on the King's own 
1and near Par1iament stairs. contrary to an ordinance forbidding 
new houses except on o1d foundations. issued in 1607. Given 
14 days to prove the existance of an o1d foundation or pu11 
down the bui1dings， Cunda11 not on1y succeeded in defying the 
King and Counci1. but obtained 1icenses to serve己主 therein，
which he was still doing as 1ate as 1638! Brett-James， "The 
Growth of Stuart London，'・ asrecorded in Know1es and Pitt. 
豆旦E!.呈 atpage 22. 
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工n 1624， par1iament passed an Act authorizing 
Sa1tpetre-men to dig up f100rs of stab1es and any other 
p1ace where earth saturated with anima1 matter cou1d be 
found， from which gunpowder might be made. Besant re-
counts that this practice became quite a grievance 
no one was permitted to pave over these f100rs as a 
resu1t --but no he1p came unti1 1656 when the threat 
of civi1 war had substantia11y abated. Thereafter， the 
owner's permission to dig was required.笠/
In response to the great fire of 1666 which destroyed 
most of London， par1iament again took over the regu1a-
tion of 1and use in serious fashion. "An Act for the 
Rebuilding of the City of London"旦/divided a11 new 
housing in London into four c1asses， with separate re-
gu1ations governing each. Uniform roof 1ines were re-
quired in many areas， and the Act required a11 houses 
on "high" streets to have front ba1conies， "four feet 
broad， with rai1s and bars of iron， of equa1 distance 
from the ground，" with pavements in front "of good and 
sufficient f1at stone." The ground f100r was required 
to be not 1ess than six nor more than eighteen inches 
above street 1eve1， and no bu1ks， jetties， windows， 
posts， seats， "or anything of 1ike sort" was to be made 
to extend "beyond the ancient foundation of houses. " 
互主/
Fina11y， to "encourage" rebui1ding， a11 owners 
of dwe11ings were given three years from the date of 
the Act in which to commence rebui1ding. After that 
time the Mayor and Counci1 of London cou1d upon due 
notice se11 the 1and to another party who wou1d com-
mence bui1ding. ~ 
49. Besant， London in the Time of the Stuart~ (1903) at pp. 185・186.
50. 19 Ch. 1I C.3 (8 Stat. Large. pages 233・251)• 
51. 19 Ch. 11 C.3 Paragraphs X111 and X1V. 
52. 19 Ch. 11 C.3 Paragraph XV. The rest of the Act reads 
1ike a modern hea1th and bui1ding code， regu1ating sewers， 
methods of construction. etc. For an examp1e of a fire 
1aw on1y， pure and simp1e， cf. 6 Anne C.3 (1707) (11 Stat./L. 
414 et三三旦・)dea1ing with making of fire hydrants， engines， 
fire procedures， etc. Hard1y a word about am哩nityhere. 
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Land use contro1s were not 1imited to dense1y popu-
1ated areas. The marshy condition of many parts of 
Eng1and gave rise to yet another series of 1and use 
contro1s re1ating to the creation of drainage systems 
and the prevention of f1oods. As various tenants con-
structed sea-wa11s and drainage works on their own prop-
erty， it soon became readi1y apparent that neg1igence 
on the part of a sing1e tenant cou1d resu1t in the in-
undation of an entire region. Thus as ear1y as 1250 
the 1andowners of Romney Marsh chose 24 "jurats" to 
watch over the sea-wa11 and watercourses， compe11ing 
each owner to maintain in repair wa11s of a certain 
length and "watergangs." Reca1citrant 1andowners were 
fined and their goods subject to seizure by the jurats' 
bai1iff. 53/ 
In 1532， the who1e process was forma1ized by en-
actment of the Statute of Sewers，当/which authorized 
Commissions to govern the sewers -- sea-wa11s and water-
courses -- in each district. The Commissions for Sewers， 
as they were ca11ed， were authorized to cause repairs 
to be made and to impress whatever was needed into service， 
to occupy lands and to seize and transport topsoi1. 主/
53. Sidney and Beatrice Webb， ~ng1ish Loca1 Governmen~， Vo1. 4， 
Authorities for Specia1 Purpose~ (1922) pp. 13・17. Such pro-
cedures， with variations， were common 1n Kent and Surrey as we11. 
54. 23 Henry V111 C.5. "The word 'sewer' itself a10ne is sufficient 
to show the nature of the office created by commissions of sewers. 
Sewer is a Saxon ward，旦と些王， that is，盟主4盟主主， protection 
against sea tides， whatever its construction." Smith， 2.旦主主， at 16. 
55. However， it appears that a11 such occupations and seizures --as 
opposed to the ordering of repairs by 1ando岬ners，was 1ibera11y 
compensated. Webb，旦区呈， at pp. 20・23，36， 56. 主主邑旦， Tou1min 
Smith， 1:he Metropo1is Loca1 Management Act. 185i (London: Henry 
Sweet， 1855) pp. 5・6，8-11， 16・26. 1n pertinent part， the Statute 
of Sewers charged the Commissioners "to survey the said walls， 
streams， ditches， banks， gutters， sewers， gates， ca1cies， bridges， 
trenches， wi11s， mi11dams， f1oodgates， ponds， 1ocks， hebbing wears 
and other impediments， 1ets and annoyances" and to cause them "to 
be I!凶de，corrected， repaired， amended， put down or reformed as the 
case shall require" and to .impress into their service as many 
"carts， horses， oxen， beasts and other instruments" and "workmen 
and 1aborers" as they deemed necessary， as we11 as to appropriate 
compu1sori1y "timber and other necessaries." According to the 
Webbs (p.36) this authority was never disputed， a1though throughout 
the 18th Century the cost of repairs was for the 目白stpart borne 
by the particu1ar owners of frontages (p.56). 













































































Other ear1y 1and use contro1s invo1ved "common 
1ands，" either open cu1tivated fie1ds， or non-cu1tivated 
wood1and or moor known as "wastes." The commons be-
10nged to a manora1 10rd but neighboring persons had 
rights to graze catt1e or cut wood on them. In either 
case such property rights were known as "common rights" 
and those possessing the right to "common" were ca11ed 
'commoners. " 
The common rights in cu1tivated fie1ds were usua11y 
dispersed in a genera11y random manner: 
As the strips of each farmer 1ay 
scattered one here and one there through 
1arge common fie1ds， a great part of his 
time and that of his 1abourers was spent 
in journeying from one of his p10ts to 
another.. • • At Wendover， in Bucks， one 
tenant in 1794 he1d 18 acres in 31 a110t-
ments; but he was far outdone by a farmer 
in G10ucestershire， who had one acre 
divided into 8 11ands" spread over a 
1arge common fie1d， so that he must 
trave1 two or three mi1es to visit the 
who1e of his acre. The expense of 
reaping and carting was proportionate1y 
increased. ・・・ 当 /
As a resu1t of mu1tip1e rights in one fie1d， some 
to p1ough， some to graze catt1e， it was necessary t。
observe a strict timetab1e with respect to the sowing 
and reaping of crops because of seria1 rights to pasture. 
The crops were thus subject to trespass， thievery and 
tramp1ing， not on1y by individua1 farmers because of 
scattered ti11age rights， but a1so by 1ivestock. Im-
provement in agricu1tura1 methodo10gy was thus rendered 
impossib1e. W 
Scrutton， 呈旦E互主， at page 115. 
For example， in Cambridgeshire， the Village of Pampisford "inter-
commoned" with the Vil1age of Whittlesford on 20 acres of arable 
land "from hay harvest to Lady Day， with a 'bite'on Easter Sunday." 
This "bite" --during wI1ich commonable animals were allowed to 
graze ・-lasted from 6:00 a.m. to the end of Church services， 
during which period so many were driven onto the commons位、at"a11 
chance of a hay crop for the year was destroyed." Scrutton. 





One of the most serious of these agricultural problems 
was the illegal "surcharge" of the comrnon， as Garrett 
Hardin described it -- the pasturing of more animals 
than the comrnon field could support. Each commoner 
found it to be to his ultimate advantage to pasture as 
many cows as possible on the comrnon field since he gen-
era11y possessed， as to g王呈zi旦旦， an undivided share in 
that fie1d. 1t "cost" him nothing extra， no matter how 
large or how smal1 his herd might be. ~ Unfortunately， 
when every comrnoner came to the same conc1usion， sur-
charging was the result. The anima1s were thus often 
ha1f-starved and therefore prey to every disease known 
at the time. ~ Moreover as the animals were pastured 
in a comrnon area， once a disease appeared it spread 
rapid1y among them.三ν
Comrnon rights to graze anima1s in the lord of the 
manor's "waste" 1ands were the jealous1y-guarded pre-
rogative of the yeoman farmer. The Statute of Merton旦/
in 1236 sanctioned "enclosure" (i.e.， Fencing of the 
1and and extinguishment of the comrnoner ・sright to use 
it) by 10rds of the manor of such "wastes，" but on1y if 
the lord was assured that there was sufficient pasturage 
remaining for the tenants. The idea of interfering 
with such a right as comrnon pasture was not taken lightly. 
But economic conditions provided an increasing 
incentive to enclose cultivated as well as waste lands. 
Plagues in the Fourteenth Century reduced the supply of 
58. "The Tragedy of the Commons，" 162 ~己盟主主， 1243 (December 13， 
1968) at 1244. 
59. There was a substantia1 qua1itative difference between 
anima1s raised on commons as opposed to those raised in 
an enc10sed pasture. The incidence of "rot" among sheep 
was a11eged to be the greater among the former c1ass of 
anima1s by a ratio of 5:1， and it was apparent1y not 
unusua1 to 10se up to half a f10ck in one year to "rot." 
巴.a1so Dorothy George， ~ng1and in Transitio~， pages 81・96，
for accounting of reasons， facts and figures supporting 
enc10sures --and the often unfortunate effects on vi11age 
life. 
60. Scrutton， 三旦旦主主， pages 116・126.
61. 20 Hen. 111 C.4; cf. Tate， 主.E.!:!， page 61・62.
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labor to work the manorial farms and increased its cost. 
&11 Meanwhile the wool trade increased following the 
Wars of the Roses.立11 By turning to sheepherding in 
enclosed fields， the lord had the advantage of often 
making as much as he previously did from tillage， with 
fewer laborers to pay. These factors provided an irre-
sistable impetus to enclose， thereby extinguishing 
62. The reduction in the number of commoners forced fifty 
percent increases in wages (paid to tenants to work 
his 10rd's land as well as his own， rather than the 
old tenuria1 requirements， which were by now commuted 
to money payments) so that former methods of open-
field cu1tivation were not profitable to the lords 
of the manor. The 10rds sought to revert to the 
"customary services" of their tenants now far IT悶re
va1uab1e than their 冒~ney commutation which was 
formerly used to足立 laborersto do the work 
origina1ly done by the tenant in return for en-
feoffment. When these efforts， 1nclud1ng an 111-
starred "Statute of Labourers" (25 Edw. III C.1) 
1ntended to主主主 tenantsto work at the old rates， 
failed， the lords looked for other ways to turn a 
profit on their lands. 
63. Another impetus to enc10se was the suppression of 
the monasteries and the confiscat10n of the1r lands. 
When abbots' 1ands. for years "t111ed on an easy 
custo冒温rysystem' were granted to noblemen. they 
were anxious to convert them to the raising of 
sheep. This was often accomplished despite a 
statute which required the grantees of monastery 
1and to retain as much in til1age as formerly. 
(27 Hen. VIII C.28 Section 17 as quoted in Scrutton. 
些匹~. page 81). Even the nat10nal defense was 
used as an excuse to enc1ose. A statute of 1555 
directed enclosure commissioners to see to the 
enclosing of parts of the northern counties within 
twenty m11es of the Scots border. (2 & 3 Phi1. & 
Hary C.1. 三三.Scrutton. 担E!.!..page 94.) 
Di日l凶 byGoogle
73. 
common rights of pasture.旦/
Many enclosures were undertaken illegally. Commoners 
were forced to seek their remedies in court to prevent 
enclosures which threatened their agricultural live-
lihood.三21 By the Sixteenth Century， the commoners 
received support frαn such well known figures as Sir 
Francis Bacon，主主/Sir Thomas More， ~ and Sir Anthony 
64. Scrutton. 主2主主.page 74・78. There even deve10ped a "1ega1" 
method of sorts to accomp11sh enc10sure in the Fifteenth 
and SixteenthCentur1es by means of an Exchequer or Chancery 
Decree， a11eged1y sett1ing a dispute b叫 t1n fact confirming 
an agreement to enc10se between the 10rd and poss1b1y cer-
ta1n of h1s tenants who had been bought out. Often the 
threat of such a suit wou1d bring tenants around to agree-
ment as the costs cou1d be ruinous to a sma11 farmer. Tate， 
三旦2主， pages 45・48and 67三L三三旦・ Such enc10sing was not 
accomp1ished without oppos1tion 1n some portions of the 
rea1m， and ar冒隠dstrugg1es and even open rebe11ion broke 
out throughout the Sixteenth Century， especia11y as demand 
for good graz1ng 1and raised rents paid by sma11 1andh01ders 
to the 1and， and statutes against enc10sures were ignored. 
Scrutton， ~互主， p唱ges86・91;Tate. 呈旦旦主主. page 67. Revo1ts 
of sorts broke out in 1536， 1549， 1554， 1569， 1596 and 1607. 
Peter Ramsey， 1:udor Econom1c Prob1em~， London: Victor Go11ancz 
Ltd. (1963) at pages 20・22. Enc10sures of wastes in the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centur1es had been more often 
for the prov1ding of pr1vate parks and hunting preserves 
for manor1a1 barons and other 10rds. Scrutton， 三旦旦玉三， at 
pages 72・82. Th1s 1s not to say such creat10n of parks 
ceased a1together 1n the Sixteenth Century. lndeed， 1t con-
t1nued to be one of the major commonor comp1aint w1th re-
spect to enc10sures. Great areas were enc10sed for deer 
parks. One fami1y， Tonne1y， was so infamo叫s1n taking 1n 
parks that 1oca1 trad1t10n had 1t that a Tonne1y was doomed 
to wander to and fro 1n his park， cry1ng "Lay out， 1ay 0叫 tJ・
(the oppos1te of "take 1n.")主主 Scrutton，pages 82・86.
65. Scrutton， 呈旦E主， at page 68三L丘三旦 Tate，豆旦E玉三， page 60 !:!..三三旦・
66. "Enc1osures began to be more frequent， whereby arab1e 1and， 
which co叫 1dnot be manured without peop1e and fami1ies， was 
turned 1nto pasture， wh1ch was easily r1d by a few herdsmen; 
and tenancies for years， 1ives， and of wi11， whereupon much 
of the yeo叩anry1ived， were turned into demesnes. 百lisbred 
a decay of peop1e. • • ." !!acon Work~. ed. by Spedding， vi.， 
93・94，as quoted 1n Scrutton， 豆旦旦玉三， page 76. 
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Fitzhubert，盟Ibecause the resu1t of enc10sure was 10ss 
of 1ive1ihood for the agricu1tura1 tenant and depopu1ation 
or even vanishing of who1e vi11ages. ~ A 1and popu1ated 
with free tenants ready to fight for their own was far 
more difficu1t to invade， they argued， than an unbroken 
horizon of open fie1ds with the odd manor or shepherd.1Q/ 
Throughout the Sixteenth and into the Seventeenth 
Century common fie1ds cou1d be 1awfu11y enc10sed if 
tenants had abso1ute but undivided rights in cu1tivated 
1and， sometimes in common with their 10rd. 明le1and 
was divided amongst a11 that cou1d show a 1ega1 interest 
and the 1arger parce1s cou1d thus be 1ega11y enc10sed. 
These agreements were genera11y confirmed by chancery 
court or by roya1 1icense， if the crown had an interest 
therein.五/
But with respect to the former1y open and uncu1ti-
vated wastes of the manor， and with respect to many open 
fie1ds， i11ega1 enc10sure by force at the hands of the 
10ca1 10rd continued. 161 Throughout the Sixteenth 
Century， King and Par1iament reacted by passing statutes 
盟註盟主 enc10sure，for reasons a1ready noted -- the 
dec1ine of food production， the desire for a popu1ated 
67. Thomas Hore， 1!.旦己主(Thirded. by H. U. S. Ogden) New York: 
App1eton ・Century-Crofts， 1949， at pages 9・10.
68. Back of Surveyin&， as quoted in Scrutton， 三2王主， page 79. 
69. Scrutton， 呈旦旦主主， at pages 130・133.
70. Tate，!.旦2主主， pages 121・122: 1nstitutes， V01. 111 (1644 ed.) 
at page 205. Even 1ρrd Coke was of the opinion that 
enc10sures --especia11y of manora1 waste --were con-
trary to the common 1aw. 
71. 1n the 1540's the Lord Protector Somerset， just prior to 
his downfa11 and eventua1 execution， issued a proc1a町田tion
"agβinst enc10sures and the taking in of fie1ds that were 
accustomed to 1ie open for the behoof of the inhabitants， 
and ordered those who had enc10sed those commons shou1d 1ay 
them open by the first of May 1549." (II1， 1002， as reported 
in Scrutton，盟主主主， page 86.) Other statutes and proc1amations 
of the period a1so attempted， apparent1y ineffectua11y， to 
contr01 the spread of enclosures. 




countryside in case of invasion. 111 Aside from further 
enclosure to reclaむnswamps and marshes， "illegal・ en-
closures of co町~on pasture， by might more than right 
and often without compensation， continued well into the 
Seventeenth Century.五/
Although originally often illegal， 121 the enclosure 
movement gradually received the blessing of parliament 
through the adoption of a variety of statutes and the 
creation of enclosure commissions， until by the time of 
colonization of the new world at the end of the Seven-
teenth Century the commoners were beginning to be deprived 
of all rights to use their land through confirmation of 
九 greed" enclosure by Parliament.五 /
3. Land Use Requlation and Propertv Riqhts 
Land use regulation， even if it forbade "land-
owners" any development of their property， did not 
appear to have offended the medieval sense of justice. 
"The idea that a man may do as he likes with his own，" 
notes Holdsworth， "would have been wholly denied" by 
lawyers and philosophers of that day: 
73. Scrutton， 豆旦2主， pages 80・95. A series of acts ・・ 4 Hen. 
VII， 27 Hen. VIII C.22， 243 Phi1.& Mary C.2， 5 E1iz. C.2 ・
a11 provided for the increase in ti11age and the tearing 
down of enc10sures， but were evaded. Even those genera11y 
excepted enc10sures for the rec1aiming of swamps， the growth 
of woods， and the nationa1 defense. 
74. Scrutton， 呈旦2主， at 102， describes such an enc10sure in 
Wi1tshire， recorded in a comp1aint addressed to Par1iament 
by the co町田IDns. As 1ate as 1655 comp1aints were addressed 
to Par1iament concerning arbitrary enc10sure of pasture， in 
comp1ete disregard of common rights. Scrutton， 三旦E王三， at 105. 
75.旦.Scrutton and Tate，盟主主主， gener a lly • 
76. Scrutton， 三旦~， at 80: Whi1e some tenants were bought out， 
others were frightened out. Those with a ss凶 11common interest 
in the 1and proposed to be enc10sed were often coerced into 
the "agreement" which， by the mid-Eighteenth Century was a1ways 
reduced to a Par1iamentary Act. Litera11y hundreds of such 
Par1iamentary Enc10sure Acts were so passed. And the Ss回 11commoner 
was 1eft with a parce1 so sma11 that he cou1d do nothing but se11 ・
probab1y the intent of the big ho1ders anyway --and thereby 10se 
his 1ive1ihood a1together. George， 豆旦E玉三， at page 80・82;
Scrutton， 三旦旦主主， at 113・150.
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"Property， said the Doctor and 
student， was given by the 1aw of man， 
not by the 1aw of God or reason， and 
therefore 'the same 1aw may assigne 
such conditions upon the propertie as 
it 1isteth， so they be not against the 
1aw of God nor the 1aw of reason.' 
Therefore the state cou1d determine the 
lむnitationsunder which property cou1d 
be acquired. In other words it cou1d 
regu1ate the conditions under which a11 
branches of commerce and ind¥且strycou1d 





































As 10ng as these regu1ations were designed to pro-
mote the pub1ic benefit， rather than the persona1 benefit 
of the King， justice was not offended. This attitude 
was exemp1ified by the decision in the year 1606 of 
The Case of the Kinq's Preroqative in Sa1tpetr~. w 
A 1andowner c1a imed co四pensationbecause the King ・s
emp10yees had dug slatpetre fro叩 his 1and to make gun-
po岬 der. The court defended the King・sactions and he1d 
that no compensation was required. 
" .. for the case of sa1tpetre 
extends to the defense of the who1e realm， 
in which every subject has benefit: but 
so it is not in the case of the preparation 
of the King's houses • • . But the King 
cannot charge the subject for the making 
of a wa11 about his own house or to make a 
bridge to co叩e to his house， 主旦L主主主主
does not extend to the pub1ic benefit: 
but when enemies come against the rea1m 
to the sea-coast， it is 1awfu1 to come 
upon any 1and adjoining to the same coast， 
to make trenches or bu1warks for the de-
fense of the realm， for every sub;ect hath 
a benefi t by it . . . for this is for the 
pub1ic， and every one hath benefit by it." 
[emphasis addedJ12I 
Ho1dsworth (Vo1.4)， Boston: Litt1e，Brown & Co.. 1924. page 316. 
12 Co. Rep. 12; 77 E.R. 1294. 






But coincident in time with the extensive regu1a-
tion of 1and use and enc10sure of common 1and that 
characterized the E1izabethan and Stuart periods was 
a reviva1 of interest in individua1 property rights 
and， in particu1ar， in the Magna Carta. ・TheE1iza-
bethan reviva1 of Magna Carta had begun in the 1580・s，" 
and as Professor Wi11iam Dunham put it， "for over 
fifty years the Charter enjoyed an indian summer."旦QI
One commentator has said of the reprinting of Magna 
Carta during this period that "it thus refreshed 1ega1 
memory which had not， for a century now， had the forma1 
reminder of a Par1iamentary confirmation."旦/
This renewed interest in the Magna Carta was pri-
mari1y generated by the batt1e of the par1iaments 
against domination by the Stuart Kings. Its chief 
theoretician was Sir Edward Coke. 
Coke took issue with James I on the proper p1ace 
of common 1aw in the hierar.chy of 1aw.笠/ Coke's 
position was basica11y that the courts had the right 
and duty to interpret and app1y statutes to preserve 
invio1ate the reason of the common 1aw， those princip1es 
of natura1 justice which the common 1aw was genera11y 
he1d to凹 .bodyat this time.包 / But James I had brought 
with him from Scot1and no common 1aw --because there 
was none in Scot1and. To the Stuart King， fundamenta1 
1aw was on1y that which preserved the 1ineage and suc-
cession of monarchs.坐 / On a11 e1se， James I fe1t 
himse1f free to 1egis1ate. Coke ・sresponse was that 
the ancient 1aws， irom Maqna Carta down， were the "fun-
damenta1" guarantees of Eng1ishmen's rights and 1iber-
ties.箆/ It was against this background that Coke 
wrote his commentaries on property and the Magna Carta 
in the Second Institutee，: .e.2/ 
80. Wi1liam H. Dunham， Jr. "Magna Carta and British Constitu-
tiona1ism，" in Torne， Kur1and. Dunham & Jennings，旦乙Grea玉
虫主主r20，32 (1965). 
81. Swind1er.!旦E主， at page 164. 
82. Ho1dsworth.!旦E主， Vo1.V.; Gough. 主旦主主主. pages 52・53.
83. Gough.!旦2主， pages 48・49.
84. As he to1d his subjects in his speech at陥liteha11on 31 March. 
1607， "百leTrue Law of Free Monarchies." 
85. Gough. 主旦E主主， pages 52・57.










































No !l豆旦 shall be disseised. that is. 
put out of seisen. or dispossessed of his 
free-hold (that is) lands. or livelihood. 
or of his liberties or free-dornes. and 
free-custornes. as belong to hirn by his 
free birthright. unlesse it be by the 
lawful judgrnent. that is. verdict of his 
equals (that is. rnen of his own condition) 
or by the law of the land (that is. so to 
speak. once and for all) by the due course 
and process of law. 包/
78. 
Coke proceeds to illustrate by citing a recent case in 
which a "custorne" of a town perrnitting a lord to 
disseise his tenant if the tenant should fail in what 
he owed for two years. and hold it until arrears were 
paid. was held "a custorne against the law of the land. 
to enter into a rnan ・s freehold in that case without 
action or answer."型 /
By the sarne token. says Coke. a royal grant of 
power to the dyers of London to search and seize cloth 
illegally dyed was sirnilarly declared to be "against 
the law of the land. and this [Magna Carta) statute: 
for no forfeitures can grow by letters patent."旦21
Coke's position that the rights of property had 
"constitutional" status (as we would use the terrn). 
and his atternpt to ascribe a sirnilar status to jury 
trial and other civil liberties.盟/were clearly at 
Coke， ];nstitute~， 三旦EE!" page 46. 
王星..citing 43 E.3 32， Lib. 8 Tr. 41 E1. F01. 125. 
旦.， at 46・47，citing Case de Londres， 2 & 3 Ph. et. Mar. 
Dier 114，115. 
90.. Some historians argue that Coke's views were a1so at odds 
with historical accuracy， and that Coke has foisted his own 
views on his less learned contemporaries for his own p01itical 
motives， with very litt1e to actually support them. Professor 
McKechnie observes that: "There is scarcely one great principle 
of the English Constitution of the present day， or indeed of 
any Constitution in any day， calculated to secure national 
1iberties or otherwise to win the esteem of mankind， which 
has not been read by commentators into the provisions of Magna 






odds with the Stuart Kings ・側n concepts.旦/ But Coke 
was not a10ne in defending property rights against 
roya1 prerogative. The supporters of Par1iament a11 
echoed the chorus in response to the divine-right c1aim 
of the Stuart monarchs. 
Thus in the Par1iamentary Debates of 1610 Hobart 
and Whitc10che hot1y disputed the right of James 1 to 
go contrary to "fundamenta1 1aws" and seize property 
without their consent. 211 In 1628 Pym dec1ared that 
taxation， being a taking of property， required the con-
sent of Par1iament in accordance with "the ancient and 
fundamenta1 1aw." W And Sir Dud1ey Diggs， one of the 
four笠/taking the commons part in the debate on the 
case arising out of the imprisonment of five knights 
for refusing to contribute to one of the King・s forced 
loans and their being consequent1y imprisoned without 
bai1， said: 
It is. •. an undoubted and funda-
menta1 point of this so ancient a 1aw of 
Eng1and [Magna CartaJ that the Subjects 
have a true Property in their Goods， 
1ands and Possessions • • • Without this 
and Eighteeoth Centuries discovered among its chapters every 
important reform which they desired to introduce into Eng1and， 
thereby disguising the rev01utionary nature of many of their 
projects by dressing them in the garb of the past." McKechnie， 
主 2主， page 156. And Professor Holt also says of Coke ・s
claim that Magna Carta was d晦claratoryof the principal grounds 
of fundamenta1 law in England that even today no one can state 
definitive1y what Chapter 29 or any other part of Magna Carta 
really meant. 師団tpoint is there in demythologizing， then， 
to arrive at what might be yet another myth? Holt， 呈旦旦主主，
page 4・8.
91. Coke's views， expressed in written opinion from the bench 
caused his dismissal， and at one point， his imprisonment. 
Coke 1ater stood for Parliament and was elected to Commons 
from which vantage he played a part in precipitating the 
rebe11ion against Char1es 1. 
92. Gough..!!旦旦主主. at 58. citing Prothero. constitutiona1 Document~， 
pages 351・352.
93. Id.. at 58. citing ~tate Trial~. iii. page 341. 
94. 百四 others being Coke， Litt1eton and Se1don. 
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there can be neither law nor justice 
in a Kingdom. ・・・ w 
四leKing・s refusal to confirm these principles was 
one of the major issues in the English civil war. 明le
Petition of Right reflected parliament・sattempt to re-
state the basic principles it attributed to the Magna 
Carta. The Royalists lost the war， of course， and the 
supremacy of parliament was not challenged again. 
And， more importantly for American purposes， the 
"fundamental" nature of the rights attributed to the 
Magna Carta was established in the minds of the English 
citizens who were engaged in the colonization of the 
new world.笠/
At the time extensive colonization of the new world 
began， therefore， the colonists were fresh from the 
victory of property rights over the royal prerogative 
of seizure. "The great migra tion of America spanned 
those years of the early Seventeenth Century when the 
House of Commons sought to impose its will on the King. 
. Those who came to America carried with them the 
memory of Commons ・battleagainst the King， the out-
come of which left an enduring imprint on the develop-
ment of colonial legislatures during the Seventeenth 
Century."笠/ The colonists also inherited， however， 
a concept of property which permitted extensive regula-
tion of the use of that property for the public benefit 
--regulation that could even go so far as to deny all 
95. Gough， 呈旦E主， at page 63， citing !.ords Journal~， iii， 718. 
It is interesting to note that the result of this debate 
was a request to the King， from Parliament (over the Royalists' 
protests that a subject held his property rights only so long 
t a剖she r目ema悶t凶i臼ned"九su曲bjec叫tト-like'ぜ.つ E出ha叫tthe K臥in時gc∞onf臼ir刊mt出ha叫
according to Hagna Carta and six Statutes conceived to be 
explanatory thereof， and the law and customs of the land， 
every free subject had a "fundamental" property in his goods. 
This the King refused， and the Petition of Rights， said to 
be the forerunner of the American Bill of Rights， follo岬ed.
96. Hazeltine， 呈旦pra，pages 182・185.
97. David Hawke， !he Colonial Experience 62 (1966). 
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productive use of the property to the owner if， as 
Coke himself stated， the regulation "extends to the 
pUblic benefit • • . for this is for the public， and 
every one hath benefit by it." W 




THE COLONIAL BACKGROUND OF恒沼 TAKINGISSUE 
The co1onists of North America brought the ideas 
of Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century Eng1and to a new 
continent， one where the 1and stretched end1ess1y out 
before them， and where they were free from the medieva1 
heritage of feuda1 10rds who c1aimed a share of the 
profits of the man who worked the 1and. 
This p1entitude of 1and and the cherished freedom 
to use it generated a fierce pride in 1and ownership 
that was a key e1ement in the frontier spirit of se1f-
re1iance. Neverthe1ess， on1y a few years after co1oni-
zation began the co1onia1 governments a1so began to re-
gu1ate the use of 1and， and the pattern of regu1ation 
that ensued grew to resemb1e the pattern of regu1ation 
in Eng1and rather c1ose1y. 
1. Land Use Requ1ation in the Co1onies 
A1though the 1and in North America seemed end1ess 
the co1onists soon found it necessary to estab1ish 
intricate syst回 IS of regu1ation to contro1 the growing 
of certain crops. 工n 1631 the Virginia House of Bur-
gesses passed an Act requiring each white adu1t ma1e 
over 16 to grow two acres of corn， or suffer the pena1ty 
by forfeiting an entire tobacco crop. 11 A 1642 Act 
required the growing of at 1east one pound of f1ax and 
hemp， 61 and an Act of 1656 required 1andowners to cu1-
tivate at 1east ten mu1berry trees per 100 acres in 
order to stimu1ate the production of si1k.立/
1. 1 H. 166. 
2. 1 H. 219. 
3. 1 H. 420. 
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The overzea1ous p1anting of va1uab1e and exportab1e 
crops often created prob1ems for the co1onies. P1anters 
of tobacco in New Amsterdam were finding it 1ucrative 
to devote entire p1antations to the profitab1e crop， at 
the expense of the community・ssupp1y of food crops. 
According1y， in 1653 such p1anters were required to sow 
equa1 amounts of corn， peas or grain as tobacco， on 
pain of forfeiting their entire tobacco crop.全/
Equa11y troub1esome was the ruining of va1uab1e 
agricu1tura1 1and by over p1anting --again usua11y 
tobacco. Thus in Virginia in 1632 the p1anting of over 
2000 p1ants per "po1" incurred the pena1ty of having 
one's entire crop destroyed.三/
Regu1ations in urban areas resemb1ed those in 
London. The cities enforced strict 1and use regu1ations 
designed to promote hea1th and safety. In the after-
math of the great fire of Boston， restrictions were 
set up on how a property owner cou1d bui1d his home. 
A series of 1aws was passed requiring the use of brick 
or stone in bui1dings. No dwelling house could be 
bui1t otherwise， and the roof had to be of slate or 
tile upon pena1ty of a fine equal to double the value 
of the building.豆/
More common were building measures designed to 
eliminate unstable structures as we11 as to provide 
fire wa11s. Philadelphia enforced measures concerning 
the construction of party walls， specifying required 
thickness and levying fines for violations. 11 
Other measures， similar to present zoning ordi-
nances， sought to 10cate certain noxious uses in such 
a manner as would render them least offensive to the 
1oca1 citizenry. Thus a 1692 Boston ordinance con-
fined the location of slaughter， sti11， curriers・and
ta1lowchandlers・houses "where it may be least offen-
sive. "旦I And in New York City， slaughtering of 
4. New York Co1onia1 Laws (March 26， 1653. 
5. 
6. Mass. Laws (1672) 269. See Bridenbaugh，豆盟旦， at 206・207
and 364・365.
7. 2 Pa. Stat. 311， Ch. 59. 
8. Bridenbaugh， supr三at 238. 
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anima1s was periodica11y banned a1together.島/
The concept of a "hea1th" regu1ation was sometimes 
carried rather far. Thus， in the city of Phi1ade1phia 
shade trees were required by a 1700 hea1th regu1ation. 
1n "An Act for regu1ating streets，" it was dec1ared 
that 
every owner or inhabitant of any 
and every house in Phi1ade1phia， New-
cast1e and Chester sha11 p1ant one or 
more tree or trees， viz.， pines， un-
bearing mu1berries， water pop1ars， 1ime 
or other shady and who1esome trees be-
fore the door of his， her or their house 
and houses， not exceeding eight feet 
from the front of the house， and pre-
serving the same， to the end that the 
said town may be we11 shaded from the 
vio1ence of the sun in the heat of 
summer and thereby be rendered more 
hea1thy. 担/
And in 1647 New Amsterdam appointed three street 
surveyors， not on1y to keep hog pens and privies off 
the pub1ic highway， but to prevent the bui1ding of 
unsight1y houses， bui1di珂 sand fences.込/
Thus the use of 1and， both in rura1 and urban 
areas， was extensive1y regu1ated in the co1onies. 
A1though the sett1ers may have cherished their new 
freedom to use their 1and they a1so recognized the 
need to regu1ate that use for the good of the community 
as a who1e. 
9. 王立.， at 239. 
10. 2 Pa. Stat. 66， Ch. 53. 
11. John W. Reps， Iown P1anning 1n Frontier America at 187・188.
主主邑旦 pp.111. 116-117. 
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2. Takings of Land for Governmenta1 Purposes 
In the ear1y period of co1onization the taking of 
1and for governmenta1 purposes presented few prob1ems 
since 1and was so p1entifu1. In genera1， the co1onia1 
governments seem to have compensated 1andowners when 
deve10ped 1and was taken for governmenta1 purposes， but 
if the 1and was undeve10ped the government sometimes 
thought it so va1ue1ess that the issue of compensation 
was ignored.旦/
The most common type of pub1ic program which re-
quired the acquisition of 1and was for the construction 
of roads and other transportation projects. Thus in 
1691 an act regu1ating streets in New York City pro-
vided that if， in the continuing or 1aying out of 
streets private 1and was taken， the city government 
was authorized to assess the va1ue of the 1and and 
treat with the owner. In case of disagreement， a jury 
cou1d be impane1ed to fix the va1ue.当/
Massachusetts a1so provided "reasonab1e satis-
faction" to any man for 1and taken for roads， though 
he cou1d not prevent the roads going through his 1and 
so 10ng as it did not require the pu11ing down of his 
house or the digging up of his orchard. よ主/
On the other hand， as 1ate as 1721 it was on1y 
for且区包単 or，!;!.旦且2盟呈 1andthat the payment of com-
pensation was required.当 /
Land was a1so purchased when the need for pub1ic 
bui1dings arose. Thus an act in Pennsy1vania authorized 
certain representatives of the co1ony to purchase a 
piece of 1and in a convenient p1ace in each county for 
the construction of a courthouse and prison. よ三/
12. Stoeb叫ck，.!旦E玉三， at 582. 
13. 1 Laws 269， Ch. 18. 
14. Laws and Libertie~ 25; rene畑ed1 Mass. Acts 136， 137; 
2 Mass. Acts 907; 3 Mass. Acts 1001. Cf. Stoebuck，旦区三，
at 600 (note 152). 
15. 2 Laws 68， Ch. 415. 
16. 4 Pa. Stat. 150， Ch. 310. A 1ater (1742) Act provided for 
the purchase of an is1and for a hospita1 for sick immigrants. 




And in Virginia， 1and was taken， with compensation， 
for the erection of virtua11y new towns， as ear1y as 
1680.立/ An examp1e is the 1742 condemnation of 50 
acres of 1and be10nging to one Jethro Summer for the 
construction of Suffo1k Town.当/
The 10w va1ue p1aced on undeve10ped 1and ref1ected 
the attitudes of those who were working the 1and and 
dis1iked distant specu1ators. Thus， in New Amsterdam 
in 1647 because many persons to whom 1and had been 
granted fai1ed to bui1d on their 10ts the Director 
Genera1 Peter Stuyvesant and his Counci1 decreed that 
"they must erect on their 10ts good and convenient 
houses within 9 months， . . . or in defau1t thereof 
such unimproved 10ts sha11 fa11 back to the patroon 
or Land1ord. ・ 121 This desire to encourage deve1op-
ment of 1and became a common theme in ear1y American 
history. 
A1though compensation was genera11y provided when 
deve10ped 1and was acquired， exceptions were made for 
emergencies. 工n the 1772 case of Emmans v. Brewer辺/
an action of trespass was brought against four men who， 
pursuant to a 1692 statute， demo1ished Emmans・house
in the course of c1earinq an area "deso1ated by the 
great fire of 3 February 1767." A portion of the 1and 
had been designated as a new1y-widened street. The 
remains of the buildings in the area were said to be 
a common nuisance and hazard to passersby. ~ The 
Court he1d the action of trespass i11-founded， in 
part on the ground that the demo1ition was authorized 
by 1aw. 
Short1y thereafter an emergency of nationa1 scope 
arose --the Revo1utionary War. The new Continenta1 
17. 2 H. 473. 
18. 5 H. 244. 
19. John W. Reps， Iown P1annin~ in Frontier Americ~， (1969) at 11. 
20. Reported in The Lega1 Powers of John Adam~， No. 33， at page 
9 et三旦・
21. エ且.， at 11・13.
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Congress sought to mobi1ize its resources to fight the 
war. It passed a res01ution on Apri1 11， 1777， to 
prevent provisions fr叩 I fa11ing into enemy hands. A 
considerab1e store of provisions was taken from various 
owners and removed to a nearby depot， inc1uding some 
be10nging to one Sparhawk. The depot fe11 to the 
British， and after the war Sparhawk "exhibited an 
account" against the pub1ic for the price of the pro-
visions which c1aim was denied by the comptr011er-
genera1. The 1atter refused payment， and 1itigation 
f0110wed， culminating in the 1788 decision of the 
Pennsy1vania Supreme Court of sespub1ica v. Sparhaw'k.盆/
It is c1ear from the decision that the state of 
war which existed in Pennsy1vania at the time was a 
definite factor: 
"The transaction， it must be 
remembered， happened i1aqrante be110: 
and many things are 1awfu1 in that 
season， which wou1d not be permitted 
in a time of peace. The seizure of 
the property in question， can， indeed， 
on1y be justified under this distinc-
tion: for otherwise， it wou1d c1ear1y 
have been a trespass:"包/
Neverthe1ess， the court a1so said that "it is better to 
suffer a private mischief， than a pub1ic inconvenience: 
and the rights of necessity， form a part of our 1aw."当/
After giving a number of i11ustrations of this princip1e， 
the court summarized its opinion as f0110ws: 
"We are c1ear1y of the opinion， that 
Congress might 1awfu11y direct the remova1 
of any artic1es that were necessary to the 
maintenance of the Continenta1 Arτny， or 
22. 1 Dall. 357 ( S. Ct. of Pa.， 1788). 




usefu1 to the enemy， and in danger of 
fa11ing into their hands: for they were 
vested with the powers of peace and war， 
to which this was a natura1 and necessary 
incident: And having done it 1awfu11y， 
there is nothing in the circumstances 
of the case， which， we think， entit1es 
the Appe11ant to a compensation for the 
consequent 10ss." 包/
The 皇盟主旦三 and 主主主主主~ cases are amo珂 thefew 
examp1es of court decisions in which land use regula-
tions or acquisitions were contested.益I In genera1 
it appears that the actions of the co1onial govern-
ments in regard to the use of 1and provoked re1ative1y 
1itt1e controversy. 
3. The Inte11ectua1 Backqround of the Takinq C1ause 
The 1ack of court decisions in the co1onia1 period 
is 1ess surprising if we reca11 that the idea of 
"unconstitutiona1ity，" so fami1iar to us today， was 
then on1y an embryo. While we now think routine1y of 
cha11enging in court the va1idity of a dubious 1egis-
1ative or administrative action， in colonia1 times the 
sUpremacy of the judiciary was not so c1ear1y estab-
25. 1 Da11. 357 at 363. 
26. Records of loca1 judicia1 decisions in the co1onia1 period 
are very difficult to obtain. See Ju1ius Goebe1. 1且旦2!l.
of the Supreme Court of the United States 112・113(1971). 
No such regu1ation seems to have been the cause of an appea1 
to the Privy Counci1 in London. which was the principa1 
appe11ate court for the co1onies. See Joseph H. Smith. 
Appeals to the Privy Counci1 from the American P1antations 
(1950). Because most of the 1and use regu1ations noted herein 
were repeated in statutes enacted over a 10ng period of time 





To understand the intellectual atmosphere which 
generated the taking clause --as well as the rest of 
the bill of rights -- it is necessary to examine various 
legal and political concepts that were being discussed 
in Eighteenth Century America. 
The idea that the judicial process must comport 
with certain basic standards of procedural fairness 
was an ancient English tradition， predating even the 
Norman conquest.包 I But in the Seventeenth Century， 
Sir Edward Coke melded the ancient concept of due 
process with the revival of the Magna Carta to promote 
a theory of parliamentary supremacy --neither judge 
nor king could contradict ・thelaw of the land" as 
made by parliament.認/
Coke ・s 1nstitute~ were basic reading for most 
colonial lawyers，辺Ias was Henry Care's型旦込些
Liberties， or the Freeborn Sub;ect・s Inheritance，込/
a work which apparently was widely circulated as one 
of the first seven books printed in the colonies ~ 
27. Acts of the co1onia1 1egis1atures required approva1 by the 
Privy Counci1， which emphasized to the co1onists their sub-
servience to Eng1and. From the beginning of the Co1onia1 
period at the end of the Seventeenth Century， the various 
co1onies genera11y resisted the suggestion that there was a 
right of appea1 to the Privy Counci1 from co1onia1 courts. 
Whi1e there was never much dispute that conf1icts between 
chartered co1onies might be reso1ved in the Privy Counci1 in 
Eng1and， the Privy Cοunci1 often rendered decisions in favor 
of Eng1ish Governors and Eng1ish interests， and against co1onia1 
c1aims. 主主 JosephHenry Smith， ~ppea1s to the Privy CouncJ! 
from the American P1antation~， pages 56・62，74， 115・118，275， 
295， 314・320.
28. ~旦 J. R. Goebe1， Jr.， "Constitutiona1 History and Constitutiona1 
Law" 38 ~旦1. ~. ~. 555， 563 (1938). 
29. See Chapter 5， 主主主玉三・
30. Ju1ius Goebe1， Jr.， 三三旦玉三 at563. (See esp. note 25 at 563・564.) 
主主監理旦旦エ， Char1es Warren， The History of the American 
邑!.a (193 ). 
31. London: E1iz. Natt and R. Gassing (1719) 4th Ed. 
32. H. D. Haze1tine "The lnf1uence of Magna Carta on American 
Constitutiona1 Deve10p眠 nt"17包1.~.生y. 1 (1917) at 19・20.
Warren， 主旦旦主主.at Ch. II-VI， and VIII. 
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and which quoted extensive1y from the passages in the 
Institute~ dea1ing with property rights and their pr。司
tection by Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta.主/
1n the 1atter part of the co1onia1 period the works 
of Sir Wi11iarn B1ackstone were wide1y circu1ated. Edrnund 
Burke， in his farnous speech to par1iarnent on Conci1iation 
with Arnerica， said "1 hear that they have sold near1y 
as rnany of B1ackstone ・sCornrnentaries in Arnerica as in 
Eng1and."当/
B1ackstone was a strong advocate of the rights of 
1iberty and property: "So great rnoreover is the regard 
of the 1aw for private property， that it wi11 not 
authorize the 1east vio1ation if it; no， not even for 
the genera1 good of the who1e cornrnunity."主/
B1ackstone had 1ectured at Oxford as Vinerian 
Professor of Law， and the Cornrnentarie~ were 1arge1y a 
write-up of those 1ectures. As ear1y as 1759， John 
Adarns of Massachusetts， 1ater President of the United 
States， wrote about the favorab1e irnpression those 
1ectures had rnade upon hirn.当/ Litera11y thousands 
of copies of the cornrnentaries thernse1ves were avai1ab1e 
by the tirne of the revo1ution itse1f. 111 1t is thus 
no wonder that， according to one of B1ackstone's bio-
graphers， when the Constitutiona1 Convention rnet in 
33. Care， ~互主， at 26・33.
34. Quoted in Richard B. Morris， ed.， !he American Revo1ution 
1763・1783:A Bicentennia1 Co11ectio~， 152，154 (1970). 
35. 1 B1ackstone， commentaries at 138・139. 主主DavidA. 
Lockmiller， Sir Wi11iam B1ackston~ (1938) 169・175.
36. Lockmi11er， ~旦~， at 169. 
37. One thousand copies were imported ~担王 to the First American 
editions in 1771・1772. Fourteen hundred comp1ete1y-
subscribed copies 百凶deup that First American edition and， 
according to Lockmiller --"The List of subscribers was headed 
by the G冶vernorsof Virginia， Pennsy1vania， New Jersey， 
Connecticut， East F10rida and the Bahan国 Is1ands. Sixteen 
of the subscribers afterwards became signers of the Dec1aration 
of Independence， six were members of the Constitutional 
Convention， one became President of the United States. and 
one was appointed the first Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court." Lockmiller， supr主， at 170. 
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1787， "most of the members of that body were fami1iar 
with， and they were no doubt great1y inf1uenced by， 
B1ackstone ・sana1ysis of the Eng1ish governmenta1 system. 
w 
As with Coke， B1ackstone discusses Magna Carta in 
very "fundamenta1 ・ terms， whi1e professing be1ief in 
Par1iamentary (but not popu1ar) sovereignty and supremacy: 
III. The third abso1ute right， 
inherent in every Eng1ishman， is that 
of property: which consists in the 
free use， enjoyment and disposa1 of 
a11 his acquisitions， without any con-
tro1 or diminution， save on1y by the 
1aws of the 1and. • • • 
Citing Artic1e 29 of the Magna Carta， he points out that 
common 1aw gives every man a right to go to court if 
he is "put out of his franchises or freeho1d." 121 
A1so inf1uentia1 at this time was an emerging re-
cognition of eminent domain as a 1egitimate power of 
government. We are now accustomed to the idea that the 
government may insist on taking a man ・s 1and if it is 
needed for pub1ic purposes. But why shou1d I give up 
my 1and just because the government says it needs it? 
Regard1ess of whether they offer me compensation， why 
must I obey the government's demand for my 1and? 
Most con官nentatorsattribute the source of the 
concept of eminent domain to the natura1 1aw movement. 
担/ The natura1 1awyers be1ieved that the power is 
38. Lockmi11e，!旦E!.!.at 174. 
39. Robert Ma1com Kerr，官leCommentaries on the Laws of Eng1and 
of Sir Wi11iam B1ackston~， (1876) at 109・1l0.
40. Arthur Lenhoff traced the concept back to the Seventeenth 
Century p01itica1 phi10sopher Hugo Grotius， who justified 
eminent domain in terms of the power of the state over a11 
private property within its bounds and the immunity.of the 
sovereign from any c1aims of his subjects. Arthur Lenhoff， 




inherent in government because it was necessary for its 
independent existence and perpetuity. 50 during colonial 
times the power of eminent domain was accepted as in-
herent in government without the need for an express 
grant of the power.且/
As the Americans debated about the nature of their 
fundamental rights they were strongly influenced by 
these concepts --parliamentary supremacy as embodied 
in the Magna Carta， and the inherent nature of the power 
of eminent domain. 
4. Colonial Precursors of the Takinq Clause 
The parliamentarians said that property could be 
taken only according to the law of the land as expressed 
by parliament. The natural law theorists said the 
sovereign had an inherent power to take property when 
it was needed for public purposes. But neither of these 
theories required that compensation be paid to the owner 
of the taken property. Even under Coke's interpretation 
the Magna Carta had required only that parliament approve 
the taking and had made no mention of compensation. 
The attempts to define fundamental rights in the 
early colonial period show little concern over the com-
pensation issue. Many of the colonial charters referred 
to the taking issue， re1ying heavi1y on Magna Carta's 
Artic1e 29， but made no mention of compensation. The 
1641 Massachusetts Body of Liberties incorporated parts 
of Chapter 29 as we11 as references to "natura1 1aw."盆/
41. See Wi1liam B. Stoebuck， "A Genera1 Theory of Eminent Domain，" 
47盟主主!!.主主・ 553，at 559-560. 
42. M. Farrand (ed.) Laws and Liberties of Ma ssachusett~ (1648) vi; 
cf. Haze1tine，主主巴~， at 15， and Phi1ip B. Kur1and，出盟主
Carta and Constitutionalism in the United States: "The Nob1e 
Lie岬 inThe Great Charter Four Essays on Magna Carta and 
百1eHistory of Our Liberty (1965) at 52. 
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Parts of the Magna Carta were a1so inc1uded in a number 
of charters granted by the Stuart Kings.担/
Ear1y "fundamenta1" 1aws passed by the co1onia1 
legis1atures a1so incorporated various provisions of 
the Magna Carta. 官leMassachusetts Body of Liberties 
of 1641 required that compensation be paid for catt1e 
and goods: 
8. No man's catt1e or goods of what 
kinde soever sha11 be pressed or taken 
for any pub1ique service un1ess it be 
by warrant grounded upon some act of the 
genera11 court [i.e.， co1onia1 1egis1a-
ture]， nor without such reasonab1e prices 
and hire as the ordinarie rates of the 
countrie do afford. And if his Catt1e 
or goods sha11 perish or suffer damage 
in such service， the owner sha11 be suf-
ficient1y recompenced.坐/
No simi1ar sentiments were expressed， however， about 
the taking of 1and.坐/
The Assemb1y of Pennsy1vania， in its first session 
(pennsy1vania was founded in 1682) passed a "fundamenta1" 
1aw that a freeman cou1d not be dispossessed of his free-
ho1d without due process of 1aw.坐/
43. (1606) R. Co. Rep. 12・13;77 E.R. 1295. The Magna Carta it-
se1f was printed for circu1ation around the turn of the 
Seventeenth Century. 玉昼" pages 188・190，206・207.
44. 1 H. 166. The document as a who1e was drafted by Nathanie1 
Ward， a co1onia1 minister and former 1awyer， and passed by 
the co1ony's 1egis1ature "as a body of grounds of 1aws， in 
resemb1ance to a Magna Carta，" according to the t.hen Governor， 
John Winthrop. (1 H. 266.) "They were apparent1y compiled 
from the Scriptures， Magna Carta， and the statutes and common 
1aw of Eng1and." (1 H. 219). 
45. Professor Chafee has suggested an ana10gy between the taking 
c1ause and the 28th Artic1e of the Magna Carta， prohibiting the 
taking of grain or provisions by the King without payment in 
money. Z. Chafee， ~ow the Human Rights Got Into The Constitu-
主担旦 45(1952). 
46. 1 H. 420. 
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Intermediate co1onia1 documents of the revo1utionary 
period continued to fo11ow Coke's pattern， expressing 
concern on1y over takings by the executive without 1egis-
1ative approva1. The Rights of the Co1onists and a List 
of Infringements and Vio1ations (1772)， 1arge1y drafted 
by Samue1 Adams， ref1ected the prevai1ing phi1osophy. 
The Supreme power cannot just1y 
take frαn any man， any part of his 
property without his consent， in 
person or by his Representative. 三v
5. Ear1v State Bi11s of Riqhts 
The first American dec1aration of the princip1e of 
just compensation for the taking of 1and appeared in 
Vermont・s first constitution of 1777: 
工1. That private property ought to be 
subservient to pub1ic uses when necessity 
requires it: neverthe1ess， whenever any 
particu1ar man's property is taken for 
the use of the pub1ic， the owner ought 
to receive an equiva1ent in money.担/
The document， whi1e passed by the 1egis1ature， was never 
ratified by the peop1e of Vermont， though the compen-
sation c1ause was inc1uded in a 1ater document which 
was fina11y ratified in 1786. 
47. 1 Schwartz 203. 
48. J. B. Wi1bur， !ra Allen: Founder of Vermon~， 96 (1928). 
The document was large1y drawn by 1ra A11en and Dr. Thomas 
Young， the 1atter of Pennsy1vania. Commentators frequently 
note its ab01ition of s1avery as a significant departure 
from the Pennsy1vania mode1， but no one other than Schwartz， 
(at 1， p. 319) seems ever to have commented on the departure 
as to compensation for taking. Vermont had not been a separate 
c010ny but had been part of New Hampshire. 1n 1777， after 
Ncw York and New Hampshire had feuded over its territory， 
Vermont dec1ared its own independence and set up a go噌ernment.
Later in 1777 a convention adopted a Constitution and Dec1ara-
tion of Rights， 1argely mode1ed on the Pennsy1vania documents 
of a year ear1ier. 1 Schwartz 322. 
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明leorigina1 Massachusetts constitution was ratified 
in the interim (1780) thus becoming the first ratified 
American constitution to have a compensation c1ause:笠/
X. Each individua1 of the society has 
a right to be protected by it in the 
enjoyment of his 1ife， 1iberty， and prop-
erty， according to standing 1aws. He 
is ob1igated， consequent1y， to contribute 
his share to the expense of his protec-
tion~ to give his persona1 service， or 
an equiva1ent， when necessary: But no 
part of the property of an individua1 
can， with justice， be taken from him or 
app1ied to pub1ic uses without his own 
consent， or that of the representative 
body of the peop1e: In fine位lepeop1e 
of this Commonwea1th are not contr011ab1e 
by any other 1aws， than those to which 
their constitutiona1 representative body 
have given their consent. And芝註呈旦主主主主
the oUb1ic exiqencies reαuire. tha t the 
prooertv of anv individua1 shou1d be ap-
Drooriated to 0¥止)1icuses. he sha11 re-
Ceive a reasonab1e compensation therefor. 
(Emphasis addedJ 豆島/
The Massachusetts Dec1aration of Rights， drafted 
in 1780 by John Adams， and apparent1y the basis for 
that constitution， contains a sentence dec1aratory of 
the princip1e of just compensation. This 1ast sentence 
on compensation was added at the end of Artic1e X by 
amendment during debate， but the records of the conven-
tion give no indication who proposed it or why， or what 
49. Stoebuck.呈盟主主.at 568. n.57・主主呈lso.J.A.C. Grant. "The 
'High-Law' Background of the Law of Eminent Domain." C. Wi三-
1. s里笠・ 67 (1930) at 71. 




discussion may have preceded its adoption. 旦/
Other states provided that land might not be taken 
for public use without consent of the legislature. The 
provisions were more in the nature of due process clauses， 
providing that the consent of the property owner， or his 
representative・swas required. Thus Pennsylvania's 
Declaration of Rights provided: 
51. Schwartz 341・342;Stoebuck. !旦~， at 567. A review of the 
returns of each town in Massachusetts. rejecting the 1778 
attempt of drawing up a constitution for that state. finds 
the issue of compensation rare1y. and then on1y brief1y. 
mentioned， a1though one co官官憶ntatorneverthe1ess maintains 
the peop1e in the towns rejected that document because of 
"the 1ack of a Bi11 of Rights. about exc1usion of Negroes 
from the suffrage， and about the inadequacy of the safe-
guards to property." Hand1in and Handlin， !旦E主主， at 22. 
The above work reprints the forma1 "returns" usua11y in the 
form of a reso1ution from each town， both with respect to 
the 1778 and 1780 Constitutions. In fact on1y two towns --
Lenox and Essex --specifica11y mentioned ・幽 and very brief1y --
the need to protect the ownership of property from government 
action， in giving reasons for rejecting the 1778 docu臨 nt
(PP. 254・324). Of much greater concern to those towns (by 
far the minority) who saw fit to set down主主主主on呈 fortheir 
rejection， were the issues of 阻 nnerof representation. 
the existence of a bi11 of ri酔 tsgenera11y and Negro 
suffrage (see pages 202・379).
As to the 1780 Constitution which combined the 1anguage 
quoted above and which 宝主主 ratified，the town of Pittsfie1d 
specifical1y mentioned in its "charge" to its de1egate to 
the convention that， among the items which ought to be con-
sidered in a bi11 of ri酔 ts，"that no man's property of 
right can be taken from him without his consent， given 
either in person or by his representative" (p. 411) ought 
to be inc1uded. None of the other "charges" co11ected 
by the Hand1ins contain simi1ar 1anguage however. Nor 
is there a sing1e word about property and compensation in 
the March， 1780， Address of the Convention purporting to 
exp1ain the 1780 document to "Friends and Countrymen" 
(pp. 434・440). As to the returns of the towns on the 1780 
document， some towns set out in detai1 the vote of the town 
on each artic1e. (e. g.， Stockbridge at p. 495). Genera11y， 
Artic1e X which contained the above-quoted compensation 
c1ause passed unanimous1y. (Though for some reason the 
people voted当盆旦主 itin Mansfield). 
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a right to be protected in the enjoyment 
97. 
of life， liberty， and property， and there-
fore is bound to contribute his protection 
towards the expense of that protection， 
and yield his personal service when neces-
sary， or an equivalent thereto: But no 
part of a man's property can be justly 
taken from him or applied to public uses， 
without his own consent or that of his 
legal representatives. ~ 
The original (pre-1789) constitutions of Maryland， 
New York， and North Carolina， and the second (pre-1789) 
constitutions of South Carolina and New Hampshire， all 
contained clauses to the effect that one should not be 
deprived of life， liberty or property without the consent 
of the law of the land. 211 But the first constitut-
ions of Delaware， Georgia， New Hampshire， New Jersey 
and South Carolina made noreference to the taking issue 
at all.旦/
6. The Draftincr of the Takincr Clause 
The Federal Constitutional Convention did not 
adopt a Bill of Rights， though the subject was brought 
up towards the end of the convention by Eldridge Gerry 
of Massachusetts， seconded by George Mason， the drafts-
man of the Virginia Declaration of Rights. In general， 
the demand for a Bill of Rights by the states represented 
anti-federalist sentiment --largely rural interests. 
In many of the state conventions which ratified the 
Constitution the antifederalists opposing the consti-
tution made an issue of the lack of a bill of rights. 
Many of the states sent proposed amendments to the 
new national government for the proposed bill of rights， 
but apparently the need for an eminent domain clause 
52. 1 Schwartz 265. 




did not come up in these debates. 221 工n fact， of the 
eight states which took the trouble to formulate amend-
ments to the Constitution --Virginia， Pennsylvania， 
Massachusetts， Maryland， South Carolina， New Hampshire， 
New York and North Carolina --none of them had a word 
to say in their formal recommendations about property 
and compensation.旦/ There were only cursory， unoffi-
cial references by a few official committees. Thus， 
in Maryland， there is a record in committee of a number 
of personal liberty guarantees， but apparently none had 
anything to do with real property and compensation. 
Moreover， none of the guarantees were adopted. 221 New 
York ratified "in confidence" that a bill of rights 
would be added， but again there is no record of specific 
mention of an eminent domain clause.旦/工n Pennsylvania 
it appears that a "group of ・gentlemen'"met in Phila-
delphia主主主主 ratificationand drafted some amendments 
to be proposed by their legislature to Congress. Again， 
no mention of an eminent domain clause.旦/
The Federalists argued that no Bill of Rights was 
needed， but they reluctantly agreed to draft a Bill of 
Rights to allay popular suspicions.盟 / They asked 
James Madison， who agreed to draft the Bill of Rights， 
but not "for any other reason than that it is anxiously 
desired by others."豆!I (The most influential of those 
others was undoubtedly Thomas Jefferson， Madison's 
friend and mentor， who strongly urged that a Bill of 
Rights be adopted.)堅 /
55. 2 Schwartz 1167;呈主主主主孟・， the Virginia proposed amendments 
in 3 E1iot. Debates on Ratificatio~ 651; 9th. That no free 
man ought to be taken. imprisoned or disseiesed of his free-
h01d. 1iberties. privi1eges or franchises. or out1awed， or 
exi1ed. or in any manner destroyed， or deprived of his 1ife， 
1iberty or property. but by the 1aw of the 1and. 
56. Edmond Dumbau1d. 1he Bi11 of Rights and What it Means TodaY.， 
at 162， 173・205.
57. Stoebuck， 豆旦E主主， at594， n.142. 
58. Id. at n. 143. 
59. Id. at n. 144. 
60. See Goebe1， 豆旦旦E三 (History • • .) at 425・426.
61. Irving Brant. JJames Madiso~. at 236. 
62. Dumbau1d，呈~三 at 8・9.
Di日l凶 byGoogle
99. 
工nMadison ・s initia1 draft he fo11owed c1ose1y the 
Virginia Dec1aration of Rights.包 / The Virginia Dec1a-
ration provided that "men • . • cannot be taxed or de-
prived of their property for pub1ic uses without their 
own consent， or that of their representatives .. "坐/
and "that no man be deprived of his 1iberty except by 
the 1aw of the 1and， or the judgment of his peers."亘.y
When Madison・sdraft was first offered to the House in 
a speech during the first session of Congress， on June 
8， 1789， it added a requirement of "just compensation": 
No person sha11 be s曲 ject，except 
in cases of impeachment， to more than one 
punishment or one tria1 for the same 
offense; nor sha11 be compe11ed to be 
a witness against himse1f; nor be deprived 
of 1ife， 1iberty， or property without due 
process of 1aw; nor be ob1iged to re1in-
quish his property， where it may be neces-
sary for pub1ic use， without a just com-
pensation. 笠/
The 1anguage， but not the substance changed slight1y in 
Committee， probab1y a1so the work of Madison， and in 
Conference with the Senate， to its present form.豆11
The amendments were debated in the House and Senate 
but apparent1y no record of any debate on the just com-
pensation c1ause exists. 
7. The Motivation for the Takinq C1ause? 
There is a conspicuous absence of historica1 data 
that might enab1e one to determine why Madison added 
63. See Z. Chaffee. 主主2主主. at 19・20.
64. Virginia Dec1aration of Rights， Section 6. 
65. 玉三.， Section 8. 
66. 1 Anna1s of Congress 451・452;2 Schwartz 1057; Stoebuck. 
主主2主主， at 595; Dumbau1d. 三旦2玉三， at 207. 
67. Dumbau1d..!!U?主主. at 211， setting forth the amendments reported 
by the Se1ect Committee on Ju1y 28. 1789. There fo11o岬 sthe 
amendments巴単語 bythe House (August 24. 1789) and Senate 
(September 9， 1789) with the identica1 1anguage on just com-
pensation， at pp. 214 and 218 respective1y. 
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the just compensation 1anguage to the Fifth Amendment. 
Records of state constitutiona1 conventions and ratifying 
conventions shed no 1ight on the subject. Nor do the 
debates in Congress at the time the Bi11 of Rights was 
proposed. Secondary sources 1ikewise appear to over-
100k the prob1em. 
There is moreover 1itt1e information avai1ab1e on 
the debates in the state 1egis1atures on ratification 
of the Bi11 of Rights， either in the 1egis1ative reports 
or the contemporary newspapers. ~ Such information 
as is avai1ab1e disc10ses virtua11y no debate on the 
1ast c1ause of what is now the Fifth Amendment.笠/
The commentators who have studied the issue have 
noted this absence of 1egis1ative history. Sax notes 
the "very short supp1y" and "great dearth" of commen-
tary on the meaning of the compensation c1ause. 1Q/ 
Stoebuck frank1y wonders， considering the 1ack of 
attention given eminent domain considerations， "how 
it got into our constitutions at a11." 111 
A number of theories have been put forward regarding 
the precise inte11ectua1 inspiration for the just com-
pensation 1anguage of the Fifth Amendment: natura1 law: 
Grotius and other civi1 1aw jurisprudents: Eng1ish 
precedent， inc1uding Magna Carta: and the common law， 
all undoubtedly p1ayed a part in its history. 161 
Quite possibly the immediate theoretical basis for 
the just compensation requirement was supp1ied by Sir 
Wi11iam Blackstone. Coke had asserted that the King 
68. 1 Annals of Congress 451・452;2 Schwartz 1057; Stoebuck. 主2玉三，595;
Dumbauld， 三旦.I?E!.， at 207. 
69. Stoebuck， 主主主主主， at 594， n. 142. 
70. 1 Schwartz 438; Stoebuck. 呈旦E互主， at 593. 
71. 2 Schwartz 1167;主主主主主A.，The Virginia proposed amendments 
in 3 E1iot， ~ebates on Ratificatio~ 651; 9th. That no free 
ought to be taken， imprisoned or disseiesed oi his freeho1d. 
1iberties， privileges or franchises， or out1awed， or exiled. 
or in any manner destroyed， or deprived of his life， 1iberty 
or property， but by the 1aw of the land. 
72. Stoebuck， 三旦2互主， at 572・573.
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was barred from appropriating property to his own use 
without consent of Par1iament. But B1ackstone went 
further than Coke. B1ackstone argued that even par1ia-
ment cou1d not give this consent un1ess the 1andowner 
were paid c叩 Ipensation: 
50 great moreover is the regard of 
the law for private property， that it wi11 
not authorize the 1east vio1ation of it: 
no， not even for the genera1 good of the 
who1e community. If a new road， for in-
stance， were to be made through the grounds 
of a private person， it might perhaps be 
extensive1y beneficia1 to the pub1ic: but 
the 1aw permits no man， or set of men， to 
do this without consent of the owner of 
the 1and. In vain may it be urged， that 
the good of the individua1 ought to yie1d 
to that of the community: for it wou1d be 
dangerous to a110w any private man， or 
even any public tribuna1， to be the judge 
of this common good， and to decide whether 
it be expedient or no. Besides， the pub1ic 
good is in nothing more essentia11y inter-
ested， than in the protection of every 
individua1's private rights， as mode1ed 
by the municipa1 1aw. In this and similar 
cases the 1egislature a10ne can， and in-
deed frequently does， interpose and com-
pel the individual to acquiesce. But 
how does it interpose and compe1? Not 
by abso1ute1y stripping the subject of 
his property in an arbitrary manner: 
but by giving him a fu11 indemnification 
and equivalent for the injury thereby 
sustained. 明lepub1ic is now considered 
as an individua1， treating with an indivi-
dua1 for an exchange. A11 that the 1egis-
1ature does is to oblige the owner to 
a1ienate his possessions for a reasonab1e 
price: and even this is an execution of 
power， which the legislature indu1ges with 
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caution， and which nothing but the 1egis-
1ature can perform. 111 
The theory of a "higher" natura1 or fundamenta1 1aw 
which transcends 1aw made by Par1iament or Kings was 
expressed as fo11ows by John Adams: 
"There are rights antecedent to a11 
ear1y government -- rights that cannot 
be repea1ed or restrained by human 1aws __ 
rights derived from the great 1egis1ator 
of the Universe • • • British 1iberties 
are not the grants of process or Par1iament 
but origina1 rights， conditions of origina1 
contracts coequa1 with prerogative and 
coeva1 with government. 五/
A1exander Hami1ton spoke of property as a universa1 
appendage of man， regu1ated by 1aw yet enjoyed by right. 12/ 
73. Robert Ha1com Kerr， !he Commentaries on the Laws of Eng1and 
of Sir Wi11iam Blackston~， (1876) at 109・110.
74. 3 Works of Adams (Charles Francis Adams， ed.) 440， as quoted 
in J .A.C. Grant， "The ・HigherLaw' Background of Eminent 
Domain" C.旦旦.1.主主・ 67 (1930) at 67. 
75. C1inton Rossiter， ~lexander Hami1ton and the Constitution 177 
(1964). 加 otherwide1y-read co1onia1 law source --Henry 
Care's English Libertie ~ --dec1ared property rights to be 
fundamental and not at a11 dependent upon charters: "Besides， 
these are not proper1y the concessions of Kings. but Affirma-
tions of the Common Law. and ratified by the suffrages of 
the people. who c1aim them as their rights and privi1eges. 
and as their Birth-right: And they did not enter into war 
with the King， (1 want King主出)because he wou1d not grant 
them new privileges. but because he abused them of these 
Rights to which they were entit1ed as we11 by the Common Law. 
as by the grants of any former Kings." Care. 三旦.2!:!..at 6. 
Care continues at page 8: "yet they (the liberties of Hagna 
Carta) must not be understood as meer Emamations of Roya1 
Favour. or new Bounties granted. which the peop1e co叫 1dnot 
just1y cha11enge. or had not a Right unto before; For the 
担王星白出.at divers places. asserts. and a11 Lawyers know， 
that this Charter 15. for the most part. on1y Dec1aration 
of the principa1 grounds of the fundamenta1 1aws and 1iberties 
of邑足盟主 nonew Freedom is hereby granted. but a Resti凶 tion
of such as lawfu11y they had before， and to free them of油 at
had been usurped and encroached upon them by any power由 atso・
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But as Professor Stoebuck has pointed out， it "is 
no great reve1ation" to discover that the just compensa-
tion requirement was supported on grounds of natura1 
1aw. "What 1ega1 doctrine did they not thus exp1ain? 
Natura1 1aw was the prevailing judicia1 phi1osophy. "1皇/
1s it possib1e that the just compensation c1ause 
was incorporated into the Fifth Amendment sole1y because 
it was one of a series of rights discussed by B1ackstone 
even though the draftsmen of the Fifth Amendment had n。
particu1ar grievance with specific takings of property? 
The decisive ana1ysis of the inner-workings of James 
Madison's mind on this subject has yet to be presented， 
but three hypothesis seem worth considering: 
First， it shou1d be remembered that Madison was 
using 1anguage from the Magna Carta， and other docu-
ments based on it， that was origina11y designed t。
protect the 1egis1ative branch against arbitrary actions 
of the executive. But the Bi11 of Rights was intended 
to 1imit both the 1egis1ative and executive branches. 
Certain1y it wou1d have been no 1imitation on the 1egis-
1ative branch to require that takings of property be 
in accordance with "the 1aw of the 1and"ー-it was the 
1egis1ature， after a11， that wou1d be making the 1aw 
of the 1and. 1t is possib1e， therefore， that the just 
compensation language was added merely in an attempt 
to give some meaning to an oft-cited c1ause that wou1d 
otherwise have been out of p1ace.立/
Second， the 2巴些a¥生 casecited earlier shows that 
the taking of property during revo1utionary war did 
cause a certain amount of controversy. A contemporary 
commentator within a couple of decades after ratifica-
tion opined that the compensation clause was probab1y 
ever: And therefore you may see this Charter often mentions 
主主主主主. their Rights. and bibertates盟主主. their Liberties. 
which shows they had them before. and that the same now were 
confirmed." 
76. Stoebuck. 呈旦2互主.at 573・574.
77. In the debates Madison expressed concern with the inadequacy 
of restraints on the legislature under the English system. 
See 1 Anna1s of Congres~ 436 (1895). 
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intended to restrain "the arbitrary and oppressive mode 
of obtaining supp1ies for the army， and other pub1ic 
uses， by impressment， as was too frequent1y practiced 
during the revo1utionary war， without any compensation 
wha tever ." W 
A third possib1e theory is that Madison， who strong1y 
represented the propertied c1asses， was concerned that 
strong popu1ist sentiments might cause the e1ection of 
a Congress with a more ega1itarian phi1osophy. Certain1y 
some of the demand for protection of property rights in 
the new Bi11 of Rights represented a fear by the property-
owning group that those 1ess fortunate wou1d soon be 
running the country. 121 
The ratification of the Fifth Amendment c10ses one 
chapter of history and begins another. 明leexact moti-
vation for the adoption of the taking c1ause may never 
be ascertained， but at 1east one thing is c1ear: the 
draftsmen were not tro¥正b1edby any issue invo1ving regu-
1ation of the use of 1and. Such regu1ations had been 
standard practice in Eng1and and throughout co1onia1 
times and se倒 tohave provoked no serious controversy. 
There is no evidence that the founding fathers ever 
conceived that the taking c1ause cou1d estab1ish any 
sort of restrictions on the power to regu1ate the use 
of 1and. 
78. St. George Tucker， ~1ackstone's Co町mentarieswith Notes of 
Reference to the Constitution and Laws of~he Federa1 Govern-
ment of the United States and the Commonwea1th of Virginia. 
(Book 1， Part 1， 1803) at 305・306.




THE FIRST CENTURY UNDER宮田 TAKINGCLAUSE 
明leadoption of the Constitution and Bi11 of Rights 
transformed drarnatical1y the ro1e of the Arnerican courts. 
No 10nger were they rnere1y the interpreters of the 
Eng1ish common 1aw to the co1onia1 outposte: now they 
had their own state and federa1 constitutions to serve 
as fina1 authority. No 10nger cou1d their decisions be 
appea1ed to the privy Counci1 in London: now the new1y-
created United States Suprerne Court was the highest 
court in the 1and. And under John Marsha11 it soon 
assurned a power no English court ever c1airned --the 
power to dec1are unconstitutiona1 1egis1ative acts --
a power which state courts a1so clairned in re1ation 
to their own constitutions.ム/
This task of rneasuring 1egis1ative acts against a 
written constitution required irnprovisation by the 
courts since there obvious1y were no prior cases inter-
preting any provisions of the Constitution， rnuch 1ess 
the taking c1ause itse1f.三/ Initia11y the courts 
rnoved cautious1y， using their new powers on1y in 
exceptional situations. But gradua11y the courts' 
se1f-restraint dirninished as they becarne rnore confident 
of their power. This gradua1 growth of judicia1 activisrn 
is a farni1iar current in Arnerican history. 
The first hundred years of judicia1 interpretation 
of the taking c1ause divides rather neat1y into two 
parts: the period before the Civi1 War， in which the 
United States Suprerne Court had 1itt1e occasion to con-
sider the taking c1ause， though rnany irnportant cases 
were decided in the state courts: and the period covering 
1. After the adoption of the Federa1 Bi11 of Rights the various 
states gradua11y amended their own constitutions unti1 by 
mid-century the great majority of state constitutions contained 
taking c1auses. Grant. "The 'Higher Law' of Eminent Domain." 
1931 ~主主・ ~. !巴.67. 70 (1931). 
2. Wi11iam B. Stoebuck. "A Genera1 Theory of Eminent Domain." 
47単車・ L・主主・ 553.575 (1972). 
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the 1ast third of the Nineteenth Century durinq which 
the Supreme Court beqan formu1atinq its own approach 
to the takinq c1ause. 
1. Ear1v State Court Decisions 
A1thouqh the federa1 and some state constitutions 
provided in qenera1 terms for compensation when property 
was "taken" it was necessary for the courts to define 
precise1y when a takinq occurred. Durinq approximate1y 
the first ha1f of the Nineteenth Century， this definition 
was based on a physica1 conception of takinq. The qreat 
majority of the cases he1d that on1y actua1 physica1 
appropriation or divestinq of tit1e constituted a takinq， 
a theory that has been characterized as "no takinq with-
out a touchinq."]/ Indirect and consequentia1 injuries 
to property， whether resl且1tinqfrom the acquisition and 
use of other property or from po1ice power requ1ations， 
were exc1uded from the definition. 
Durinq the period the courts were wi11inq to upho1d 
po1ice power requ1ations even when they 1eft 1andowners 
with no feasib1e use of their 1and， as evidenced by the 
1826 New York case of Brick Presbvterian Church v. 切le
ci tv of New Yor'k.三/ The City of New York had conveyed 
1ands for the purposes of a church and cemetery to the 
Brick Presbyterian Church. Later the city passed a by-
1aw prohibitinq the use of these 1ands as a cemetery. 
The Court of Appea1s uphe1d the city's action: 
"Sixty years aqo， when the 1ease 
was made， the premises were beyond the 
inhabited part of the city. They were 
a common~ and bounded on one side by a 
vinyard. Now they are in the very heart 
of the city. When the defendants cove-
nanted that the 1essees miqht enjoy the 
premises for the purposes of buryinq 
their dead， it never entered into the 
contemp1ation of either party， that 
3. Stoebuck， 呈主主主主， at 601. 
4. 5 Cow. 538 (New York 1826). 
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the hea1th of the city might require the 
suspension， or the abo1ition of that 
right." Y 
107. 
工twas common1y thought at the time that the burying 
of the dead produced unhea1thy vapors and this be1ief 
was ref1ected in the court ・s opinion: 
"It wou1d be unreasonable in the 
extreme， to hold the plaintiffs should 
be at liberty to endanger not only the 
lives of such as belong to the corporation 
of the church， but also those of the 
.citizens genera11y， because their lease 
contains a covenant for quiet enjoyment. ・
宮'
(This case is perhaps the earliest example of judicial 
approva1 of a governmental regulation of the use of 
1and designed to promote env，ironmenta1 purposes.) 
One year 1ater the Coates case and series of related 
cases 11 dealt with attacks on the same statute of the 
5. 5 Cow. at 542. 
6. 玉三.， In yanderbi1t v. Adam~， .7 Cow. 349 (N. Y. 1827)， a New 
York statute authorizing the harbor masters to regu1ate and 
station vesse1s in the East and North Rivers in the City of 
New York was attacked by the owner of the steamboat Legis1ature 
who had refused on two separate occasions to obey the orders 
of one of the harbor masters of the city as to the stationing 
of his steamboat at a private wharf. After ho1ding that private 
wharves were subject to the po1ice regu1ation thus imposed， 
and finding that the power exercised was essentia1 for the 
purpose of protecting the rights of a11 concerned because 
of the crowded harbor with vesse1s arriving dai1y from various 
ports， the court he1d: 
The 1ine between what wou1d be a c1ear invasion 
of rlght on the one hand， and regu1ations not 1essening 
the va1ue of the right and ca1cu1ated for the benefit 
of a11， must be distinct1y marked • • • Every pub1ic 
regu1ation in a city n凶 y，and does， in some sense， 1imit 
and restrict the abso1ute right that existed previous1y. 
But this is not considered as an injury. 50 far from 
it， the individua1， as we11 as others， is supposed to 
be benefited. (at 351) 
7. 7 Cow. 585 (New York 1827)， 7 Cow. 587 (New York 1827)， and 
7 Cow. 587 (New York 1827). 
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State of New York authorizing the City of New York to 
make by1aws regu1ating or preventing the interment of 
the dead within the city. The City passed such a by-
1aw prohibiting the interment of the dead within certain 
parts of the city despite the fact that p1aintiffs had 
rights under grants or tit1es to 1and he1d in trust 
for the sole purpose of interment， some of which 1and 
had been used for that purpose for more than a century. 
Counse1 for the p1aintiffs argued that a regu1ation 
so severe was equiva1ent to a taking:旦/
"Not even the exercise of the 
right which becomes a nuisance wi11 
warrant its destruction without indemnity. 
The pub1ic good is paramount. This is 
exemp1ified in taking 1and for roads and 
cana1s; but 1and thus taken must be paid 
for. Is it not the same thing， whether 
the pub1ic good is to be promoted by 
taking the use of property for pub1ic 
benefit， or destroying the property for 
the same purpose?" 21 
Counse1 for the City responded that it was a "mere 
regulation. " 
"No instance has been shown， and 
none can be found， of a law providing 
compensation for an injury arising from 
a mere regu1ation. In all the cases of 
compensation cited， the property was 
either entered upon or taken. Here was 
no entry， no eviction. This law cannot 
be ca11ed an interference with the prop-
erty any more than our fire laws." 
The court， with respect to the question of the con-
stitutionality of the bylaw， he1d the rep1y of counsel 
for the city conclusive: 
8. 7 Cow. at 590. 
9. 7 Cow. at 595. 
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"We are of the opinion that this 
by1aw is not void either as being un-
constitutiona1 or as conf1icting with 
what we acknow1edge as a fundarnenta1 
of civi1ized society， that private prop-
erty sha11 not be taken even for pub1ic 
use without just cornpensation. No prop-
erty has， in this instance， been entered 
upon or taken. None are benefited by 
109. 
the destruction， or rather the suspension 
of the rights in question， in any other 
way than citizens a1ways are， when one 
of their nurnbers is forbidden to con-
tinue a nuisance." .!Q/ 
The New York cases were fo11owed with approva1 in 
an 1831 Massachusetts case， ~aker v. Boston.且I By 
indenture between the Town of Boston and the Boston Mi11 
Corporation the corporation granted to the town a certain 
proportion of a tract of 1and covered with water， except-
ing a creek and certain cana1s for the passage of boats. 
By a subsequent indenture it was agreed that the town 
might put a covering over part of the creek provided n。
interruption or irnpedirnent wou1d be rnade be10w the cover-
ing to boats or rafts passing through the cana1. The 
creek was kept open however and a nurnber of peop1e in-
c1uding Baker used the creek for boat navigation. Baker 
c1airned he had a right of navigation that was taken un-
constitutiona11y by the city when it fina11y decided to 
put a cover on for sanitary purposes. 
After reciting the irnportance of safeguarding the 
pub1ic hea1th as a proper rnunicipa1 function， the court 
said: 
"It is c1ear then that the city 
governrnent had the right to rernove the 
nuisance cornp1ained of by fi11ing up 
the creek un1ess it thereby un1awfu11y 
interferred with private prope士tyand 
10. 7 Cow. at 605 and 606. 
11. 12 Pick. 183 (Mass. 1831). 
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that they did not so interfere we think 
it is very manifest the measure was a 
mere hea1th 1aw or regu1ation and every 
citizen ho1ds his property subject t。
such regu1ations. po1ice regu1ations 
to direct the use of private property 
so as to prevent it proving pernicious 
to the citizens at 1arge are not void 
a1though they may in some measure in-
terfere with private rights without 
providing for compensation." 話/
Again in Massachusetts， in 1846， the regu1ation of 
rea1 property was uphe1d against a c1aim of unconsti-
tutiona1ity in the famous case of commonwea1th v. 
TewksburV.且/ Tewksbury cha11enged a statute which 
provided that anyone who removed stones， sand or grave1 
from any of the beaches in the town of Che1sea shou1d 
be fined宇20.00. Tewksbury owned property on the beach 
in the town of Che1sea， and a11eged that to so prohibit 
an owner from taking grave1 frαn his own 1and was a 
taking of the 1and for pub1ic purpose within the meaning 
of the Dec1aration of Rights， Artic1e 10 (which stated 
that no part of the property of any individua1 cou1d be 
taken from him or app1ied to pub1ic uses without making 
him a reasonab1e compensation therefore)， and since the 
statute made no provision for compensation to the owner 
it was unconstitutiona1 and void. 
The court in an opinion by Chief Justice Shaw， he1d 
the regu1ation to be a "just and reasonable exercise of 
the po1ice power:" 
"The protection and preservation 
of beaches in situations where they form 
the natura1 embankments to pub1ic ports 
and harbors and navigab1e streams， is 
obvious1y of great pub1ic importance: 
a1though on many parts of the coast the 
‘ 
12. 12 Pick. at 194. 
13. 11 Metc. 55 (Mass. 1846). 
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situation of the shores is such， that 
the remova1 of sand and grave1， by the 
owner， wou1d not be of the 1east injury 
to anybody." 当/
111. 
The court then set out the damage to the ancient 
town of P1ymouth Beach which was in danger of being 
who11y destroyed as a resu1t of the cutting away of 
wood on a narrow strip of 1and that protected and 
extended in front of it. Noting the 10ng history of 
such acts， some dating prior to the Revo1ution， and 
further noting simi1ar acts prohibiting mowing or 
qrazing， some of which did and some of which did not 
provide compensation， the court conc1uded: 
"Without hazarding an opinion upon 
any other question， we think that a 1aw 
prohibiting an owner from removing the 
soi1 composing a natura1 embankment to a 
va1uab1e， navigab1e stream， port or har-
bor， is not such a taking， such an inter-
ference with the right and tit1e of the 
owner， as to give him a constitutiona1 
right to compensation， and to render an 
act unconstitutiona1 which makes no such 
provisions， but is a just restraint of an 
injurious use of the property， which the 
1egis1ature have authority to make." 担/
This period of judicia1 history cu1minates in 1853 
with the even more famous Massachusetts case， Common-
wea1th v. A1qer.語IIn that case the defendant had 
vio1ated the statute which prohibited the erection of 
a wharf beyond specified 1ines in Boston Harbor by 
bui1ding a wharf on his own property， received under a 
1641 grant from the state， made for the very purpose 
of bui1ding wharves.!1I Again Chief Justice Shaw wrote 
14. 11 Metc. 55， and 58. 
15. 11.Metc. 55 at 59. 
16. 7 Cush. 53 (Mass. 1853). 
17. Leonard W. Levy， !he Law of the Commonwea1th and Chief 




"We think it is a settled principle， 
growing out of the nature of well-ordered 
civil society， that every holder of prop-
erty， however absolute and unqualified 
may be his title， holds it under the 
implied liability that his use of it 
shall not be injurious to the equal 
enjoyment of others having an equal 
right to the enjoyment of their prop-
erty， nor injurious to the rights of 
the community. ・・・" 担/
Shaw found the police power quite distinct and unrelated 
from the power of eminent domain. 
"This is very different from the 
right of ~minent domain，ー-the right 
of a government to take and appropriate 
private property to public use whenever 
the public exigency requires it， which 
can be done only on condition of pro-
viding a reasonable compensation there-
for • • • Nor does the prohibition of 
such noxious use of property -- injurious 
to the public --although it may diminish 
the profits of the owner， make it an 
appropriation to a public use， so as to 
entitle the owner to compensation." よ21
明lekey distinction， said Shaw， is whether the public 
has any right to use the land themselves or make a profit 
from it: 
"But he is restrained， not because 
the public have occasion to make the 
like use or to make any use of the prop-
erty， or to take any benefit or profit 
to themselves frαn it，ー-but because 
18. 7 Cush. 53 at 84. 
19. !且.， at払・85.
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it would be a noxious use， contrary to 
the maxim， sic utere tuo ut alienum non 
よ些怠呈・ It is not an appropriation of 
the property to a public use， but the 
restraint of an injurious private use 
by the owner7 and it is therefore not 
within the principle of property taken 
under the right of eminent domain."辺/
113. 
According to Chief Justice Shaw， the legislature 
unquestionably had the power to define a class of things 
which， if done， were contrary to the public interest 
regardless of whether the particular facts of a given 
case constituted a danger to the public (which， in 
this particular case， in fact it did盟主).W The 
court conceded， however， that there might be situations 
in which the legislature would be in doubt whether to 
accomplish a particular purpose by the police power or 
by eminent domain: 
"The distinction， we think， is 
manifest in principle7 although the 
facts and circumstances of different 
cases are so various that it is often 
difficult to decide whether a partic-
ular exercise of legislation is prop-
erly attributable to one or the other 
of these two acknowledged powers."盆/
In his biography of Shaw Leonard Levy summarized 
the judge・sphilosophy of the police power: 
"[T]he general welfare required 
the anticipation and prevention of 
prospective wrongs from the use of 
private property. Accordingly he 
held that the legislature might inter-
fere with the use of property before 
20. !昼.， at 85. 
21. Levy， 呈旦E互主， at p. 250・252.
22. 7 Cush. at 85. 
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the owner became amenab1e to the 
common 1aw. 50 a man cou1d not even 
remove stones from his own beach if 
prohibited by the 1eqis1ature， nor 
erect a wharf on his property beyond 
the boundary 1ines fixed by it. Even 
if his use of his property wou1d be 
'harm1ess or indifferent，・ theneces-
sity of restraints was to be judqed 
'by those to whom a11 1eqis1ative 
power is intrusted by the sovereiqn 
authority.' 5imi1ar1y the 'reason司
ab1eness・ofsuch restraints was a 
matter of 'experience，・ tobe deter-
mined by the 1eqis1ature， not the 
court. 明lesimp1e expedient of havinq 
a precise statutory ru1e for the obe-
dience of a11 was sufficient reason 
for a findinq of constitutiona1ity. 辺/
5haw's position was the prevai1inq view at the time 
the Civi1 War approached. Theodore 5edqwick， a con-
temporary author of a treatise on constitutiona1 1aw， 
summarized the status of the takinq c1ause in 1857: 
"It seems to be sett1ed that， to 
entit1e the owner to protection under 
this c1ause the property must be 
actua11y taken in the physica1 sense 
of the word. .• "包/
2. 5 upreme Court decisions in the Late Nineteenth Centurv 
The Supreme Court oriqina11y construed the Bi11 
of Riqhts as app1icab1e on1y to restrain the federa1 
qovernment， not the states.詰/ 5ince the federa1 
23. Levy， 豆旦旦主主， at 309. 
24. Theodore Sedgwick， ~ Treatise on the Ru1es which Govern the 
Interpretation and Construction of Statutory and Con~~itutiona1 
担主 (1sted. 1857) at 519・520.
25. See Withers v. Buck1ey， 61 U.S. 20 (1857)， ho1ding the taking 
c1ause inapp1icab1e to the states. 
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government had little need to acquire or regu1ate land 
the Court had 1itt1e occasion to consider the taking 
c1ause.話/ After the Civi1 War， however， the Court 
gradua11y began to incorporate various provisions of 
the Bi11 of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment's due 
process clause， and by the end of the century it was 
c1ear that the states were governed by the taking 
c1ause. W 
The Court's first significant contribution to the 
interpretation of the taking c1ause came in Rumpe11v v. 
Green Bav Co. ，担Idecided in 1871. A state statute 
had authorized the construction of a dam to contro1 
floods， but the dam caused the f100ding of p1aintiff's 
land. The Court held that by f100ding it the govern-
ment had "taken" it: 
"It would be a very curious and 
unsatisfactory resu1t if， in construing 
a provision of constitutiona1 1aw， 
a1ways understood to have been adopted 
for protection and security to the 
rights of the individua1 as against 
the government， and which has re-
ceived commendation of jurists， states-
men， and commentators as p1acing the 
just princip1es of the common 1aw on 
that subject beyond the power of ordinary 
1egis1ation to change or contro1 them， 
it sha11 be he1d that if the govern-
ment refrains from the abso1ute con-
version of rea1 property to the uses 
of the pub1ic it can destroy its va1ue 
entire1y， can inf1ict irreparab1e per-
manent injury to any extent， can， in 
effect， subject it to tota1 destruction 
without making any compensation， because， 
in the narrowest sense of the word， it 
is not主些主主 forthe pub1ic use." W 
26. The court did use the "obligation of contracttr c1ause to strike 
down state actions that wou1d now be dea1t with under the taking 
c1ause. 里旦里 F1etcher v. Peck. 2 Cranch (6 U.S.) 87 (1810). 
27. See Chic白石 Bur1in~ton & Quincy Ry. v. Chicag~J 166 U.S. 26 (1896). 
28.80 U.S. 166 (1871). 
29.80 U.S. at 177. 
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The opinion limits the holding to cases where real estate 
is actua11y invaded "by super-induced additions of water. 
earth， sand or other material or by having any artificial 
structure p1aced on it so as to effectually destroy or 
impair its usefu1ness."辺/
The Court fo1lowed ~盟旦弘江 in U. S. v. Lvnah， 1ν 
where it was he1d that there had been a taking of peti-
tioner ・s rice p1antation when an overf1oωresl且1ting
from works in the improvement of navigation on the 
Savannah River， had turned it into a bog. ~ But both 
30. 80 U.S. at 181. 
31. 188 U.S. 445 (1903). 
32. The New York case of Peop1e v. P1at~， 17 Johns. 195 (1819) and 
the North Caro1ina case of State v. Glen'-52 No. Car. 321 (1859)， 
invalidated statutes which wou1d in effect require the tearing 
do岬nof private dams across non-navigab1e waterways， the owner-
ship of the bottom and banks of which had in each case been 
granted to the defendant by the stat~. In each case， the 
state intended to assure downstream owners a supp1y of fish， 
which the dams were impeding. In North Carolina， the court 
he1d that "rights acquired in streams • • • by grants fro叩
the state • • • cannot be taken from the owners by the govern-
ment， except in the exercise of the power of eminent domain， 
and then on1y for pub1ic use， with a provision for just com-
pensation." (at 334). In New York the court noted of the 
river th巴reinvo1ved: 
"It (the river) has been granted， and thus 
has ')<.!come private property， as high up as Sa111lOn 
ascend. The fishing itse1f has passed under the 
grantsj the defendants and those whose estate they 
have rightfu11y and 1ega11y acquired， erected the 
dam sought to be alteredj and they have been in the 
uninterrupted enjoyment of a11 rights connected with 
the dam for more than thirty years. Can it admit 
of a doubt that the defendants' rights， growing out 
of a contract executed by the state， and for which a 
va1uab1e and competent consideration has been re・
ceived， wi11 be impaired by the demo1ition of the dam， 
or an alteration of it， which might， and probab1y wou1d， 
essentially destroy an immense property?" (at 218・219)• 
Both these invo1ved the destruction of a physica1 piece of 
property as well as the destruction of a property right. which 
had been received from the state itself. In neither case 
did the pub1ic health or safety require the measure. 
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pumDell~ and Lyn呈hwere distinguished a year later in 
Bedford v. U.~. 111 工n that case revetments erected 
by the government for the improvement of navigation on 
the Mississippi River had produced a gradual erosion of 
that land， which had also been subject to overflow for 
a number of years. 明leCourt denied compensation， 
pointing out that in ~旦!!!.E.三よよヱ and 主主nah there had been 
an actual invasion of the land as opposed to conse-
quential damage.当/
No clear pattern emerged from the Court ・searly 
decisions under the taking clause， but when the Court 
was convinced the purpose was sound it was willing to 
uphold some governmental actions despite fairly severe 
damage to private property. In!ransDortation CO.v. 
豆且主坦Q l2I the Court denied compensation for acknowl-
edged damages incurred while the city built a tunnel 
under the Chicago River， noting that: 
"Acts done"in the proper exercise 
of governmental powers， and not directly 
encroaching upon private property， though 
their consequences may impair its use， 
are universally held not to be a taking 
within the meaning of the constitutional 
provision." 当/
The Court went on tοlimit the ~盟民主Lヱ rule to situations 
where there had been a permanent direct encroachment. 
Similarly， in!!ridqe Co. v. U.~. 11I the Court held 
that Congress could require substantial modification 
of a bridge over navigable waters without the payment 
33. 192 U.S. 217 (1904). 
34. 192 U.S. at 225. 主主位盟主己主:t..， J. M. Cormack， "Lega1 
Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain，" 41主L主主・.:!.221， 
233・236(1931). 
35. 99 U.S. 635 (1878). 
36. 99 U.S. at 642. 
37. 105 U.S. 70 (1881). 
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of compensation.旦/
During the late Nineteenth Century the Court struck 
down many attempts by government to regulate commerce 
and transportation， but even in railroad cases， the 
Supreme Court occasionally favored regulations over 
property rights， as in Richmond. Fredricksburq & Potomac 
RV. Co. v. Richmond.主/ In that case， the Supreme 
Court upheld a municipal regulation of the railroad pro-
hibiting its use on public streets saying: 
"The power to govern implies the 
power to ordain and establish suitable 
police regulations • • • Appropriate 
regulation of the use of property is 
not 'taking・property，within the 
meaning of the constitutional pro-
hibition." 担/
But it was Justice Harlan・sopinion in ~uqler v. 
E旦盟主主νthatestablished the most powerful support 
for a strong police power. The case involved. a Kansas 
statute which prohibited the manufacture and sale of 
intoxicating liquors. Mugler owned a brewery which， 
under the statute， was made relatively worthless. 主主/
The defendants contended that the doctrine of the 
旦盟!!.E.主主主ヱ caserequired that they be compensated. Harlan 
distinguished that case because it arose under the 
state ・seminent domain power rather than the police 
power. Furthermore， the case "was an extreme qualifi-






The state courts a1so continued to provide genera1 support 
for a strong po1ice power. Thus， for examp1e， in旦斗当主
of Carthage v. Fredric~， 122 N.Y. 268 (1890) a New York 
Court uphe1d a fine assessed against a property owner who 
had not c1eared his private side岬 a1kof obstructions， despite 
Fredrick's contention that the ordinance requiring a side-
wa1k to be c1eared authorized the taking of his property 
for pub1ic use witho叫 tcompensation. 
96 U.S. 521 (1877). 
96 U.S. 521， at 528・529.
123 U.S. 623， 8 S. Ct. 273 (1887). 
123 U.S. 624・627，8 S.Ct. 273 (1887). 
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done in the proper exercise of government powers， and 
not directly encroaching upon private property， though 
these consequences may impair its use，・ donot constitute 
a taking. •. " In the E.盟巴~ case， said Justice 
Harlan， "there was a 'permanent flooding of private 
property，・ a ・physicalinvasion of the real estate of 
the private owner， and a practical ouster of his pos-
session.・" As a result his property "was， in effect， 
required to be devoted to the use of the pUblic， and， 
consequently， he was entitled to compensation."盆/
"A prohibition simply upon the use 
of property for purposes that are declared， 
by valid legislation， to be injurious t。
the health， morals， or safety of the com-
munity， cannot， in any just sense， be deemed 
a taking or an appropriation of property 
for the public benefit. 2 uch leqislation 
does not disturb the owner in the control 
or use of his propertv for lawful purposes， 
nor restrict his right to dispose of it， 
but is onlv a declaration bv the state that 
its use bv anvone. for certain forbidden 
purposes. is pre;udicial to the public 
interest~. Nor can legislation of that 
character cαne within the Fourteenth Amend-
ment， in any case， unless it is apparent 
that its real object is not to protect the 
community， or to promote the general well-
being， but， under the guise of police re-
gulation， to deprive the owner of his liberty 
and property， without due process of law." 
The police power must not be "burdened・ with re-
quirements of compensation， suggested Harlan: 
"The exercise of the police power by 
the destruction of property which is it-
self a public nuisance， or the prohibition 
of its use in a particular way， w~ereby 


































its value becomes depreciated， is very 
different from takinq property for pUblic 
use， or from deprivinq a person of his 
property without due process of 1aw. In 
the one case， a nuisance only is abated: 
in the other， unoffendinq property is 
taken away from an innocent 0制ner."
[emphasis added1 主主/
120. 
In Harlan's view the difference between a police 
power requ1ation upon property use and a public takinq 
of property was not a difference of deqree， but a 
difference in kind. His opinion exp1icityly stated 
that a prohibition upon the use of property desiqned to 
protect the pUblic health and safety cou1d never be 
deemed a takinq because such a prohibition did not 
affect an individua1's title to his property， not did 
it result in qovernmental use of private property. 
Rather， the sole purpose of such a requ1ation was to 
declare that a particular property use was forbidden 
because it was injurious to the community. The test， 
therefore， wou1d be whether the requlation had a 
rational relationship to the pub1ic welfare. 
The旦旦旦L主主 opinionestab1ished as a constitutiona1 
principle the doctrine that police power requ1ations 
do not constitute compensable takinqs， but where the 
qovernment action permanent1y appropriated the owner ・s
property compensation was required even if the qovern-
ment・spurpose was to abate a nuisance. 
This was the case in Sweet v. Rechel.笠/ Massa-
chusetts had passed a statute which provided that t。
abate a nuisance arisinq from poor drainage， the city 
miqht take tit1e to the land by paying the 0制nercom-
pensation for his damages. "The abatement of a nuisance 
--nothinq more beinq required or done --is not of it-
self， and within the meaninq of the constitution， an 
appropriation of property to public uses."主岳IHowever: 
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If private property is actua11y 
taken and appropriated for pUb1ic uses. 
a1though taken or appropriated in virtue 
of a statute having as its main or 
primary object the conservation of the 
pub1ic hea1th. reasonab1e cαnpensation 
must be made to the owner . . . And so 
it was appropriated when the city took 
the fee. and thereby acquired a right 
to se11 the property after it was im-
proved. and put the proceeds into its 
treasury. UndoUbted1y. the state. with-
out taking the tit1e to itse1f. may. 
in sαne appropriate mode and without 
compensation to the owner. forbid the 
use of a specified private property. 
where such use wou1d be injurious to 
the pUb1ic hea1th." 包/
121. 
The most difficu1t test for the Court came when 
Pennsy1vania out1awed the sa1e of 01eomargarine. thus 
rendering a number of factories virtua11y use1ess. The 
Court was unab1e to find. said Justice Har1an. that the 
1egis1ation "has no rea1 or sUbstantia1 re1ation" t。
the protection of the pUb1ic hea1th. and it uphe1d the 
1aw in 1888 in Powe11 v. Pennsv1vania.坐I The c1aim 
under the taking c1ause was dismissed as "without 
merit. ・ .iV 
A n四nberof other Supreme Court cases in the c10sing 
years of the Nineteenth and opening years of the Twentieth 
Century supported the旦盟註王 interpretationof the 
47. 159 U.5. at 398. Henry Mi11s writing before the Court's 
ana1ysis in this case said， "There can never be any 
necessity for permanent1y appropriating 1and without com-
pensation by the exercise of the po1ice power; the property 
may be temporari1y interfered with or appropriated; but 
the power ceases with the necessity of its exercise." 
Henry Mills， The Law of Eminent Domai~ 58 (2d ed. 1888). 
48. 127 U.5. 678， 684 (1888). 




The state courts a1so construed a taking of property 
in very tangib1e terms. They thought of a taking as 
an actua1 appropriation of the property by the taker 
for the 1atter's own use.旦I There now began rumb1ings 
of concern over this strict interpretation. Dissatis-
faction with denia1 of compensation in cases invo1ving 
damage to owners of abutting property in street-grade 
cases. such as Rigney v. City of Chicaq~. ~ contributed 
to the passage of state constitutiona1 amendments by 
!11inois and other states to make sure that such 10sses 
were compensated. 211 
50. In Chicago. Bur1ington and Quincy Ry. Co. v. ChicagQ. 166 U.S. 26 
(1896) the Court he1d that expenses incurred by the rai1road 
for 町田intenancefor the safety of the pub1ic were mere1y in-
cidenta1 to the exercise of the po1ice power of the state. 
In New Or1eans Gas Light Co. v. Drainage Commissio!!.. the 
Court uphe1d a po1ice power action which had forced the 
gas company to change the 1ocation of its pipes at its own 
expense in order to acco町mwdatea new pub1ic system of drain-
age. (197 U.S. 453. 462. -1905・). Finally. in生主些b
Bur1ington and Ouincv R.R. Co. v. Drainage Commissioner!!.. 
200 U.S. 561 (1906) the Court justified a po1ice power re-
gu1ation which required that the rai1road tear down a bridge 
and rep1ace it at its own expense in order to accommodate 
the p叫b1icdrainage system: 
"Whatever conf1ict there is arises upon 
the question whether there has been or wi11 be 
in the particu1ar case. within the true meaning 
of the Constitution. a 'taking' of private prop-
erty for pub1ic use. If the injury comp1ained 
of is on1y incidenta1 to the 1egitimate exercise 
of governmenta1 powers for the pub1ic good， then 
there is no taking of property for the pub1ic 
use. and a right to compensation. on account 
of injury， does not attach under the Constitu-
tion." 200 U.S. at 593-594. 
51. Joseph M. Cormack. "Lega1 Concepts in Cases of Eminent 
Domain，" 41 X己主 1.l. 221 (1931) at 231. 
52. 108 111. 64 (1892). 
53. Robert Kratovi1 and Frank J. Harrison， Jr.， "Eminent 




明losewho were dissatisfied began to ca11 for a 
broader interpretation of the taking c1ause. 
"Theretofore， expropriation had 
practica11y coincided with the acqui-
sition of tit1e to 1and. Now， it was 
urged that an impairment of the benefi-
cia1 use or of the va1ue of 1and ought 
to be he1d tantamount to a taking despite 
the fact that the owner continued t。
ho1d the possession of and tit1e to the 
1and. It became manifest that the scope 
of the right of eminent domain was de-
pendent upon concepts of the nature of 
property. Why not， it was natura11y 
asked， give the word ・property・a
meaning somewhat broader than that 
supp1ied by common 1aw concepts?" 当/
As the taking c1ause reached the end of its first century 
pressures for change were brewing. 
e 
54. Arthur Lenhoff. "Deve1opment of the Concept of Eminent 




PENNSYLVANIA COAL V. MAHON: 
HOLMES REWR工TESTHE CONSTlTUTION 
1. Settinq the Staqe 
Meanwhi1e， back in Massachusetts a young 1ega1 
scho1ar was having very different thoughts indeed about 
the re1ationship of the po1ice power and the Fifth 
Amendment. Writing anonymous1y in the American Law 
Review in 1872 he asked whether the po1ice power wasn't 
a term "invented to cover certain acts of the 1egis-
1ature which are seen to be unconstitutiona1， but which 
are be1ieved to be necessary? •• "主/
After he was appointed to the Supreme Judicia1 
Court of Massachusetts 01iver Wende11 Ho1mes， Jr.， had 
occasion to express his views from the bench. In 1889， 
just two years after Har1an・sapparent1y dispositive 
decision in Muq1er v. Kansa~， Ho1mes wrote the opinion 
in Rideout v. Kno~. y 
Massachusetts had passed a 1aw which prohibited 
property owners from erecting fences more than six feet 
in height upon their own property if the purpose of 
erecting such a fence was to annoy adjacent property 
owners. The Supreme Judicia1 Court uphe1d this 1egis-
1ation， but admitted that if the restriction p1ace~‘ 
upon the property owner were more severe the case 
might have been decided different1y. The question， 
said Ho1mes， was one of degree. 
"It may be said that the difference 
is on1y one of degree: most differences 
are when nice1y ana1yzed. At any rate， 
1. 6 Am. L.担ヱ.141・142(1872). See Mark De Howe. ~些且些
O1iver Wende11 Ho1mes: The Proving Year5 57 (1963). 
2. 148 Mass. 368 (1889). 
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difference of degree is one of the dis-
tinctions by which the right of the 1egis-
1ature to exercise p01ice power is deter-
mined. Some sma11 1imitations of previously 
existing rights incident to property may 
be imposed for the sake of preventing 
manifest evi1: 1arger ones cou1d not be 
except by the exercise of the right of 
聞 linentdomain." 11 
Justice 01iver Wende11 Holmes continued to express 
this same phi10sophy after being e1evated to the United 
States Supreme Court. 明lUS，in工nterstateRai1wav Co. 
v. Massachusett!!，全/a case inv01ving a street rai1way 
corporation's c1aim that a statute enacted prior to its 
charter and requiring it to transport public school 
chi1dren at ha1f price deprived the corporation of its 
property without just cαnpensation， he likened the 
a11eged burden to a tax， and said， "The question narrows 
itself to the magnitude of the burden imposed 四 to
whether the tax is so great as to exceed the limits of 
the p01ice power." 21 
Again， a year 1ater in ~udson Water Co. v. McCarter 
豆/where New Jersey passed a statute making it i11ega1 
for Hudson to transport water from that state to New 
York pursuant to a contract entered into主主主主王 the 
statute was passed， Holmes stated， in response to Hudson ・s
c1aim that its property was thus taken without due pro-
cess of law: 
明le1imits set to property by other 
pUb1ic interests present themse1ves as a 
branch of what is ca11ed the police power 
of the State. The boundary at which the 
conf1icting interests balance cannot be 
determined by any general formula in 
advance， but points in the line， or help-
ing to estab1ish it， are fixed by decisions 
3. 148 Hass. at 372. 
4. 207 U.S. 79 (1907). 
5. 玉三.， at 87・88. (The Rai1way 1ost.) 
6. 209 U.S. 349 (1908). 
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that this or that concrete case fa11s on 
the nearer or farther side. For instance， 
the p01ice power may 1imit the height of 
bui1dings， in a city， without compensation. 
To that extent it cuts down what other-
wise wou1d be the rights of property. But 
if it shou1d attempt to 1imit the height 
so far as to make an ordinary bui1ding 10t 
wh011y use1ess， the rights of property 
wou1d prevai1 over the other pUb1ic inter四
est， and the p01ice power wou1d fai1. To 
set such a 1imit wou1d need compensation 
and the power of eminent domain. 
It sometimes is difficult to fix 
boundary stones between the private right 
of property and the p01ice power when， as 
in the case at bar， we know of few decisions 
that are very much in point. 11 
H01mes ・phi10sophyfound expression in an influ-
entia1 treatise on the p01ice power written in 1904 by 
Ernst Freund， a respected 1aw~rofessor at the University 
of Chicago. Freund thought that commonwea1th v. A1qer 
was "based upon no inte11igib1e principle" Y while 
powe11 v. pennsv1vani~ was simp1y wrong. 21 
The view espoused by H01mes and Freund reached its 
cu1mination in Ho1mes ・decisionin Pennsv1vania Coa1v. 
Mahon on December 11， 1922. Because of the crucial 
importance of this decision as the keystone of a11 sub-
sequent "taking" 1aw it is worth examining the back-
ground of the case in some detai1. 
2. The prob1em of Mine Subsidence 
The case began in Northeastern Pennsy1vania， which 
at the beginning of this century was a we11 popu1ated 
7. 玉三.， at 355. Of incidental note 1s the strong language with 
respect to the state's interest in protecting its environ-
ment at 356・357.
8. Ernst Freund， The Police Powe!:. 425 (1904). 
9. よ且.， at 569・570.
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area， rich in anthracite coa1. Unfortunate1y， the 
digging of mine shafts and the taking of coa1 from the 
ground 1eaves a void beneath the earth ・s surface. If 
enough coa1 is taken， the surface wi11 no 10nger be 
adequate1y supported and wi11 co11apse， a phenomenon 
referred to by the term "surface subsidence，" or， as it 
is sometimes ca11ed， "mine subsidence，" which 1itera11y 
removes the earth・s support from under the towns and 
cities of the anthracite region. 
Coa1 fie1ds are present in nine counties and cover 
an area of approximate1y 5，000 square mi1es in North-
eastern Pennsy1vania.旦I The anthracite region is not 
rura1 in character: numerous towns and cities dot the 
region. In 1922， the year the Rennsv1vania Coa1 case 
was decided， the 1argest city in the anthracite region 
was Scranton， a municipa1ity of 137，000 peop1e ~ocated 
in Lackawanna County. よ主I Wi1kes-Barre， situated in 
Luzerne County， was a1so a we11 deve10ped urban center 
by the ear1y twenties. Given the popu1ation centers 
in the region， and the fact that coa1 was there for the 
taking， it is not surprising that mine subsidence shou1d 
cause prob1ems in Northeastern Pennsy1vania. 
By the time the Rennsv1vania Coal case was decided， 
coa1 mining had been going on in Pennsy1vania for some 
two hundred years， but rapid changes in mining techno1-
ogy in the first two decades of the Twentieth Century 
had 1itera11y transformed the sca1e of mining operations. 
After Wor1d War I the coa1 companies were taking coa1 
fr叩， the ground faster and in greater quantities than 
before.当I As the resu1ting subsidence continued t。
increase， residents of the anthracite region saw their 
homes and businesses destroyed， their own safety threat-
ened. Describing the effects of subsidence upon Scranton， 
10. 百len1ne counties are Carbon， Co1umbia， Luzerne， Northumber1and， 
Schuy1k111， Lackawanna， Susquehanna， Wayne and Dauphin. 
11. Br1ef on Beha1f of the City of Scranton. Interveno!.. 1n the 
Supreme Court of the United States， October term， 1922. P. 1. 
12. Brief of the Defendants 1n Erro!. 1n the Suprell睡 Co叫rtof 
the United States. October Term 1922. P. 6. (Mahon br1ef). 
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Phi1ip Mattes. the City So1icitor. wrote: 
Scranton bid fair to become a 
second Verdun. her bui1dings razed 
to the ground by shots from be1ow. 
Whi1e every section of the city was 
more or 1ess affected the worst dev-
astation was in the heart of the 
business section of West Scranton. 
Visitors there today (1922) can 
c1amber through pits strewn with 
broken brick and rUbbis covering 
great areas former1y improved with 
handsome business b10cks but now 
permitted， in the words of Governor 
Sprou1 (of Pennsy1vania)， "to re-
vert to the wi1derness of abandon." 
Our once 1eve1 streets are in humps 
and sags. our gas mains have broken. 
our water mains threatened to fai1 
us in time of conf1agration. our 
sewers spread their pesti1entia1 
contents into the soi1. our bui1dings 
have co11apsed under their occupants 
or fa11en into the streets， our 
peop1e have been swa110wed up in 
sudden1y yawning chasms， b10wn up 
by gas exp1osions or asphyxiated in 
their s1eep， our cemetaries have 
opened and the bodies of our dead 
have been torn from their casket. 
旦/
The Pennsy1vania 1egis1ature was not insensitive 
to the difficu1ties facing the anthracite region. In 
1911 the two houses of the 1egis1ature enacted a joint 
reso1ution ca11ing for the appointment of a Governor ・s
Commission "for the purpose of investigating and re-
porting upon the physica1 conditions and 1ega1 rights 
in the matter of surface support where anthracite coa1 
has been removed.・ 当/ The Commission reported its 
13. Scranton Brief， 呈旦2主主， P. 5. 
14. Pub1ic Law 26， approved March 24， 1911. 
Digitized by Google 
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findings to the 1egis1ature in 1913. The 1egis1ature 
responded by passing a 1aw which forbade the mining of 
coa1 under municipa1ities un1ess the mining company 
provided sufficient artificia1 support to rep1ace the 
coa1 r伺 oved.旦I But it didn't work. Artificia1 
supports were not enough. SUbsidence cave四 inscontinued. 
L畠/
In 1921 the 1egis1ature sent cwo more pieces of 
legis1ation dea1ing with mine sUbsidence to the Governor. 
On May 21， 1921 Governor Sprou1 signed into 1aw the 
Fow1er Act，立Iestab1ishing the Pennsy1vania State 
Anthracite Mine-Cave Commission， and the Koh1er Act， 
which prohibited the mining of coa1 so as to cause the 
sUbsidence of any bui1ding， structure， or transportation 
route within the 1imits of a designated c1ass of munici-
pa1ities. 明leAct made it un1awfu1 so to mine anthra-
cite coa1 as to cause the caving-in， c011apse or sUb-
sidence of: 
(a) Any pUb1ic bui1ding or any structure 
customari1y used by the pub1ic as a p1ace 
of resort， assemb1age or amusement， in-
c1uding， but not being 1imited to， churches， 
scho01s， hospita1s， theatres， hote1s and 
rai1road stations. 
(b) Any street， road， bridge or other 
pub1ic passageway dedicated to pub1ic use 
or habitua11y used by the pub1ic. 
(c) Any track， roadbed， right of way， pipe， 
conduit， wire or other faci1ity used in the 
service of the pUb1ic by any municipa1 cor-
poration or pub1ic service company as de-
fined by the Pub1ic Service Company 1aw. 
(d) Any dwe11ing or other structure used 
15. Pub1ic Law 1439. Section 6. Act of Ju1y 26. 1913. 
16. 出 honBrief.盟庄三 P.9. 
17. Pub1ic Law 1192. 
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as a human habitation or any factory， store， 
or other industria1 or mercanti1e estab1ish-
ment in which human 1abor is emp10yed. 
(e) Any cemetery or pub1ic buria1 ground. 
1n September of 1921， H. J. Mahon and his wife 
Margaret were residing at 7 Prospect Place， Pittston， 
Pennsylvania， in Luzerne County. Some forty years ear1ier 
the Pennsylvania Coal Company had owned the 1and upon 
which the Mahon's home sat. When the Coa1 Company had 
conveyed title to the property in 1877 to a Mr. Craig， 
the Company retained the mineral rights be10w the sur-
face of the property. Further， Mr. Craig・sdeed stipu-
lated that he waived any future claim against the coa1 
company for personal injury or property damage due to 
possible mine subsidence. The minera1 rights provision 
and the waiver were then passed through the chain of 
tit1e down to the Mahons. Thus the Mahon・sdeed of 1917 
inc1uded an express provision reserving the minera1 
rights to their property in the Pennsy1vania Coa1 Company 
and the waiver of any claim against the Company for sub-
sidence damage. 
The Mahons' situation was not unique. 1n the 1ate 
Nineteenth Century the coal companies had been the prime 
1andowners in the anthracite region. To purchase 1and 
in a town 1ike Pittston， one bought from the companies， 
who were often wi11ing to sel1 parce1s to individua1 
buyers， provided that the mineral rights to the prop-
erties would remain in the companies. As with the Mahons， 
the deed would often stipulate that the buyer waived any 
right he possessed to bring a future c1aim against the 
seller for possib1e subsidence damage. 官lebuyer wou1d 
normally accept these terms for two reasons. First 
there was no one to buy 1and from except the coa1 com-
panies. Second， the waiver provision did not seem too 
important if at the time the 1and was purchased， the 
nearest mining operations were miles away. Of course 
eventually the coa1 companies would assert their minera1 
rights， so somewhere along the chain of tit1e a purchaser 
suffered.旦/
18. See ~cranton Brief，三盟主主， P. 14. 
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On September 2， 1921， the Mahon's received a 1etter 
f rom the Pennsy1vania Coa1 Cαnpany which began: 
Dear Sir and Madam: 
You are hereby notified that the mining 
operations beneath your premises wi11 by 
September 15th have reached a point which 
wi11 then or short1y thereafter cause sub-
sidence and disturbance to the surface of 
your 1ot. 
旦/
The 1etter went on to note that the Coa1 Company 
had reserved the right to mine the property under the 
origina1 deed executed in 1877 to Mr. Craig. It con-
cluded by noting that whi1e the Company was in no way 
liab1e for any injury resu1ting from the sUbsidence， 
it was giving the Mahons notice "for the safety of 
yourse1ves and the members of your househo1d." 
Six days after receiving the 1etter， Mahon， an 
attorney， fi1ed a bi11 in equity to have mining opera-
tions beneath his property permanent1y enjoined.辺/
Mahon admitted the existence of the Coa1 Company's 
rights to the minera1s be10w his property， but a11eged 
that the recent1y passed Koh1er Act made any future 
mining on his property i11ega1. He pointed out that 
the Koh1er Act express1y provided that injunctive re-
lief was a proper means for its enforcement. 
Pennsy1vania Coa1 Company ・sanswer did not cha1唱
lenge the facts a11eged by Mahon. Rather， the Company 
denied 1iabi1ity， on the ground that the Koh1er Act was 
unconstitutional. First， it a11eged that the Koh1er 
Act impaired the obligation of contracts in vio1ation 
of Artic1e I， Section 10 of the Federa1 Constitution， 
because its rights under its minera1 rights deed had 
been destroyed. Second， it 主11egedthat the Koh1er Act 
19. Transcript of Record (29.099) fi1ed August 17. 1922 in the 
Supreme Court of the United States. October Term. 1922. P. 10. 
20. .!昼. P. 5. 
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took the Coal Company's property without due process of 
law. Specifically， the Company argued that the Act was 
not a police power regulation as claimed by the Penn国
sylvania legislature， but， rather， the Act amounted t。
a public taking of private property without just compen-
sation. Finally， it alleged that the Pennsylvania legis-
lature had not acted in good faith in passing the Kohler 
Act because the legislation favored a particular class 
of property owners. 
After initially granting a preliminary injunction. 
the Court of Common Pleas denied Mahon the permanent 
relief he sought. ~ Mahon appea1ed to the Supr剖 e
Court of Pennsylvania， which on June 24， 1922， reversed 
the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas， dec1ared the 
Kohler Act constitutional， reinstated the pre1iminary 
injunction， and remanded the case. ~ That Court 
specifically he1d the Koh1er Act a valid exercise of 
the state ・5 police power and asserted that the Act was 
c1early app1icable to the pending controversy: 
The po1ice power， "legitimate1y 
exercised. can never be 1imited by 
contract nor bartered away by the 
legis1ature" . . • and this court， 
in dea1ing with the po1ice power has 
repeatedly he1d that private con-
tracts cannot interfere with its 
legitimate exercise by the state: 
the theory being that al1 contracts 
raising rights or imposing obliga-
tions， the exercise of which may 
affect the pub1ic welfare. are， of 
necessity， made subject to the re四
served right of the state to modify 
them by legitimate assertions of the 
po1ice power. 
It was the harmfu1 resu1ts， to 
the community as a who1e， of contracts 
21. .!昼.， P. 20. 
22. 玉且.， P. 69. 
Di日l凶 byGoogle
133. 
granting the right to 1et down the surface 
under any and a11 circumstances， that gave 
rise to the statute now attacked: and the 
power to enforce the pub1ic po1icy of the 
state， dec1ared in this 1egis1ation， cannot 
be defeated because they who move the court 
(p1aintiffs at bar) are parties to such a 
contract. 包/
The Pennsy1vania Coa1 Company appea1ed to the United 
States Supreme Court. 
3. Holmes' Phi1osophv 
The Coa1 Company's two basic premises were first 
that the Koh1er Act impaired the ob1igation of contracts， 
and second that the Koh1er Act took private property 
without just compensation. 
Ho1mes chose to concentrate on the taking c1aim， 
large1y ignoring the ob1igation of contract arg四nent.
The issue was neat1y framed. Was the Koh1er Act simp1y 
an exercise of the po1ice power to protect the pub1ic 
hea1th and safety against an ever-growing hazard， as 
Mr. Mahon and the State of Pennsy1vania maintained: or 
was the Act mere1y a means of getting the Coa1 Company's 
property without paying for it， as the Coa1 Company 
argued? In Holmes ・viewthe question was whether the 
Koh1er Act tried to accomp1ish through po1ice power re四
gu1ation what cou1d on1y be accomp1ished by eminent 
domain: 
Government hard1y cou1d go on if 
to some extent va1ues incident to prop-
erty cou1d not be diminished without 
paying for every such change in the 
genera1 1aw. As 10ng recognized， some 
va1ues are enjoyed under an imp1ied 
limitation and must yie1d to the po1ice 
power. But obvious1y the imp1ied 1imi直
23. 旦..P. 74. 
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tation must have its limits or the con-
tract and due process clauses are gone. 
One fact for consideration in determin-
ing such limits is the extent of diminution. 
When it reaches a certain magnitude， in 
most if not in all cases there must be 
an exercise of eminent domain and com-
pensation to sustain the act. 50 the 
question depends upon the particular 
facts. The greatest weight is given 
to the judgment of the legislature， 
but it is always open to interested 
parties to contend that the legislature 
has gone beyond its constitutional 
power. 包/
Thus， in Justice Holmes ・viewthe difference be-
tween regulation and taking was a difference of 豆~主主主
not kind. 
Thus stating the issue went against the entire 
line of cases to .this point， including Justice Harlan' s 
decision in Muqler v. Kansa~. ~ Of course the problem 
was where to draw the line. And to this problem， Holmes 
suggested no answer: "50 the question depends upon the 
particular facts." 
Having stated his rule， Holmes then proceeded to 
deal briefly with the facts of the case: "This is the 
case of a single private house . . • A source of damage 
to such a house is not a public nuisance even if similar 
damage is inflicted on others in different places. The 
damage is not common or public.・ 盆/ But the whole 
basis of the Kohler Act was that cases like this were 
widespread， and the danger to life and property extreme. 
That was why the Kohler Act was passed. Was Holmes con-
tradicting the legislature's judgment? Was he suggesting 
that things were not as bad in Pennsylvania as Mahon 
24. 260 U.S. at 413. 
25. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
26. 260 U.S. at 413. 
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and the amicus briefs suggested? 
Holmes made practica11y no reference to the factua1 
situation in Pennsylvania. 官leonly fact mentioned was 
the Coal Company's ten day notice to the Mahons. From 
this Holmes concluded the Mahons couldn't really main-
tain that their well-being was endangered. Further， he 
asserted that the Kohler Act was really not needed to 
protect the public's safety because such protection 
could be provided by notice alone! Holmes thus summarily 
brushed aside a legislative determination， based upon 
years of commission reports， on the question of mine 
subsidence and public safety. 
Holmes then concluded that the Kohler Act violated 
the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause (which was 
held to have incorporated the Fifth Amendment's taking 
c1ause) : 
It is our opinion that the Act 
cannot be sustained as an exercise 
of the police power， so far as it 
affects the mining of coal where 
streets or cities in places where 
the right to mine such coal has been 
reserved. As said in a Pennsy1vania 
case， "For practical purposes， the 
right to coa1 consists in the right 
to mine it." Commonwealth v. Clear-
view Coal Co叩pany，256 Pa. St. 328， 
331. What makes the right to mine 
coa1 va1uab1e is that it can be 
exercised with profit. To make it 
commercia11y impracticable to mine 
certain coal has very nearly the 
same effect for constitutiona1 
purposes as appropriating or de-
stroying it. Thus we think we are 
warranted in assuming the statute 
does. 
Holmes went on to state the test that became the basis 
for countless future decisions: 
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The genera1 ru1e at 1east is， 
that whi1e property may be regu1ated 
to a certain extent， if regu1ation 
goes too far it wi11 be recognized 
as a taking. 辺/
After Pennsy1vania Coa1 the Supreme Court has dealt 
with the distinction between po1ice power regulation 
and governmenta1 taking on1y rare1y. The next major 
case invo1ving 1and use regu1ation that was to reach the 
Supreme Court， beginning just about the time Rennsv1vania 
Co主 wasdecided， never rea11y reached these issues. In 
November， 1922， the City of Euc1id， Ohio adopted a com-
prehensive zoning ordinance. The Ambler Realty Company， 
which was ho1ding 1arge tracts of land as potential 
industria1 sites， found some areas restricted to re-
sidentia1 use. 
Zoning was a nove1 technique and state courts had 
handed down varying opinions on its constitutiona1ity. 
Amb1er brought suit in the Federa1 Court， seeking an 
injunction against any enforcement of the ordinance， 
inc1uding among its al1egations a c1aim that the ordi-
nance constituted a taking of its property because the 
ordinance cut the va1ue of its land from宇10，000t。
事2，500per acre. 三島/
27. Justice Brandeis dissented. (5ee Ch. 12，担主主・) In h1s 
v1ew the Koh1er Act was a va11d exerc1se of the po11ce 
power to safeguard the p叫b1ichea1th and safety. A11 
Pennsy1van1a had done. Brand巴isasserted， was to prevent 
a nox1ous use of pr1vate property. lf coa1 m1n1ng en-
dangered the pub1ic. 1t was certain1y 1n the state's power 
to regu1ate such mining. Brande1s conc1uded that the Koh1er 
Act did not take property w1thout just compensat1on. but 
rather. regu1ated property rights under the aeg1s of the 
po1ice power to protect the pub1ic we1fares. The Brande1s 
dissent 1s d1scussed at 1ength 1n Chapter 12. 
28. Citv of Euc lid v.釦nb1erRea1ty C~.. 272 U.5. 365. 384 
(1926). For a history of the邑己且 casesee 5eymour 
Toll. ~oned Am町1can213.主L三旦・ (1969).
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The trial judge， relying on Rennsvlvania Coa1， 
held the ordinance invalid， ~ but the Supreme Court 
upheld it in an opinion by Justice Sutherland in which 
忌♀虫 Holmesand Brandeis joined. 1Q/ However， the 
Court never reached the taking issue， saying only that 
it would be time enough to deal with the actual appli-
cation of the ordinance to particular premises as the 
cases arose.旦/
TWo years later the Supreme Court tοok another 
zoning case， ~ect仰 v. Cambridq~. There， the plaintiff 
showed that he had a contract to sell his land for 
industrial use for事63，000，while under the residential 
classification of the ordinance the Court found that 
the land was "of comparatively little value. •• " 
This time it found that the loss in value to the prop-
erty owner outweighed the value to the community and 
held the particular zoning classification invalid.芸/.
The Court， however， did not discuss whether the 
regulation of land here involved was a旦主担9:of prop-
erty. Instead the court merely found that since there 
was no clear community interest in so regulating plain-
tiff's land， plaintiff was correct in his allegation 
that ・theaction of the zoning authorities comes within 
the ban of the Fourteenth Amendment."主 /
29. Amb1er Rea1tv Co. v. Citv of Euc1i~， 297 Fed. 307， 311・312
(D.C.， N.D.， Ohio， 1924). 
30. Justice 5uther1and was strong1y oriented toward private 
property， so his authorship came as something of a surprise， 
but his biographer suggests he may have been impressed 
with the argument that zoning wou1d 1ncrease overa11 
property va1ues even if it reduced the va1ue of some 
indiv1dua1 tracts. 5ee J. F. Pascha11， ~r. Justice 5uther-
1and 127 (1951). 
31. Citv of Euc11d v. Amb1er Realtv C~. ， 272 U.5. 265， 395・397(1926). 
32. 277 U.5. 183 (1928). In 1927 the court had uphe1d another 
zoning ordinance but it does not appear that the p1aintiffs 
had cha11enged 1t under the taking c1ause. ~ahn v. Board 
of Public Work~， 274 U.5. 325 (1927). 
33. Id.， at 189. 
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In the same year， however， in Mi11er v. Schoene 
the Court reviewed a statute of the State of Virginia 
requiring the destruction of red cedar trees without 
compensation to the owners because they produced a 
cedar rust that damaged app1e orchards. Citing cases 
such as旦旦旦L主主 andHadachec~ the Court uphe1d the 
va1idity of the ordinance against the charge that it 
constituted a taking.当/
After the 1920・s the Supreme Court virtua11y re-
tired from the fie1d of 1and use cases. Since the Nectow 
decision the Court has on1y rare1y taken cases invo1ving 
the regu1ation of 1and， preferring tο1eave these sub-
jects to the state courts. 121 Because of this， ~旦旦­
sv1vania Coa1 Companv v. Maho~ has set the parameters 
for a11 subsequent taking cases. Cited frequent1y at 
first， it has now become so we11 accepted that， 1ike 
Marburv v. Madiso~， it has passed into b1ack 1etter 1aw. 
34. Mi11er v. Schoen~， 276 U.S. 272 (1928). 
35. The one notab1e exception 1s ~oldb1att v. Town of Hempstea~， 
369 U.S. 590 (1962)， in wh1ch the Court uphe1d a regu1at1on 
prohib1t1ng the operation of a grave1 p1t in an urbanized 
area. The Court cited Pennsy1van1a Coa~ as providing the 
app11cab1e test. The邑民主担主主 casei8 discussed 1n Chapters 
9 and 13. 
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PART 1工
THE REGULATORY TAKING IN CURRENT LAW 
工ntroduction
Given the nature of the ba1ancing test devised 
by Justice H01mes it is not surprising to find courts 
emphasizing that a "taking case" 11 must be decided 
on its own particu1ar facts. 
"When regu1atory measures have 
been cha11enged as unconstitutiona1， 
courts have tended to 1imit the scope 
of .their decisions to the issues and 
circumstances before them， dec1aring 
that it is not in the nature of things 
that any definitive 1ist of the p01ice 
power's app1ications can be drawn up." 
y 
The ba1ancing test invo1ves so few theoretica1 e1ements 
that the court often mere1y repeats c1iches. As Professor 
Van A1styne puts it， "The judicia1 ca1cu1us invo1ved in 
the ba1ancing process is described in a variety of un-
i11uminating ways.'・:v
Since the courts themse1ves emphasize that the 
facts are usua11y the determinative e1ement of a taking 
case it is not surprising that 1awyers faced with a 
taking issue genera11y 100k for precedents invo1ving 
simi1ar fact situations. In Chapter 10 we have cate-
gorized the taking cases according to the most common 
1. The term "taking case" will be used here to describe any 
case in which a 1and use regu1ation is cha11enged on the 
ground that it constitutes a taking of property without 
compensation. 
2. Netherton， "Imp1ementation of Land Use Po1icy: Po1ice 
Power vs. Eminent Domain，" 3 Land & Wate!.!:-主工・ 33，38 (1968). 
3. Van A1styne， "Taking or Da町田gingBy Po1ice Power: The 
5earch for Inverse Condemnation Criteria，'・ 4450. Cal. L. 
主主.1， 39 (1971). 
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types of 1and use regu1ation that give rise to 1itigation 
under the taking c1ause. 
A number of noted 1ega1 scho1ars have attempted to 
find more abstract princip1es running through the taking 
cases. Does the nature of the pub1ic purpose behind a 
1and use regu1ation corre1ate with its acceptabi1ity to 
the courts? In Chapter 11 we have examined some of the 
princip1es that have been suggested. 
Fina11y， in Chapter 12 we examine on1y the most 
recent cases 田昌 the cases of the ・70・s. This examination 
suggests an interesting hypothesis about the very current 
attitude of the courts toward 1and use prob1ems， a hypo-





THE REGULATORY TAKING工NCURRENT CASE LAW 
Introduction 
Some types of 1and use regu1ation are so we11 
accepted， or have such insubstantia1 economic impact， 
that they almost never give rise to a taking issue ー田
electrica1 codes， for examp1e， or off-street parking 
requirements. Certain other types of regu1ations， how-
ever， frequent1y create such a reduction in property 
va1ue that they stimu1ate taking c1aims. 
The categories of regu1ation that have often gen田
erated 1itigation are those restricting mining， regu1a由
tions for the preservation of open spaces， regulations 
that seek to eliminate existing uses， regulations of 
flood prone areas， wetlands， estuarine and beachlands， 
and a variety of regulatory deterrents to urban growth. 
L Requlation of Mininq 
In a recent fronta1 attack on Pennsvlvania Coa1 
before the Third Circuit Court of Appeals，主主主主止ヱ・
Reoub1ic Steel Corooration-主/the Kleins attempted to 
enforce a successor to the Koh1er Act struck down in 
Pennsvlvania Coa~ which the Pennsylvania legislature 
had adゆpted15 years later. The new act was similar 
to the origina1 Kohler Act except for the addition of 
five words， "in such a neg1igent manner" after the 
description of the type of mining prohibited. l/ Because 
the plaintiffs had based their action on an abs01ute 
statutory 1iabi1ity and had avowed any claim of negli-
gence， the Court found they were outside the scope of 
the 1937 Act and thus did not reach the constitutional 
1. 435 F.2d 762 (3d Circ. 1970). 




Recent 1egis1ation setting mine safety and po11ution 
discharge standards have resu1ted in 1itigation in which 
the taking issue p1ays a part in the more comp1ex fabric 
of regu1ation of mining. Genera11y the emp10yee safety 
standards are approvedゲ as they were in Rennsy1vania 
Co込 byJustice Holmes. Po11ution standards have not 
a1ways fared as we11. 
In P ittsburgh Coa1 Company v. Sanitary Water Board， 
21 a majority of the Pennsy1vania Commonwea1th Court 
found that a regu1ation requiring treatment of mine 
waste waters before discharge to be a taking of the 
operator ・sproperty rights. The mine was operated at 
the 10west point in the basin ・sseam of coa1 and was 
beneath some 100 to 350 bi11ion ga110ns of po11uted 
waters in abandoned mines higher on the sloping coa1 
seam. Three natura1 out-f1ows tota1ed 17 mi11ion 
ga110ns a day. 
The mine operator argued that of the 3.44 mi11ion 
ga110ns of water discharged which it pumped dai1y from 
its mine， on1y 1.27 mi11ion originated from its mine， 
the rest coming through breaches in the barrier between 
the mine and the huge adjoining poo1. Therefore， it 
proposed to treat on1y its 1.27 mi11ion ga110ns under 
the Pennsy1vania Pure Streams Law. Faced with an order 
to cease operations if it did not treat its discharge， 
it appea1ed to the Courts re1ying heavi1y on the consti-
tutiona1 prohibition against taking property without 
3. Pennsy1vania has adopted a ne岬 "BituminousMine Subsidence 
and Land Conservation Act of 1966，" 52 Purdon's Pa. Stat. 
Anno. Section 1406.1三L三三1・， which provides for a so!鴎・
what different system of regu1ation and re1ief. The section 
has not yet been tested. 主主 Note，30 !l. f主主.1・主主.391 
(1968); Comment， 6 Land & Wate!:.1.主主・ 543(1971). 
4. ~主主主之島・， 11nited States v. Fin1ey Coa1 Compan'.L， 345 F. Supp. 
62 (1972); Howerton， "The Federa1 Coa1 Mine Hea1th and Safety 
Act of 1969，" 16坐些ヱ些些旦些些些旦1L盟主旦担辺三 539(1971). 
5. 4 Pa. Cmw1th. 407， 286 A.2d 459 (1972);主主主担旦邑2主主ヱ
W'ater Board v. Har官、arCoa1 Compan'，L 4 Pa. Cmw1th. 435， 285 
A.2d 898 (1972). 
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compensation. 
The majority of the judges sitting found: 
"No matter ho制 meritoriousthe 
desired resu1ts may be， the use and 
enjoyment of property by its owner 
shou1d not be burdened or impaired 
in the name of pub1ic hea1th， safety 
or we1fare absent a rationa1 re1ation-
ship between the evi1 sought to be 
cured and the use of property as con-
tributing to the evi1. It is at this 
point that curing the evi1 shou1d be 
assumed as a direct responsibi1ity of 
government and not p1aced upon the 
property owner in the guise of an 
exercise of the po1ice power. 5ee 
Pennsv1vania Coa1 Co. v. Mahon， 260 
U.5. 393， 43 5. Ct. 158， 67 L. ED. 
322 (1922). 岳/
143. 
It is important to note that the Pennsy1vania Court 
approved the requirement that the mine operator treat 
its own wastes， even though it he1d unconstitutiona1 
its app1ication to these particu1ar facts ・1/
The regu1ation of surface mining has met better 
acceptance in the courts. !iadacheck v. 5ebastia!l，Y 
an ear1y 5upreme Court case discussed in Chapter 8， approved 
stringent regu1ation of brick manufacture in conjunction 
with c1ay mining. In Qo1db1att v. Hempstea9" J./ a1so 
discussed in Chapter 8， the 5upreme Court uphe1d a 
6. 286 A.2d at 468. 
7. 5主， 主主皐・.1:nlted States V. Je111co Industrie~. 3 E.R.C. 
1519 (D.C.M.D. Tenn.. Dec. 20. 1971). 主主監盟主主込:L.Howard. 
11 Heasurem陪ntof the Externa1 Dlseconomies Associated with 
Bltuminous Coa1 Surface Mlnlng. Eastern Kentucky. 1962・1967.'・
11虫主・旦主主・ 4盟主. 76 (1971).旦.Chlcago A11is Mfg. Corp.V. 
Metropo1itan Sanitarv Dlstric ~. 52 111. 2d 320. 288 N.E. 2d 
436 (1972) (Industria1 Waste Surcharge); 1arsen Baking Co.V. 
C1ty of New Yor~. 30 A.D. 2d 400. 292 N.Y.S. 2d 145 (1968). 
8. 239 U.S. 394 (1915). 
9. 369 U.S. 590 (1962). 
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municipa1 ordinance which regu1ated dredging and pit 
excavation on property within the town 1imits. 
At the time the Supreme Court was considering the 
New York's Goldb1at~ case， the Ca1ifornia Supreme Court 
was considering a somewhat simi1ar case in which the 
City of Los Ange1es had imposed zoning contro1s which 
prohibited rock and grave1 mining operations in agri-
cu1tura1 and residentia1 districts.辺/
The owner of a parce1 of 1and which the tria1 court 
found va1uab1e for rock， sand and grave1 excavation， but 
of "no appreciab1e economic va1ue" for any other purpose， 
brought suit a11eging an improper exercise of the po1ice 
power. 
The property consisted of three hundred and forty-
eight acres zoned for agricu1tura1 and residentia1 use. 
An adjoining tract of 125 acres had been used for a 
grave1 operation for approximate1y thirty years and was 
nearing exhaustion. 
Exp10ring many aspects of the taking issue， the 
tria1 court had considered air po11ution， dangers to 
chi1dren and other nuisance factors， and acknow1edged 
the dangers as minima1. However these factors were he1d 
to be issues for 1egis1ative judgment since the area 
was a1so known as a haven for sufferers of respiratory 
ai1ments because of its pure air. 
In sustaining the tria1 court， Justice Doo1ing of 
the California Supreme Court distinguished Rennsv1vania 
Co主 and a number of other ear1ier cases. Dea1ing 
specifica11y with the contention that the property had 
"no appreciable economic va1ue for any of the uses 
permitted in the districts for which it was zoned， " the 
Court noted that the 1egis1ature had considered a nm叫)er
of uses to which it was suited: 
"Stab1ing horses， catt1e feeding and 
grazing， chicken raising， dog kenne1s， 
10. Consolidated Rock Products Cornpany v. City of 108 Angele~ 
57 Cal. 2d 515， 20 Cal. Rptr. 638， 370 P.2d 342 (1962). 
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fish hatcheries， g01f courses， certain 
types of horticu1ture， and recreation." 
且/
The Court went on to quote an ear1ier opinion: 
"However， the very essence of the 
p01ice power as differentiated from 
the power of eminent domain is that 
the deprivation of individua1 rights 
and property cannot prevent its opera-
tion， once it is shown that its exer-
cise is proper and that the method of 
its exercise is reasonab1y within the 
meaning of due process of 1aw." 旦/
145. 
1n other jurisdictions prohibition of surface mining 
of rock， grave1 or sand has frequent1y been uphe1d in 
urban areas，担/but where a regu1ation attempts to pro-
hibit mining in a rura1 undeve10ped area it is 1ike1y 
to fai1.当/
11. 20 Ca1. Rptr. at 647. 
12. 玉三.， quot1ng !!ever1v Oi1 Co. v. Citv of 10s Ange1e~， 40 Ca1. 2d 
552， 11557・558. 254 P.2d 865. #867. 
13. Farmington River Co. v. Town P1an and Zoning Commission 25 
Co叫n.Sup. 125. 197 A.2d 653 (1963) (permit regu1ation of 
grave1 and sand operation); Vi11age of Spi11erton v. Prewitb 
21 111. 2d 582， 171 N.E. 2d 582 (1961) (prohibition of strip 
mining within vi11age 1imits); feop1e v. Ca1va~， 286 N.Y. 219. 
36 N.E. 2d 644 (1941) (excavation of sand. prohibition uphe1d 
because of fai1ure to exhaust administration remedies);担主且
v. Juiellera~， 161 Ohio St. 424. 119 N.E. 2d 611 (1954); Town 
of Waterford v. Grabne~， 155 Conn. 431， 232 A.2d 481 (1967); 
Troiano v. Zoning Board of Appea1s of Town of Westpor~， 154 
Conn. 650， 228 A.2d 518 (1967); f'eop1e v. Gree~. 264 Ca1. App. 
2d 774， 70 Ca1. Rptr. 818 (1968) (may compe1 fi11ing or grading 
of dangerous excavations). 
14. L，yon Sand & Grave1 v. Township of Oak1an~. 33 Mich. App. 614. 
190 N.W. 2d 354 (1971); ~xton Quarrys. Inc.. v. Zoning Board of 
Adiustment of West White1and Townshi~. 425 Pa. 43， 228 A.2d 
(1967); citv of Warwick v. De1 Bones Sand and Grave1 Co. 99 
R.1. 537， 209 A.2d (1965); ~ast Fairfie1d Coa1 Co. v. Booth， 
166 Ohio St. 379， 143 N.E.2d 309 (1957); ~id1and E1ectric Co. 
Corp. v. Knox CountY. 1 111. 2d 200， 115 N.E. 2d 275 (1953); 
Gibbons & Reed Company v. North Sa1t Lake City， 19 Utah 2d 329. 
431 P.2d 559 (1967) (Terminated use too rapid1y);主主 Bosse1man，
"The Contro1 of Surface Mining: An Exercise in Creative Federa1・
ism，"9E邑・主主・主旦・ 137. 155 (1969). 
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A recent Michigan Appe11ate Court opinion is repre-
sentative of this attitude. In I.von Sand and Grave1 
Companv v. Township of Oak1ang，旦/the Court examined 
an ordinance which prohibited grave1 mining without a 
permit and which severe1y 1imited the depth of excavation 
and manner of operation of grave1 pits. The operators 
introduced evidence at tria1 that the township wou1d 
have on1y 5，400 residents by 1980， that there were five 
mi11ion tons of grave1 on the site "required for road 
construction and most bui1ding，" and that the deposit 
wou1d be exhausted within ten years.当/ The Court 
quoted the conc1usion of the tria1 judge with approva1: 
"Where needed natura1 resources 
are known to exist in usab1e quantity 
their uti1ization shou1d be permitted 
in a manner cαnpatib1e with the pre-
sent use of adjacent 1ands. The taking 
shou1d not interfere with the reasonab1e 
use of neighboring properties but out-
right prohibition of the taking is in 
fact confiscation rather than conser-
vation. "立/
A finding that app1ication of any of the provisions of 
the ordinance "wou1d prevent the remova1 of any sub-
stantia1 amount of grave1" 1ed the Court to inva1idate 
it in its entirety. 
Regu1ation to prevent topsoi1 remova1 in urban 
areas was tested in a recent Massachusetts case which 
reaffirmed the princip1e that municipa1ities may "regu-
late the use of 1and and in so doing they may 1imit， 
contr01 or prohibit the remova1 and sa1e of 10am， sand， 
grave1， stone or other component parts of the 1and.-主主/
The case picks up a chain of precedent from the 1ate 
1940・swhere municipa1ities in the northeast were attempt-
15. 33 Mich. App. 614. 190 N.W. 2d 354 (1971). 
16. 190 N.W. 2d at 355. 356. 
17. 190 N.W. 2d at 356. 




ing to regulate removal and sale of topsoil.旦/ Dea1-
ing with a situation where a profitab1e use exploiting 
the natura1 resources of the land left the area barren 
and unsightly and a1most valueless， the courts found 
the soil remova1 ordinances a const'itutiona1 exercise 
of municipa1 police powers. 
2. Requ1ation of Flood Prone Areas 
Increasing awareness of the massive property damage 
floods may entail has 1ead to increasing1y stringent 
contro1s of land use in flood hazard areas.辺/ The 
Courts have reached varying conc1usions with respect to 
regu1ation of f100d prone areas.註/
19. Town of Bi11erica v. Quin~， 320 Mass. 687， 71 N.E. 2d 235 
(Mass. 1947); Town of Bur1ington v. Duns， 318 Mass. 216， 61 
N.E. 2d 243 (1945)三三五五・ 基~. 326 U.S. 739 (1945); ~red v.Mayor 
aI1A counci1 of Borough of 01d Tappas， 17 N.J. Super. 153， 
85 A.2d 317 (1951)呈立会， 10 N.J. 515， 92 A. 2d 473;主旦註ュ.
Ses旦no，176 Misc. 723， 29 N.Y.S. 2d 45 (1941). 主主主監旦立!!.!.!l.，
American Society of P1anning Officia1s (ASPO)， "Land Use Contro1 
in the Surface Extraction of Minera1s，" P1anning Advisory 
Service Report No. 153 (1961). 
20. E.主， 三~.， F100d Insurance Act of 1956， 70 Stat. 1078 (1956)， 
as amended 42 U.S.C. Sections 2401・2421 (1970); 2 R. Anderson， 
Arnerican Law of Zonin8. 19 (1968); Dunham， "Flood Contro1 Via 
the Police PO嶋 r，" 107邑 L.主主・ 1098(1959); Comment， 10 
主主主旦!!b主主.381 (1973). 
21. Whi1e o1der cases se1dom distinguish different areas on hydro-
10gic grounds， recent 1iterature has emphasized differences 
between f100dway 1and and f100dway fringe. Genera11y the 
f100dway is subject to more frequent f100ding and its main-
tenance without substantia1 obstructions is considered essentia1 
if the river or stream channe1 is to accommodate peak f100ds 
without impeding water and aggravating upstream f1ooding. 
The f100dway is a1so the zone of greatest danger; the f100dway 
fringe is more 1ike1y to be passively flooded， serving as a 
retention area for peak flood waters which the channe1 cannot 
accomodate. 主主 UnitedStates Water Resources Council，生邑-
lation of Flood Hazard Area~， (1971); American Society of 
Planning Officials (ASPO)， "Regulations for F1ouc' P1ains，" 
Planning Advisory Service Report No. 277 (Feb.， 1972). 
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The Connecticut Supreme Court in yarte1as v. Water 
Resources Commissio11，辺/uphe1d a state statute which 
authorized the Water Resources Commission to estab1ish 
an encroachment 1ine， beyond which no structure or en-
croachment cou1d be p1aced without specia1 permission 
from the authority. 切le1and in question had 10ng been 
occupied by bui1dings which were destroyed by f100d in 
1955. After the estab1ishment of the 1ine "on1y sixty 
square feet of the property [remainedJ for the erection 
of any structure apart from one approved by the commis-
sion. "包/
The 1andowner appea1ed the decision estab1ishing 
the 1ine and c1aimed an unconstitutiona1 taking of his 
property for a pub1ic use without compensation. The 
Court hedged on the taking issue by noting that the re-
gu1atory statute a1so provided for the exercise of eminent 
domain in appropriate situations depending "upon the 
circumstances of the particu1ar case.・ 話/ The Court 
found that the p1aintiff had not been deprived of the 
use of his property on these facts， particu1ar1y since 
he had never app1ied for a specia1 permit to bui1d prior 
to filing suit. 
Apparent1y， a subsequent app1ication for a concrete 
b10ck bui1ding was denied and a1though the denia1 was 
not an issue in this suit the Court commented: 
"The Commission has， at most， refused 
its permission for the erection of a par-
ticu1ar structure. Whether the p1aintiff 
cou1d bui1d another type of structure --
for examp1e， on piers or canti1evers --
which wou1d not impair the capacity of 
the channe1 in time of f100d is a matter 
which the commission was not asked to， 
and did not， pass upon." W 
22. 146 Conn. 650. 153 A.2d 822 (1959). 
23. 153 A.2d at 823. 
24. 153 A.2d at 824. 
25. 153 A.2d at 825. 
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Turning to the regu1ation estab1ishing the encroach-
rnent 1ines， the Court found: 
"The 10ss of hurnan 1ife and the 
destruction of property wrought by 
the f100ds in August， 1955， justified 
the 1egis1ature in conferring upon the 
Cornmission broad powers to adopt pre-
ventive measures against their repe置
tition. 明letria1 court found that 
the encroachment 1ines as estab1ished 
by the Cornmission extend for severa1 
mi1es a10ng the Naugatuck River， accord 
with sound engineering princip1es and 
statu~ory requirements， and were designed 
to reduce hazard to 1ife and property in 
the event of recurring f100ds. The Com由
rnission did not abuse its powers in pro-
ceeding by way of regu1ation rather than 
by way of eminent domain." 話/
A 1ater Connecticut decision， however， dea1ing with 
f100d prone 1and on Long Is1and Sound narrowed the scope 
of Varte1as. In D001ev v. Town P1an and Zone Cornmission 
of Town of Fairfie1~， 11I the Connecticut Supreme Court 
disapproved a 10ca1 f100d p1ain zoning c1assification 
which prevented residentia1 and most cornmercia1 construc-
tion on the p1aintiff's 1and in a f100d zone adjoining 
Long Is1and Sound. 
The properties inv01ved were 10cated approximate1y 
one-ha1f mi1e fr佃 I the Sound. One parce1 had been sub-
ject to an宇11，000sewer assessment when it previous1y 
had been in a residentia1 district. The on1y evidence 
with respect to f100ding which the Supreme Court noted 
indicated that "much of that [Do01ey's] property is on 
good high ground and was not under water in 1938 hurricane. 
三身'
26. Id. 
27. 151 Conn. 304， 197 A.2d 770 (1964). 




The ordinance 1isted per官litteduses for the x100d 
p1ain zone inc1uding parks. p1aygrounds. a marina. a 
boathouse or 1anding and dock. c1ubhouse. wi1d1ife 
sanctuary. farming and grave1 surfaced parking. 明le
Court found the private1y oriented uses a11 resu1ted 
in "substantia1 diminution in the va1ue of the 1and." 
noting the conc1usion of a rea1 estate expert who found 
the 1and had depreciated in va1ue by 75% under the in-
f1uence of the regu1ation. The pub1ic1y-oriented uses. 
which they found more rea1istic. practica11y restricted 
the "potentia1 buyers of the property to town or govem-
menta1 uses. . • ." Thus the Court found the regu1ation 
unreasonab1e and therefore inva1id.辺/
Turner v. Countv of De1 Norte.旦Iis a recent 
Ca1ifornia Appe11ate case affirming an abso1ute pro-
hibition of residentia1 or commercia1 structures in a 
f100d p1ain on facts somewhat simi1ar to those found in 
Va己主担三・ In T旦盟主. the p1aintiff was the owner and 
subdivider of approximate1y 31 acres of 1and on the 
K1amath River in Ca1ifornia. His subdivisiοn had been 
approved and he had constructed a mode1 home and so1d 
21 10ts by 1ate December of 1964. Short1y thereafter 
severe f100ding occurred. sweeping a11 improvements. 
roads and the water system from the property. eroding 
the surface and making it more susceptib1e to future 
f1ooding. This was the fourth time since 1927 that the 
area had f1ooded. 
After the 1964 f1ood. the U. S. Army Corps of Engi-
neers proposed a f100d contro1 program which wou1d pro-
tect the town of K1amath. but did not inc1ude the p1ain-
29. 197 A.2d at 773. The Court re1ied heavi1y on zoning pre・
cedent for its conc1usion that the 75% depreciation was 
unreasonab1e. See Ke11er v. Township of FarmingtoI!， 358 
Mich. 106， 99 N.W. 2d 578 (1959); liager v. Louisville and 
Jefferson Countv Planning and Zonin且 CommissioI!， 261 S.W.2d 
619 (Ky. 1953); .eturdy Homes， Inc.， v. Township of Redfor~， 
30 Mich. App. 58， 186 N.W. 2d 43 (1971); .eummerville v. 
North Platte Va11ey Weather Control Distric ~， 170 Neb. 46， 
101 N.W. 2d 748 (1960) (Hai1 suppression program inva1idated); 
Hofkin v. Whitemarsh Township Zoning Board of Adiustmen~， 
88 Montg. 68， 42 D.C. 2d 417 (C.P. 1967). 
30. 2為 Ca1.App. 3d 311， 101 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1972). 
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tiff ・s1and. One condition required in connection 
with the project was 10ca1 assurance that f100d p1ain 
uses wou1d be regu1ated in the rest of the va11ey. 四le
Crops of Engineers distrusted.zoning as a regu1atory 
device because of its susceptibi1ity to manipu1ation 
which might 1essen the beneficia1 effects of the pro-
ject. However， the Ca1ifornia Department of Natura1 
Resources took the position that a state 1aw mandating 
such regu1ation in f100d contro1 project areas was suf-
ficient guarantee to meet federa1 and state requirements 
that there be no such re1axation. 
The Court in its ho1ding affirming the 10ca1 ordi-
nance found: 
"We have conc1uded from the evidence 
that the zoning ordinance prohibiting 
certain types of bui1dings in the area 
and 1imiting the use to parks， recrea-
tion and agricu1tura1 uses did not con-
stitute an un1awfu1 taking of appe11ants' 
property and was， in fact， proper1y en-
acted within the po1ice power of the 
Board of Supervisors of De1 Norte County." 
込/
The property owners a1so contended that the county had 
taken a f10wage easement over the property. The Court 
emphatica11y rejected their argument finding "The f100d 
contro1 project wi11 not increase significant1y the 
extent to which appe11ant's 1ands wou1d be inundated 
in a future f1ood."旦/ Simi1ar approval has been given 
in other jurisdictions， often subject to further proof 
on factua1 issues.認/
31. 101 Cal. Rptr. at 95. 
32. 101 Cal. Rptr. at 96. 
33. See 1owa Natural Resources Council v. Van Dyk~. 261 1a. 1287. 
158 N.W. 2d 111 (1968); !urnpike Realty v. Town of Dedharr~. 
284 N.E. 2d 891 (1972); ~armington River Co. v. Town Plan & 
Zoning Commission of Farmingto~. 25 Conn. Sup. 125. 197 A.2d 
653 (1963); ~elch v. Mitchel~. 95 W.Va. 377. 121 S.E. 165 (1924); 
American Land Co・v.Citv of Keen~. 41 F.2d 484 (1st Cir. 1930); 
Cf. L05 Angeles County Flood Control District v.~outh_ern 
California Edison C~.. 51 Cal. 2d 331. 333 P.2d 1 (1958); 
City of Baltirrωre v. Baltimore Gas and Electric CompanY.. 232 Md. 
123. 192 A.2d 87 (1963) (who must bear the cost of certain 
ci匂 improve融 ntsaffecting utilities). 
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In Turnpike Rea1ty v. Town of Dedham，当/出e
Massachusetts Supreme Judicia1 Court uphe1d stringent 
f100d p1ain restrictions on the Rea1ty Company・sprop-
erty. The severity of the restraint 1ead the chief 
justice to separate1y concur in the decision 1est it 
be read as approving regu1ations which might impose a 
"substantia1 diminution" in va1ue， a question of degree 
on which the majority of justices are pointed1y ambiguous. 
ユv
The p1aintiff in this case owned near1y 70 acres 
of 1and， of which two sma11 parce1s tota1ing 3.4 acres 
were up1ands and the remainder was "a 10w  swampy area." 
A11 of the 1and was subject to the town zoning by-1aw 
which provided: 
(1) 明lepurpose of the F100d P1ain Dis-
trict is to preserve and maintain the 
ground water tab1e: to protect the pub1ic 
hea1th and safety， persons and property 
against the hazards of f100d water inun-
dation for the protection of the com-
munity against the costs which may be 
incurred when unsuitab1e deve10pment 
occurs in swamps， marshes， a10ng water 
courses， or in areas subject to f1ood: 
and to conserve natura1 condition， wi1d 
1ife， and open spaces for the education， 
recreation and genera1 we1fare of the 
public. 
(2) Within the F100d P1ain District no 
structure or bui1ding sha11 be erected， 
a1tered or used， and no premises sha11 be 
used except for one or more of the fo11ow-
ing uses: Any wood1and， grass1and， wet-
1and， agricu1tura1， horticu1tura1， or re-
creationa1 use of 1and or water not re-
quiring fi11ing. Bui1dings and sheds 
34. 284 N.E. 2d 891 (Mass. 1972). 
35. 284 N.E. 2d at 901， 902. 
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accessory to any of the F100d P1ain uses 
are permitted on approva1 of the Board 
153. 
of Appea1s. Notice of each such F100d 
P1ain bui1ding permit app1ication sha11 
be given to the Town pub1ic Works Depart-
ment， to the Town Board of Hea1th， to the 
Town P1anning Board， and to the Town Con-
servation Commission as we11 as a11 other 
parties required. 語/
The p1aintiff attempted to support severa1 argu-
ments in his factua1 proof. 工tfirst attacked the 
motives for the ordinance arguing its primary purpose 
was to retain the 1and in its natura1 state. This the 
Court refused to exp10re in view of the 1egis1ative 
statement of purpose. Rather， the Justices found that 
"since the by-1aw is fu11y supported by other va1id 
considerations of pub1ic we1fare [protection of indivi-
dua1s， 1andowners and the community from disaster]， 
the additiona1 purpose of conserving・natura1con-
ditions， wi1d 1ife， and open spaces・doesnot bring 
it into conf1ict with the enab1ing act." W 
The Rea1ty Company a1so argued that the f100ding 
was not from "natura1" causes but rather depended on 
the operation of a f100d contro1 gate but the Court 
agreed with the tria1 judge's denia1 of requests for 
a ru1ing on this point. On review the Court noted 
"extensive evidence on e1evation， topography， dams， 
f100d contro1， f100d gates， a11 bearing on the issue 
whether or not the 10cus was subject to・seasona1・or
'periodic' f1ooding. • • 三島/
Conf1icting expert opinion on va1uation was a1s。
considered. Rea1ty argued that the diminution amounted 
to 88% of the property's va1ue. Citing ~adacheck v. 
sebastian旦/where the United States Supreme Court 
36. 284 N.E. 2d at 894. 
37. 284 N.E. 2d at 896. 
38. 284 N.E. 2d at 899. 
39. 239 U.S. 394 (1915). 
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sustained a regu1ation diminishing va1ue by over 90%， 
the Court however was unab1e to find evidence of d~inu­
tion in va1ue sufficient to support an argument that 
p1aintiff's property had been taken.担/
Baker v. P1anninq Board of Framinqharn， 生よIis an-
other Massachusetts case expressing a somewhat different 
viewpoint from that expressed in ~urnpike Rea1ty， and 
which may suggest a situation which might again 1ead 
that Court to a different resu1t. 
The 1and owned by Mrs. Baker consisted of e1even 
acres of 1and which had come to be surrounded by sub-
divisions of the town of Farmingham. The town had he1d 
an easement for a ditch to conduct storm waters across 
the property since 1934 which had origina11y been suf-
ficient to accommodate a11 runoff. However， as the 
area was deve1oped， the ditch became inadequate， and 
during heavy rains and thaws the property served as a 
retention area for f100d waters. 
Mrs. Baker ・sproposed subdivision was disapproved 
because the creation of the subdivision wou1d deprive 
the town of the retention basin and as a resu1t， over-
tax the downstream drainage faci1ities. The Court cited 
the finding of a master in the case: 
"The board had but a sing1e reason 
for disapproving the • • • [definitiveJ 
p1an， name1y， the extra cost to the 
town of hand1ing the sewage and surface 
drainage produced by the subdivision." 
忽/
40. The dissenting Justice cited MacGibbon v. Board of Appea1s 
of Duxbury， 356 Mass. 696， 255 N.E. 2d 347 (1970)， on this 
point. The majority referred to the case on1y ln reference 
to zoning procedure. The majority opinion did clte邑邑旦
v. To岬nP1an & Zone Commission of Town of Fairfie1~， 151 
Conn. 304， 197 A.2d 770 (1964) as a case ho1ding a f100d 
p1ain regu1ation to be a taking. 
41. 353 Mass. 141， 228 N.E. 2d 831 (1967). Cf. Annotation， 
"Rlghts to Inundate Land as Renderlng Tit1e Thereto Unmarket-
ab1e，'・ 151ALR 2d 966. 
42. 288 N.E. 2d at 833. 
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Spea1cing to the ta1cing issue， it went on "Obvious1y a 
p1anning board may not exercise its authority to dis-
approve a p1an so that a town may continue to use the 
owner ・s 1and as a water storage area and thereby de-
prive the owner of reasonab1e use of it."包/ As this 
case demonstrates，叫lenthe regu1ation appears to be 
designed to secure 1and for a pub1ic faci1ity such as 
a retention basin the Courts are 1i1ce1y to fee1 that 
cond倒 nationis the on1y appropriate technique. 
3. Requ1ation for the Protection of Wet1ands or 
Estuarine Areas 
In considering regu1ations requiring the maintenance 
of particu1ar1y sensitive areas in a re1ative1y unspoi1ed 
state， the courts often ma1ce an effort to separate f100d 
and property protection objectives from those of pre-
servation of natura1 resources， wi1d1ife， fishing rights， 
and water purity. Three of the principa1 cases in this 
area exemp1ify the prob1ems this distinction may create. 
全会/
Morris Countv Land工mprovementCompany v. Parsippany-
Troy Hi11s TownshiQ.，笠/is a case from the New Jersey 
Supreme Court rejecting an ordinance which created a 
Meadows Deve10pment Zone for a portion of a 1500 acre 
swamp 1ying within the township. The regu1ation a110wed 
a variety of agricu1tura1 uses， 1imited residentia1 
use in conjunction with the agricu1tura1 uses， out-
door recreationa1 uses， pub1ic uti1ity transmission 
43. Id.， ~主主主主旦， l!ager v. Louisvi11e and Jefferson County 
P1anning and Zoning Commissio~， 261 S.W. 2d 619 (Ky. 1953). 
44. 主主皐旦主主且~， Yanggen & Kus1er， ~egu1ation of F100d Hazard 
Areas to Reduce F100d Losse~: Part 111， Chapter 1V (1971); 
Abbott， "Some Lega1 Prob1ems 1nvo1ved in Saving Georgia' 5 
Marsh1ands，" (1970)色旦邑主主革主主工主旦盟主 27(1970); 
Morgan， "On the Lega1 Aspects of North Coasta1 Prob1ems，'・
49 ~・Ç.. 1.・主主・ 857(1971)， Comment， 5色旦s!..1.・ Rev.64 
(1972) -; Note， 58巴2主主主 L・主主・ 876(1972); Comment 52 
Boston旦.~.主主・ 724 (1972); Binder， "Taking Versus Reasonab1e 
Regu1ation: A Reappraisa1 in Light of Regiona1 P1anning 
and Wet1ands，" 25 !!.旦三・ L・主主・ 1(1972); Brior， "Virginia 
Natura1 Resources Law and the New Virginia Wet1ands Act，" 
30 単車・~詮三1.・註ヱ・ 19 (1973). 
45. 40 N.J. 539， 193 A.2d 232 (1963). 
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1ines， radio or te1evision transmission faci1ities and 
township sewage treatment p1ants and water supp1y faci1-
ities.笠/ The ordinance a1so permitted other uses 
within the Meadows zone under a strict site p1an review 
program. Fi11 materia1 was restricted to materia1 from 
within the marsh and an amendment to the origina1 pro-
vision a1so prohibited taking earth products from the 
zone. 
The p1aintiff in this case owned a substantia1 
tract of industria1ly zoned land and a smaller adjoining 
66 acre tract which was within the Meadows zone. It 
began filling its meadow (marsh) land and continued to 
do so in disregard of the Meadows Zone regulations. 
Fina1ly applying for permission to continue their opera-
tion， it found its request denied. 
τ~e trial court had directly addressed the taking 
issue concluding: 
"There is no question at all but that 
the township governing counci1 was con-
scious of the physical nature of this 
area and that it was concerned about 
the danger of flooding. There is a limit 
to fill without adequate safeguards. The 
ordinance here is predicated on the physical 
nature of the area to substantial extent. 
官le1and at the present time is not suitable 
for any intensive use. 包 /
The Supreme Court of New Jersey recharacterized this 
finding: "There cannot be the slightest doubt from the 
evidence that the prime object of the zone regulations 
is to retain the land substantially in its natural state." 
笠/ The Court found that the marsh consisted of about 
46. 193 A. 2d at 236. 
47. 193 A. 2d at 239. The tria1 court was reversed in the 




six to eight feet of mucK and c1ay over grave1 and that 
the two 1ayers of mucK and c 1ay had to be "removed and 
rep1aced with proper fi11 • • • [or) topsoil" before 
active uses cou1d be considered.笠/
After a detai1ed discussion of the engineering 
difficulties involved in achieving "proper fill，" with-
out consideration of the regulations， the Court con-
c1uded that it might be virtually impossible under the 
regu1ations since absence of an adverse effect on ad-
jacent properties was an e1ement to be proved before a 
permit to fi11 wou1d be issued. A large amount of ad-
jacent property was owned by a tax-paying corporation 
which managed it for conservation purposes and the Court 
assumed it wou1d be difficu1t to fi11 marshland without 
an adverse effect on the conservation area. 
明leCourt was a1so concerned that many of the per-
mitted uses were public (recreationa1 uses operated by 
a governmental agency or division) or quasi-public， here 
1umping pub1ic uses with regulated uses such as uti1ity 
operations and broadcasting. 
With respect to the proof at trial which evidently 
inc1uded hydr010gic reports regarding flooding and other 
ec010gical evidence， the Court concluded: 
49. Ic1. 
"It is equally obvious from the 
proofs， and lega11y of the highest 
significance， that the main purpose 
of enacting regulations with the 
practica1 effect of retaining the 
meadows in their natura1 state was 
for a public benefit. This benefit 
is twof01d， with somewhat interrelated 
aspects: first， use of the area as a 
water detention basin in aid of flood 
contr01 in the 10wer reaches of the 
passaic Valley far beyond this munici-
pality: and second， preservation of 
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the 1and as open space for the bene-
fits which wou1d accrue to the 1oca1 
pub1ic from an undeve10ped use such 
as that of a nature refuge by wi1d1ife 
(which paid taxes on it). ・ 2Q/ 
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the Court reversed Finally citing Rennsv1vania Coa1， 








"We cannot agree with the tria1 
court ・s thesis that， despite the prime 
pub1ic purpose of the zone regu1ations， 
they are va1id because they represent 
a reasonab1e 1oca1 exercise of the po1ice 
power in view of the nature of the area 
and because the presumption of va1idity 
was not overcαne. "三11
TheMorris County case had a significant inf1uence 
in the 1960・s. MacGibbon v. Board of Appea1s of Duxbury， 
2II a decision of the Massachusetts Supr四 e Judicia1 
Court， reached a simi1ar conc1usion with respect to 
a zoning by-1aw adopted: 
"For the purpose of protecting and 
preserving from despo1iation the natura1 
features and resources of the town， such 
as sa1t marshes， wet1ands， brooks and 
ponds. No obstruction of streams or 
tida1 rivers and no excavation or fi11ing 
of any marsh， wet1and or bog sha11 be 
done without proper authorization by a 
specia1 permit issued by the Board of 
Appea1s. I・ w
The town board had repeated1y denied an app1ication by 
Mr. MacGibbon to fi11 portions of estuarine wet1and 
which he owned.当/
193 A.2d at 240. 
193 A.2d at 242. 
356 Mass. 696， 255 N.E. 2d 347 (1970). 
255 N.E. 2d at 349. 








The Court in MacGibbon read Massachusetts zoning 
enab1ing 1egis1ation narrow1y to prohibit such action 
by towns in the state: 
"The preservation of private1y owned 
1and in its natura1， unspoi1ed state for 
the enjoyment and benefit of the pub1ic 
by preventing the owner from using it for 
any practica1 purpose is not within the 
scope and 1imits of any power or authority 
de1egated to municipa1ities under the 
Zon ing Enab1 ing Ac t. " W 
They thus avoided the taking question which they con-
sidered sett1ed by their ear1ier opinion in ~onunissioner 
of Natura1 Resources v. S. Vo1pe & Companv.旦/
They詰巴 casecame before the Supreme Judicia1 
Court after an injunction was issued to prevent further 
fi11ing of a sa1t marsh pursuant to the Massachusetts 
Wet1ands Act. The tria1 judge conc1uded: "官latBroad 
Marsh is a 'sa1tmarsh・necessaryto preserve and pro-
tect marine fisheriesi ・.. [and) tha t the ・condition'
imposed is not an un1awfu1 taking entit1ing the defendant 
to compensation."三11 His findings inc1uded extensive 
evidence of the pub1ic purposes served by the regu1ation. 
The Supreme Judicia1 Court， however， conc1uded 
that "this is not the who1e matter •• " Citing Go1呈-
b1att v. Hempstead and Morris County and quoting exten-
s ive1y from Rennsv1vania Coa~， they found the tria1 
judge's consideration of the issue inadequate and re-
manded for further factua1 findings.翠/
55. 255 N.E. 2d at 351. 
56. 349 Mass. 104， 206 N.E. 2d 666 (1965). 
57. 206 N.E. 2d at 668. 
58. Compare K1icker v. Stat~， 197 N.W. 2d 434 (Minn. 1972). ~主主
呈担.2Qibsonv. Stat~. 110 N.H. 8， 259 A. 2d 397 (1969); Fo己主
v. Miami Beach， 146 F1a. 676， 1 So. 2d 642 (1941); 豆主主主主2
v. Board of Adiustmen~. 137 N.J.L. 630. 61 A. 2d 167 (1948); 
City of Stockton v. Mi1es & Sons， In~. 165 F. Supp. 554 (N.D. 
Ca1. 1958); 主主皐盟主旦lli.Annotation， "Conservation: Va1idity， 
Construction. and App1ication of Enactments Restricting Land 
Deve10pment by Dredging or Fi11ing，'・ 46A. L.R. 3d 111422. 
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The impact of these cases has been further dimin-
ished by the opinion of the Supreme Judicia1 Court in 
Golden v. Board of Se1ectmen of Fa1mouth.旦I In this 
1970 case， the Court made c1ear the distinction it had 
tentative1y drawn in ~acGibbo~ near1y one year ear1ier. 
The Court found that "protecting the town's natura1 
resources a10ng its coasta1 areas" through a permit 
system a 1egitimate exercise of 1oca1 zoning powers.盟/
On1y when permit denia1 was "based on a 1ega11y un-
tenab1e ground， or * * * unreasonab1e， whimsica1， capri-
cious or arbitrary，" wou1d there be grounds for Court 
in te rven t ion.立νMacGibbonis cited as one such situ-
ation. The Court notes however， 
Our construction of [the Wet1andsJ 
Act 1ogica11y permits each of the re-
spective governmenta1 bodies • • . to 
carry out effective1y the 1egis1ative 
and 1oca1 po1icy of preserving and pro-
tecting coasta1 wet1ands. 
* * * 
The advances thus far made in this 
Commonwea1th with regard to environmenta1 
contro1 wou1d be reversed if 1oca1 com-
munities were prevented from exercising 
regu1atory authority. ~ 
State v. Johnso~， ~ the Maine Supr佃 eCourt opinion 
frequent1y cited with Morris County. and V邑巴 onthe 
59. 265 N.E. 2d 573 (Mass. 1970). 
60. 265 N.E. 2d at 575. 
61. 265 N.E. 2d at 576. 
62. 265 N.E. 2d at 577. 
63. 265 A. 2d 711 (Me. 1970). 主主主与三 Sibsonv. Stat~. 111 N.H. 
305. 282 A. 2d 664 (1971) reported earlier at 110 N.H. 8. 
259 A. 2d 397 (1969). ~旦主主主主. Wilkes. "Constitutional 
Dilemmas Posed by State Policies Agβinst Marine Pollution --
The Maine Example." 23単担三 L・主主・ 143(1971). 
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issue of regu1atory taking， addressed a Maine statute 
regu1ating use of 1and in sa1t water marshes. Con-
sidering on1y the facts that the property was "wet1and" 
within the terms of the statute， and was 10cated with-
in the Town of We11s， Maine， and was suitab1e for 
bui1ding if fi11ed to bring grade above the high water 
1eve1， the Court found the regu1ation to be a taking on 
these facts. 
The Court conc1uded that un1ess fi11ed the 1and 
had no va1ue whatsoever.坐I The Court focused on the 
burden born by the 1andowners: "明leircompensation by 
sharing in the benefits which this restriction is in-
tended to secure is so disproportionate to their de-
privation of reasonab1e use that such exercise of the 
state's p01ice power is unreasonab1e."箆/
Strong 1egis1ative findings supported by evidence 
of critica1 danger to the ec010gy of the area have re-
su1ted in contrary resu1ts in Ca1ifornia where an order 
of the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Deve10pment 
Commission prohibiting fi11ing of the Bay was sustained 
in an appe11ate court decision. The decision is dis-
cussed at 1ength in Chapter 11.笠/
官leWisconsin Supreme Court has a1so given a strong 
stamp of approva1 to shore1ine regu1ation which inc1udes 
wet1ands protection. 官liscomprehensive regu1ation has 
ramifications which reach beyond the ear1ier "sing1e 
objective" regu1ations and is a1so discussed at 1ength 
in Chapter 11. ~ 
More recent wet1ands cases suggest that judicia1 
attitudes are changing. The Mary1and Court of Appea1s 
in potomac Sand & Grave1 Co. v. Governor of Mary1and，些/
64. 265 A. 2d at 716. 
65. Id. 
66. Cand1estlck Propertles Inc. v. San Francisco~ay Conservatlon 
and Deve10pment Commlssio~. 11 Ca1. App. 3d 557. 89 Cal. Rptr. 
8976 (1970); Cf. fountv of Orange v. He 1t~. 106 Ca1. Rptr. 825 
(App. 1973). 
67. JIUst v. Marlnette Count~. 56 Wis. 2d 7. 201 N.W. 2d 761 (1972). 
68. 226 Hd. 358. 293 A. 2d 2沌1(1972). ~・豆主主・ 41 L. W. 3309 
(Dec. 4. 1972). 主主主 Lelghty."Publ1c Rights in Navigab1e 




uphe1d a state 1aw which prohibited grave1 extraction 
frorn tida1 1ands. 
The Potornac Sand and Grave1 Cornpany was the owner 
of three parce1s of tida1 1ands frorn which they proposed 
to rernove sand and grave1 by dredging. The Court re-
viewed extensive evidence regarding the bio1ogic pro-
ductivity of the rnarshes， the tax history of the parce1s， 
their potentia1 productivity for sand and grave1 pro-
duction， and their tota1 size. 
The Court then addressed the issue of whether the 
regu1ation arnounted to a taking without cornpensation. 
They cited cornrnonwea1th v. Tewksbur~， ~ discussed in 
Chapter 7， bringing it up to date with the rnore rnodern 
cases a1ready noted， and distinguished the Maine court's 
decision: 
"S tate v. Johnso~ is inapp1icab1e. 
The Court 1irnited its ho1ding to the 
'facts pecu1iar to the case.・ Thecase 
at bar is not concerned with a 1egis1ative 
sanction of dredging in Char1es County with 
an adrninistrative perrnit procedure. Rather， 
the case at bar is a 1egis1ative prohibition. 
Chapter 792 was enacted 1ess than a year 
after the Wet1and Act of 1970， and was 
intended to be rnore restrictive than the 
Wet1ands Act of 1970. Fina11y， 呈主主主主ヱ-









The 1egis1ative prohibition on dredging sand， grave1 
and other aggregates or rninera1s was he1d to be "a 
1irnitation upon a use of a property， not a taking • 
工t is within the purview of the po1ice power for the 
state to preserve its exhaustib1e natura1 resources. "11/ 
Commonwea1th V. Tewksbury， 11 Met. 55 (1846). 







Going on to document their position that the exercise 
of the p01ice power was reasonab1e， they app1ied the 
Lawton v. Stee1~ ~ test revived by Q01品 1att:ヱ11
[to justify the State in . • • inter-
posing its authority in beha1f of the 
pub1ic， it must appear:) 
(1) that the interests of the pub1ic 
genera11y， distinguished from those 
of a particu1ar c1ass， require such 
interference: 
(2) that the means are reasonab1y 
necessary for the accomp1ishment of 
the purpose: and， 
(3) that the means are not undu1y 
oppressive upon individua1s. 
Chapter 792 is not in vi01ation 
of the Lawton ru1e. [It) does not 
benefit a particu1ar c1ass: rather， 
it benefits a11 citizens of Mary1and. 
The means uti1ized are reasonab1y 
necessary in 1ight of the potentia1 
harm as testified to at tria1 by 
experts for both parties." 五/
The Court thus resisted the taking argument and affirmed 
the denia1 of permission to dredge on the tida1 wet-
1ands.五/
72. 152 U.5. 133 (1844). 
73. Go1db1att v. Hempstea~， 369 U.5. 590， 595 (1962). 
74. 293 A. 2d at 249. 
75. Cf. ~abe1 v. Tab~. 430 F. 2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970). A1so 
reported as ~abe1 v. Pine11as County Water & Navigation 
Contr01 Authorit~， 171 50. 2d 376 (F1a. 1965). Cf・邑旦三
v. Wisehear~， 205 50. 2d 708 (F1a. App. 1968). 
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4. Requ1ation for the Protection of Beach Lands 
Re1ative1y few cases have exarnined constitutiona1 
issues raised by regu1ations for the protection of 
beach 1ands， which genera11y dea1 with strict regu1ation 
of construction in the foreshore or dry sand area or 
use contro1s for the protection of barrier dunes. A 
pair of New Jersey decisions i11ustrate the Court's 
ana1ysis of the issues raised by such regu1ations. In 
speiq1e v. Beach Haven，豆/a 1oca1 ordinance adopted 
under a state enab1ing act， estab1ished contro1s over 
beach zones to regu1ate construction and excavation. 
The objective was to protect the beaches and dunes frorn 
erosion which wou1d aggravate property darnage frorn 
waves and storrn tides. On the ocean side of a "bui1ding 
1ine，" deterrnined by engineering survey， no structures 
were perrnitted except fences， pavi1ions of 1ess than 
300 square feet and boardwa1ks. 
The p1aintiffs owned four tracts， two of which 
were fair1y even1y divided between bui1dab1e and pro-
tected 1and， and two of which were a1rnost entire1y sea-
ward of the bui1ding 1ine. P1aintiffs argued that the 
prohibition of structures resu1ted in a taking of the 
property. 
The Court he1d that the p1aintiffs had fai1ed to 
rneet their burden of proof: 
"P1aintiffs fai1ed to adduce any 
econornic use to which the property cou1d 
be put. The borough， on the other hand， 
adduced unrebutted proof that it wou1d 
be unsafe to construct houses oceanward 
of the bui1ding 1ine (apparent1y the on1y 
use to which 1ands sirni1ar1y 10cated in 
defendant ・srnunicipa1ity have been put)， 
because of the possibi1ity that they 
wou1d be destroyed during severe storrn --
76. 46 N.J. 479， 218 A. 2d 129 (1966). 
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a result which occurred during March of 
1962. Additional1y， defendant sUbmitted 
proof that there was great peril to life 
and health arising through the likely 
165. 
destruction of streets， sewer， water and 
gas mains， and electric power lines in 
the prescribed area in an ordinary storm. 
The gist of this testimony was that such 
regulation prescribed only such conduct 
as good husbandry themselves imposed on 
the use of their own lands ・" III 
The Court also sustained a requirement that the land-
Owner construct a boardwalk for beach access to avoid 
erosion of sand dunes and thus maintain the dune line. 
An earlier lower court decision reached an oppo-
site conclusion where a barrier dune had been constructed 
bγthe government on the plaintiff・sproperty after a 
period of flooding. In!~rio v. Sea Isle Cit~， W the 
court found the deprivation "of any use of the land" t。
be the determinative fact on the taking issue. 121 There-
fore the "appropriation for the public necessity，" could 
not be justified under the police power.旦Q/
A California case， McCarthv v. Citv of Manhattan 
豆盟主且，皇νaroseout of a dispute between the owner of 
a beach and the city which had zoned the land for re-
creational activities alone. The owner had intended 
to erect houses on pilings along the beach front. 
The land consisted of roughly three-fifths of a 
mile of sandy beach frontage within the City of Manhattan 
Beach. The land varied in width between 174 and 186 
feet and formed a strip between the ocean and a 50 foot 
wide strip of land held as a state park. 明leCourt 
77. 218 A. 2d at 137. 
78. 85 N. J. Super. 506， 212 A. 2d 802 (1965). 
79. 212 A. 2d at 803. 
80. There was no consideration of doctrines of riparian rights. 
f!. Annotation， 23 ALR 2d 750. 





their property before or after the passage of the 1941 
ordinance. A1so， since the passage of the ordinance 
they made no use of the property for commercia1 recrea-
tiona1 purposes， nor did they introduce evidence that 
the property cou1d not be used in conforτnity with the 
ordinance. The Court thus distinguished ear1ier cases 
dea1ing with re1ative va1ues in respective uses of the 
property坐/and affirmed the decision of t~e tria1 
judge. 
Frequent1y， cases inv01ving beach protection turn 
on tit1e theories which h01d that the owner of adjoining 
1and has never had， or has re1inquished， his rights in 
the property. Thus Oregon has app1ied a theory of cus-
tomary 1aw to affirm a 1egis1ative dec1aration of pub1ic 
rights in beach 1and.笠/ 1n Ca1ifornia and Texas， some-
84. 264 P. 2d at 939. 
85. In State ex re1百¥ortonv. Hay， 254 Ore. 584， 462 P. 2d 671 
(1969)， the Oregon Supreme Court approved state regu1atlons 
which prohibited any construction on the ocean side of the 
vegetatlon 1ine stretchlng a10ng the Oregon coast. In dolng 
so they re1ied on traditlona1 property 1aw doctrines to find 
that the pub1lc had acquired， over the years， an easen隠 nt
to go upon and enjoy the dry sand area from the 1ine of mean 
high tide to the vegetatlon 11ne. Imp1ied dedlcatlon， pre-
scriptlve rlghts and the 1aw of custom were a11 considered 
as the basls for the assertlon of pub1ic rlghts in the use 
of 1and. The Court rejected imp1led dedlcatlon because they 
were doubtfu1 that lntent to dedlcate cou1d be found or even 
presumed. A1though they agreed that prescrlptlve ease臨 nts
wou1d be estab1lshed by 10ng standlng pub1lc use， they a1so 
found thls unsatlsfactory because lt required determlnations 
on a tract by tract basis whl1e lt was recognized that 
Oregon's beaches had been used by the pub1lc for as 10ng as 
the 1and had been inhabited. 百¥eCourt thus turned to the 
anclent concept of customary 1aw to arrive at thelr decislon. 
Looking to Blackstone they found that to be recognlzed as 
1aw a custom must be anclent， uninterpreted， peaceab1e and 
free from dlspute， reasonab1e， certaln and ob1igatory. 
Flndlng the hi酔1yvislb1e， undlsputed and 10ngstanding 
use of the dry sand area of the beach met a1l these requlre-
ments， the Court validated the Oregon statute declaring 
pub1ic ri酔tsas a codlflcation of custo回 rylaw. 
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what simi1ar prescriptive rights doctrines are applied 
where pub1ic right of use is to be estab1ished.単/
5. Requ1ations to Create Open Space in New Subdivisions 
One of the most active1y 1itigated 1and use prac-
tices in recents years is the practice of requiring man-
datory dedication of 1and， or payment of fees in 1ieu 
of 1and， as a prerequisite to subdivision of 1and. 
Associated Home Builders v. Citv of Wa1nut Cree'~ ， 
包/a recent decision from the Ca1ifornia Supr倒 eCourt， 
approved the formu1a adopted by the City of Wa1nut Creek， 
California， pursuant to state statute. Wa1nut Creek had 
adopted a genera1 park and recreation p1an for the city. 
Making reference to this p1an， their dedication provi-
sion provided: 
"That if a park or recreationa1 
faci1ity indicated on the genera1 p1an 
fa11s within a proposed subdivision 
the 1and must be dedicated for park 
use by the subdivider in a ratio (set 
forth in a res01ution) determined by 
the type of residence built and the 
nw由 erof future occupants. Pursuant 
to the ratio， two and one-ha1f acres 
park or recreation land must be pro-
vided for each 1，000 new residents. 
If， however， no park is designated 
on the master p1an and the subdivi-
sion is within three-fourths of a 
mi1e of a park or a proposed park， 
or the dedication of 1and is not 
feasib1e， the subdivider must pay 
a fee equal to the va1ue of the 
1and which he wou1d have been re-
86. Gion v. City of Santa Cru~， 2 Cal. 3d 29， 84 Cal. Rptr. 162， 
465 P. 2d 50 (1970); S~away v. Attorney Genera!. 375 S.W. 
2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). 
87. 4 Cal. 3d 633， 94 Cal. Rptr. 630， 484 P. 2d 606 (1971). 
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quired to dedicate under the formu1a." 
皇皇/
Turninq to ear1ier cases. the Court tested the 
constitutiona1 parameters by reference to a case re-
1atinq to mandatory dedication of streets where the 
1andowner had arqued that the dedication requir鍋 ent
amounted to the exercise of the power of eminent domain. 
皇21 The Court noted that: 
"We he1d that the city.was not 
actinq in eminent dαnain but. rather. 
that a sUbdivider who was seekinq to 
acquire the advantaqe of sUbdivision 
had the duty to camp1y with reasonab1e 
conditions for dedication so as t。
conform to the we1fare of the 10t owners 
and the qenera1 pub1ic." 盟/
In a survey of other recent decisions exp10rinq simi1ar 
provisions the Court found that none had "he1d a dedi-
cation provision inva1id on the qround that， un1ike 
sewers or streets. recreationa1 faci1ities are not suf-
ficient1y re1ated to the health and welfare of sUbdivi-
sion residents to justify the requirement of dedication. ・
w 
Faced with the slippery slope a10nq which police. 
fire and qenera1 municipa1 operatinq expense contribu-
tions cou1d a1so be required. the Court reversed judq-
ment， notinq however. two state statutes requirinq ded-
ication of access to p曲 1ic1yowned beaches and lakes 
88. 94 Ca1. Rptr. at 633. 百四 Courtnotes in its footnote: 
"古田 require臨 ntof dedication is qua1ified as to subdi-
visio唱lS containing 50 parce1s or 1ess. In order to comp1y 
with subdivision (g) of Section 11546 on1y the payment of 
fees may be required in subdivisions of such size. 
89. A，yres v. City Counci1 of 10s Ange1es. 34 Ca1. 2d 31， 207 P. 2d 
1 (1949). 




which were neither approved nor criticized in the opin-
ion.主/
Aunt Hack Ridqe Estates， Inc.， v. P1anninq Commis-
Sion of the Citv of Danbury，旦/a Connecticut case 
dea1ing with dedication of 1and for park space in sUb-
divisions， addressed the taking issue more direct1y. 
The Danbury ordinance which the Court ruled upon pro-
vided: 
"The Commission may require that 
a p1an of sUbdivision show an area for 
park or p1ayground. Such an area， if 
required， sha11 be at a rate of not 
more than four percent of the total 
area to be approved for subdivision， 
but not less than 10，000 square feet. 
The area sha11， in the opinion of the 
Commission， be suitab1e for recreational 
use and 10cated so as to fit in with 
a city wide recreation p1an: it may 
be required to be contiguous with open 
spaces of neighboring subdivisions. 
工tsha11 in a11 cases be availab1e and 
accessib1e to a11 residents of the sUb-
division. "坐/
The Court first reviewed Connecticut cases approving 
the exercise of the po1ice power when the laws ・havea 
rationa1 re1ation to the public we1fare • • • and [are] 
reasonab1e and impartial."主/ Noting that this regu-
1ation only required dedication of land and not money， 
the Court found: 
"It is c1ear that the requirernent 
which is cast upon the p1aintiff by the 
regulation and statute with which we 
92. Ca1. Business & Professiona1 Code， Sections 1161.05， 1161.07. 
93. 160 Conn. 109， 273 A. 2d 880 (1970). 
94. 273 A. 2d at 882. 
95. 273 A. 2d at 884. 
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are concerned is unique1y and sole1y 
attributab1e to its activity in under-
taking to estab1ish a subdivision. 
Engaging in the activity is 1eft to 
its own choice. When it undertakes 
to s曲 divide，the popu1ation of the 
area is necessari1y increased and 
the need for open space for its 
peop1e becomes a pub1ic one." 笠/
And conc1uded: 
"Basica11y， however， the com-
p1aint is that the p1aintiff shou1d 
be ab1e to assert an individua1 in田
terest in fi11ing the entire area 
with housing as superior to the pub田
1ic interest in maintaining a more 
hea1thfu1 open space environment. 
For the reasons a1ready discussed， 
the pUb1ic we1fare must be para-
mount. " 旦Y
171. 
p ioneer Trust & Savinqs Bank v. Vi11aqe of Mount 
Prospec~，盟/ came to an opposite conc1usion under a 
simi1ar ordinance since there had been no proof that 
・theneed for recreationa1 and education faci1ities 
is one that is specifica11y and unique1y attrib-
utab1e tοthe addition of the subdivision and which 
shou1d be cast upon the subdivider as his sole finan-
cia1 burden."笠/ Citing fennsv1vania Coa1 and the 
96. 273 A. 2d at 885. 
97. 273 A. 2d at 885， 886. 主主 AssociatedHomebui1ders v. Citv 
of Wa1nut Cree~， 4 Ca1. 3d 836， 94 Ca1. Rptr. 630， 484 P. 2d 
606 (1970); ~ommers v. City of 10s Ange1e~， 254 Ca1. App. 
2d 60S， 62 Ca1. Rptr. 523 (1967); ~i11ings Properties. 1nS.J 
v. Ye11owstone Count~， 144 Mont. 25， 394 P. 2d 182 (1964); 
Jenad. 1nc. v. Vi11age of Scarsda1~， 18 N.Y. 2d 78， 271 N.Y.S. 
2d 955， 218 N.E. 673 (1966); Jordon v. Vi11age Menomonee 
且!!三， 28 Wis. 2d 608， 137 N.W. 2d 442 (1966). 包旦畠盟主主旦~，
Annotation， 43 ALR 3d 862. 
98. 22 111. 2d 375， 176 N.E. 2d 799 (1961). 
99. 176 N.E. 2d at 802. 
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主ヱ旦呈 case.!旦ν1aterre1ied upon by the Ca1ifornia 
Supreme Court in !a1nut Cree~， the 111inois Supreme 
Court conc1uded that a taking of property resu1ted 
from the app1ication of the ordinance. 
The ordinance had required the dedication of one 
acre for each sixty acres of residentia1 use and one-
tenth acre for each acre of business or industria1 site 
in the subdivision. The Court he1d: 
"The agreed statement of facts 
shows that the present schoo1 faci1i-
ties of Mount Prospect are near capac-
ity. This is the resu1t of the tota1 
deve10pment of the cαmnunity. lf this 
who1e community had nat been deve10ped 
to such an extent or if the existing 
schoo1 faci1ities were greater， the 
purported need supposed1y wou1d not 
be present. Therefore， on the record 
in this case the schoo1 prob1em which 
a11eged1y exists here is one which the 
subdivider shou1d not be ob1iged to pay 
the tota1 cost of remedying， and to so 
construe the statute wou1d amount to 
an exercise of the power of eminent 
domain without compensation." 旦よ/
Other cases have inva1idated simi1ar provisions on 
varying grounds. 102/ 
sommers v. Citv of Los Anqe1e~，且11 approved man-
datory dedication of property designated on the area 
master p1an for highway widening as a prerequisite to 
100. A:.yres v. City Council of I.os A:ngele!， 34 Cal. 2d 31. 207 
P. 2d 1 (1949). 
101. 176 N.E. 2d at 802. 
102. Se三Haugenv. Gleaso~. 226 Ore. 99. 359 P. 2d 108 (1961); 
Coronado Deve10pment Co. v. City of Mc Pherso~， 189 Kan. 
174. 368 P. 2d 51 (1962); Qordゆnv. Vi11age of Wavn!.. 
370 Mich. 329. 121 N.W. 2d 823 (1963). 
103. 254 Ca1. App. 2d 605. 62 Cal. Rptr. 523. (1967). 
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the grant of a bui1ding permit for expansion of a serv-
ice station. The zoning ordinance inv01ved required 
the dedication before issuance of a bui1ding permit if 
a 10t in: 
"An R3 or 1ess restricted zone， 
if such 10t abuts on a major or sec-
ondary highway， un1ess the ha1f of 
the highway 10cated adjacent to such 
10t has been dedicated or improved 
to its master p1an width. 明lesection 
then provides certain 1imitations upon 
and exceptions to such restriction and 
a procedure by which a variance from 
the restrictions and requirements of 
the section may be procured， or dedi-
cation can take p1ace expeditious1y 
if it is desired to bui1d ~ediate1y 
rather than await the widening of the 
street， if such wideninq is necessary， 
by some other means." 担全/
The owner of a sma11 and aqinq service station 
wished to destroy adjoininq property which he owned to 
expand and modernize the station， and when faced with 
the dedication requirement， he resisted， arquinq that 
the city had to compensate for the 1and used as a road-
way. 
In this case， the required dedication amounted to 
three feet a10nq 150 feet of frontaqe and thirteen feet 
a10nq anοther shorter side of the 10t. The tria1 court 
had found a pUb1ic need for secondary hiqhways， an in-
adequacy of the present street system and other facts 
with respect to traffic f10w qenerated by the business 
use. The Appe11ate Court， citinq ~ons01idated Rock 
Product~， he1d: 
"Bearinq in mind the compre-
hensive zoninq p1an of the City of 
Los Anqe1es， the findinqs of the 
104. 62 Ca1. Rptr. at 523. 
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tria1 court and the evidence in sup-
port of such findings， we have no 
difficu1ty in conc1uding that a11 
the re1evant facts and circumstances 
amp1y warrant the 1egis1ation here 
cha11enged and that it is not uncon-
stitutional.・ 以v
Reviewing the findings of the tria1 court， the Court 
conc1uded: 
"It is asserted that the va1ue 
of the property requested to be ded喧
icated is宇5，000. It shou1d be noted， 
however， that there was testimony 
that the va1ue of property ordinari1y 
wi11 increase with permanent street 
improvements in the area， and it was 
incontrovertib1y estab1ished that 
the improvements to be insta11ed by 
appe11ants' 1essee wou1d resu1t in 
a substantia1 increase in the renta1 
income from the service station." 
旦岳/
They thus affirmed the tria1 court， rejecting a11egations 
that a taking had taken p1ace. 
In Se1bv Rea1tv Co. v. Citv of San Buenaventura， 
旦11another Ca1ifornia Appe11ate Court reached the 
opposite conc1usion with a substantia11y simi1ar ordi-
nance where: 
"Such dedication and construc-
tion wou1d render p1aintiff・s 1and 
use1ess for its p1anned purpose for 
the reason that there wou1d be in-
sufficient 1and 1eft for the proposed 
apartment bui1ding. Except for non-
105. 62 Ca1. Rptr. at 532. 
106. 62 Ca1. Rptr. at 534. 
107. 104 Ca1. Rptr. 866 (App. 1972). 
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conformity with the Genera1 P1an， 
p1aintiff's proposed construction 
was in a11 respects in comp1iance 
with bui1dinq requir叩 ents." よ盟/
175. 
The Court may have been inf1uenced by the fact that the 
forma1 ordinance had on1y been passed on the day the 
comp1aint in the case was fi1ed， a1thouqh there is no 
reference to bad faith in the opinion. The case is 
now before the Ca1ifornia Supreme Court which may re-
so1ve the inconsistencies between Se1bv Rea1tv and the 
ear1ier血盟主主 case. 1091 
6. Regu1ation to Contro1 Popu1ation Densitv and Preserve 
Aqricu1tura1 Land 
Preservation of private open space has been the 
objective of numerous zoninq provisions which prescribe 
1arqe 10t sizes and deep bui1dinq setbacks.込Q/ In a 
rura1 context twenty acre or 1arqer 10t sizes may be 
emp10yed in areas desiqnated for aqricu1tura1 use， al申
thouqh such a ho1dinq zone often permits residential 
construction as we11 if specia1 procedures are fo11owed. 
よ且/ The zoninq precedent makes sαnewhat confused con-
108. 104 Ca1. Rptr. at 870. 
109. Since the appea1 has been accepted in the主連y..case， the 
appe11ate opinion has va1ue principa11y for informationa1 
P叫rposes，and the S叫premeCourt ru1ing wi11 be determinative 
of the 1aw. 
110. 主主主畠盟主且!I" 2 R. Anderson， The American Law of Zoning 
30 (1968). Density zoning has a1so been used as a con-
tr01 in the vicinity of airports. 主主， 2 R. Anderson， 
E旦.2!主.at 186; Annotation. 77 ALR 2d 1362. 
111. ~旦 CODlDent. 1些些単m1.・ l..451 (1972). Very 1arge 
parce1 agricu1tura1 zoning has been used in Ca1ifornia 
in conjunction with the Wi11iamson Act. but the consensua1 
nature of proceedings under the Act makes a constitutiona1 
cha11enge on the taking issue un1ike1y. Cf. ~.e11v v. MahoneY. 
185 Ca1. App. 2d 799. Ca1. Rptr. 521 (1960); ~an2 v. Countv 
of Santa Barbar~. 182 Ca1. App. 2d 93. 5 Ca1. Rptr. 724 
(1960); ~a1ton v. Citv and Counci1 of Hon()lu1!!. 51 Ha. 400， 
492. 462 P. 2d 199 (1969). 
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stitutiona1 1aw because of the interre1ationship of en-
ab1ing 1egislation and the constitutional parameters. 
斗三/ Many cases ho1d such restrictions valid， making 
brief reference to constitutional principles.主旦/ Other 
courts approving large minimum lot size have looked to 
drainage and physical characteristics of the area to 
evaluate the restriction.込全/ In some cases， however， 
other courts have recognized other factors， such as pre-
servation of area character， as justifying 10w  density 
zoning in certain areas， a1though such regulation is 
usua1ly balanced against possible exc1usionary motives. 
斗v
In Salamar Builders Corp. v. Tutt1e， 主語/while 
the plaintiffs' app1ication for subdivision approval 
was pending， the Town of Southeast increased the mini-
mum lot size required in the area. 切ledeve10per re-
sisted the change， arguing that his land had been re-
duced in value to such an extent that the regulation 
amounted to a taking of his property. 
The area proposed for subdivision was in a part of 
the town where sewer and water faci1ities were not p1anned 
due to difficu1ties with the terrain. 賢官 Courtnoted: 
112. ~旦Annotation ， 95 ALR 2d 716 (1arge 10t zoning)j 93 ALR 
2d 1223 (front setback regu1ations). 
113. ~主主， 主主孟・.c1emons v. 10s Ange1e!， 36 Ca1. 2d 95， 222 P. 
2d 439 (1950) (5，000 sq.ft.)j Qarvin v. Baker. 59 So. 2d 
360 (F1a. 1952); ~undee Rea1tv Co. v.αnah!.， 144 Neb. 448， 
13 N.W. 2d 634 (1944); Eirst Nationa1 Bank v.αlicago. 
25 111. 2d 366， 185 N.E. 2d 181 (1962) (25，000 sq.ft.). 
114. 主主主.!.&.， ~ygmont v. P1anning and Zonin2 Commission 152 
Conn. 550. 210 A. 2d 172 (1965); ~overt v. Washin2ton 
~主主主~， 25 N.J. 57. 135 A. 2d 1 (1957); tl町四ckv. Cook 
血盟主~. 12 111. 2d 257， 146 N.E. 2d 35 (1957); 邑註盟主
Bui1ders Corp. v. Tuttl~， 29 N.Y. 2d 221， 325 N.Y.S. 2d 
933 (1971); l(avanewsky v. Zoning Board of Appeals of the 
Town of Warre~. 160 Conn. 397. 279 A. 2d 567 (1971). 
115. ~主主主主孟.， ~tee1 Hi11 Deve10pment Corp. v. Sanbornto!!.， 469 
F. 2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972); countv Commissioners of Queen 
Anne's Co. v. Miles. 246 Md. 355， 228 A. 2d 450 (1967); 
邑主主主主 Nationa1Land & lnvestment Co. v. Koh!.， 419 Pa. 
504， 215 A. 2d 597 (1965). 
116. 29 N.Y. 2d 221. 325 N.Y.S. 2d 933 (1971). 
Di日l凶 byGoogle
177. 
"expert testimony to the effect 
.that the topography and soi1 conditions 
were such as to inhibit the insta11a喧
tion of centra1 sewer and water systems， 
so that any present residential deve10p-
ment wou1d necessari1y be limited to the 
use of we11s and septic tanks: and that， 
in turn， 1argely because of the area's 
topography， its 10cation within or con-
tiguous to the New York City watershed， 
and drainage difficulties， the area 
wou1d best>be zoned for residences on 
two由 acrep10ts in order to provide amp1e 
space for drainage and thus minimize the 
danger of water pollution. Additiona1 
testimony was adduced which estab1ished 
that the rezoning was initiated as part 
of a we11-coordinated and comprehensive 
land use scheme for the ⑦own of South-
east generally.、" よ立/
In spite of this testimony， the tria1 court had found 
that a宇3，650 increase in cost per 10t was "significant 
economic injury" requiring inva1idation of the ordi田
nance because of the absence of countervailing consid-
erations. 
The Court of Appeals noted its ear1ier decision 
in Fu11inQ' v. pall.U1lbQ，込島Iwhere it had ru1ed that 
evidence of significant economic injury could rebut 
the standard presumptions of validity supporting an 
ordinance. First the landowner must sho制 significant
injury， then the city must demonstrate by affirmative 
proof the relationship to health， safety and welfare， 
which the landowner again may overcome if he may show 
that he is deprived of "any use of the property to 
which it is reasonab1y adopted，" or if the regulation 







































































































































of Sl正bstantiationefforts to maintain "a rura1 cαmnunity 
with open spaces" required.主&J
An extension of these concepts was app1ied in呈主主L
Hi11 Deve10pment， Inc.， v. TOWn of Sanbornton，旦]/t。
va1idate a "forest preserve" district for the preserva-
tion of open space and the rura1 character of the town 
of Sanbornto.n， New Hampshire. The to岬n of Sanbornton 
is a sma11 town in the hi11s of New Hampshire with a 
year round popu1ation of around 1，000 residents. With 
the growth of both winter and summer recreationa1 faci1i国
ties in the area， the extension of Interstate Highway 
93 and 1ake and skj faci1ities nearby， Sanbornton had 
attracted some 400 seasona1 homes and a regu1ar inf1ux 
of about 1，000 summer residents. 
Stee1 Hi11 Deve10pment Company had proposed adding 
about another 500 units on 510 acres. 工tbegan nego-
tiations on specia1 zoning text amendments and rezonings 
which wou1d permit the first stage of the deve10pment. 
These hearings aroused substantia1 pub1ic opposition 
and a1though the p1anning board approved the subdivision 
p1an for thirty-seven 10ts， it a1so approved zoning 
district changes which p1aced approximate1y 70 percent 
of Stee1 Hi11・s1and in a six acre minimum 10t size 
agricu1tura1 district and prohibited .c1uster" deve10p-
ment. 
Stee1 Hi11 appea1ed the rezoning asking that it be 
found unreasonab1e because it bore no rationa1 re1ation-
ship to the hea1th， safety， mora1s or genera1 we1fare 
as required by the State of New Hampshire and because 
the reduction of the va1ue of the 1and was a taking with-
out compensation. 
126. 279 A. 2d at 571. 主~， s.011 v. Tr.oy， 370 Mich. 94， 120 
N.W. 2d 804 (1963). 旦.C.ounty C.ommissioner's of Queen 
ぬlne'sCounty v. Mile~， 246 Md. 355， 228 A. 2d 450 (1967) 
(2 acre lot size upheld on similar facts). 
127. 469 F. 2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972). 
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The Court exp10red precedent re1ating to the duty 
of a municipa1ity to accommodate growth 12旦Iand found 
that no precedent app1ied to the facts of this case 
where "a 1oca1 1egis1ative determination that the gen由
era1 we1fare wi11 be promoted by exc1usion of an unwanted 
use from a non由 metropo1itancommunity • • • is not 1ike1y 
to conf1ict with a regiona1 need for 1oca1 space for that 
use.・ 旦21
The Court then reviewed the factors which entered 
the town ・sdecision: 
"We recognize， as within the 
genera1 welfare， concerns relating 
to the construction and integration 
of hundreds of new homes which would 
have an irreversib1e effect on the 
area's ecological balance， destroy 
scenic values， decrease open space， 
significantly change the rural char由
acter of this small town， pose sub-
stantial financial burdens on the 
town for police， fire， sewer， and 
road service， and open the way for 
the tides of weekend ・visitors・who
would own second homes. If the fed-
eral government itse1f has thought 
these concerns to be within the gen-
eral welfare， 主主主， e.g.， 42 U.S.C. 
S4321， 主主~.， we cannot say that 
Sanbornton cannot simi1arly consider 
such values and reflect th回 I in its 
zoning ordinance. Though some 
courts may have rejected them within 
the suburban zoning context， as in 
E虫旦， and its progeny， or where per-
manent first homes are involved， as 
128. Kavanewsky v. Zoning Board of Appea1s of Town of Warre!h 
160 Conn. 397， 279 A. 2d 567 (1971) (sma11 town wanted to 
stay "rura1"); ~atlona1 Land Investment Company v. Koh!.， 
419 Pa. 504， 215 A. 2d 597 (1965); ~oard of County Super-
vlsors of Falrfax County v. Carper， 200 Va. 653， 107 5.E. 
2d 390 (1959). 
129. 469 F. 2d at 961， cltlng Note， 57 ~盟主・匙y. 126 (1972). 
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in I<avanewsk~， but cf. Morqan Hi11， 
we think they are persuasive in the 
case before us. Many environmenta1 
and socia1 va1ues are invo1ved in a 
determination of how 1and wou1d best 
be used in the pub1ic interest. The 
choice of the voters of [the city] 
is not 1acking in support of this 
regard. .
181. 
The Court was not， however， enthusiastic about the manner 
in which Sanbornton reached its objectives. It noted 
・seriousworries whether the basic motivation of the 
town meeting [at which the decision was made] was not 
simp1y to keep outsiders， provided they wished to come 
in quantity， out of town."旦Q/ Nonethe1ess， the 
Court treated this as an interim measure: 
"But， at this time of uncer-
tainty as to the right ba1ance be-
tween eco1ogica1 and popu1ation 
pressures， we cannot he1p but fee1 
that the town ・sordinance， which 
severe1y restricts deve1opment， may 
proper1y stand for the present as a 
1egitimate stop-gap measure." 主主/
With that qua1ification the Court turned to the 
taking issue: citing the s盟盟旦よ芸/and ~and1estick 
koDerties且11cases the Court he1d: 
130. Id. 
-・The zoning ordinance here in 
question has been in existence 1ess 
than two years. Hopefu11y， Sanborn-
ton has begun or soon wi11 begin to 
p1an with more precision for the 
131. 469 F. 2d at 962. 
132. Golden v. Plann1ng Board of Town of RamapQ， 30 N. Y. 2d 
359. 334 N.Y.S. 2d 138， 285 N.E. 2d 291 (1972). 
133. Candlest1ck Propert1es Inc. v. San Franc1sco Bay C & D 
Coam1ss1on. 11 Cal. App. 3d 557. 89 Ca1. Rptr. 897 (1970). 
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future， taking advantage of nwmer-
ous federa1 or state grants for 
which it might qua1ify. Addition-
ally， the New Hampshire 1egis1ation， 
to the extent it expects sma11 towns 
1ike Sanbornton to cope with environ-
mental problems posed by private de-
velopments， might adopt 1egis1ation 
similar to the federal Nationa1 En-
vironmental policy Act， 42 U.S.C. 
S4321旦i主主g.，and thereby require 
deve10pers to submit detai1ed en-
vironmenta1 statements， if such 
power does not a1ready reside within 
the town・sarsena1 of 1aws. 明lUS，
whi1e we affirm the district court ・s
determination at the present time， 
we recognize tha~ this is a very 
specia1 case which cannot be read 
as evidencing a general approva1 of 
six-acre zoning， and that this re-
quirement may we11 not indefinate1y 
stand without more homework by the 
concerned parties." 主主/
7. Requ1ation for the Preservation of Historic Bui1dinqs 
or Districts 
Historic preservation has been the objective of 
nwmerous 1oca1 ordinances and state 1aws. 135/ In 
Louisiana， the Vieux Carre provisions were estab1ished 
in the mid-'30・s in the state's constitution. In other 
states there is sometimes specific enab1ing 1egislation 
authorizing 1oca1 governments to adopt historic pre-
servation as a regu1atory objective. 
134. 369 F. 2d at 962. 
135. 主主監理旦且~， J. Morrison， ~istoric Preservation Law 
(2d ed. 1965) (Supp1ement 1972). Morrison's text pro-




1n the courts， historic preservation has fared 
we11. The case 1aw in this field shows surprising1y 
few cases where the regu1ation was inva1idated， partic-
u1ar1y on constitutiona1 grounds.旦主/
citv of New Or1eans v. Perqament且V is an ear1y 
case confirming the authority to the City of New Orleans 
to pass an ordinance creating a commission for the pre-
servation of the antiquity of the "French and Spanish 
quarter of the city." The Rerqament case concerned the 
regu1ation of the size and the nature of signs to be 
used by businesses in the historic quarters. Mr. perga-
ment argued that since his gas station was a mοdern 
structure having no architectura1 or historica1 worth 
it was not subject to regu1ations adopted pursuant to 
the Louisiana Constitution. 
The Court found that issues might arise under the 
equa1 protection c1ause in the Fourteenth Amendment 
with arbitrary decisions or a fai1ure to prescribe 
simi1ar standards for a11 persons simi1ar1y situated. 
1t fai1ed to consider arguments that such regu1ations 
might resu1t in a taking of private property also pre-
scribed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court noted: 
"The purpose of the ordinance is 
not on1y to preserve the old bui1dings 
themselves， but to preserve the antiq-
uity of the wh01e French and Spanish 
quarter， the辺旦主主旦笠些主主， so to speak， 
by defending this re1ic against icono-
c1asm or vanda1ism. Preventing or pro-
hibiting eyesores in such a 10ca1ity is 
within the p01ice power and within the 
136. 主主主主・.facesetter Homes. Inc. v. Vi11age of 01ympia Fie1d~， 
104 111. App. 2d 218， 244 N.E. 2d 369 (1968); ~ent County 
Counci1 for Historic Preservation v. Romne'L. 304 F. 5upp. 
885 ( W.D. Mich. 1969) (p1aintiffs were denied standing 
under the federa1 statute); commonwea1th v. Nationa1 Getty5-
burgh Batt1efie1d Tower. 1nc. 302 A. 2d 886 (Pa. Cmw1th. 
1973). 
137. 198 La. 852. 5 50. 2d 129 (1941). 
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scope of this municipa1 ordinance. 
The preservation of the Vieux Carre 
as it was origina11y is a benefit 
to the inhabitants of New Or1eans 
genera11y， not on1y for the senti-
menta1 va1ue of this show place but 
for its commercia1 va1ue as we11， 
because it attracts tourists and 
conventions to the city， and is in 
fact a justification for the slogan， 
'American ・smost interesting city.'" 
担皇/
The 1ρuisiana Supreme Court thus enunciated a princip1e 
which is we11 estab1ished in Louisiana 1aw today.当岳/
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts in an advisory 
opinion in 1955 a1so approved a proposed act to estab1ish 
historic districts in Nantucket. Within these districts: 
"・nobui1ding or structure sha11 hereafter be erected， 
reconstructued， a1tered or restored・unti1an app1ication 
for a bui1ding permit sha11 have been approved as t。
exterior architectura1 features subject to pub1ic view 
from pub1ic street， way or p1ace， and evidence of such 
approva1 sha11 be 'a certificate of appropriateness・
issued by the commission."当QI The commission cou1d 
a1so prevent destruction of any bui1ding or structure 
"the remova1 of which in the opinion of said commission 
wou1d be detrimenta1 to the pub1ic interest."且!I
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicia1 Court was asked 
by the state 1egis1ature whether the statute wou1d vio-
1ate the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States. In its ru1ing， the Court conc1uded: 
138. 5 So. 2d at 131. 
139. City of New Or1eans v. Levy ， 223 La. 14， 64 So. 2d 798 
(1953); Maher v. City of New Or1ean~， 235 So. 2d 403 
(La. 1970). 
140. 128 N.E. 2d at 559. 
141. Id. 
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"There are many regulations 
be10nging in these categories [po1ice 
regu1ation without compensation] too 
numerous and too fami1iar to require 
specific reference here. Those which 
in many respects most near1y res回1b1e
the proposed act are the zoning 1aws 
the constitutiona1ity of which is in 
genera1 thorough1y estab1ished . 
Many zoning regu1ations are as severe 
in their operation on 1andowners as 
any of the provisions of the proposed 
act wou1d be 1ike1y to be." 当y
185. 
明leCourt noted that it had previous1y approved the 
"prohibition of bi11boards in p1aces 'where they deface 
natura1 scenery and p1aces of historic interest.・当v
The Court took judicia1 notice that Nantucket had been 
a famous seat of the wha1ing industry in ear1ier years 
and now depended heavi1y on vacation and trave1 busi-
ness. Noting that "it is not difficult to imagine how 
the erection of a few who11y incongruous structures 
might destroy one of the principa1 assets of the town，" 
主坐/the Court was of the opinion that the proposed act 
wou1d be constitutiona1 as an act for the promotion of 
the pub1ic we1fare.当y
Other 1oca1ities have emp10yed regu1ation to meet 
specific objectives in the preservation of historic 
districts. In Rebman v. City of Sprinqfie19.， .!坐/prop-
erty owners cha11enged a city ordinance that established 
a historic zone which permitted property 10cated within 
the zone to be used on1y for residences， churches， pub-
1ic1y-owned centers， auditoriums， historica1 museums 
and professiona1 government or business offices not used 
for retai1 sa1es. 切leobjective of出 ecity of Spring-
fie1d， 111inois was to preserve the area immediate1y 
142. 128 N.E. 2d at 561. 
143. Id. 
144. 128 N.E. 2d at 562. 
145. !旦主主主主.1ee v. Montgomery CountY. 264 Md. 606. 287 A. 2d 
491 (1972) (cannot force one to dispose of junk cars). 
46. 111 111. App. 2d 430. 250 N.E. 2d 282 (1969). 
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surrounding the home former1y owned and occupied by 
Abraham Linco1n from commercia1 exp1oitation. 
P1aintiffs origina11y instituted their action 
after their app1ication for rezoning permitting a "Top 
Boy" drive-in restaurant was denied. The Court conceded 
that the Rebmans・propertywou1d be more va1uable t。
them if they cou1d use it for purposes not permitted 
by the existing zoning. The Court then turned to the 
historic factors. finding "the common denominator" is 
the fact that preservation of historica1 areas under 
reasonab1e 1imitations as to use is within the concept 
of pub1ic we1fare and may be affected by the exercise 
of the usua1 po1ice power attendant upon zoning."当Y
Thus the Court he1d the historic preservation objectives 
mentioned by the state 1egis1ature a proper exercise of 
the po1ice power and not a taking of the plaintiffs prop-
erty.よ坐/
In Bohannan v. Citv of San Diego.当21a California 
Appel1ate Court approved historic district zoning in 
the "Old San Diego Architectura1 Control District." 
The ordinance estab1ishing the district contro1led 
exterior characteristics of bui1dings and signs within 
public view in the area which formed the original settle-
ment of San Diego. characterized by the Court as "the 
birth place of California."当Q/
Re1ating the ordinance to both cultural and eco-
nomic factors. the Court noted with regard to the taking 
issue. "there is no showing [that] compliance with the 
provision imparing style requirements upon remodeling 
or repairing exist1ng buildings in practical effect 
wou1d render them valueless or substantially less valu-
147. 250 N.E. 2d at 288. 
148. 主主邑~. M& N Enterprises. 1nc. v. Citv of Sprinafie1~. 
111 111. App. 2d 444. 250 N.E. 2d 289 (1969). 
149. 106 Ca1. Rptr. 333 (App. 1973). 




New York's highest court reached a contrary con-
c1usion in ru1ing upon a 1aw designed to preserve the 
old metropo1itan opera house in New York City. In 
hvstone Associates v. Moerd1er，よ~ the Court he1d 
unconstitutiona1 the provision of a 180 day ho1ding 
period during whiι~h a specia1 corporation with the 
power of eminent domain was to raise funds to condemn 
the old opera house. 
The 1egis1ation enacted by the state 1egis1ature 
in 1967 created the Old Met Opera House Corporation and 
vested it with the power to condemn the opera house 
and appropriate it for use as an auditorium in which 
operas and other musica1 and cu1tura1 events cou1d be 
he1d. The 1egis1ation a1so provided that the superin-
tendant of bui1dings of the City of New York cou1d re-
fuse a d佃 olitionpermit for a period of 180 days upon 
the request of the trustees of the corporation if they 
secured a deposit of宇200;000. Short1y after the statute 
was approved Keystone Associates who he1d demo1ition 
rights initiated court proceedings to compe1 the issu-
ance of a demo1ition permit. 
The Court focused on the uncertainty of compensa-
tion which resu1ted from the fact that the corporation 
was not funded by the 1egis1ature. Turning to the 180 
day ho1ding period， the Court he1d: 
"Wha t the 1egis1a ture cannot 
do direct1y， it cannot do indirect1y， 
as the Constitution guards as effec-
tua11y against insidious approaches 
151. 106 Cal. Rptr. at 337. 主主 ι旦.Trustees of Sailor's Snug 
Harbor v. Plat~. 29 App. Div. 2d 376. 288 N.Y.S. 2d 314 (1968); 
hnhattan Club v. Landmark Preservation Conunissio!!.. 273 N.Y.S. 
2d 848 (Sup. 1966); ~cNeeley v. Board of Appeal of Bosto!!.. 
261 N.E. 2d 336 (Mass. 1970); citv of Sante Fe v. Gamble-
Sk02l1lO. In~.. 73 N.M. 410. 389 P. 2d 13 (1964). 
152. 19 N.Y. 2d 78. 278 N.Y.S. 2d 185 (1966). 
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as an open and direct attack. 珊len-
ever a 1aw deprives the owner of the 
beneficial use and free enjoyment of 
his property， or imposes restraints 
upon such use and e吋oymentthat 
materia11y affect its value， without 
1ega1 process or compensation， it 
deprives him of his property， within 
the meaning of the Constitution. 主込
that is beneficia1 in propertv arises 
from its use and the fruits of that 
use. and whatever deprives a person 
of them deprives him of a11 that is 
desirab1e or va1uab1e in the tit1e 
and Dossessio~. It is not necessary， 
in order to render a statute obnoxious 
to the restraints of the Constitution， 
that it must， in terms or in effect 
authorize an actua1 physical taking of 
the property or the thing itse1f， so 
10ng as it affects its free use and 
enjoyment. or the power of dispos-
session at the wi11 of the owner." 
[Emphas is by Court) 主v
9. Requ1ation of Siqns and Re1ated Aesthetic Consider-
ations 
Aesthetic contr01s. particu1ar1y when exercised 
153. 278 N.Y.S. 2d at 189. As noted by the chief judge in his 
dissent. the New York court in this case ru1ed on a moot 
issue. The 180 day period had expired by the time of the 
decision and by the terms of the statute the superintendent 
of bui1dings of New York City was required to issue the 
dem01ition permit. The dissent a1so puzz1ed over the 
回 jority'sstatements with reference to the absence of any 
exercise of the police power. noting "the majority had 
given no weight whatever to the ancient presumption of 
constitutiona1ity of statutes and 1itt1e credit to the 
proper 1egis1ative purpose of protecting a part of our 
cu1tura1 heritage and of the structures which enshrined 
those traditions. The 町~king of statutes such as this shou1d 
be encouraged by the courts not found upon because of the 
comparative nove1ty of the methods used." 278 N.Y.S. 2d 192. 
D附l悶叩刷日引引例lは川1凶l
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over signs and exterior architectura1 features， are 
close1y re1ated to historic preservation contro1s noted 
previous1y. 官lelaw in this respect has evo1ved quite 
rapid1y in the 1ate 1960・sand has drawn considerab1e 
comment. .!旦I Genera11y the courts are displaying in-
creasing sympathy for aesthetic regu1ation， but some 
recent decisions have tied the aesthetic judgment to 
economic considerations as we11.よ笠/
In PeODle v. Goo伽 an主主Ithe New York Court of 
Appea1s approved a sign regulation ordinance adopted 
as a vi11age ordinance pursuant to regu1ations under 
the Fire Is1and Nationa1 Seashore Act. 明leordinance 
banned signs ~reater than four square feet in area and 
required removal of existing nonconforming signs after 
two years. 
Mr. Goodman was a pharmacist in the Vi11age of 
Ocean Beach where he provided pharmaceutical services 
and on occasion furnished first aid in the vi11age. 
With four signs which violated the vi11age ordinance， 
he was tried， convicted and fined. 
Finding， "It is now sett1ed that aesthetics is a 
154. 主主主 1R. Anderson， The American Law of Zoning 520 (1968); 
Conment， 59 ~orthwester!!. b Rev・372(1965); Comment， 27 
washington 6& Le~ ~.主主.303 (1970); Comrnent. 39旦・些些盟主主
at lCansas CitI.~・ Rev. 179 (1970); Comment. 35 主些~~・
主主.126 (1970); Turnbull， "Aesthetic Zoning，lt 7単主主
色盟主主~....:邑~. 230 (1971); Co問削t，48 d盟主・ ofY.些盟主・
740 (1971). 
155. 呈些 Naege1eOutdoor Advertising Company v. Minnetonk!.. 281 
Minn. 492， 162 N.W. 2d 210 (1968); ~ationa1 Advertising 
Company v. County of Monterey， 1 Ca1. 3d 875， 464 P. 2d 33， 
83 Ca1. Rptr. 577 (1970); ~urphy Inc.. v. Board of Zoning 
全血盟主主.147 Conn. 358， 161 A. 2d 185 (1960); yil1age of 
z.rchmont v. Sutto!!.. 30 Misc. 2d 245， 217 N.Y.S. 2d 929 (1961). 
Co盟主主， ~eop1e v. Goodma!!.. 31 N.Y. 2d 262， 338 N.Y.S. 2d 
97 (1972); ~anta Barbara v. Purce11. In~. ， 251 Ca1. App. 2d 
169， 59 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1967). ~旦主主主主， feop1e v. Diamon~， 
71 Misc. 311. 335 N.Y.S. 2d 711 (1972) (New York Court struck 
ordinance prohibiting "for sale" signs as discriminatory). 
156. 31 N.Y. 2d 262. 338 N.Y.S. 2d 97 (1972). 
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va1id subject of 1egis1ative concern，" 1571 the Court 
addressed itse1f to the reasonab1eness of the regu1a-
tion. In doing so it qua1ified its positLon in the 
ear1ier case of Cromwe11 v. Ferrier主主Iby making a 
requirement of ~ ubstantia1 re1ationship to the "eco-
nomic， socia1 and cu1tura1 patterns of the community 
or district，・ 詰21the key to reasonab1eness. The 
ordinance was regu1atory， not prohibitory， and it 
estab1ished minima1 erection and maintenance standards， 
both factors which impressed the court. 
The Courts have genera11y been quite 1enient with 
regu1ation of signs through amortization of nonconforming 
sign uses.通Q/ In ~ationa1 Advertisinq Companv v. 
Countv of Monterey，当主Ithe Ca1ifornia Supreme Court 
reversed a 10wer court decision which had found a one 
year amortization period to be unreasonab1e with respect 
to 42 off-site signs owned by the Nationa1 Advertising 
Company. 切1ecourt found that the signs were constructed 
between 1933 and 1950 and that thus 31 of the signs had 
been fu11y amortized for tax purposes before the end of 
the amortization period. Finding the amount of book 
va1ue 1isted by the p1aintiff was "supported by nothing 
more than p1aintiff's bare assertion，" the Court saw no 
sign of arbitrariness or unreasonab1eness with respect 
to the 31 signs which were fu11y amortized. With re-
spect to the other 11 signs the Court found that there 
157. 338 N.Y.S. 2d at 100. 
158. 19 N.Y. 2d 263， 279 N.Y.S. 2d 22， 225 N.E. 2d 749 (1967). 
159. 338 N.Y.S. 2d at 101. 
160. Amortization provisions frequent1y focus on such nuisance-
1ike uses as junk yards as we11， and a1though the time 
period may differ， they are a11 genera11y simi1ar in 
operation. 主主 U Chape11e v. The Town of Goffstow!!.. 
225 A. 2d 624 (N.H. 1967); ~tandard Oi1 Company v. City of 
Tallahasse~， 183 F. 2d 410 (1950); ~purgeon v. Board of 
Commissioner~， 181 Kans. 1008， 317 P. 2d 798 (1957); 
McKinnev v. Rei 11~. 105 N.H. 249. 197 A. 2d 218 (1964); 
Shiff1ett v. Ba1timore Count~， 247 Md. 141， 230 A. 2d 310 
(1967); ~oard of Supervisors of Cerro Gordo County v~_Mi11e!.. 
170 N.W. 2d 358 (la. 1969). ~旦主三五. Arkansas State Highway 
Commission v. Turk's Auto Corp. 1n~. ， 491 S.W. 2d 387 (Ark.1973). 
161. 1 Ca1. 3d 875， 464 P. 2d 33， 83 Ca1. Rptr. 577 (1970); Cf. 
citv of Escondido v. Desert Outdoor Advertisin量. 1n~. ， 106 
Ca1. Rptr. 172 (1973). 
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shou1d be a reasonab1e amortization period in order to 
permit Nationa1 Advertising to recover the origina1 cost. 
明1eopinion is suggestive of an approach dea1ing 
wi出 suchprovisions on a case by case basis.よw
Other courts have a1so been reasonab1y to1erant of sign 
amortization provisions.よ包/ In a few states however 
amortization of nonconforming uses seems to be consid-
ered an unconstitutiona1 exercise of the po1ice power. 
The Ohio Supr倒 eCourt in Citv of Akron v. Chapman昌生/
he1d that: 
MThe right to continue to use 
one's property in a 1awfu1 business 
and in a manner which does not con-
stitute a nuisance and which was 
1awfu1 at the time such business 
was estab1ished is within the pro-
tection of Section 1， Artic1e 14， 
Amendments， United States Constitu-
tion， and Section 16， Artic1e 1 of 
the Ohio Constitution， providing 
that no person sha11 be deprived of 
1ife， 1iberty or property without 
due process of 1aw. よ包/
The Court went on to ho1d an amortization provi-
sion inc1uded in comprehensive zoning ordinance of the 
City of Akron which wou1d have e1iminated a junkyard 
162. Co盟主主 k11ckerv. Stat~. 197 N.W. 2d 434 (Minn. 1972)芝己主
Lamm v. Vo1pe. 449 F. 2d 1202 (10th Clr. 1972) which dis-
cusses the lmplicatlons of "just compensat1on" required in 
federa1 slgn contro1 1egls1atlon. 主主 23U.S.C. Sec. 131 
(g) (1970). 
163. 主主主拍lrphy.Inc. v.百leBoard of Zoning Appea1!!. 147 Conn. 
358. 161 A. 2d 185 (1960); Yi11age of Larchmont v. Sutto!!.. 
30 Misc. 2d 245. 217 N.Y.S. 2d 929 (1961); 邑ι盟三，♀些主盟主
and Reed Co. v. North Sa1t Lake CitY. 431 P. 2d 559 (Utah 
1967) (terminate forthwith); ~tate Hlghway Department v. 
E旦nch.222 Ga. 770， 152 S.E. 2d 372 (1966); ~a t iona 1 Adver-
tising Co. v. State Highway Departmen~， 195 S.E. 2d 895 (Ga. 
1973) • 




over a one year amortization period to be unconstitu-
tiona1 as a taking of private property. Since "the 
substantia1 va1ue of property 1ies in its use，"語岳/
the Court found the amortization provision to be unre-
1ated to the objectives of cαnprehensive zoning. 1671 
10. Requ1ation for the PurDose of Phasinq or Timinq 
Residential DeveloDment 
Traditiona1 1earning h01ds that a municipa1ity may 
not escape the burdens of growth in the guise of regu-
lation to maintain a status quo or artificia11y 10w 
density.旦皇/ Neverthe1ess， there has been some recog-
nition of the right to restrict deve10pment in accord 
with the abi1ity of the municipa1ity to provide essen-
tia1 services.通Y
The principle of phased deve10pment in accord with 
a community capital budget or plan was approved in Q邑主旦
v. Planninq Board of Town of RamaD0，よ1Q/by the Court 
of Appeals in New York. Ramapo had extended the concept 
of zoning to inc1ude a permit system for residentia1 
development which measured the availabi1ity of munici-
pa11y provided services to evaluate the suitabi1ity of 
the land for residential development. 
明leprogram was fair1y simp1e. A deve10per could 
not build more than one residential unit on a pre-
existing zoning 10t without showing that each 10t t。
166. 116 N.E. 2d at 700. 
167. 主主主主担~. ~i1ver v. Zoning Board of Adiustmen~. 435 Pa. 99. 
225 A. 2d 506 (1969); tloffman v. Kenea11Y. 389 S.W. 2d 745 
(Mo. 1965); city of Houston v. Adam~. 326 S.W. 2d 627. (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1959). 
168. 主主，三4・.!:!ationa1 l.and & Investment 白.v. Eastto'wn， 419 
Pa. 504. 215 A. 2d 597 (1965). 
169. ~旦. ，!osephs v. Town Board of C1ardstow~. 24 Misc. 2d 366. 
198 N.Y.S. 2d 695 (1960)j ~adover v. Township of Farmington. 
374 Mich. 622. 132 N.W. 2d 687 (1965). ~旦主主主主. Board 0主
County Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Carpe~， 107 S.E. 
2d 390 (Va. 1959). 
170. 30 N.Y. 2d 359. 334 N.Y.S. 2d 138. 285 N.E. 2d 359 (1972). 
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be deve10ped was within a minima1 distance from sewers， 
fire protection， scho01s and the 1ike. points were 
assigned according to proximity to the required services， 
and a deve10per with fifteen points cou1d bui1d. 
The necessary faci1ities were schedu1ed for the 
entire town in a six year capita1 budget and two sup-
plementa1 six year capita1 p1ans.主主I Under this pro-
gram， it was possib1e that some 1and could be kept from 
residentia1 deve10pment for as 10ng as eighteen years. 
0七herfactors which moderated the effects of the regu-
1ation were tax relief provisions for land blocked 
from development or preserved for agriculture and a 
low incαne housing program for residents. 
明leCourt exp10red the growth pressures and compre-
hensive p1anning recommendations which had resu1ted in 
the provisions to eliminate premature sUbdivision and 
unchecked suburban spraw1. 明leCourt distinguished 
Arverne Bav v. Thatche~， 172/ a classic case finding a 
taking under a restrictive zoning provision， because 
the Ramapo provision was "of a certain duration and 
founded upon estimate determined by fact."よ111 The 
Court found the restrictions "substantia1 in nature and 
duration，" but "not absolute." The Court conc1uded: 
-・ Insum， where it is clear that 
the existing physica1 and financial 
resources of the community are inade-
quate to furnish the essential ser-
vices and facilities which a substan-
tia1 increase in population requires， 
there is a rationa1 basis for 'phased 
growth' and hence， the cha11enged 
ordinance is not violative of the 
Federa1 and State Constitutions."よ旦/
171. Both sanct10ned by New York enab11ng legis1ation. A developer 
cou1d buy the needed points， although 1n some cases (sewerage 
in particu1ar) the buy-out provision might not generate 
as many points as the municipa11y provided faci1ities. 
172. 278 N.Y. 222， 15 N.E. 2d 587 (1938). 
173. 285 N.E. 2d at 304. 
174. 285 N.E. 2d at 303. 
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The ear1ier case of Westwood Court Estate. Inc.v. 
vi11aqe of South Nyac~. 1751 decided by the same court， 
provides a usefu1 counterpoint. The Vi11age of South 
Nyack had adopted an ordinance barring a11 new apart-
ment dwe11ings to a11eviate the burden on the vi11age 
sewerage faci1ities. 
Noting that the vil1age cou1d take "appropriate 
steps under its other and genera1 po1ice powers" t。
contro1 hazards from its sewage disposa1 prob1ems. the 
Court nonethe1ess inva1idated the zoning provision. In 
so doing， it noted in particu1ar that the requirement 
did not arise from "any requirement of or change in the 
comprehensive p1an for the deve10pment of the Vi11age." 
官lUS the New York Court estab1ished a "limit of 
necessity" test whereby an ordinance which was not 
1imited as to time nor direct1y re1ated to sanitation 
was struck down. The comp1ex and interre1ated tests of 
旦豆旦呈EQ，which possib1y cou1d restrain residentia1 deve1op-
ment for a generation， were nonethe1ess approved.よ豆/
175. 23 N.Y. 2d 424. 297 N.Y.S. 2d 129. 244 N.E. 2d 700 (1969). 
176. .!!旦主主主主.Kit Har Bul1ders. Inc. v. Townshlp of Concor~. 




ARE SOME PUBLIC PURPOSES MORE PUBLIC恒IANOTHERS? 
When the Supreme Court 10st interest in 1and use 
regu1ation after the ・20's it 1eft the state and 10wer 
federa1 courts with a genera1 princip1e for making de-
cisions --the ba1ancing test in Rennsv1vania Coa1 --
and few examp1es of its app1ication. 11 Since that 
time the courts have app1ied that test to a wide variety 
of fact situations， as the previous chapter indicates. 
As this wea1th of cases has pi1ed up 1ega1 scho1ars 
have searched for sαne pattern that wou1d provide guide-
lines to predict the outcome of future cases. Most of 
the scho1ars who have made the attempt have conc1uded 
that the search was not too rewarding. 
Professor Arvo Van A1styne， whose exhaustive ana1-
ysis of the taking cases is one of the most recent， con-
c1udes that ・judicia1opinions rejecting constitutiona1 
attacks • • • se1dom provide re1iab1e guides to the re-
levant substantive standards. •• " whi1e "decisions 
inva1idating 1and use contro1s are often equa11y devoid 
of he1pfu1 exp1anatory data. . • • ・ Y Professor 
A11ison Dunham of the University of Chicago Law Schoo1 
has characterized the cases as "a crazy-qui1t pattern 
of Supreme Court Doctrine" and conc1udes that "it is 
not surprising that there are f10undering and differ-
ences among judges and among generations of judges." ]/ 
1. The 5upreme Court has issued a number of decisions regarding 
the taking c1ause since the ・20・s(主主 Allison恥 nham，
"Griggs v. A11eghenv County in Perspective: Thirty Years 
of Supreme Court Expropriation Law，" 1962主主・包・主主.63) 
but except for the brief opinion in ~01db1att v. Hempstea!!， 
the cases did not inv01ve questions about the regu1ation 
of the use of 1and. 
2. Arvo Van A1styne， "Taking or Damaging by Police PO岬 er: The 
5earch for Inverse Condemnation Criteria，" 44 50・包よ・ 1.
E旦. 1， 14 (1971). 
3. Allison臥mham，"Griggsv. A11eghenv County in Perspective: 




Professor Joseph Sax of the University of Michiqan is 
simi1ar1y convinced that 1itt1e proqress has been made: 
"Few 1eqa1 prob1四 IS have proved 
as resistant to ana1ytica1 efforts as 
that posed by the Constitution's re-
quirement that private property not 
be taken for pub1ic use without pay-
ment of just cαnpensation. Despite 
the intensive efforts of commentators 
and judqes， our abi1ity to distinquish 
satisfactori1y between ・takinqs・
and exercises of the po1ice power . • • 
has advanced on1y sliqht1y since the 
Supreme Court beqan to struqq1e with 
the prob1em some eiqhty years aqo." 
生/
To the same effect， Professor Frank Michelman of Harvard 
Law Schoo1 observes: 
"The attempt to formu1ate ru1es 
of decision for cαnpensability cases 
has， with suqqestive consistency， 
yie1ded ru1es which are ethica11y 
unsatisfyinq. This observation 
seems to justify the hypothesis 
that decisiona1 ru1es simp1y can-
not be formu1ated which wi11 yie1d 
other than a partia1， imperfect， 
unsatisfactory solution and sti11 
be consonant with judicia1 action. ・
y 
Despite this universa1 aqreement amonq some of the 
4. Joseph L. Sax， "Takings， Private Property and Pub1ic Rights'" 
81 Ya1e ~. d. 149 (1971). 
5. Frank 1. Miche1官凶n，"Property， Utility and Fairness: 
Comments on the Ethica1 Foundations of 'Just Compensation' 
Law" 80出立・ L・E旦・ 1169，at 1171 (1967). 主主主担b
Ross D. Netherton， "Imp1ementation of Land Use Po1icy: Po1ice 




most prominent academic authorities about the 1ack of 
consistency in the judicia1 opinions， each of them de-
rives a few genera1 princip1es from their ana1yses of 
the cases. Because Van A1styne・sstudy豆/is the most 
recent， and certain1y one of the most thorough， the 
under1ying structure of his ana1ysis is used as the 
out1ine for this chapter. 
1. The Nature of the Regu1atory Ob;ective 
Many 1ega1 scho1ars who have examined the cases 
have found a corre1ation between the nature of the pub1ic 
purpose which the regu1ation is designed to achieve and 
the wi11ingness of judges to upho1d the regu1ation. As 
Van A1styne puts it， "nove1 and nontraditiona1 po1icy 
goa1s， perceived as 1acking in broad community accept-
abi1ity， have sometimes fai1ed to obtain judicia1 ap-
prova1. Objectives with a strong historic pattern of 
socia1 approva1 are thus more 1ike1y to survive consti-
tutiona1 attack. ・・・ "1/ The traditiona1 embodiment 
of pub1ic po1icy in regard to 1and use is found in 
common 1aw concepts of nuisance. ~ The common 1aw 
might prohibit as a nuisance -- if in the wrong p1ace --
emission of dense smoke from industria1 furnaces， 21 
the maintenance of ferti1izer works，よQ/the operation 
of 1ivery stab1es込Ior the storage of gaso1ine. l6/ 
Netherton notes that "historica11y the process of ex-
tending the app1ication of the po1ice power can be traced 
6. Van Alstyne， n. 2， 主主E主主・
7. Id.， at 15. 
8. Professor Michelman， while he would prefer to dispense 
with it， also agrees there is "a general rule dispensing 
with compensation in respect of al1 regulations apparently 
of the 'nuisance-prevention' type." Michelman， n. 5， 呈旦旦主主，
at 1197. 
9. Nlorthwestern Laundrv v. Citv of Des Moine~， 239 U.S. 486 (1916). 
10. Northwestern Fertilizer Companv v. Hvde Park， 97 U.S. 659 (1878). 
11. Reinman v. Citv of Little Rock， 237 U.S. 171 (1915). 




to efforts to comp1ement nuisance 1aw." W 
The c1assica1 examp1e of this case is Radacheck v. 
sebastia~ ， discussed at 1ength in Chapter 8.当I In 
that case， the Supreme Court uphe1d a city ordinance 
out1awing the operation of a preexisting brick yard 
within recent1y expanded city 1imits as a proper exer-
cise of po1ice po制 er，noting that the brick yard pro-
duced excessive smoke and odor. The Court conceded 
that the va1ue of the subject property was diminished 
from事800，000 to $60，000 but found the ordinance a 
justifiab1e exercise of the po1ice power. Modern 
examp1es may be found in cases sustaining prohibitions 
against the use of incinerators for the burning of 
rubbish ょ~ as we11 as contro1s aimed at the reduction 
of air po11ution. 主主/
13. Netherton. 三旦~. at 36. Professor Yanggen and Professor 
Kus1er in their study of f100d p1ain regu1ations reach a 
simi1ar conc1usion: 
"Protection of pub1ic safety and prevention 
of nuisance uses have been given great weight. 
Usually protection of esthetic values has not." 
Doug1as A. Yanggen and Jon A. Kus1er. "Regu1ation of F100d 
Hazard Areas to Reduce F100d 1ρsses" (United 5tates Water 
Resources Council. undated). Professor Daniel Wilkes. of 
the Universi ty of Rhode Is 1and. concurs: "Under the 'nuisance 
doctrine，' courts a1ready can enjoin 1and四 ner全from
changing his 1and to a new use for the detriment of neigh-
boring 1andowner !.'s enjoyment of 1and." 加 nie1Wi1kes. 
"Constitutiona1 Di1emmas Posed by 5tate Po1ices Against 
Marine Pollution -the Maine Examp1e." 23担担三 L・註ヱ・
143. 153 (1971). 
14. 239 U. 5 • 394 ( 1915 ) •
15. Lees v. Bay Area Po11ution Contro1 Distric ~. 48 Ca1. Rptr. 
295 (1965 (; and !!oard of Health v. New York Centra1 Rai1roa~. 
90 A. 2d 729 (1952). 
16. 1豆Anothervery famous 5upreme Court case regarding 
nuisance-type 1and uses is Qo1db1att v. Hempstea~， (369 U.5. 
590， 1963) a1so discussed in Chapter 8. in which a municipal 
ordinance regulating quarries was uphe1d. An otherwise valid 
exercise of the po1ice power is not unconstitutiona1 mere1y 
because it deprives property of its most beneficial uses. 
the Court he1d. (369 U.5. at 592). 
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In Conso1idated Rock Products Co. v. The City of 
Los Anqe1e~，ょ11 the 10ca1 ordinance sought to end the 
nuisance caused by the mining of rock and grave1 in agri-
cu1tura1 and residentia1 districts. It was a11eged that 
the 1and was capab1e of no other use that wou1d create 
appreciab1e economic va1ue. Even though the Court de-
termined that the nuisance factors a11eged (such as air 
po11ution， danger to chi1dren and the 1ike) were minima1， 
it he1d these factors to be issues for 1egis1ative judg-
ment and sustained the regu1ation. 
When this 1ine of cases is re1ied on， the absence 
of nuisance-1ik~ effect can be fata1， as the case of 
Lyon Sand and Grave1 Co. v. Township of Oak1and迫/
c1ear1y demonstrates. There the Court had before it an 
ordinance prohibiting grave1 mining without a permit， 
at the same time severe1y 1imiting the depth of excava-
tion and the manner of operation in a re1ative1y rura1 
area. As the re1ative1y 1ight popu1ation distribution 
prec1uded any serious nuisance consequences， the Court 
struck down the regu1ation as "a confiscation rather 
than conservation." 主主/
The courts often seem 1ess wi11ing to upho1d regu-
1ations if they obvious1y benefit a narrow segment of 
the popu1ation rather than the community as a who1e. 
引lUS regu1ations are often stricken， finds Professor 
Van A1styne， "where severe private detriment has not 
been offset by wide1y shared pub1ic benefits but has 
instead inured chief1y to the advantage of a narrow1y 
defined but specifica11y identifiab1e c1ass of private 
beneficiaries."三Q/
切lUS，for examp1e， when a vi11age encouraged the 
construction of a regiona1 shopping center but then de-
c1ined to permit commercia1 uses across the highway the 
17. 370 P. 2d 342 (1962). appea1 dismissed 371 U.S. 36. 
18. 190 N.W. 2d 354 (1971). 
19. 190 N.W. 2d at 356. 
20. Van A1styne. n. 2.些匹!:.> at 20. ~主主Danie1 Hande1ker. 




Minnesota Supreme Court threw out the regulation as an 
invalid attempt to protect a small group of businesses 
from competition.益/
Similarly， a Delaware court held unconstitutional 
a local attempt to prohibit the location of a new service 
station within 200 feet of any existing service station. 
"It may be that older gas stations may benefit from the 
absence of a new modern station in the area，" said the 
Court， "but the public interest is not served." W 
Professor Van Alstyne notes that cases of this sort 
are rather rare: 
"Such decisions necessarily assume 
judicial capability for distinguishing 
between regulations primarily serving 
private rather than public interests， 
in direct opposition to the presumptively 
valid legislative judgment on the matter. ・
包/
The line is difficult to draw， he notes， because every 
regulation tends to have incidental beneficial conse-
quences for sume private interests. 
Courts have generally struck down cases which en-
rich the government in its proprietary capacity at the 
expense of individual landowner or group of landowners. 
When the government is operating utilities or other 
income-generating services， or even when it is operating 
schools or parks， the courts tend to treat the govern-
ment in much the same way as they would treat a private 
21. Pearce V. Village of Edin~， 263 Minn. 553， 118 N.W. 2d 659 
(1962). 
22. Mobil Oil Corporation v. Board of Adiustment of the Town of 
単盟主主， 283 A. 2d 837 (Del. Super. 1971). The courts are 
by no means unanimous in striking do叩nthis type of ordinance， 
but when such an ordinance is squarely based on control of 
competition its chances are slim. 主主 1Anderson，主主且旦旦
Law of Zonin&， 547・552(1968) (Florida 300 yd. case). 
23. Van Alstyne， n. 九三三疋主主， at 20・21.
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landowner. 切lUS，if the government seeks to use its 
regulatory power to reduce its costs of acquiring land 
the courts generally disapprove. 
Professor Van Alstyne cites the general principle: 
"A regulation which restricts the 
use of private property solely to govern-
mental functions， such as use for pUblic 
schools， pUblic parks， or public housing， 
as a prelude to later eminent domain pro-
ceedings， is uniformly regarded as an un-
constitutional infringement of private 
property rights. Even in the absence of 
a limitation of public activities， highly 
restrictive use regulations， imposed for 
the purpose of preventing private deveiop-
ments that would increase the cost of 
planned future acquisition of the sUbject 
property for governmental purposes， are 
equally invalid." 話/
And Professor Dunham cites a number of specific examples: 
"Thus it has been held unconstitu-
tional to compel an owner， without compen-
sation， to leave his land vacant in order 
24. 玉三..at 23. Yanggen and Kusler also note the 血 ngersat 
regulating land in a manner that appears to be an attempt 
to reduce compensation costs. Similarly. Professor 
Micheln温nnotes others have suggested: 
"That the way to distinguish between 
compensable and noncompensable impositions 
is to ask whether the imposition simply re-
strains conduct which is harmful to others 
or whether. on the other hand. it aims at 
positive enrichment of the public through 
the extraction of public good from private 
property. The idea is that compensation is 
required when the public helps itself to 
good at private expense. but not when the 
public simply requires one of its members 
to 8tOp making a nuisance of himself." 
Michel闘 n.呈旦E!!..at 1196. 
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to obtain the advantages of open land 
for the public or in order to save the 
land for future public purchase， but 
it is within constitutional power to 
compel an owner to leave a portion of 
his land vacant where building would 
be harmful to the use and enjoyment 
of other land (e.g.， setback lines). 
工t is unconstitutional to compel an 
owner to commit his land to park use 
in order to meet the public desire 
for a park， but an owner may be com-
pelled to furnish a portion of his 
land for a park where the need for 
a park results primarily from activity 
on other land of the owner. It is 
unconstitutional to compel him to 
use his land as a parking lot in 
order to obtain a parking lot for 
the community， but it is within con-
stitutional power to compel an owner 
to provide a parking lot for the 
parking needs of activities on his 
own land. It is improper to cαnpel 
a railroad to install grade-crossings 
for highways in order to promote the 
convenience of highway users， but it 
is permissible to compel the railroad 
to install grade-crossings so as to 
eliminate danger and hazards from the 
railroad・s use of its own property. 
工t is not permissible to compel an 
owner to hold land in reserve for 
industrial purposes by restricting 
his use to industrial purposes only， 
but it is permissible to exclude 
industrial development from districts 
where such development will harm other 
uses in the district. It is beyond 
state power to compel an owner with-
out compensation to set aside or 
give land to the public for a street 
or highway， but it is within that 
power to compel him to do so where 
the need for the streets is related 
Digitized by Google 
to the traffic generated by the owner's 
use of his other land." W 
203. 
工n that case， Framingham話/disapproved a subdivision 
plan for the subject property in part on the ground that 
the proposed development would deprive the town of a 
retention basin and over-tax downstream drainage. 官le
Court stated: 
"Obviously a planning board may 
not exercise its authority to disapprove 
a plan so that a town may continue t。
use the owner ・s land as a water storage 
area and thereby deprive the owner of 
reasonable use of it." W 
工nM.orris Countv Land Improvement Companv v. Parsip-
panv-Trov Hills TownshiE， discussed in Chapter 9， the 
New Jersey Supreme Court rejected an ordinance creating 
a meadow development zone to govern land uses. Through-
out the opinion， it is obvious that the Court is con-
vinced that the regulation is meant to accomplish the 
acquisition of rights and property for public benefit， 
rather than regulation to protect the public interest. 
The main purpose of the regulation， said the Court， was 
to obtain: 
"Use of the area as a water re-
tention basin in aid of flood control 
in the lower reaches of the passaic 
Valley far beyond this municipality: 
and second， preservation of the land 
as open space for the benefits which 
would accrue to the local public from 
an undeveloped use such as that of a 
nature refuge by wildlife (which paid 
taxes on it)." 
25. Dunham. bega1 Basis for City P1annin&， 呈~主主， at 666・667.
主主主担2.Dunham. QriRgS v. A11egheny CountY.些区三. at 75. 
26. 228 N.E. 2d 831 (1967). 
27. 288 N.E. 2d at 833. 
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The Court also noted that many of the permitted uses 
were public or quasi-public. 
2. Suitabilitv of the Regulation to the Nature of the 
旦王.QE.主主主工
COs官nentatorsfrequently note that the validity of 
a regulation often varies with its "s1，itability" to the 
property to which it is applied. 
On the other hand， the claim that 
land use controls have taken or damaged 
private property interests in an uncon-
stitutional sense is frequently advanced 
today as the basis for an attack upon 
the validity of a particular restriction 
as applied to a particular parcel of 
land. 工na particularized challenge of 
this sort， the factual components of the 
individual cases are obviously of crucial 
significance， and tend to defy meaningful 
generalization: the decisions， as one 
might expect， often repeat the familiar 
judicial disclaimers that the legal re-
sult necessarily "varies with circumstances 
and conditions，" and that an exact line 
between valid measures and unconstitu-
tional overreaching "is not capable of 
precise delimination." 担/
Thus in zoning cases courts have typically looked 
to see whether the regulation permits the land to be 
used in a manner similar to the uses of surrounding 
and nearby land. ~ Thus， for example a Florida Court 
28. Van Alstyne. n. 2. 豆旦主主主. at 28. 
29. .1昼. at 29. Professor Van Alstyne adds: 
Why this result necessarily follows 
from the legal premise. however. is seldom 
explained. Often. on the apparent assump-
tion that the connective reasoning i5 self-
evident. the result i5 merely announced in 
conclu5ionary form. Sometimes it is accom-
panied by references to evidence showing 
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held unconstitutional a regulation limiting property 
to single-family use under the following circumstances: 
"In the instant case， the only 
property in the neighborhood which 
is used for single family dwellings 
is separated from appellant's prop-
erty by vacant marshlands and a 
sewage disposal plant. The property 
surrounding appellant's tract is 
used to maintain the yards of the 
railroad， a convenience store， a 
gas station， a large apartment 
complex and a sewage disposal sys-
t倒・" 旦/
A corollary proposition is that the uses permitted 
under the regulation must be the kind of uses that could 
reasonably be undertaken on the property: 
"工f existing uses of surrounding 
or nearby land are so highly incom-
patible with permitted uses of the 
subject property that development for 
the latter purposes is unlikely t。
occur， the restriction may be deemed 
arbitrary and confiscatory." 込/
that the 1ess restrictive1y zoned adjoining 
1and was physica11y simi1ar to the subject 
property. that the 1atter 1and wou1d be more 
va1uab1e without the existing use restrictions. 
and that e1imination of those restrictions 
wou1d not adverse1y affect surrounding 1ands. 
Each of the reinforcing factors mentioned. 
however. has been said to be insufficient. 
standing a10ne. to inva1idぽtea zoning regu-
1ation. According1y， the contro11ing question 
re1ates to the weight to be ascribed to the 
severa1 factua1 e1ements and their interre1a-
tionship in the tota1 judicia1 equation. on 
these matters， however， typica1 judicia1 
opinions are genera11y uninforrr温 tive.
30. Wi11iam Murray Bui1ders. Inc. v. City of Jacksonvi11~， 254 
50. 2d 364， 366・367(F1a. App. 1971). 




This ru1e is often described as the princip1e that 
there must be a rationa1 re1ationship to regu1atory ob-
jectives. As Professor Dunham observes， "the standard， 
that regu1ation without compensation requires a casua1 
re1ationship between the regu1ated activity and a harm， 
is a test with some e1ement of objectivity." W 
The c1assic case cited for this proposition has 
been Arverne Bav Construction Co. v. Thatcher.主/
P1aintiff owned a tract of 1and on the norther1y side 
。fLinden Bou1evard in Brook1yn， described by the Court 
(in 1938) as an "a1most undeve1oped" area with a few 
farm bui1dings being the on1y structures within a mi1e." 
当/
P1aintiff wanted to bui1d a gas station but the 
city zoned the property residentia1. The Court found 
the regu1ation unsuitab1e to the condition of the sur-
rounding area: 
"Findings of the tria1 judge， 
sustained by evidence presented by 
the p1aintiff， estab1ish that， in 
the vicinity of the p1aintiff's 
premises， the city operates an incin-
erator which "gives off offensive 
fumes and odors which permeate 
p1ainヒiff'spremises." About 1，200 
or 1，500 feet from the p1aintiff's 
1and，・'a trunk sewer carrying both 
storm and sanitary sewage empties 
into an open creek. 合合*The said 
creek runs to the south of p1ain-
tiff・spremises and gives off 
nauseating odors which permeate 
the sa id property." 主/
3 2. Dunham..Qriggs v. A11eghenY. 呈旦E!!!..at 75. 
33. 278 N.Y. 222. 15 N.E. 2d 587 (1938). 
34. 15 N.E. 2d at 590. 
35. Id.. at 591. 
Di日l凶 byGoogle
207. 
τ~e Court said the property couldn・tbe profitably or 
"reasonably used" under the regulation and held it in-
valid， citing Holmes' balancing test. 
"The warning of Mr. Justice 
Holmes should perhaps be directed 
rather to Legislatures than to 
courts: for the courts have not 
hesitated to declare statutes in-
valid wherever regulation has gone 
so far that it is clearly unrea-
sonable and must be 'recognized 
as taking，' and unless regulation 
does clearly go so far the courts 
may not deny force to the regula-
tion. We have already pointed 
out that in the case which we are 
reviewing， the plaintiff・s land 
cannot at present or in the imme-
diate future be profitably or 
reasonably use~ without violation 
of the restriction. An ordinance 
which permanently so restricts 
the use of property that it can-
not be used for any reasonable 
purpose goes， it is plain， beyond 
regulation， and must be recognized 
as a taking of the property. The 
only substantial difference， in 
such case， between restriction 
and actual taking， is that the 
restriction leaves the owner sub-
ject to the burden of payment of 
taxation， while outright confis-
cation would relieve him of that 
burden. "差/
36. Id.， at 590・591.
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3. The Extent of Loss in Land Va1ues 
工n a test based on ba1ancing pub1ic gain against 
private 10ss the extent of the private 10ss is obvious1y 
a significant e1ement. 121 Various commentators have 
attempted to reach some numerica1 assessment of the 
amount of 10ss in 1and va1ue that the courts wi11 find 
acceptab1e. 
Ten years ago Professors Jan Krasnowiecki and Ann 
Louise Strong conc1uded that a 10ss of two-thirds of 
廿leproperty's va1ue represented the average point where 
a taking occurred: 
"One of the authors recent1y made 
a survey of cases inv01ving the issue of 
unconstitutiona1 taking of private prop-
erty by regu1ation， covering a11 the 
cases which cite va1ue figures. It was 
found that the average breaking point 
between va1id regu1ation and ・taking・
is at a 10ss of two-thirds of the ad-
mitted va1ue for some other use. Even 
though such surveys without differen-
tiation between the facts of each case 
contain some e1ement of naivete， the 
average 10ss countenanced by the courts 
sure1y supports the view that the courts 
are wi11ing to go very far in a110wing 
regu1ation to r011 back the market."旦/
31. Van Alstyne. n. 2， ~主主. at 31. 
38. Jan Krasnowiecki and Ann Louise Strong， "CompensableORegu-
lations for Open Space，" :!.誕生主主盟主・且旦・ of旦盟盟玉三
81，89 (1963). Michelman also focuses on degree of loss: 
"to de termine compensabi 1i ty one is expec ted 
to focus on the particular 'thing' injuriously 
affected and to inquire what proportion of its 
value is destroyed by the measure in question. 
If this proportion is so large as to approach 
tota1ity， compensation is due; otherwise. not." 
Michelman， 主主~. at 1192. 
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On the other hand Professor Anderson ・sattempt to 
find a mathematica1 corre1ation proved inconc1usive: 
"No basis for precise prediction 
can be found in the d011ars-and-cents 
evidence reported by the courts in the 
constitutiona1 cases. Examination of 
approximate1y 50 cases in whicb the 
courts mentioned proof of the va1ue of 
the subject 1and if used for a permitted 
purpose， as compared with its va1ue if 
used for a proposed purpose out1awed by 
the ordinance， revea1ed that about ha1f 
of the ordinances were approved and 
ha1f were found unconstitutiona1. More-
over. the 10ss of use va1ue in the cases 
where the ordinances were uphe1d was 
about the same as the 10ss proved in the 
cases where an ODDosite resu1t was 
王主主主主主昼 Ifany conc1usion is warranted 
by this random samp1ing， it is that 
financia1 10ss is a re1evant consideration， 
but not a sing1e or decisive one." W 
Whether or not such quantification is possib1e， at 
least most COIT町¥entatorsagree that extent of 10ss is 
important. As Professor Sax notes， "the conventiona1 
view [is] that any governmenta1 regu1ation that makes 
a private right essentia11y worth1ess is a taking of 
property for which compensation must be paid." 担/
A1though the commentators recognize that 1and va1ues 
39. 1 Anderson. ~merican Law of Zonin&. 101 (1968). 
40. Sax. 三旦旦主主.at 152.156. 
Under present practice. the question posed 
by a court would be whether the governmental regu-
1ations. however justified. so reduced the value of 
the restricted owner's land as to deprive it of al1 
present economic productivity. If the effect of 
prohibiting strip mining were to make the mining 
land utterly worthless to the holder. who might 
own on1y coal mining rights. most courts today 
would award compensation to him. 
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p1ay a r01e in determining va1idity they a1so recognize 
that the 10ss of 1and va1ues by itse1f has 1itt1e pre-
dictive va1ue in determining the outcome of cases. Zoning 
regu1ations have been uphe1d， says Professor Anderson， 
when the difference in 1and va1ue was as great as 8 to 
1 and where the asserted 10ss was as much as事350，000.
盆/ On the other hand， when the courts ta1k about 10ss 
of 1and va1ues in striking down a regu1ation it is usua11y 
on1y one of a number of reasons. 
"In near1y a11 of the cases where 
an i11ega1 taking of property was de-
tected by the courts， the evidence dis-
c10sed not on1y a serious 10ss of use 
va1ue， but other factors which rendered 
the permitted uses impossible or im-
practica1. Thus， an ordinance which 
1imited certain 1and to residentia1 use， 
for which it had no va1ue， and proscribed 
uses which wou1d have rendered the 1and 
usefu1 at 1east to the extent of $17，000， 
was he1d confiscatory. The same resu1t 
was reached where 1and was unsuitable 
to residentia1 use and the ordinance 
which 1imited it to that purpose reduced 
its va1ue事8，000per acre. 盆/
Fina11y， one major caveat shou1d be noted in re-
gard to this entire chapter. The ana1yses of case law 
referred to， and the cases cited， are frαn the 1960・s
or ear1ier. Most of them predate the great upwe11ing 
of environmenta1 awareness that the 1970 ・shas produced. 
Consequent1y， many of the conc1usions suggested by these 
ear1ier cases may a1ready be out of date. 
As the next chapter wi11 indicate， the more recent 
cases suggest that many courts are aware that traditiona1 
common law nuisance theories are not adequate to deal 
with modern prob1ems. It is perhaps fitting to c10se 




























































the 5th Circuit Court of Appea1s from a case decided as 
the ・70・swere just beginning: 
"It is the destiny of the Fifth 
Circuit to be in the midd1e of great， 
oftentimes exp10sive issues of spec-
tacu1ar pub1ic importance. So it is 
here as we enter in depth the contem-
porary interest in the preservation 
of our environment. " 
'~e h01d that nothing in the 
statutory structure compe1s the Sec-
retary to c10se his eyes to a11 that 
others see or think they see. The 
estab1ishment was entit1ed， if not 
required， to consider ec010gica1 
factors and， being persuaded by them， 
to deny that which might have been 
granted routine1y five， ten， or fif-
teen years ago before man's exp10sive 
increase made a11， inc1uding Congress， 
aware of civi1ization・spotentia1 
destruction from breathing its own 
p011uted air and drinking its own 
infected water and the immeasurab1e 
10ss from a si1ent-spring-1ike dis-
turbance of nature・seconomy. We 
reverse." 主11




CASES FROM THE SEVENTIES: A QUIET JUDICIAL REVOLUT工ON
The scho1ars whose ana1yses were quoted in the pre-
vious chapter were writing in the 1960・s.11 That view 
of the Arnerican systern as it rnoved to rnore severe1y re-
strict the free use of 1and was succinct1y put by Pro-
fessor Danie1 R. Mande1her in 1961: 
"The 1aw can take cognizance of 
individua1 circurnstances and cornpensate 
fu11y when 1irnitations are irnposed. 
Or the 1aw ca~ expand the concept of 
cornrnunity we11-being which is essentia1 
to a finding of constitutiona1 va1idity 
under the po1 ice power." y 
A drarnatic change in Arnerican attitudes toward the 
environrnent carne in the opening years of the decade of 
the 1970・s. We wondered whether the courts were affected 
by this sarne change in attitudes. To test this hypo-
thesis we cu11ed out the Appe11ate Court opinions bear-
ing a decision date of January 1， 1970 or 1ater in which 
the taking issue was discussed. We recognize that the 
cases frorn a period on1y slight1y 10nger than three 
years rnay seern to be a very srna11 sarnp1e， especia11y 
when dea1ing with an issue that traces its 1ineage back 
over seven centuries. Neverthe1ess， this sarnp1ing gives 
sorne signs that a quiet revo1ution in judicia1 attitudes 
rnay be in the rnaking. 
1. The Mood of the Seventies 
The 1970・shave brought an intangib1e but high1y 
significant change in the attitudes of the pub1ic toward 
1. A few of the works cited in that chapter bear 1970 or 1971 
dates， but even these appear to have been based primarily 
on research conducted in the 1960's. 
2. "Notes from the English: Compensation in Town and County 
Planning，" 49包1.!!・主主・ 699，736・737(1961). 
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the use of 1and that has resu1ted in a series of state 
1egis1ative enactments imposing new regu1ations on 1and 
use. In The Quiet Revo1ution in Land Use Contro1， Y 
we described this changed attitude toward 1and that we 
observed: 
If one were to pinpoint any 
sing1e predominant cause of the quiet 
revo1ution it is a subt1e but signifi-
cant change in our very concept of the 
term "land，" a concept that under1ies 
our who1e phi1osophy in 1and use regu-
1ation • • • Basica11y， we are drawing 
away from the Nineteenth Century idea 
that 1and's on1y function is to enab1e 
its owner to make money. 
This concern over the interre1at-
edness of 1and uses had 1ed to a recog-
nition of the need to dea1 with entire 
eco1ogica1 systems rather than sma11 
segments of them • . • Increasing1y 
the question being asked is not on1y， 
"wi11 this use reduce the va1ue of 
surrounding 1and?" but "Wi11 this make 
the best use of our 1and resources?" 
三/
The Citizens・AdvisoryCommittee on Environmenta1 
Qua1ity describes the changing attitudes toward the use 
of 1and as a "new mood" in the nation， a mood that rec-
ognizes for the first time that decisions regarding the 
use of 1and wi11 have a major impact on our society.三/
The wave of state 1and use 1egis1ation generated 
by the new mood rea11y began around the beginning of the 
1970・s.~ This 1egis1ation， though differing wide1y in 
3. Bosse1n温nand Callies，百leQuiet Revolution in Land Use 
色旦rol，1971. 
4. 1.昼.， at 314・318.
5. Citizens ・AdvisoryCommittee on Environmental Quality Task 
Force on Land Use and Urban Growth， !he Use of Lan2.， 147・148
(1973) • 
6. Only the Hawaiian Land Use Act predated the late 1960's. 




its detai1s， shared a common emphasis. It viewed the 
use of 1and as a resource decision that must be ana1yzed 
from a state or regiona1 perspective not mere1y with an 
eye to its effect on the Unmediate neighbors. Thus 1972 
brought such significant 1egis1ative breakthroughs as 
Ca1ifornia's Coasta1 Zone Conservation Act， 11 and F10rida's 
Environmenta1 Land and Water Manag四 entAct of 1972.島f
2. Court Decisions Reqardinq State and Reqiona1 Systems 
of Requ1ation 
Attempts to use state or regiona1 mechanisms t。
contr01 the use of 1and are brand new. The pioneering 
Hawaiian Land Use Law was enacted in 1963， but wasn・t
f0110wed by any simi1ar state 1egis1ation unti1 the 1ate 
・60・s，and the rea1 1egis1ative push began in 1970. 
Since the 1egis1ation is so young， and frequent1y 
inv01ves "start-up" periods of at 1east a year before 
it achieves fu11 impact， judicia1 decisions construing 
these 1egis1ative efforts are not yet common. Genera1-
izing from such meager data is hazardous， but the ini-
tia1 returns are very encouraging for advocates of 廿lis
type of system. 
One of the first systems for regiona1 contr01 of 
1and use was the system administered by the San Francisco 
Bay Conservation and Deve10pment Commission under the 
McAteer-Petris Act of 1969. 21 The outgrowth of a 10ng 
and concerted effort by citizens determined to prevent 
the bay from becoming a 吋 iver，"旦/ the 1egis1ation 
7. Cat. Pub. Resources Code Section 27000三L三三旦・
8. F1a. Stat. Anno. Section 380呈主ー主主1・
9. Ca1. Govt. Code Section 66600 三L三三~ (1972). 
10. See， E. Jack Schoop and John E. Hirten， "The San Francisco Bay 
P1an: Combining Po1icies with Po1ice Power ，" :!・ of虫主主主王・
主主主・ ofP担盟主主 2(1971); Note. "Saving San Francisco Bay: 
A Case Study on Environmenta1 Legis1ation，" 23 里~an. L. Rev. 
一一一-349 (1971); Note， 55邑i・L・主主・ 728(1967). 
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proc1aimed the pub1ic interest in preserving San Fran-
cisco Bay， and recognized the inherent danger in unre-
gu1ated fi11 activities. The Commission was directed 
to prepare a comprehensive p1an for the conservation of 
the shore1ine and to issue or deny permits for any pro-
posed project that invo1ved fi11ing or dredging the bay. 
斗/
Cand1estic、.kProperties bought a parcel of 1and 
which was submerged by high-tide waters of the bay with 
the idea of depositing fil1 from construction projects. 
Candlestick alleged that the 1and had no va1ue for any 
other purpose. Cand1estick was denied a fil1 permit 
from the Commission and sought damages for an a11eged 
taking of its property. 
The case came before the Court of Appeals in 
Cand1estick Properties. 工nc. v. San Francisco Bav Con-
servation and Deve10pment Commission.旦I In upholding 
the Co罰百nission'sdecision the Court exp1ained its view 
of the modern attitude toward the po1ice power. Quoting 
one of its ear1ier decisions， the Court dec1ared: 
"In short， the po1ice power， as 
such， is not confined within the nar-
row circumspection of precedents， 
resting upon past conditions which 
do not cover and contro1 present day 
conditions . . • that is to say， as 
a commonwea1th deve10ps po1itica11y， 
economica11y， and socia11y， the po1ice 
power 1ikewise develops， within reason， 
to meet the changed and changing con-
ditions. "旦/
11. 旦" at 900・901. Gov. Code， Sections 66600・66604. 主主
監旦旦旦且~， Bosse1man and Ca11ies， The恥 ietRevo1ution in 
Land Use Contro1， pp. 108-135 (1971). 
12. Cand1estick Properties lnc. v. San Francisco Bay Conser-
vation and Deve10pment Commissio~， Ca1. App. 2d， 89 Ca1. 
Rptr. 897 (1970). 
13. 89 Ca1. Rptr. at 90S， citing ~i11er v. Board of臥lb1ic
些主主主， 234 P. 2d 381 at 383. 
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The Court set forth its distinction between the 
p01ice power and eminent domain: 
"However， under the p01ice power 
property is not taken for use by the 
pub1ic: its use by private persons is 
regu1ated or prohibited where neces-
sary for the pub1ic we1fare." 当/
After paraphrasing the purpose c1ause of the McAteer-
Petris Act the Court emphasized the need for a regiona1 
approach: 
"工n those sections the 1egis1ature 
has determined that the bay is the most 
va1uab1e sing1e natura1 resource of the 
entire region and changes in one part 
of the bay may a1so affect a11 other 
parts: that the present uncoordinated， 
haphazard manner in which the bay is 
being fi11ed threatens the bay itse1f 
and is therefore inimica1 to the we1-
fare of both present and future resi-
dents of the bay area: and that a re-
giona1 approach is necessary to pro-
tect the pub1ic interest in the bay." 
主/
明leCourt conceded the p1aintiff's argument that 
an undue restriction on the use of private property 
wou1d be as much a taking as appropriating it or de-
stroying it， citing Rennsy1vania Coa1 v. Mahor1.当/
But the Court express1y found that case inapp1icab1e 
to the facts before it: 
"It cannot be said that refusing 
to a110w appe11ant to fi11 its bay 1and 
amounts to an undue restriction on its 
use. In view of the necessity for con-
tr011ing the fi11ing of the bay • 
14. 89 Cal. Rptr. 905 
15. Id. 
16. 260 U.S. 393 (1922) cited at 89 Cal. Rptr. 906. 
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it is c1ear that the restriction imposed 
does not go beyond proper regu1ation 
such that the restriction wou1d be ref-
erab1e to the power of eminent domain 
rather than the po1ice power." 立/
217. 
工n 1966 Wisconsin enacted the Shore1and Protection 
Act requiring that 10ca1 governments adopt shore1and 
zoning regu1ations to protect the condition of the state・s
many 1akes and wate四 ays.よg; The State Depar回 entof 
Natura1 Resources pub1ished a mode1 ordinance which re-
commended that some shore1and areas be p1aced in a con-
servancy district. The conservancy district is designed 
primari1y to protect shore1ands designated as swamps or 
marshes， which are described as "se1dom suitab1e for 
building，" and 1ists a number of permitted uses (forestry， 
transmission 1ines， hunting， fishing， riding， golf courses) 
and specia1 exception uses (dams， farming， piers and docks). 
Residentia1， commercia1 or industria1 deve10pment is not 
permitted.旦/
Marinette County passed a shore1and zoning ordinance 
based on the state's mode1. Mr. and Mrs. Just owned prop-
erty fronting on Lake Norquebay， the front ha1f of which 
was covered with aquatic p1ants， and the back of which 
contained a stand of trees. They began fi11ing the front 
ha1f of the property contrary to the ordinance. The 
county obtained an injunction and the Justs appea1ed to 
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin which issued its opinion 
October 31， 1972， in Just v. Marinette CountY.辺/
There is a serious conf1ict， said the Court， between 
the pub1ic interest in stopping the despoi1ation of 
natura1 resources， which our citizens unti1 recent1y 
have taken as inevitab1e and for granted， and an owner's 
asserted right to use his property as he wishes. 2よ/
17. 89 Cal. Rptr. 906. 
18. Wisc. Stat. Ann. Section 144.26. Section 59.971. 
19. See Bossel町田nand Callies. !he Quiet Revolution in Land 
Use Contro!.. at 242. 
20. 56 Wis. 2d 7. 201 N.W. 2d 761 (1972). 
21. 201 N.W. 2d at 767. 
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"There can be no disagreement，" said the Court， "over 
the pub1ic purpose sought to be obtained by the ordi-
nance. "辺/ The Court went on to describe the tradi-
tiona1 test under the taking c1ause: 
"The distinction between the 
exercise of the po1ice power and 
condemnation has been said to be 
a matter of degree of damage t。
the property owner. In the va1id 
exercise of the po1ice power rea-
sonab1y restricting the use of prop-
erty， the damage suffered by the 
owner is said to be incidenta1. 
However， where the restriction is 
so great the 1andowner ought not to 
bear such a burden for the pub1ic 
good， the restriction has been he1d 
to be a constructive taking even 
though the actua1 use or forbidden 
use has not been transferred to the 
government so as to be a taking in 
the traditiona1 sense." 辺/
The Court quοted Professor Ernst Freund・sc1assic 
ana1ysis that "the state takes property by eminent domain 
because it is usefu1 to the pub1ic， and under the po1ice 
power because it is harmfu1. . • .・話/ Thus if the 
proposed use of the 1and wou1d cause "pub1ic harm，" says 
the Court， no compensation need be paid， whereas if the 
regu1ation were designated to produce a pub1ic benefit 
it wou1d be beyond the scope of the po1ice power. (A1-
though not cited， the Court ・sopinion fo11ows c1ose1y 
the framework of ana1ysis by Justice Brandeis in his 
dissenting opinion in Rennsvlvania Coa1 Co. v. Mahon. ) 
The Court noted that the 1akes and rivers were 
origina11y c1ean， and said that the State of Wisconsin 
has a obligation in the nature of a pub1ic trust t。
22. 201 N.W. 2d at 765. 
23. 201 N.W. 2d at 767. 
24. Id.， Quoting E. Freund， The Po1ice Powe!" 546 (1905). 
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"eradicate the present pollution and to prevent 
further pollution." It found that the regulation 
sought to prevent harm to 吋.he natural主主主主些立旦旦 of
the environment，" and was not designed to produce a 
pub1ic benefit for which compensation would be required. 
w 
切leCourt went on to emphasize that lands "adjacent 
to or near navigable waters exist in a special relation-
ship to the state."盆/
"What makes this case different 
from most condemnation or police power 
zoning cases is the interrelationship 
of the wet1ands， the swamps and the 
natural environment of shorelands to 
the purity of the water and to such 
natural resources as navigation， fish-
ing， and scenic beauty. Swamps and 
wet1ands were once considered waste-
land， undesirable， and not picturesque. 
But as the people became more sophisti-
cated， an appreciation was acquired that 
swamps and wetlands serve a vital ro1e in 
nature， and part of the balance of nature 
and are essentia1 to the purity of the 
water in our lakes and streams. Swamps 
and wet1ands are a necessary part of 
the ecological creation and now， even 
to the uninitiated， possess their own 
beauty in nature." 包/
As a resul七， the Court continued， man can no longer 
do with his land as he likes - in fact， pub1ic rights 
can be protected by means of the police power even if 
it means private lands are restricted to their "natural" 
uses: 
25. 201 N.W. 2d at 768. 
26. Id.， at 769. 
27. 起TheCourt's analysis is similar to that of Professor 
Sax in the article discussed in Chapter 15. 
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"The changing of wet1ands and 
swamps to the damage of the general 
pub1ic by upsetting the natura1 
environment and the natura1 re1a-
tionship is not a reasonab1e use 
of that 1and which is protected 
from po1ice power regu1ation." 辺/
E1aborating on this "natural use" concept. and 
focusing on the broad "pub1ic purpose to preserve the 
natura1 condition of the area" the Court he1d: 
"It seems to us that filling a 
swamp not otherwise commercia11y 
usab1e is not in and of itse1f an 
existing use. which is prevented. 
but rather is the preparation for 
some future use which is not in-
digenous to a swamp. 引コomuch stress 
is 1aid on the right of an owner t。
change commercia11y va1ue1ess land 
when that change does damage to the 
r igh ts of the public." W 
"The Justs argued their property 
has been severe1y depreciated in va1ue. 
But this depreciation of va1ue is not 
based on the use of the 1and in its 
natura1 state but on what the 1and 
wou1d be worth if it cou1d be fi1led 
and used for the 10cation of a dwe11inq. 
Whi1e 10ss of va1ue is to be considered 
in determining whether a restriction is 
a constructive taking. ya1ue based upon 
chanqinq the character of the 1and at 
the expense of harm to pub1ic riqhts is 
not an essentia1 factor or contro1linq." 
旦/
28. 201 N.W. 2d at 768. 
29. 201 N.W. 2d at 770. 
30. 201 N.W. 2d at 771. 
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The Marinette Court commented on the case of Penn-
Wlvania Coal v. Mahon.込 / Focusing on that portion 
of Holmes ・opinionthat warns of the "danger of forgetting 
that a strong public desire to improve the public con-
dition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire 
by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying 
for the change， ・ the Court attempted to distinguish the 
case: 
"The observation refers to the 
improvement of the public condition， 
the securing of a benefit not pres-
ently enjoyed and to which the public 
is not entitled. The shoreland 
zoning ordinance preserves nature， 
the environment， and natural resources 
as they were created and to which the 
people have a present right. The ordi-
nance does not create or improve the 
public condition but only preserves 
nature from the despoilage and harm 
resulting from the unrestricted acti-
vities of humans." W 
The Maine Site Location Law旦/requires persons 
intending to construct or operate a development which 
may substantially affect the local environment to notify 
the Environmental Improvement Commission of their inten-
tion before commencing operations. If the Commission 
determines that a hearing is necessary， the developer 
then has the burden of satisfying the Commission that 
the development will not substantially adversely affect 
the environment or pose a threat to the public health， 
safety or general welfare.当/
Lakesites，工nc.，owned a tract of approximately 
31. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
32. 201 N.W. 2d at 771. 
33. 38 M.R.S.A. Sections 481・488.
34. 38 M.R.S.A. Sections 483 and 484. Cf. Bosselman and Callies， 
Th~ Quiet Revolution in Land Use Contro1. pages 187-204. 
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92 acres 10cated a10ngside Raymond Pond. Under the 
authority of the Site Location Law， the State Environ-
menta1 Improvement Commission directed Lakesites t。
stop deve10ping the subject property unti1 Lakesites 
had app1ied for and received the Commission's approva1 
of their Spring Va11ey deve1opment. The property was 
to be divided into 90 10ts to be sold to individua1 
purchasers for the construction of both "year-around 
or part-time" homes. Whi1e Lakesites had c1eaned and 
graded portions of the property and bui1t a road for 
ingress and egress， it did not intend to construct 
the bui1dings itse1f， nor to contro1 the 1and use on 
individua1 1ots. According to an agreed statement of 
facts， Lakesites had done nothing to provide water and 
sewer services for any of the 1ots. 
Lakesites appea1ed.to the Supreme Judicia1 Court 
of Maine， which issued its decision on February 9， 1973， 
z~ the Matter of Spring Va11ey Deve10pmen~. W After 
ho1ding that the Site Location Law did app1y to resi-
dentia1 subdivisions， units of which were to be sold at 
a profit，当/the Court proceeded to Lakesite's conten巴
tion that the app1ication of the Act to its property 
amounted to an unconstitutiona1 taking of its 1and with由
out compensation. The Court dismissed the contention 
out-of-hand: 
"We see no merit to the Lakesites' 
contention that the app1ication of the 
Act to it is an unconstitutiona1 taking 
of its 1and without compensation. Noth-
ing in the record indicates that the Act 
as app1ied constitutes such an unrea-
sonab1e burden upon the property as wou1d 
35. 300 A. 2d 736 (Me. 1973). 
36. The Law does not mention residentia1 construction， b叫 ton1y 
commercial and industrial development as subject to the Act. 
The Court took the position that d庖velopment~ffecting the 
environmcn~ would include residential development offered 
commcrcially for sa1e. 
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主主旦盟旦， Me.， 265 A. 2d 711 (1970): 16 
Am. Jur. 2d， Constitutiona1 Law， ~294. 
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In fact， the record demonstrates on1y 
that the Appe11ant's 1and cannot be s01d 
for residentia1 purposes whi1e subdivided 
to the extent and in the manner Lakesites 
origina11y p1anned. 主/
The Court emphasized that the state was fu11y justified 
in considering the environmenta1 impact of 1and use in 
drafting p01ice power regu1ations: 
"It seems se1f-evident in these 
times of increased awareness of the re-
1ationship of the environment to human 
hea1th and we1fare that the state may 
act -- if it acts proper1y -- to conserve 
the qua1ity of air， soi1 and water. 
To do so the State may justifiab1y 
1imit the use which some owners may make 
of their property. 
We consider it indisputab1e that 
the 1imitation of use of property for 
the purpose of preserving from unrea-
sonab1e destruction the qua1ity of air， 
soi1 and water for the protection of 
the pub1ic hea1th and we1fare is within 
出 ep01ice power." 当/
In so h01ding the Court emphasized， not the degree of 
injury with which Holmes had been concerned， but the 
differenc~ between regu1ation under the p01ice power 
37. 300 A. 2d at 749. 
38. 旦.， at 746・748. A1though the Court did not overru1e 
the case of State v. Johnso~， 265 A. 2d 711 (He.， 1970)， 
叫lichhad held the state's wet1and law invalid as applied 
to a particular tract， the Court's 1anguage gives hope to 




and taking under四 inentdomain. First，廿leCourt cited 
an 1835 Maine decision， Wad1eiqh v. Gilmar1: 
"Po1ice regu1ations may forbid 
such a use， and such modifications， 
of private property， as would prove 
injurious to the benefits which men 
derive from associating in communities. 
It may sometimes occasion an incon-
venience to an individua1: but he has 
a compensation， in participating in 
the general advantage. Laws of this 
character are unquestionab1y within 
the scope of the 1egis1ative power， 
without impairing any constitutiona1 
provision. 工tdoes not appropriate 
private property to pub1ic uses: but 
mere1y regulates its enjoyment. •• " 
w 
Fina11y， with respect to the particu1ar case before 
it the Court again emphasized what it fe1t to be the 
crucia1 re1ationship between the environment and the 
po1ice power: 
"Whi1e most such deve10pments 
may be expected to "affect" the en-
vironment adversely to the extent 
that they add to the demands already 
made upon it， it is the unreasonable 
effect upon existing uses， scenic 
character and natura1 resources 
which the Legis1ature seeks to avoid 
by empowering the Commission t。
measure the nature and extent of the 
proposed use against the environment's 
capacity to to1erate the use . 
The Act recognizes the pub1ic interest 
in the preservution of the environment 
because of its re1ationship to the 
qua1ity of human 1ife， and in insisting 
39. 12 Me. 403， at 405 (1935). 
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that the pub1ic's existing uses of the 
environment and its enjoyment of the 
scenic va1ues and natura1 resources re-
ceive consideration， the Legis1ature 
used terms capab1e of being understood 
in the context of the entire bi11. The 
Legis1ature has dec1ared the pub1ic in-
terest in preserving the environment 
from anything more than minima1 destruc-
tion to be superior to the owner's 
rights in the use of his 1and and has 
given the Commission adequate standards 
under which to carry out the 1egis1ative 
purpose. "主ν
225. 
In 1971 Mary1and enacted state wet1ands 1egis1ation 
dec1aring un1awfu1 the dredging of any tida1 waters or 
marsh1ands of Char1es County for sand or grave1.位/
Potomac Sand and Grave1 Company sought a dec1aratory 
judgment that the 1aw was unconstitutiona1. The tria1 
judge dismissed the suit and his opinion was adopted by 
the Court of Appea1s of Mary1and in Rotomac Sand and 
Grave1 Co.. v. Governor of Marv1and.笠/
The Court described at 1ength the eco1ogica1 values 
to be preserved in the wet1ands area. It described the 
statute as "a prohibition limited to dredging sand， grave1 
or other aggregates or minerals，" which， it said， was 
"a 1imita tion upon a use of a property， not a taking •. " 
and "a valid exercise of the police powers • • • for the 
State to preserve its exhaustable natural resour~es." 包/
"The current trend，" said the Court， "is to consider the 
preservation of natural resources as a valid exercise of 
the po1ice powers."乏生/
40. 300 A. 2d at 751. 
41. Laws of Md.. 1971. Ch. 792. 
42. Potomac Sand & Grave1 Co.. v. Governor of Marv1an~. 266 Md. 
358. 293 A. 2d 241. f三互主・ 三塁旦.41 LW 3309. 
43. 293 A. 2d at 2沌8.
44. 玉三'.at 249. The Court re1ied on fommonwea1th v. TewksburY. 




The Tahoe Regiona1 P1anning Agency was created in 
1970 pursuant to an interstate compact between Ca1ifornia 
and Nevada.竺/ The Agency adopted a p1an and regu1a-
tions governing the use of 1and in the Tahoe Basin，坐/
which has been attacked by a number of 1andowners who 
allege that their property has been taken without com-
pensation.主y
Whi1e the "taking・ 1itigation has yet to be decided， 
the Ca1ifornia Supreme Court has a1ready affirmed the 
constitutionality of the Agency・sformation in the face 
of a cha11enge by 10ca1 governments that their "home 
ru1e" powers under the California Constitution were 
being vi01ated. While the Court's opinion in Peopよ旦
ex rel Younqer v. Countv of E1 Dorad0，坐/does not 
deal with the taking issue its emphasis on the need for 
regiona1 solutions to environmenta1 prob1ems is worth 
quoting at some 1ength: 
"A staggering increase in popu-
1ation， a greater mobi1ity of peop1e， 
an aff1uent society and an incessant 
urge to invest， to deve10p， to acquire 
and mere1y to spend --a11 have com-
bined to pose a severe threat to the 
Tahoe regions. On1y recent1y has the 
pub1ic become aware of the de1icate 
balance of the ecology， and of the 
compact interre1ated natura1 processes 
which keep the 1ake's waters c1ear and 
fresh， preserve the mountains from 
unsight1y erosion， and maintain a11 
forms of wi1d1ife at appropriate 
1eve1s. Today， and for the foresee-
ab1e future， the ec010gy of Lake Tahoe 
stands in grave danger before a mounting 
wave of popu1ation and deve10pment. 
45. Pub1ic Law 91・148.83 Stat. 360 (1969). 
46. See. Bosse1man and Ca11ies. !he Quiet Revo1ution in Land 
Use Contro!. pages 291・293.
47. See Chapter 4， page 40. 
48. 5 Ca1. 3d 480. 487 P. 2d 1193， 96 Ca1. Rptr. 553 (1971). 
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The Court described the adoption of the Tahoe Regional 
Planning Compact as "imaginative and commendable": 
"The basic concept of the Compact 
is a simple one --to provide for the 
region as a whole the planning， conser-
vation and resource development essen-
tial to accommodate a growing population 
within the region's relatively small 
area without destroying the environment. 
To achieve this purpose， the Compact 
establishes the Tahoe Regional Planning 
Agency with jurisdiction over the entire 
region. (~66801 ， Art. 1工工， s ubd . ( a) . ) 
The Agency has been given broad powers to 
make and enforce a regional plan of an un-
usually comprehensive scope." 笠/
The Court quoted the legislative findings that the 
subject matter of the compact was regional in nature 
and beyond the scope of home rule powers. 2Q/ But even 
without such findings， said the Court: 
"We could hardly avoid a conclusion 
that the purpose of the Compact is t。
conserve the natural resources and con-
trol the environment of the Tahoe Basin 
as a whole through area-wide planning. 
Lake Tahoe itself is an interstate body 
of water: the surrounding region， de-
fined by the Compact， is also interstate， 
since it includes not only the lake but 
the adjacent parts of three counties of 
Nevada and two counties of California. 
• The water that the Agency is to 
purify cannot be confined within one 
county or state: it circulates freely 
throughout Lake Tahoe. The air which 
the Agency must preserve from pollution 
knows no political boundaries. The wild-
49. 5 Cal. 3d at 486-487. 
50. 5 Cal. 3d at 493. 
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life which the Agency should protect 
ranges freely from one local juris-
diction to another. Nor can the popu-
lation and explosive development which 
threaten the region be contained by 
any of the local authorities which 
govern parts of the Tahoe Basin. Only 
an Agency transcending local boundaries 
can devise， adopt and put into opera-
tion solutions for the problems beset-
ting the region as a whole. Indeed， 
the fact that the Compact is the pro-
duct of the cooperative efforts and 
mutual agreement of two states is 
impressive proof that its subject 
matter and objectives are of regional 
rather than local concern." 三y
Given the regional nature of the problem， said the 
Court， it is "fatuous" to suggest that it must be solved 
by local methods. 
"Furthermore， problems which ex-
hibit exclusively local characteristics 
at certain times in the life of a com-
munity， acquire larger dimensions and 
changed characteristics at others. ・工t
is * * * settled that the constitutional 
concept of municipal affairs is not a 
fixed or static quantity. It changes 
with the changing conditions upon which 
it is to operate.' • • . When the 
effects of change are felt beyond the 
point of its immediate impact， it is 
fatuous to expect that controlling such 
change remains a local problem to be 
solved by local methods. Old attitudes 
confer no irrevocable license to con-
tinue looking with unseeing eyes.'・w
51. 5 Ca1. 3d at 493・494.
52. 5 Cal. 3d at 498・499.
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切le rea~oninq in these cases invo1ves a common e1e-
ment. Each court expressed a stronq wil1inqness t。
abide by the 1eqis1ature's judqment that the pub1ic in-
terest required extensive police power requ1ation. Each 
decision emphasizes that the cha11enqed enactment repre-
sents a determination of the state 1eqislature that is 
not to be 1iqhtly overturned. 
3. Local Land Use Requlations 
The "new mood" of the public toward the oland has 
not been ref1ected only in state or reqiona1 solutions. 
As Part 1 points out. local qovernments all over the 
nation are also seekinq to protect their 1and resources 
throuqh a variety of new requ1ations. 切lesetoo have 
increased qreat1y in the last few years. 
Traditional1y， 1oca1 land use requ1ations have not 
been treated by the courts with the same deference shown 
by the courts to state requ1ations. Althouqh the courts 
have established a "pres沼町:ptionof va1idity" for local 
requ1ations， in many states the presumption is easi1y 
rebutted. To determine whether this attitude has chanqed 
in the ・70・swe examined a11 of the printed appe1late 
cases al1eqinq that主.Q.S.主 land use requ1ations amounted 
to a takinq. 
If the cases involvinq 10cal requ1ations were 
equa11y favorab1e then the cases upholdinq state and 
reqional systems of requ1ation wou1d probably repre-
sent only a part of a qenera1 trend of judicial con-
cern for the environment which 1eads courts to uphold 
restrictive land use requ1ations reqardless of whether 
they implement s叩 leovera11 state or reqiona1 po1icy. 
But an examination of the takinq cases invo1vinq 
loca1 1and use requ1ations shows no particular chanqe 
from the trend of decisions in the 1960・s:
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1. 1970 Goodwin v. Board of Se1ec匂nentof 
Hopkinton， 358 Mass. 164， 261 N.E. 2d 
60 (1970). (Uphe1d soi1 remova1 ordi-
nance) • 
2. 1970 MacGibbon v. Board of Appea1s of Duxbury， 
356 Mass. 696， 255 N.E. 2d 347 (1970). 
(Struck down wet1ands zone). 
3. 1970 Go1den v. Board of Se1ec匂nenof Fa1mouth， 
265 N.E. 2d 573 (Mass. 1970). (Uphe1d 
wet1and zoning) • 
4. 1970 A unt Hack Ridge Estates Inc. v. P1anning 
Commission of the City of Danbury， 160 
Conn. 109， 273 A. 2d 880 (1970). (Uphe1d 
mandatory dedication). 
5. 1970 Maher v. City of New Or1eans， 235 So. 2d 
403 (La. 1970). (Uphe1d historic pre-
servation). 
6. 1970 McNee1y v. Board of Appea1 of Boston， 
358 Mass. 94， 261 N.E. 2d 336 (1970). 
(Uphe1d historic preservation). 
7. 1970 Nationa1 Advertisinq Company v. County 
of Monterey， 1 Ca1. 3d 875， 464 P. 2d 33， 
83 Ca1. Rptr. 577 (1970). (Uphe1d sign 
amortization) . 
8. 1971 Lyon Sand & Grave1 Co.. v. 世'ownshipof 
旦主主1a旦~， 33 Mich. App. 614， 190 N.W. 2d 
354 (1971). (Struck down prohibition 
of grave1 mining in rura1 area). 
9. 1971 S turdy Homes. Inc. v. To制nshipof Redford， 
30 Mich. App. 53， 186 N.W. 2d 43 (1971). 
(Struck down f100d p1ain zoning). 
10. 1971 Associated Home Bui1ders v. City of Wa1nut 
立主主主. 4 Ca1. 3d 633. 94 Ca1. Rptr. 630. 




11. 1971 Kavanewskv v. Zoninq Board of Appea1 of 
TO制n of Warren， 160 Conn. 397， 279 A. 2d 
567 (1971). (Struck down 1arge 10t re-
quirements) • 
12. 1971 Sa1amar Bui1ders v. Tutt1e， 29 N.Y. 2d 
221， 325 N.Y.S. 2d 933， 275 N.E. 2d 585 
(1971). (Uphe1d 1arge 10t requirements). 
13. 1972 Turner v. Countv of De1 Norte， 24 Ca1. 
App. 3d 311， 101 Ca1. Rptr. 93 (1972). 
(Uphe1d f100d p1ain zoning). 
14. 1972 Peop1e v. Goodman， 31 N.Y. 2d 262， 290 
N.E. 2d 139 (1972). (Uphe1d sign re-
gu1ations) . 
15. 1972 Pittsburqh Coa1 Companv v. Sanitarv 
Water Boarg， 4 Pa. Cmw1th. 407， 286 A. 
2d 459 (1972). (Struck industria1 waste 
treatment requirement). 
16. 1972 Chicaqo A11is Mfq. Corp. v. Metropo1itan 
sanitarv Distric t， 52 111. 2d 320， 288 
N.E. 2d 436 (1972). (Uphe1d industria1 
waste treatment surcharge). 
17. 1972 Turnpike Rea1tv Co. v. Town of Dedham， 
284 N.E. 2d 891 (Mass. 1972). (Uphe1d 
wet1ands protection regu1ations). 
18. 1972 Se1bv Rea1tv Co. v. Citv of San Buena-
ヱ主主主旦玉三， 104 Ca1. Rptr. 866， (Ca1. App. 
1972). (Struck down mandatory dedication 
requirement). 
19. 1972 Stee1 Hi11 Deve1opment. 1nc. v. Town of 
Sanbornton， 469 F. 2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972). 
(Uphe1d forest conservation zone). 
20. 1972 Go1den v. P1anninq Board of Town of RamapQ， 
30 N.Y. 2d 359， 334 N.Y.S. 2d 138， 285 




21. 1973 C itv of Escondido v. Desert Outdoor 
Advertisinq. In~.. 106 Ca1. Rptr. 172 
(1973) • (Uphe1d siqn requ1ations). 
22. 1973 Countv of Oranqe v. Hei~. 106 Ca1. Rptr. 
825 (1973). (Uphe1d wet1ands requ1ation). 
23. 1973 Devo v. Haqen. 341 N.Y.S. 2d 328 (A.D. 
(1973). (Uphe1d non-conforminq use 
amortization) • 
24. 1973 Wa1ters v. Countv of Olmsted. 204 N.W. 
2d 215 (Minn. 1973). (Uphe1d county 
zoninq) . 
25. 1973 Bohannan v. Citv of San Dieqo. 106 Ca1. 
Rptr. 333 (App. 1973). (Uphe1d historic 
districts) . 
Measurinq chanqes in the 1aw by countinq ayes and 
nays is risky business. but this 1ist qives some rouqh 
sense of the way the cases have been qoinq. Loca1 qovern-
ments have won most of them --but then they a1ways have. 
The "myth" of the takinq c1ause has a1ways 1ured 1and-
owners to expect more from it than prior precedents real1y 
justify. 
This is not meant to detract from some of the very 
siqnificant victories won by loca1 qovernments in the 
ear1y years of the Seventies. ~urnDike Realtv Co..v. 
Town of Dedham，旦/in which the Massachusetts Supr聞 e
Judicia1 Court stronqly uphe1d wet1ands protection despite 
previous adverse decisions， is an important case. So is 
Associated Home Bui1ders v. Citv of Wa1nut Creek，当/in 
53. 284 N.E. 2d 891 (Mass. 1972). 
54. 4 Ca1. 3d 633， 94 Ca1. Rptr. 630， 484 P. 2d 606 (1971). 
Extensive use of mandatory dedication raises important 
lega1 issues， and may be questionable as a 80cial policy， 




which the California Supreme Court upheld mandatory 
dedication of open space. 
But local governments lost a number of significant 
cases as well. And in sαme of those that were won the 
Court expressed misgivings about permitting local govern-
ments to enforce strict regulations in the absence of 
some plan for a larger area. 
Steel Hill Development， Inc. v. Town of Sa~Qrnton ， 
22/ discussed in Chapter 9， approved the designation of 
the plaintiff's land as a "forest conservation district" 
in which buildings could be constructed only on lots six 
acres or larger. But the Court said it was "disturbed" 
by the "crude manner" in which the law was passed without 
?・anyprofessional or scientific study. ・
"Were we to adjudicate this as 
a restriction for all time， and were 
the evidence of pressure from land-
deprived and land-seeking outsiders 
more real， we might well come to a 
different conclusion. Where there 
is natural population growth it has 
to go somewhere， unwelcome as it may 
be， and in that case we do not think 
it should be channelled by the happen-
stance of what town gets its veto in 
first. " 主主/
The Court upheld the local ordinance as a "stopgap 
measure" until "an adequate study can be made of future 
needs." 
"Hopefully， Sanbornton has be-
gun or soon will begin to plan with 
more precision for the future， taking 
advantage of numerous federal or state 
grants for which it might qualify. 
55. 469 F. 2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972). 
56. 469 F. 2d at 962. 
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Additiona11y， the New Hampshire leqis-
1ature， to the extent it expects sma11 
towns 1ike Sanbornton to cope with en-
vironmenta1 problems posed by private 
deve1opments， miqht adopt 1eqis1ation 
simi1ar to the federa1 Nationa1 Environ-
menta1 po1icy Act， 42 U.S.C. S 4321 
三L主主g.，and thereby require developers 
to submit detai1ed environmental state-
ments， if such power does not already 
reside within the town ・sarsenal of 
1aws. ・ w 
The New York Court of Appeals volunteered similar 
sentiments whi1e upho1dinq the development timinq ordi-
nance adopted by the Town of Ramapo. 1n Qolden v. 
Planninq Board of Town of Ramap2， ~ the Court criti-
cized the current zoninq enab1inq 1eqis1ation for its 
failure to inc1ude a reqional e1ement: 
57. Id. 
"Undoubtedly， current zoninq 
enab1inq 1eqis1ation is burdened by 
the 1arqe1y antiquated notion which 
deiqns that the requ1ation of land 
use and deve10pment is uniquely a 
function of loca1 qovernment --that 
the public interest of the State is 
exhausted once its politica1 sub-
divisions have been de1eqated the 
authority to zone (ALI， ~ Model Land 
Deve100ment Cod~ [Tent. Draft No. 1)， 
Intro. Mem.， p. xxi). While such 
jurisdictional allocations may we1l 
have been consistent with former1y 
prevai1inq conditions and assumptions， 
questions of broader public interest 
have commonly been iqnored (AL1，主
Mode1 Land Deve10pment Cod~ [Tent. 
Draft No. 1]， Intro. Mem.， p. xxi: 
~主主lso ， Roberts， ・Demiseof Property 
58. 30 N.Y. 2d 359. 334 N.Y.S. 2d 138， 285 N.E. 2d 359 (1972). 
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Law，" 57 Corne11 L. Rev. 1， 19， 21: 
R. Babcock， l'he Zoninq Game [1966]， 
p. 19). 豆21
235. 
Experience has shown， said the Court， "serious 
defects" in "community autonomy in 1and use contro1s." 
Ordinances such as Ramapo・sraise serious questions， 
said the Court， which cannot be so1ved by one community 
a10ne but depend on the "accommodation of wide1y disparate 
interests. " 
"To that end， state-wide or regiona1 
contro1 of p1anning wou1d insure that in-
terests broader than that of the munici-
pa1ity under1ie various 1and use po1icies. 
Neverthe1ess， that shou1d not be the on1y 
context in which growth devices such as 
these， aimed at popu1ation asstmi1ation， 
not exc1usion， wi11 be sustained: especia11y 
where， as here， we wou1d have no a1terna-
tive but to strike the provision down in 
the wistfu1 hope that the efforts of the 
State Office of P1anning Coordination and 
the American Law工nstitutewi11 soon bear 
fruit." 包/
These cases indicate an increasing concern on the 
part of the courts over the fai1ure of some 1oca1 govern-
ments to base their 1and use regu1ations on anything but 
popu1ar prejudice. 工nan often cited 1955 artic1e， Pro-
fessor Char1es Haar criticized the courts for fai1ing 
to put teeth in the statutory requirement that zoning 
be "in accordance with a comprehensive p1an."旦/ Per-
haps the courts are fina11y arriving at that resu1t 
through the back door. 
59. 285 N.E. 2d at 299. 
60. 285.N.E. 2d at 300. 
61. Char1es Haar. "In Accordance with a Comprehensive P1an." 




GOVERNMENTAL STRATEGIES FOR APPROACHING 
THE TAKING ISSUE 
A governmenta1 unit that seeks to regu1ate the use 
of 1and to preserve the environment is faced with the 
amorphous mass of taking cases discussed in the previous 
chapters. What strategy shou1d it emp10y to achieve the 
most desirab1e ba1ance between the needs for environmental 
protection and the rights of its individua1 citizens. 
The next five chapters consider five possib1e strategies. 
One approach wou1d be a firm stand against the 
1ibera1 construction that Holmes and his fo11owers gave 
to the taking c1ause. A return to a strict construction 
of the c1ause according to the original intent of the 
draftsmen cou1d culminate in a dramatic overru1ing by 
the Supreme Court of Rennsv1vania Coa1 v. Mahon and a 
return to ear1ier precedents. A dramatic and news-worthy 
event of this sort might be the on1y thing that cou1d 
destroy the "myth" of the taking c1ause which seems so 
much more powerfu1 than the c1ause itse1f. 
A second strategy would re1y on a gradua1 increase 
in the weight given by courts to the environmental pur-
poses behind 1and use regu1ations. 四lisstrategy wou1d 
concede the va1idity of the ba1ancing test --weighing 
the importance of the pub1ic purpose against the 10ss 
of va1ue to each 1andowner --but argue that our in-
creasing know1edge of the environmental damage caused 
by some patterns of 1and use makes many pub1ic purposes 
weigh so heavi1y that they can virtua1ly never be out-
ba1anced by an individua1's 10ss of property values. 
A third tactic wou1d propose 1egislative standards 
to codify more precise1y the 1ine between regu1ation 
and taking. A n山由erof commentators have suggested 
that the courts would we1cαne 1egis1ative c1arification 
of this question. The English have adopted such stand-
ards and seem to find them quite satisfactory. 
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Approach number four would not rely on any change 
in the sUbstantive law but would count on careful drafting 
and factual presentation to resolve disputes over land 
use regulation. Many of the government's losses in taking 
cases can be attributed to sloppy legal workmanship. 
Careful preparation can greatly increase the chance of 
success. 
Finally， the taking issue can be avoided entirely 
if the government uses its land acquisition powers rather 
than its regulatory powers whenever it seeks to restrict 
severely the development of land. 明legovernment could 
acquire the fee title to such lands， or it could acquire 
easements or development rights， or it could institute 
a system of compensable regulations. Only budgetary . 
limitations limit the usefulness of this strategy. 
In the next five chapters we present the arguments 




THE STRATEGY OF STRICT CONSTRUCT工ON
Governmenta1 regu1ation of the use of 1and is sub-
jected to a stricter judicia1 test than other types of 
governmenta1 regulation. Whi1e other regu1ations are 
only tested to determine whether they bear a reasonable 
relationship to a valid pub1ic purpose， 1and use regu-
lations must be tested by ba1ancing the va1ue of the re-
gulation against the 10ss in va1ue to each affected prop-
erty owner.よ/
This ba1ancing test was estab1ished as the 1aw by 
the famous case of Pennsy1vania Coal Co. v. Maho!!.. Y 
It can be argued that the ba1ancing test is historical1y 
unsound， 10gical1y unnecessary， and environmenta11y dis-
astrous. 
The Supreme Court cou1d overru1e ~ennsy1vania Coa1 
and return to the strict construction of the taking c1ause 
by declaring that a regu1ation of the use of 1and， if 
reasonab1y related to a valid pub1ic purpose， can never 
constitute a taking. A dramatic gesture of this magnitude 
wou1d go a 10ng way toward overcoming the popu1ar myth 
that 1and can't be severe1y reduced in va1ue through re-
gulation. 工t is this myth， as noted in Chapters 1 through 
14， which has 1ed so many peop1e to shy away from under-
taking needed regu1atory measures. 
1. The Oriqinal Intent of the Draftsmen 
工nChapters 5 through 8 of this book we have examined 
the historica1 evidence and found no indication that the 
draftsmen of the taking c1ause ever conceived the possi-
bi1ity that a regu1ation of the use of land cou1d be con-
sidered a taking. The fear of expropriation of property 
1. Obvious1y a11 types of governmenta1 regu1ations are subject 
to a who1e range of other constitutiona1 1imitations but 
none re1evant to the present discussion. 




b y  the King， as exemplified in the Magna Carta and carried 
do~ in British legal thought through the Seventeenth 
and Eighteenth Centuries， provided the motivation for 
the draftsmen of the taking clause. But during this same 
period extensive regulation of the use of land was common， 
both in England and in America， and both before and after 
the adoption of the taking clause. 
Professor Cormack has correctly summarized the 
founding fa thers' conception of a "tak ing" as "a purely 
physical conception • . ." deriving from colonial times 
when there was infrequent need for eminent domain. 
"Whenever there was any occasion 
for the institution of eminent domain 
proceedings， the land was "taken" in 
every sense of the word. Under these 
conditions， the physical concept of 
the taking of property for public use 
developed. Its use was later encour-
aged by the adoption of constitutional 
provisions containing the words "take" 
and "property，" with their physical 
connotations." Y 
There is no evidence that anyone involved in the drafting 
of the state or federal bills of rights ever considered 
the possibility that a regulation might be thought to be 
a taking， even when the regulation effectively prohibited 
any economic use of the land. 
明leidea that too extensive regulation of the use 
of land could constitute a taking was an invention of 
the early Twentieth Century. This expansion of the taking 
clause had no support in the historical analysis of the 
origins of the Constitution. It was the product of a 
Supreme Court which had thrown out all kinds of regula-
tory measures from child labor laws to milk quality con-
trols. 恒legreat majority of those decisions have now 
3. Joseph Cormack. "Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain." 
41主主主 L・!.221. 225 (1931). 
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been either overruled or silently ignored. The ~ennsvlvania 
Co込 decisionrernains valid only because the Supr師 eCourt 
has effectively abdicated its jurisdiction of cases in-
volving land use regulation， apparently treating these 
cases as prirnarily local in irnport. 
The idea that a regulation of the use of land which 
prevents the owner frorn rnaking rnoney can arnount to a 
taking assurnes that a landowner has a constitutional 
right to use and develop his land for sorne purpose which 
will result in personal profit， regardless of the effect 
that such developrnent will have on the public. Such a 
holding gives land as a cornrnodity a constitutional status 
higher than other co町田lodities--a status land no longer 
deserves.ゲ
2. Holrnes ・Fascinationwith the "Bundle of sticks" 
Why did Holrnes， noted for his strict construction 
of the due process clause and his willingness to support 
legislative experirnents， take an opposite approach when 
these experirnents affected real estate? What was there 
about the "bundle of sticks，" as he conceived rights in 
real property， that rnade thern rnore sacrosanct than other 
values? 
Holrnes had to silently ignore a host of inconsis-
tent precedent to reach the result he sought. His rnajor-
ity opinion in fennsvlvania Coa1 conveniently ignored 
the whole line of police power cases terτninating in 
Muqler v. Kansa~ 21 which approved regulations rnaking 
Mugler's brewery virtually worthless. Muqler v. Kansas 
had becorne a frequently cited classic on the nature of 
the police power， but Holrnes ignored it entirely. 
However， if Holrnes did not challenge旦旦旦主主王 direct1y
in his opinion， he was well aware that旦皿詮玉 didnot 
4. See， Fred Bosse1man and David Ca11ies， !!le Quiet Revo1ution 
in Land Use Contro1. 314・318(1971). 




support his "question of degree" approach to the dis-
tinction between regu1ation and taking. 1n a 1etter 
to Haro1d Laski， dated January 13， 1923， Holmes' fee1-
ings about旦盟註互 weremade exp1icit: 
"1 fear 1 am out of accord for 
the moment with my pub1ic minded friends 
in another way. Frankfurter genera11y 
writes to me about any important opin-
ions of mine and he has been si1ent as 
to the one 1 sent you in which Brandeis 
dissented (主主・ Co旦1>:probab1y fee1ing 
an unnecessary de1icacy about saying 
that he disagrees. Of course 1 under-
stand the possibi1ity of thinking other-
wise - 1 cou1d not fai1 to， even if 
Brandeis had agreed. But neverthe1ess 
when the premises are a 1itt1e more 
emphasized， as they shou1d have been 
by me， 1 confess to fee1ing as much 
confidence as 1 often do. 1 have 
a1ways thought o1d Har1an's decision 
in Muq1er v. Kansa~ was pretty fishy. 
主/
Knowing Holmes・stance in pennsy1vania Coa1， his 
fee1ings about旦盟註玉 arehard1y surprising. And yet， 
to an individua1 fami1iar with Ho1mes・achievements in 
genera1， but not fami1iar with Pennsy1vania Coa1， Ho1mes' 
assessment of担弘主 might100k a 1itt1e unusua1. After 
a11， Har1an's respect for the po1ice power and deference 
to 1egis1ative judgment are characteristics associated 
with Justice Ho1mes as we11. In fact， Holmes ・popu1ar
reputation has rested in 1arge part upon his simi1ar 
respect and deference. Yet， Ho1mes could not accept 
旦旦g!.主主 asbeing a proper way of handling a claim under 
the taking c1ause. 
Holmes' disagreement with旦坦註王 andhis stand in 
Pennsy1vania Coa1 point up his conflicting approaches 
6. H01臨 s-Laski Letters. Hark de W01fe Howe. (ed.) 346 (1963). 
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to constitutiona1 cha11enges based upon the taking c1ause 
or the due process c1ause. Ho1mes was to1erant of 1egis-
1ative experiment and genera11y skeptica1 towards sub-
stantive due process attacks upon such experiment. For 
the most part he did his best not to trans1ate his own 
po1icy predi1ections into constitutiona1 limitations 
upon the po1ice power of the state. 11 Rea1izing that 
the ro1e of the Supreme Court was not to pass upon the 
"wisdom'・。fa statute， but rather upon its constitution-
a1ity， Ho1mes practiced restraint. It was enough for 
him that a statute shou1d be "reasonab1e，" it did not 
have to be wise. 
Given this attitude towards judicial restraint， 
Holmes ・skepticismtowards judicia1 efforts of the 1920・s
and 1930・s to invalidate other regu1ations is more easily 
understood. A judge cou1d make "substantive due process・
mean just about anything. Dissenting in ~ruax v. Corriqan， 
~ a case which he1d unconstitutiona1 a state 1aw for-
bidding the issuance of injunctions against peaceful 
picketing in 1abor disputes， Holmes wrote: 
"There is nothing I more deprecate 
than the use of the Fourteenth Amendment 
beyond the abso1ute compunction of its 
words to prevent the making of social 
experiments， that an important part of 
the community desires， in the insu1ated 
chambers afforded by the severa1 states， 
even noxious to me and to those whose 
judgment I most respect." y 
When faced with a substantive due process argument 
against the constitutionality of po1ice power 1egislation， 
Holmes ・approachwas quite simi1ar to Har1an's treatment 
of the taking c1aim in旦坦註王・ He genera11y focused upon 
7. For examp1e: !~chner v. New Yor~. 198 U.S. 45. 74 (1905); 
Adkins v. Children's Hospita!. 261 U.S. 525. 567 (1923); 
Truax v. Corriga~. 257 U.S. 312. 343 (1921). 
8. 257 U.S. 312 (1921). 
9. 257 U.S. at 343 (1921). 
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the public purpose and rationality of the regulation 
under attacx. Then the regulation's effect upon contract 
rights could be put into proper perspective， and the re-
gulation would usually be upheld. 
In Lochner v. New Yorx， 主皇/for example， the issue 
before the Court was whether a New Yorx law which limited 
baxers ・employmentto sixty hours per weex was unconsti-
tutional because it interfered with "liberty of contract" 
as guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amendment due process 
clause. 骨lemajority held the law unconstitutional. 
Holmes' famous dissent did not concentrate upon the 
statute's effect upon contractual rights， but rather con-
cerned itself with the purpose and rationality of the 
law. Finding the purpose (baxers ・health) to be a per-
missible one under the police power， Holmes concluded 
七hatthe statute was reasonably related to its purpose 
and stated that in his opinion the law was constitutional. 
Yet， clearly this was not the approach Holmes toox 
to the taxing claim in Rennsvlvania Coa1.切lerethe 
primary focus was upon the regulation's effect upon a 
certain individual・sproperty rights. The public pur-
pose and rationality of the statute were peripheral con-
cerns. 
明lequestion becomes， why did Holmes grant the taxing 
clause a judicial deference which he did not hold for 
the contracts clause in Article工 ofthe Constitution? 
Or why did Holmes uphold the police power against "liberty 
of contract" challenges， but not against "taxing of prop-
erty" challenges? Clearly the numerous arguments Holmes 
made on behalf of public po岬 eragainst private ~ontractual 
rights could just as easily be made against private E王.Q.E.-
主主主~ rights. 明lereis no inherent reasoning that demands 
that the balancing of public and private interests should 
change when the private interest involved is proprietary 
in nature rather than contractual. Yet Holmes did in 
effect give property rights a preferred position. 
It is evident from his opinion that Holmes was much 
impressed with the idea that the Coal Company トadmineral 
10. 198 U.5. 45 (1905). 
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rights to the Mahons・propertyprior to the Kohler Act. 
and that the Act. in effect. took these rights away. 
In a letter to Frederick pollock， Holmes elaborated on 
this theme: 
"My ground (for decision) is that 
the public only got on this land by 
paying for it and that if they saw fit 
to pay only for the surface rights they 
can't enlarge it. •• " !!I 
If Holmes really based his decision primarily on this 
ground he failed to qualify the broad language of his 
opinion in a way to convey such a limited intent. Pos-
sibly he emphasized this point later to explain away a 
bad decision. although at least some judges have seized 
upon this point to distinguish his opinion. 
Holmes constantly professed a good-natured impa-
tience with Brandeis' preoccupation with the facts. 
preferring to think cases could be decided by reliance 
on basic principles. 111 But because Brandeis concen-
trated on the facts he easily saw the fallacy of per-
mitting the landowner to divide his "bundle of sticks" 
into a series of conceptually separa七eproperty rights 
and then argue that one of these rights was completely 
destroyed: 
"The rights of an owner as against 
the public are not increased by dividing 
the interests in his property into sur-
face and subsoil. The sum of the rights 
in the parts cannot be greater than the 
rights of the whole • . . No one would 
11. Ho1mes-Po11ock Letters. Mark de Wo1fe Howe. (ed.) 108・109
(1941). 
12. Ho1mes wrote: "宮、atdiab01ica1 Brandeis has skewered田y
heart by speaking thus as to vacation: ・.Yo岨 shou1d
do something new --take an excursion lnto some domaln of 
unfami1iar fact. e.g. the texti1e industry ln Massachusetts. 
and .・・ 8ρtoLawrence and see with your own eyes what lt 
means.' 1 hate facts. and 1 fee1 as lf it mlght be a solemn 
call to duty • • • It has made me squlrm wlthln anyhow." 
James Blshop Peabody. (ed.) The H01鴎 s-ElnstelnLetters 187 
(1964). 
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above one hundred feet frαn the sur-
face he could prevent the State from 
limiting， by the police power， the 
height of structures in a city." 担/
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Brandeis recognized that the conveyance by the 
Mahons of their subsurface rights was in fact an in-
voluntary submission to a condition imposed by the coal 
companies on anyone who sought to live in the area. As 
1and sales actually took place in northeastern Penn-
sylvania prior to the turn of the century， it was not 
a question of whether a buyer "saw fit" to pay only for 
the surface rights. The Coal Company was the only land-
10rd in certain mining towns and would not sell the 
mineral rights， so the buyer could hardly argue. There 
was little mutuality in such a transaction. 
Holmes himself recognized that the apparent tangi-
bility of real property encouraged greater rigidity in 
the conception of property rights than of other rights. 
Pennsvlvania Coa 1 might have come out differently if 
Holmes had followed the principles he had espoused in 
Block v. Hirsch.当I In that case， Holmes upheld a 
District of Columbia rent-control law which was chal-
lenged by landlords as a taking of their property. 
Holmes responded: 
"The fact that tangible property 
is also visible tends to give a rigidity 
to our conception of our rights in it 
that we do not attach to others less 
concretely clothed. But the notion 
that the former are exempt from the 
legislative modification required from 
time to time in civilized life is con-
tradicted not only by the doctrine of 
eminent domain， under which what is 
taken is paid for， but by that of police 
13. Pennsv1vania Coa1 Co. v. Haho~， 260 U.S. 393， 419 (1922) 
(dissenting opinion). 




power in its proper sense， under which 
property rights may be cut down， to that 
extent taken， without pay. •• ..よy
3. Land Use Requlations Deserve Eaual Status With Other 
Requlations 
To argue that Holmes was wrong does not suggest 
that land use regulations should be ~une from judicial 
review. But it does suggest that they should be reviewed 
under the same standards applied by the courts to other 
governmental regulations. 
In general， government regulations are held invalid 
only if they fail to bear a reasonable relationship t。
a valid public purpose. Because Brandeis was one of the 
earliest exponents of this standard of judicial review， 
it is helpful to review the Brandeis dissent in Pe旦旦ー
svlvania Coa~ and his general approach to judicial policy 
in this area， because Brandeis' dissent and later deci-
sions indicate some of the restraints on the exercise 
of the police power that are generally applicable to 
government regulations and would be specifically applied 
to land use regulations if his view had prevailed. 
Perhaps Brandeis' most fundamental characteristic 
was his concern for fact. The inventor of the "Brandeis 
Brief" did not lose his research abilities upon taking 
the bench. It was not uncomrnon for Brandeis to devote 
numerous pages of an opinion to historical， social and 
economic analysis of the problem facing the Court. 主主/
Such research was necessary， he believed， if the Court 
was to understand the basis for the legislation under 
revl.ew. 
In analyzing Brandeis ・dissentthe first point 
worth noting is his distinction between regulation and 
15. 256 U.5. at 155. 
16. A prime examp1e is Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Brya~. 264 U.5. 
504. 517 (1924). 
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taking. He rejects Holmes' contention that the differ-
ence between the two is one of亘eqr主主・ In Brandeis・
view the difference between regulation and taking is a 
d ifference in kin~. According to Brandeis the govern-
ment takes property only when it actually assumes title 
to the property or makes use of it. 
Given Brandeis・definitionof a taking it is not 
surprising that he found the arguments of the Pennsyl-
vania Coal Company against the Kohler Act untenable. 
In the first paragraph of his dissent. Justice Brandeis 
stated the basic theme of his opinion: 
"Coal in place is land: and the 
right of the owner to use land is not 
absolute. He may not so use it as to 
cause a public nuisance: and uses. 
once harmless. may owing to changed 
conditions seriously threaten the 
public welfare. Whenever they do. 
the legislature has power to prohibit 
such uses withput paying just compen-
sation: and the power to prohibit 
extends alike to the manner. the 
character and the purpose of the use." 
ょy
Brandeis was fully aware of the economic burden 
placed upon the Coal Company by the Pennsylvania legis-
lation. It was apparent to everyone that the value of 
company land was greatly diminished if it could not be 
used for mining coal. But in Brandeis' view such dif-
ferences in degree with respect to value did not con-
cern the taking issue. and he looked instead to other 
constitutional principles which might be invoked.・
"Restriction upon use does not become inappropriate 
as a means merely because it deprives the owner of the 
only use in which property can be put，" he argued. A 
restriction would only be unconstitutional if its pur-
pose were not to "protect the public" or if it were not 
17. 260 U.8. 393， 417 (1922) (dissenting opinion). 
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an "appropriate means" to a valid purpose. W A re・
striction upon property rights would not become inappro-
priate merely because it made the property unprofitable. 
He then stated， "The liquor and oleomargarine cases 
settled that.・ 旦/
Powell v. Pennsvlvani~，辺/ the oleoo町 garinecase， 
was decided just a few years after旦坦註王， the liquor 
case discussed earlier. In E些弘主， Pennsylvania's 
statutory prohibition of the manufacture or sale of 
oleomargarine was attacked as a taking of private prop-
erty. Pennsylvania argued that the prohibition of oleo-
margarine was necessary to protect the public against 
widespread fraud， since a substantial number of enter-
prising merchants had been passing oleomargarine off as 
butter. The Supreme Court upheld the prohibition， re-
lying explicitly on旦坦詮王・ There was nothing in the 
record， said the Court， to suggest that Pennsylvania's 
judgment on the gravity of the fraud evil and the need 
for the chosen remedy was unreasonable. 
Another case cited by Brandeis is worth noting. 
In Hadacheck v. Los Anqele~ ， ~ a municipal ordinance 
prohibiting the manufacture of bricks within a specified 
area of Los Angeles was held to be a constitutional ex-
ercise of the police power， despite the fact that Hada-
check・sproperty rights and property value were shown 
to be considerably modified by the ordinance. Prior to 
the passage of the ordinance Hadacheck had bought a piece 
of land rich in clay for the purpose of making bricks. 
Thus he was able to show quite graphically how severely 
his rights were affected when the ordinance became law. 
He had a lot of clay worth very little now that it could 
not be made into bricks at that location. 
Approving the ordinance， the Court recognized an 
allegation that the land would diminish in value by over 
18. 260 U.5. at 417・418.
19. 260 U.5. at 418， referring to ~u l!. 1er v. Kansa!!.， 123 U.5. 
623， 668，669 (1887) and fowe11 v. Pennsv1vani~， 127 U.5. 
678， 682 (1888). 
20. 127 U.5. 678 (1888). 
21. 239 U.5. 394 (1915). 
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90%， from宇800，000to手60，000，if it cou1d not be used 
for brick-making purposes. 官官 Courtnoted: 
"It is to be remembered that we 
are dea1ing with one of the most es国
sentia1 powers of government， one 
that is the 1east 1imitab1e. It may， 
indeed， seem harsh in its exercise， 
usua11y is on some individua1， but 
the imperative necessity for its ex-
istence prec1udes any 1imitation 
upon it when not exerted arbitrari1y." 
w 
To Brandeis，' the Pennsv1vania Coal case presented 
a concise question. Cou1d the State of Pennsy1vania 
contr01 mine subsidence under the authority of its p01ice 
power? To reach his answer Brandeis mere1y asked the 
same questions that Justice Har1an had asked in旦盟詮王
v. J(ansas，包/and Justice Ho1mes in ~ochner v. New York. 
1!1 Was the purpose of the 1egis1ation a va1id one under 
the po1ice power? Was the 1egis1ation an appropriate 
means to the purpose? Simp1y put， Brandeis be1ieved 
Pennsv1vania Coa1 Companv v. Maho~ was a p01ice power 
case. The fact that the rights affected by the 1egis-
1ation were rooted in rea1 property rather than in a 
contract did not change the character of the case. 
In Nashvi11e， C & St. Louis Rv. v. Wa1ters，主/
decided in 1935， Brandeis elaborated his views as t。
the 1imits of the po1ice power. The State of Tennessee 
had by statute imposed upon the p1aintiff one-ha1f of 
the cost of an underpass to separate the grades of its 
main 1ine and proposed new highway. Speaking for the 
majority Brandeis found the Tennessee action so "arbi-
trary and unreasonab1e" as to vio1ate the Fourteenth 
Amendment. "State actionむnposingupon a rai1road the 
cost of e1iminating a dangerous grade crossing of an 
22. 239 U.S. at 410. 
23. 260 U.S. at 422. 
24. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
25. 294 U.S. 405 (1935). 
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existing street might be valid although it appears that 
the improvement benefits commercial highway users who 
make no contribution towards its cost，"話Ihe said， 
but he found that such was not the case here. 
The railroad had adduced a host of主主主主呈ー-something 
to which Brandeis was always sympathetic --all tending 
to show that the public亙旦単主主 resultingfrom the overpass 
was largely unre1ated to the public protection from the 
卓三旦2主主豆 ofthe railroad grade crossing. Brandeis com-
pared the attempt to charge the railroad for half the 
cost of the overpass to an assessment for public improve-
ments laid upon particu1ar property owners which are 
"ordinarily constitutional only if based on benefits 
received by them." W 
Another majority opinion written by Brandeis in 
1937， Thompson v. Consolidated Gas utilities Corporation， 
担Iconsidered the constitutiona1ity of a Texas gas 
proration order. This regulation forced Consolidated 
Gas Uti1ities Corporation to cut back its production of 
certain kinds of natural gas and thus forced the Corpo-
ration to purchase gas from other producers to fill its 
customer's order. Texas argued that the regulation met 
a public purpose， namely preventing waste of natural 
gas. The corporation had produced evidence， however， 
which suggested that in effect the regulation was de-
signed to make Consolidated Gas provide the use of its 
own pipeline for other less efficient private producers. 
Justice Brandeis again found a violation of the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 由 e regu-
lation did not bear an appropriate relationship to the 
admittedly proper purpose of limiting waste in the pro-
duction of natural gas. A1though Brandeis believed the 
proration order before the Court to be unconstitutional， 
he expressed no doubt as to the state's power to restrict 
private production for public purposes. He explicitly 
stated that Texas could constitutionally prorate natural 
26. 294 U.8. at 413. 430. 
27. 294 U.8. at 430. 
28. 300 U.8. 55 (1937). 
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gas production to prevent waste. 明leprob1em was that 
a11 the 1egis1ation did was to make an efficient pro-
ducer buy frαn a 1ess efficient producer. Brandeis 
conc1uded that whi1e a state cou1d.regu1ate private 
property for the benefit of the public welfare， it could 
not do so for the benefit of a private interest.認/
To reiterate Brandeis ・testof due process suggests 
the same standard for decision app1ied in a variety of 
other modern situations where regulation works severe 
economic detriment. Recent cases dealing with water 
qua1ity standards offer contemporary i11ustrations. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court， asked to consider prohi-
bition on the discharge of treated sewage over one mi1e 
downstream from the nearest water intake on the Missis-
sippi River， struck down the regulation as app1ied to 
a loca1 sanitary district. They based their conc1usions 
on two factors: 
-・First. the prohibition is abso-
1ute. subject on1y to the variance 
provision. without reference to the 
purity of the eff1uent: and secondly 
and decisive1y. we concur in the 
finding that the prohibition is un-
reasonab1e to the extent it is based 
on the possibility of eff1uent dis-
charged • • • reaching the main 
Minneapo1is water intake 1.1 mi1es 
up the river." 辺/
29. Other cases dealing w1th pol1ce regulation v. private property 
rights decided during the years Holmes and Brandeis sat 1nclude: 
P1erce 011 Company v. City of Hop~. 248 U.S. 498 (1919);旦旦主
主ι旦主主~. 256 U.S. 135 (1920); ~dgar A. Levy Leasing Co.v. 
邑盟主1.258 U.S. 242 (1921); ~uclid v. Ambler Realty Co!.. 272 
U.S. 365 (1926); ~arrisonville v. W. S. Dickey C1ay Mfg. C2. . 
289 U.S. 334 (1932); ~ashvi11e. Chattanooga. & St. Louis Ry. 
~単旦主主. 294 U.S. 405 (1934). 
30. North Suburban Sanitary District v. Water Pol1ution Comm!.. 281 
Minn. 524. 162 N.W. 2d 249. (32 ALR 3d 199 at 211)(1968). Com巴玉三，
c:hicago Al1is Mfg. Corp. v. Metropolitan Sanitary Distric ~. 52 
111. 2d 320. 288 N.E. 2d 436 (1972); f包op1ev. Goodma!!. 31 N. Y. 
2d 262. 388 N.Y.S. 2d 97 (1972); and fittsburg Coa1 Co. v. Sanitary 




切ledecision was based on voluminous test~y to this 
effect， and the Court pointedly noted that it could not 
invalidate the entire regulation since the clearおnpli-
cation of testimony received was that upstream discharges 
would result in hazardous contamination. 
A Federal District Court was recently asked to con-
sider the issues presented by a ban on phosphates in 
detergent imposed by the City of Chicago. 明leCourt 
heard extensive arg四nentson the degree of algae forma-
tion which could be attributed to phosphates. The 
question framed by Judge MacMillen was: 
-・ [W)hether廿leplaintiffs have 
the right to sell and ship a harmless 
product in in写erstatecommerce. The 
evidence of increased costs • . • is 
relevant to show a burden on inter-
state commerce. It then becαnes the 
task of the defendant City to justify 
its ordinance by showing at least some 
need to protect the pUblic health， 
safety or welfare. The need is not 
measurable in dol1ars and cents but 
can be weighed equitably against the 
plaintiff's right to free trade." 旦/
Based on the evidence， the Court found that the City of 
Chicago failed to show demonstrable harm from phosphate 
discharges. 
Professor Ratner， discussing the function of the 
due process clause as reflected in our constitutional 
philosophy of government， suggests that it may embody: 
"A social purpose limitation on 
government， requiring not pUblic gain 
heavier than private determent， but a 
regulatory purpose that reflects recog-
nizable community values and a regula-
31. Soap and Detergent Association v. City of Chicag12. 5 ERC 1119. 
1122 (March 6. 1973). 
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tory method that intrudes on individual 
choice no more than necessary to im-
pl側 entthe purpose." 主/
253. 
Overruling the Rennsvlvania Coa1 decision would 
not mean the end of judicial review. If the Brandeis 
proposition that regulation is different in kind from 
taking is accepted. the full panoply of due process 
protections remains. but the focus is shifted to the 
purpose and effect of the regulation. where the emphasis 
really belongs. 
The Task Force on Land Use and Urban Growth recently 
considered the taking issue at length and concluded that 
the Supreme Court should reexamine its precedents that 
focus on the diminution of property values affected by 
regulations and seek to balance public benefit against 
land value loss in every case. We are aware of the 
sensitivity of this matter. and of the important issues 
of civil liberty associated with ownership of property. 
But it is worth remembering that when U. S. constitu-
tional doctrine on the taking issue was formulated 
during the late Nineteenth and early TWentieth Centuries. 
land was regarded as unlimited and its use not ordinarily 
of concern to society. Circumstances are different today. 
Now there is growing recognition of the need to see that 
urbanization proceeds in an orderly and non-destructive 
fashion and that our limited natural and cultural re-
sources are conserved. It is time that the U. S. Supreme 
Court re-examine its earlier precedents that seem to re-
quire a balancing of public benefit against land value 
loss in every case and declare that when the protection 
of natural. cultural. or aesthetic resources or the 
assurance of orderly development are involved. a mere 
loss in land value will never be justification for in-
validating the regulation of land use. Such a re-examin-
ation is particularly appropriate considering the con-
sensus that is forming on the need for a national land-
use policy. Although fifty years have passed. it is not 
too late to recognize出 atJustice Brandeis was right.主/
32. Ratner."官leFunctlon of the Due Process Clause.'・1l6!，・ of
聖旦哩・~.註~. 1048. 1050 (1968). 
33. 訂正:lzens'Advlsory Conmlttee on Envlronmental Qual1ty Task 
Force on Land Use and Urban Growth.百leUse of Land 174・175(1973). 
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4. The Need for Compensation for Rea1 Takinqs 
None of the previous discussion shou1d suggest any 
doubt that a rea1 taking --the appropriation of 1and 
by the government， feared since the days of Magna Carta 
and barred by the Fifth Amendment --must be compensated! 
To say that a regu1ation is different in kind from a 
taking does not e1iminate the need for the taking c1ause. 
An actua1 appropriation of 1and for pub1ic use， such 
as for a park， highway or reservoir， must be accompanied 
by compensation: this no one wou1d dispute. 
Pumpe11y v. Green Bay Company， the 1871 case which 
estab1ished the princip1e that 1and did not have to be 
forma11y expropriated to require compensation， is con-
sistent with such a position. A new dam constructed 
for f100d contro1 had caused 1and to be f100ded a1though 
the 1and had not been purchased for such use. 明leSupreme 
Court found arguments that such a physica1 invasion was 
not a taking ca11 for "a very curious and unsatisfactory 
resu1t. " 
It wou1d be equa11y curious to a110w enterprising 
communities to zone 1and for pub1ic parks or bui1dings， 
and the courts have not permitted regu1ations which 
1imit private 1and to pub1ic uses. For examp1e， in 
citv of Plainfie1d v. Midd1esex Borouqh当/a town had 
attempted to preserve space for "parks， p1aygrounds 
and pub1ic schoo1s" with such a specia1 zoning c1assifi-
cation. Their case was rejected by the Court on taking 
grounds which wcコu1dremain va1id under the doctrines of 
pumpel1γA1though there was no forma1 resolution for 
the purchase of the land， evidence of negotiations for 
purchase and preliminary agreement offered convincing 
proof of such a purpose. On the other hand， where the 
1andowner is ab1e to make a profit by operating his 1and 
as a pub1ic recreation area， the courts wi11 not inva1i-
date a regu1ation which prohibits him from using it for 
any other purpose.主/
34. 69 N.J. Super. 136， 173 A. 2d 785 (1961). 
35. See， ~cCarthv v. City of Manhattan Beach， 4 Ca1. 2d 879. 264 




It has been fashionable to deprecate Harlan's 
"sむnplistic"approachin旦旦E主主主， but his theory is con-
sistent with the intent of the founding fathers: when 
the government physically appropriated your property --
that was a taking. A return to this simple and unsophis-
ticated principle would go a long way toward upholding 




THE STRATEGY OF EVOLVING PUBLIC PURPOSE 
The ba1ancing test of Rennsv1vania Coa! requires 
that the va1ue to the pub1ic of the regu1ation be weighed 
against the 10ss to the individua1 property owner. In 
practice， though not in theory， the Courts have often 
recognized an exception to the ba1ancing test when the 
regu1ation is designed to prevent a use of 1and so harm-
fu1 to the pub1ic safety or hea1th that it wou1d present 
a serious and unmediate danger. 明lenthe Courts have 
frequent1y weighed the va1ue to the pub1ic so heavi1y 
as to overba1ance any 10ss to the property owner. 
It can be argued that this exception shou1d be 
expanded to treat many more types of 1and use regu1a-
tions as "heavyweights" now that we are increasing1y 
aware of the adverse eco1ogica1 consequences of many 
more types of 1and use. The Courts need on1y recognize 
that the uses of 1and prohibited by modern environmenta1 
regu1ations， though they may not be as obvious1y harmfu1 
as unfenced quarries or fungus-bearing cedars， are in 
the 10ng run equa11y damaging. 
A1though 1ess dramatic than a return to strict 
construction， a strategy of gradua1 evo1ution is con-
sistent with current trends. In the evo1ution of a 
constitution， it is far more common to find a case 
gliding gracefu11y into ob1ivion than to find it dra-
matica11y overru1ed. Such cou1d be the fate of 主主旦旦-
sv1vania Coa! as an ev01ving appreciation of pub1ic 
purpose and pub1ic necessity takes form in the 1970・s.
Courts may increasing1y find particu1ar regu1ations for 
the protection of certain environmenta1 and eco1ogica1 
va1ues such an important exercise of the po1ice power 
that they outweigh呈旦ヱ 10ssof 1and va1ues under the 
Pennsv1vania Coa! ba1ancing test. 
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1. "Heavvweiqht" Public Purposes in Earlier Decisions 
The myth of the taking clause says that government 
can never tell a man that he can ・t "use" his land (i.e.， 
make reoney out of it) unless it pays hむず compensation.
In reality， however， courts have often upheld regulations 
that effectively prohibit any profitable use of land if 
the regulation serves a "heavyweight" public purpose. 
No neat classification of public purposes can ex-
plain the pattern of previous decisions. A number of 
co町~entators have noted that regulations prohibiting 
uses of land that resemble co四~on-law nuisances have 
often been treated as heavyweights. 11 The classic ex-
ample， previously discussed but worth repeating， is 
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead.三/ Mr. Goldblatt was 
the owner of a sand pit in the town of Hempstead， Long 
Island. The sand mining and dredging operation had 
once been located in a rural area but the rapid growth 
of Nassau County soon brought it into the middle of a 
thriving residential n~ighborhood. Meanwhile， a high 
water table had led Mr. Goldblatt to remove sand through 
dredging techniques creating a lake with steep banks and 
depths ranging to over forty feet. Although Mr. Goldblatt 
attempted to seal off the quarry from his neighbors with 
fencing the children in the neighborhood apparently found 
ways to sneak over or under the fences to play in this 
highly attractive flooded excavation. The town officials 
sought to eliminate the hazard by passing an ordinance 
prohibiting the use of the land as a quarry. Mr. Goldblatt 
contested the ordinance alleging that it took his prop-
erty without just compensation. Althouch unsuccessful 
in the New York State Courts he filed a Writ of Certiorari 
and the petition was heard by the United States.Supreme 
Court. 
In a rather brief opinion a unanimous Court disposed 
of the case without substantial difficulty. Although 
1. 8ee Chapter 10. 
2. 369 U.8. 590 (1962). 
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citing and re1ying on the Eennsv1vania Coa1 case the 
Court he1d that the type of regu1ation imposed by the 
Town of Hempstead was not so unreasonab1e as to con-
stitute a taking of property. This despite the fact 
that it is hard to imagine any other profit-making use 
of a water-fi11ed quarry other than quarrying. Professor 
Sax points out that ・since it has been argued that the 
ordinance who11y destroyed the economic va1ue of the 
1and，" then the "opinion 1eaves some doubt about whether 
the Court is fo11o司~ing ， or repudiating， the Holmesian 
doctrine." Y 
Other cases that seem to fit the nuisance ana10gy 
are discussed in Chapter 10. Perhaps the most glaring 
gap in the nuisance theory， however， is the Eennsv1vania 
E旦よ case itse1f. What cou1d be a greater nuisance than 
having your 1and co11apse underneath your house? 
Some courts have attempted to e1iminate this gap 
by distinguishing Eennsv1vania Coa1 as a case in which 
the p1aintiffs had previous1y bargained away their rights. 
There is some substantia1 indication that the Supreme 
Court of Ca1ifornia has virtual1y eliminated the tradi-
tiona1 app1ication of Eennsv1vania Coa!. through this 
approach， by treating as dicta Holmes ・1anguageregarding 
the app1icabi1ity of the Koh1er Act to public streets 
and bui1dings， and interpreting the case as a private 
dispute. Seizing the opportunity in consolidated Rock 
Products Company v. City of Los Anqeles，生Ithe Court 
noted: 
"It [pennsv1vania Coa11 was decided 
before the princip1es of comprehensive 
zoning were estab1ished and differs from 
our case additionally in that the mining 
念、，
3. 5ax， "Takings and the Po1ice Power，" 74主主主主主・ l.36. 42・43
(1964) • 
4. 57 Ca1. 2d 515. 370 P. 2d 342， 20 Ca1. Rptr. 638 (1962)， appea1 
dismissed. 371 U.5. 36 (1962). 置はscase uphe1d a regu1ation 
prohibiting a11 quarrying on the pla1nt1ff's property. As in 
the色盟主語旦， the p1a1ntiff was 1eft w1th a half-completed 
quarry， the usefu1ness of which 18 qulte 11m1ted. 
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persons to be benefited bv the leqis-
lation were qrantees as to whom the 
r iqht to mine had been expresslv re-
g 立単・..四.phasisaddedl ~ 
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An earlier case frαn the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals， sitting in California， rendered an even more 
explicit reading of Eennsv1vania Coa1: 
-・TheState Legis1ature pro-
hibited mining in such fashion as 
wou1d interfere with the structures 
er色ctedby the grantees upon the 
surface， thus in effect giving to 
the grantees a security in the en-
joyment of the surface which they 
had not bargained nor paid for， 
and depriving a grantor of the 
right it had reserved in its deed 
to the grantee." 豆/
It can be argued that the United States Supreme 
Court itse1f has accepted the Eennsv1vania Coa1 doctrine 
more in theory than in practice. Six years after 主主旦旦-
svlvania Coal， the Supreme Court he1d in ~iller v. 
皐豆且旦盟主，11 that a Virginia statute which provided for 
the destruction of red cedar trees infected by the cedar 
rust disease was a proper exercise of the state's po1ice 
power. 明lefungus infection was not dangerous to the 
cedar trees， but the fungus destroyed the fruit and 
foilage of apple trees. 切leCourt found the destruction 
of red cedars within two mi1es of an orchard to be the 
"on1y practicable method of contro11ing the disease and 
protecting app1e trees frαn its ravages. •. .旦I and 
5. 20 Cal. Rptr. at 646. 
6. Karblehead Land Company v. City of 10s Ange1e~. 47 F. 2d 528. 
532 (9th Cir. 1931). 主主主担旦. ~cCarthv v. City of Manhattan 
主主h.4 Cal. 2d 879. 264 P. 2d 932 (1953).三三五五・主主・ 348U.S. 
817 (1954). 
7. 276 U.S. 272 (1928). 
8. 276 U.S. at 278. 
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found the state faced with an unavoidab1e decisiοn as 
to which wou1d be protected to prevent the spread of 
the fungus. It fai1ed to cite Eennsv1vania Coa1， in-
stead re1ying on Badachec''k and other ear1ier cases as 
evidence that a preponderant pub1ic concern justified 
the state's decision to protect app1e trees. 
2. Heavvweiqht Pub1ic Purposes in the Seventies 
Chapter 11 examined the cases of the ・70・sand 
found a judicia1 wi11ingness to support state and re-
giona1 programs to regu1ate the use of 1and. Viewed 
from a different ang1e these same cases can be inter-
preted as expressing support for a variety of new and 
sophisticated pub1ic purposes --purposes so important 
that they outweigh any 10ss in 1and va1ues. 
One of the most dramatic of these recent cases is 
Just v. Marinette County， 21 the Wisconsin case approving 
a statewide program for zoning contr01s in shore1ine 
areas. Accepting the 1egis1ative determin~tions which 
were supported by extensive factua1 and p1anning data， 
the Wisconsin Court nonethe1ess did not repudiate 
Pennsv1vania Coa1. Rather it shifted the ba1ance for 
designated shore1ine areas to ref1ect as its initia1 
equi1ibrium the natura1 state of the 1and and water. 
A prohibition of uses which cou1d destroy water qua1ity 
or the natura1 character of the 1and cou1d be accepted 
as reasonab1e under this new ba1ance. 
The Task Force on Land Use and Urban Growth has 
recently recommended such an approach. 明1ecourts can 
begin to fi11 information deficiencies if they wi11 
acquire a healthy respect for the unknown. In the past 
ten years， story after story has appeared on the adverse 
effects of changes in land use that are recognized on1y 
after the fact. pelicans died， and we learned that DDT 
was responsible. 明1eedges of Lake Tahoe turned green， 
and we learned that storm water runoff frαn parking 10ts 
was the cause. Houses careened down hi11s in muds1ides， 
"9. 56 Wis. 2d 7， 201 N.W. 2d 761 (1972). 
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and we learned that qradinq practices were responsible. 
恒lerehave been so many examples of unforeseen adverse 
consequences from chanqes in the natural ecosystem that 
the impact of these unknown consequences should be con-
sidered in a balancinq of private and public interests. 
明lecourts should "pres四ne"tha t any change in 
existing natural ecosyst回 IS is likely to have adverse 
consequences difficult to foresee. 明leproponen t of 
the change should therefore be required to demonstrate， 
as well as possible， the nature and extent of any changes 
that will result. Such a presumption would build into 
common law a requirement that a prospective developer 
who wishes to challenge a governmental regulation pre-
pare a statement similar to the environmental impact 
statements now required of public agencies under federal 
pr勾 r翻 s.且/
The Maine Supreme Court has expressed similar views 
in approving a Site Location Law which brings most major 
development in the state before the Environmental Im-
prov倒 entCommission. Their opinion， 1n The Matter of 
Sprinq Vallev Developmen1;，込/emphasized the difference 
between regulation under the police po制 erand taking 
under eminent domain. Significantly， they noted， "[TJhe 
legislature has declared the public interest in preserving 
the environment from anything more than minimal destruc-
tion to be superior to the 0岬ner'srights in the use of 
his land and has given the Commission adequate standards 
under which to carry out the legislative purpose."旦/
The Court went on to approve the program and its appli-
cation in the Spring Valley Development case. 
California， whose early attempts to diminish the 
impact of Rennsvlvania Coa1 on zoninq regulations have 
already been noted， is another state where certain legis-
latively declared public purposes have been given parti-
cular judicial deference. The regional control approach 
10. Citizens ・AdvisoryCommittee on Environmental Quality Task Force 
on Land Use and Urban Growth， Ihe Use of Lan~， 174 (1973). 
11. 300 A. 2d 736 (Me. 1973). 
12. 300 A. 2d at 751. 
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of the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development 
Commission is one example. 工n the Candlestick ProDerties 
且Icase developers had applied for fill permits which 
were rejected with little more than a recitation of the 
extensive findings made by the California Legislature 
in drawing its enabling statutes: "The public has an 
interest in the Bay as the most valuable single natural 
resource of an entire region • • • The legislature 
further finds and declares * * * uncoordinated， haphazard 
* * * filling in San Francisco Bay合 * 合 threatens the 
Bay itself and is therefore inimical to the welfare of 
both the present and future residents of the area sur-
rounding the Bay. •• " 
This concern may extend to regulations adopted at 
the local level as well when they are supported by sound 
legislative findings. The recent California Appellate 
opinion approving historic controls in the city of San 
Diego is an illustration where findings of significant 
public purpose have lead a court to approve a restrictive 
land use regulation.当/
Massachusetts legislation allowing towns to zone 
to protect their flood plains has been given similar 
approval by the Supreme Judicial Court. In ~旦互旦E主主主
Realtv v. The Town of Dedham，主/zoning to preserve 
areas of the flood plain of the Charles River lying 
within the town received approval with the court stressing 
the public purpose served by prevention of such nuisance-
like characteristics.当/
Professor Joseph Sax of the University of Michigan 
Law School has provided a very interesting theoretical 
framework for the presentation of facts to support the 
13. C:and1estick Properties lnc. v __ San Francisco Bay Conservation 
&Deve10prnent Cornrnissio!!. U Ca1. App. 3d 557. 89 Ca1. Rptr. 
897 (1970). 
14. Bohannan v. City of San DiegQ. 106 Cal. Rptr. 333 (App. 1973). 
15. 284 N.E. 2d 891 (Mass. 1972). 
16. Reference to Chapter 11 wi11 provide other situations and more 
detai1ed exp1anation of the ana1ysis by courts which have sus-
tained regu1ation which rnet particu1ar public purposes. 
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pub1ic benefits created by 1and use regu1ations in a 
recent artic1e in the Ya1e Law Journa1.!1I Professor 
Sax accepts the soundness of the Ho1mes' position in 
Pennsv1vania Coa1 but says the existing 1aw has often 
fai1ed to measure the true benefits generated by 1and 
use regu1ations because it fai1ed to recognize the 
interconnectedness of 1and uses. Too often， he says， 
the court 100ks on1y at the impairment of the owner's 
abi1ity to profit frαn the 1and without 100king at the 
broader costs to others that wi11 resu1t frαn his pro-
posed deve1opment. 
The one who profits from a piece of property， he 
argues， uses not on1y the resources of the physica1 prop-
erty itse1f but uses the comp1ex interre1ationship of 
that property with other property as we11. 
"Frequent1y， the use of any 
given parce1 of property is at the 
same time effective1y a use of， or 
a demand upon， property beyond the 
border of the user." W 
Frequent1y a proposed use of one owne~ ・ s 1and wou1d 
cause substantia1 economic detriment to the owners of 
neighboring property. In such cases the ba1ancing test 
shou1d be weighed to insure that the 10ss to neighboring 
property owners is inc1uded as part of the equation. 
Even more frequent1y， however， the benefits gener-
ated by regu1ations are not confined to a sma11 number 
of neighboring property owners but accrue to a11 prop-
erty owners in the community in amounts that may be 
neg1igib1e to any individua1 property owner but quite 
sUbstantia1 when viewed in the aggregate. In such 
situations Professor Sax argues the benefits of the re-
gu1ation shou1d be treated as "pub1ic rights." Where 
such pUb1ic rights are we11 recognized they shou1d be 
a110wed to prevai1 over any norma1 amount of private 
injury without the necessity of quantification of proof.よy
17. Sax. UTakings， Private Property and Pub1ic Rights." 81 主註~.
:!. 149 (1971). 
18. .!!. at 152. 
19. !昼.， at 155・159.
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Professor Sax's analysis follows the pioneering 
work by Professor Allison Dunham of the University of 
Chicago Law School.辺/ Sax accepts Dunham's argument 
that police power regulation should be permissable only 
when designed to protect against harm to the public 
caused by particular development proposals， not when 
designed to encourage development that would produce 
public benefits. Thus under Sax ・s theory as well as 
Dunham・s the presentation of facts would concentrate 
on the public rights that would be subject to depriva-
tion if the development proposed by the landowner were 
to be undertaken， not on positive benefits to be gained. 
Some of the cases previously discussed indicate， 
however， that the courts may go beyond the balancing 
test altogether if the public purpose is sufficiently 
strong. Although the courts， including the Supreme 
Court， credit the continuing validity of廿leprinciple 
that regulation may constitute a taking， they appear to 
be recognizing evolving areas where the balancing test 
is inoperative. Such public purposes as the safety of 
children (Goldblat~) ， protection of public waters (立旦主主)， 
or more conventional zoning for the enhancement of 
community values込/have drawn increasing attention 
and approval. For the legislation advancing these pur由
poses， it can be argued that there is virtually n。
balancing test， because their public purpose is weighed 
so heavily that Rennsvlvania Coa1 remains only to in-
dicate to legislative bodies the heavy burden of justi-
fication that land use regulation must bear. 
One may see this simply as a return to the stand-
ards of旦盟註王 andR盟主主主， discussed at length in the 
preceding chapter. After all， Holmes did not refer to 
20. Professor Dunham's position can be seen in the foll側 ingartic les: 
"A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning，" 48色!.~.主主・
650 (1958) j "From Rura1 Enc10sure to Re-enc1osure of Urban Land，" 
35 !i・ E・旦.L・主主.， 1238 (1960); "Qriggs v. Allegheny County 
in Perspective， 1962，"主旦.C・主主・ 63(1962). 
21. See， Qolden v. P1anning Board of Town of Ramapo， 30 N.Y. 2d 359， 
334 N.Y.S. 2d 138， 285 N.E. 2d 359 (1972). 
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these cases sustaininq police power requlations in his 
opinion and they th倒 Iselveshave never been formally 
overruled. It would be only appropriate if Rennsvlvania 





STATUTORY LIM工TATIONSON REGULATION 
Since the taking c1ause is a basic constitutiona1 
provision the courts are the fina1 arbiters of its 
interpretation. Neverthe1ess， court宅 havecomrnon1y 
deferred to reasonab1e 1egis1ative attempts to define 
more precise1y such difficu1t standards as the line be-
tween taking and regu1ation. Legis1ative bodies cou1d 
easi1y use the technique of statutory definition as a 
means of 1imiting the operation of the taking c1ause 
and preventing its use against types of regu1ation that 
are c1ear1y necessary in the pub1ic interest. 
Two 1eading 1ega1 scho1ars have advocated the use 
of statutory definition as a means of providing a more 
sensib1e and equitab1e system for reso1ving the compen-
sation issue. Arvo Van A1styne of the University of 
Utah， and Frank 1. Miche1man of Harvard Law School both 
have suggested that the 1ack of standards for distin-
guishing between regu1ation and taking indicate a need 
for 1egis1ated standards.主/
Van A1styne finds the judicia1 efforts to devise 
a useab1e test for deciding whether police power mea-
sures impose constitutiona11y compensab1e 10sses to be 
"notab1y unsuccessfu1." 
"This state of affairs 
ref1ects the absence of a generally 
accepted theoretica1 rationale for 
circumscribing the boundaries of 
1. Van A1styne， "Taking or Dan温gingby Po1ice Power: 宮崎 Search
for Inverse Condemnation Criteria，" 44 ~・色l・ b 主主. 1 (1970); 
Van A1styne， "Statutory Modification of lnverse Condemnation: 
The Scope of the Po1ice Power，" 19 S旦旦・ b!旦・ 727(1967); 
Micheln国 n，"Property， Utility and Fairness: Comments on the 
Ethica1 Foundation of 'Just Compensation' Law，" 80単立・ L・主主・
1165 (1967). 
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the police 、power，as well as the 
persistent reluctance of legisla-
tures to provide statutory guide-
lines or criteria for the resolu-
tion of the issues thus posed." y 
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He believes the courts would welcome legislative assis-
tance: 
"One of the most conspicuous 
features of constitutional law is 
the disposition of courts to give 
full effect to statutory measures 
designed to implement or govern 
the application of broadly worded 
constitutional precepts." 11 
Professor Michelman is similarly disenchanted with 
judicial attempts to resolve regulation/taking solutions， 
characterizing the results as "liberally salted with 
paradox， "主Iand concl'udi時 that"fairness as a stand-
ard for judging a political decision may simply be too 
difficult for courts to grasp and apply successfully." 
21 He suggests that the matter of standards and rules 
be placed in the hands of the legislature for solution: 
"Here is a situation in which 
a legislature can impose a useful 
fairness discipline which eludes 
the grasp of the courts." y 
The feasibility of this strategy need not rely 
solely on theory. A model is available in the very 
country from which the taking clause originated --
England， which has for a number of years established 
statutory standards defining the limits of regulation 
and providing for cases in which compensation need be 
paid. An examination of the operation of the British 
2. 44 S. Ca1. L. Rev. at 3. 
3. 19 Stan. L. Rev. at 729. 
4. 80 Harv. L. Rev. at 1170. 
5. 80 Harv. L. Rev. at 1246・1247.
6. 80 Harv. L. Rev. at 1255;主主主邑旦主主且:t..pp. 1252・1256.
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system of compensation will give us an idea of how such 
a system might work in this country. 
England's system of land use regulation is really 
quite similar to our own. Although the terminology is 
different， making the systems sound foreign to each 
other， "the differences between American and English 
planning administration are not so great as they seem. ・
1/ In each country the regulatory process begins with 
a proposal by a developer to build something. This 
proposal is submitted to the local authorities for their 
approval. 工n England the local authority must measure 
the proposal against the officially-adopted plan for the 
area. In the united States it must measure the proposal 
against the community・szoning and other land use ordi-
nances.島I But in practice the English plans are drawn 
sufficiently loosely to give local authorities a large 
measure of discretion， and the American ordinances are 
usually drawn sufficiently tightly to assure that any 
major development proposal in a newly-developing area 
will require an amendment to the ordinances， which under 
the law of most American states is treated as a discre-
tionary legislative action. 明lUS in both countries 廿le
development process involves a highly discretionary 
approval or disapproval of a development proposal by 
local authorities. 
What can the aggrieved applicant do if he is denied 
"planning permission" (as local approval is called in 
7. Daniel Handelker， green Belts and Urban Growth 5 (1962). For 
a compar1son of the systems see J. F. Garner and D. L. Callies， 
"Plann1ng Law in England and Wales and in the United States" 
1 Anl/;lo・America!!..bReヱ.292 (1972). Hore detailed descrip-
t10ns of the English system回 ybe found in Desmond Heap，生E
Outline of Plann1ng La~ (5th ed. 1969); J. B. Cul1ingworth. 
town and Country Planning 1n England and ~ale~. (2d ed. 1971); 
J. F. Garner. "An -lntroduct1on to Engl1sh Planning Law，" 24 
~U. 'I.主.457，(1971). 
8. 面子coursein the Un1ted States there are some co咽剛nities曲 ich
employ no regulatory ord1nances or which use only very loose 
regulat1ons， b叫tthe pract1ce of "wa1t-and-see" zoning herein 
described is the typical one in this country. 
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勘¥gland)? Under the EDglish system of government the 
courts have no power to declare an act of parliament 
void or unconstitutional. Nevertheless， the English 
courts have used their powers of statutory construction 
to support the principle that compulsory acquisition 
requires full c側 Ipensat ion: Y 
OIIt is a well-established prin-
ciple that， unless no other inter-
pretation is possible， justice re-
quires that statutes should not be 
construed to enable the land of a 
part・icularindividual to be confis-
cated without payment.OI 旦/
parliament has specified certain situations in which 
a landowner may obtain compensation for a land use re-
striction by serving of a OIpurchase noticeOl requiring 
the purchase of his land by the local authorities.且/
A purchase notice must be confirmed by the Secretary of 
State for the Environment before it is enforcible. The 
Secretary may， in lieu of confirming the purchase notice， 
grant the requested permission to develop， or grant per-
mission for other development.当/ In general， if the 
Secretary decides to ~旦主主主~ a purchase notice， he must 
find first: 
(a) the land is incapable of reasonably 
beneficial use in its existing state: 
and， 
(b) that the land cannot be rendered cap-
able of reasonably beneficial use by 
the carrying out of any other develop-
ment for which permission either has 
9. A. E. Te11ing， f1anning Law and Procedure~ (2d ed.， 1971). 
10. A-G v. DeKeysor's Roya1 Hote1. Lt~. (1920) A.C. 508. 主主己主~，
Be1fast Corp. v. O. D. Cars. Lt~. (1960) 1ιL. E. R. 65. 
11. The nationa1 government bears a11 or part of the cost whenever 
it decides to do so. 
12. Town and Country P1anning Act of 1971， Section 183. 
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been granted or has been undertaken 
to be granted either by the local 
planning authority or by the Secre-
tary. 当 /
Thus， the owner must demonstrate the uselessness of his 
land in its existing state， wholly apart from any potential 
value for development which it may have. 
The Town and Country Planning Act contains a number 
of detailed provisions setting forth whether compensation 
need be paid in given situations.当I Thus， for example， 
compensation is often required when a permit is granted 
and then later revoked.当I On the other hand many de-
tailed rules forbid the payment of compensation if， for 
example， development is prohibited because of a danger 
of flooding or because of lack of water supplies or 
sewerage serv~ces: 
Compensation . • • shall not 
be payable in respect of the re-
fusal of permission to develop 
land， if the reason or one of the 
reasons stated for the refusal is 
that development of the kind pro-
posed would be premature by ref-
erence t。
(a) the order of priority 
(if any) indicated in the develop-
ment plan for the area in which 
the land is situated for develop-
ment in that area: [orJ 
(b) any existing deficiency 
in the provision of water supplies 
or sewerage services， and the 
period within which any such defi-
C主encymay reasonably be expected 
to be made good: 
13. 1.昼.， at Section 180. 
14. Town and Country P1anning Act of 1971， Sections 134・208.
15. エ昼.， at Section 164. 
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Compensation • • • shall not be 
payable • • • if the land is unsuitable 
for the proposed development on account 
of its liability to flooding or to sub-
sidence. 当/
271. 
Thus by establishing an order of priority of development 
in the development plan for the area the payment of com-
pensation may be avoided. 
Nor is compensation payable because a landowner is 
unable to obtain permission for the主n!.皇 ofdevelopment 
or the density， design， lay-out， or type of buildings 
he wants to construct: 
Compensation under this Part of 
this Act shall not be payable --
(a) in respect of the refusal 
of planning permission for any de田
velopment which consists of or in-
cludes the making of any material 
change in the use of any buildings 
or other land: or 
(b) in respect of any decision 
made on an application in purs~ance 
of regulations under Section 63 of 
this Act for consent to the display 
of advertisements. 
Compensation under this Part of 
this Act shall not be payable in re-
spect of the imposition， on the 
granting of planning permission to 
develop land， of any condition re-
lating to --
(a) the nur曲 eror disposition 
of buildings on any land: 
16. 且.， at Section 147 (4) and (5). 
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(b) the dimensions， design， 
structure or external appearance 
of any building， or the materials 
to be used in its construction: 
(c) the manner in which any 
land is to be laid out for the pur-
poses of the development， including 
the provision of facilities for the 
parking， loading， unloading or 
fueling of vehicles on the land: 
(d) the use of any buildings 
or other land: or 
(e) the location or design of 
any means of access to a highway， 
。r the materials to be used in the 
construction of any such means of" 
access. 立/
Decisions by the Secretary in purchase notice cases 
are rendered only after an administrative hearing.主V
Some very recent administrative decisions will illustrate 
the operation of the system. In the first， the Secretary 
of State for the Environment reluctantly confirmed a 
purchase notice upon finding that the land in question 
was incapable of reasonably beneficial use. The site 
was partly open， but no one appeared interested in any 
agricultural use. The owners sought to build a ware-
house and office building， and planning permission had 
been denied. 
The Secretary concluded that "open storage，" one 
of the few uses the local authority was willing to per-
mit， would generate little or no value because of the 
lack of demand. Similarly he found no demand for the 
land for agricultural purposes. He then concluded that 
the site was incapable of reasonably beneficial use in 
its existing state. After summarizing his reasons for 
17. .!昼.， at Section 147 (1) and (2). 
18. 玉昼.， at Section 182. 
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finding the site unsuitab1e for cα潤nercia1or residentia1 
use， he conc1uded there was 旦~ suitab1e use， and confirmed 
凶 epurchase notice.立/
In a second case， a purchase notice was served with 
respect to three parce1s of 1and near an agricu1tura1 
estate after permission to bui1d 11 houses was denied. 
The parce1s had bui1dings， foundations and 100se brick 
scattered on them so that the inspector was constrained 
to report that at 1east one parce1 "might be of a 10wer 
agricu1tura1 qua1ity for a few years to come." Never-
the1ess， the Secretary recommended that the purchase 
notice旦2主beconfirmed because the three parce1s cou1d 
be effectively uti1ized for agricu1tura1 purposes in 
connection with the agricu1tura11y-uti1ized estate 1ands 
adjacent. This agricu1tura1 potentia1 was regarded as 
sufficient to be reasonab1y beneficia1.辺/
Another recent case involved property in a housing 
subdivision in which the owner served a purchase notice 
with respect to 1and which comprised the major portion 
of a former c1ay pit fi11ed during the ear1y 1960・s to 
within a few feet of the genera1 level of the surrounding 
deve1opment， a1so owned by the owner of the subject prop司
erty. It was sti11 rough， unleve11ed and， in part， water-
10gged and， in the words of an inspector " in its 
existing state is incapab1e of reasonab1y beneficia1 use 
to the owners." 官lesame inspector fe1t that p1anning 
permission ought not to be granted for residentia1 
deve1opment， and further， that the 1and主立旦主主 have been 
capable of reasonab1y beneficia1 use if the owners had 
developed it as a 1andscaped tract for open space in 
accordance with a condition attached to a planning per-
mission with r.espect to the whole estate， granted at an 
ear1ier date. But the Secretary held that even if that 
ear1ier condition wou1d have been fu1filled， the land 
wou1d not be capable of reasonab1y beneficial use under 
19. Extracted from Secretary of State for the Environment 1etter 
ref. pc2/1985/176/19， reprinted in (1972) ~・~.~. 520. 
20. Letter of Secretary of State for the Environment， PC2/1985/176/ 
16， 17， 18， dated 10 March， 1971. 
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the statute， and confirmed the purchase notice.込/
In another example， a purchase notice was confirmed 
on land occupied by unsafe buildings， holding that an 
income of宇35.00a month on such property demonstrated 
no reasonably beneficial use， in its existing state， 
and that all other possible uses involved such great 
expenditures for repair (including the use for which 
planning permission was refused) that the property could 
not be rendered capable of reasonably beneficial use. 
辺/
50metimes the 5ecretary directs that the request 
for planning permission be granted in lieu of confirming 
a purchase notice. In one such case the subject prop-
erty was originally planned for open space so the local 
authority denied planning permission.包/ However， the 
local council was in the process of acquiring a similar 
site for such purposes. This and other circumstances 
convinced the government to grant per百¥issionfor resi-
dential development rather than confirm the purchase 
notice.訟/
Appeals to the courts have upheld the government's 
position that property need not be purchased merely be-
cause it will lose value due to denial of planning per-
mission. In R. v. Minister of Housinq and Lοcal Govern-
E盟主主21after an applicant had failed to obtain planning 
21. :!. ~. b 659・662(1969). 
22. :!・~. .b 239・241(1971). 
23. No doubt in most cases the landowner serving the purchase notice 
hopes for this result. just as American landowners do拍車nthey 
seek to upset local zoning decisions. 主主DonaldG. Hagman. 
"Planning (Condemnation) Blight. Participation and Just Compen-
sation: Anglo-American Comparisons.'・4Urban Lawyer. 434. 435 n.7. 
24. :!. ~・ 1. 276・279(1970). 
25. 2 ALL E. R. 407 (1960). Note that the suit was against the 
"Minister" ・ of Housing and Local Government. 油 olereferences 
have been to the "Secretary" ・・ of State. for Environment. In 
1970 a reorganization combined the responsibilities of several 
Ministers whose activities had considerable impact on the environ-
ment. such as the Ministry of Highways and the Ministry of Housing 
and Local Government. into one Department of the Environment. headed 
by a Secretary. Most of the previous examples cited are post-
1970 and hence the appropriate governmental official was the 
Secretary of the State for the Environment. 
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permission to put 60 - 70 caravans 2王 bungalowson a 
site used to locate 20 - 30 caravans， he served a pur-
chase notice alleging， !旦主主主主よ主主， the 10ss of double 
value on his land. The Court upheld the Minister in 
refusing to confirm the purchase notice. 
What practical effect does this English system 
have on the land deve10pment process? To answer this 
question， we asked a number of Eng1and's more prominent 
property deve10pers廷Iwhat they thought of their 1and 
use contro1 system， what were its chief drawbacks， and 
how it affected the property which their companies pro-
posed to deve1op. Whi1e each deve10per has his own views 
there were certain common conc1usions with which near1y 
all agreed. 
26. Richard Coopman， Director， London and Overseas Property and 
lnvestment Company， Ltd. (The Company is principally a devel-
oper of commercial and office propertY)j B. D. East， Chairn凶n
and Managing Director， and W. Wade， Director (and Barrister) 
of Town and City Properties， Limited (the company engages 
primarily in office and commercial development)j Stanley 
Ferrada. Director， the Hammerson Property and lnvestment Trust 
Limited (the company develops primarily office and commercial 
properties)j Michael Fenton-Jones， Director， Commercial Union 
Properties， Limited (the company engages primarily in commer-
cial office development)j Nigel Mobbs， Managing Director， 
Slough Estates， Limited (the company engages primarily in 
industrial development. with some commercial development)j 
R. 1. Northen， Executive Director for Development， Capital and 
Counties Property Company Limited (the company develops primarily 
office and other commercial properties)j M. F. Sanderson. 
Managing Director， Bovis Limited (the company engages in re-
sidential development)j J. J. Walker， Managing Director， English 
and Continental Properties Company， Ltd. (the company develops 
principally commercial and office property， with some residential). 
Also interviewed was Mr. T. J. Nardecchia， one of the best-
known chartered surveyors in London， and partner in the 
prestigious firm of Montagu Evans & Sons. Mr. Nardecchia's 
profession often performs the function of consulting and 
guiding development proposals which falls to lawyers and 
consultant planners in the United States • 
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By far the most uniform agreement came with respect 
to compensation and its place in the development of land. 
None of the developers considered the limited availability 
of compensation for planning law restrictions a detriment 
to land development. Most of the developers agreed with 
Fenton司 Jones 司ー that if property had been purchased for 
development without planning permission， that would most 
certainly have been reflected in the purchase price， and 
if not， then "someone has not done his homework." 
There was also uniform agreement with respect to 
the most important area of receiving compensation re-
lating to a land use restriction --the situation in 
which a local authority王立2主主主 aplanning permission. 
Most of the developers agreed with Nigel Mobbs that they 
would certainly at least ~hreate~ to seek compensation 
under this circumstance， always hoping the local author-
ity would reconsider the revocation.立/
Next in order of importance came the purchase notice. 
All confirmed it was rarely used. Some --like Nigel 
Mobbs --could not recal1 a precise instance when they 
had served a purchase notice and carried the procedures 
through to conclusion. Usually the local authority 
would at some point either further modify the conditions 
under which the planning permission was granted， or if 
permission had been actually refused， relent and grant 
a modified permission of some sort. As R. 1. Northen 
and Richard Coopman pointed out， most disputes between 
local authorities and property developers involve den-
sities， design， and amenity features like the preserva-
tion of trees. Very few disputes in the above category 
would actual1y give rise to a situation in which an 
owner-developer could allege that conditions imposed 
would amont to rendering the subject property "incapable 
of reasonable beneficial use in its existing state.・ 謹/
27. In the United States such cases are often treated under the cate-
gory of "vested rights" or "estoppe1" and do not reach the taking 
issue. 
28. Another area of unanimous agreement came with respect to compen-
sation sti11 payab1e under the unexpended ba1ance of 400 million 
pound fund created by the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act. 
As Barry East exp1ained. one wou1d be made aware of any such 
unexpended ba1ance. usua11y as a matter of course from reports 
on property upon which one contemp1ated development. but no one 
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As indicated above， the practice appears to be to 
reach a sett1ement with the 10ca1 authority that refuses 
or harsh1y-conditions a p1anning permission， even if 
the resu1t of the 10ca1 authority creates a purchase-
notice situation. Loca1 authorities， according to R. 
1. Northen， don ・t1ike to pay out money for either the 
compu1sory acquisition of property under the purchase 
notice procedures 旦~ the paying of compensation for the 
revocation of a previous1y-granted peDnission. 
This is not to say that there are not circumstances 
warranting approva1s， though. Nige1 Mobbs recounts a 
situation in the town of Slough in which his company 
sought p1anning permission to deve10p 19 sites which 
the city showed as car parks on its deve10pment p1an. 
As soon as p1anning permission was sought， the Minister 
"ca11ed in" the case and granted permission on 14 of the 
19. The cαnpany then served a purchase notice with re-
spect to the other five and an inspector from the centra1 
government agreed that they were incapab1e of reasonab1y 
beneficia1 use in their existing state. Rather than pay 
for a11 five， the city compromised and granted p1anning 
permission for deve10pment on three of the five. The 
company used the remaining two for car parks. 
A11 the deve10pers agreed the Eng1ish system of 
1and use regu1ation was basica11y good. Some thought 
it was the best in the wor1d， whi1e free1y admitting it 
was easier for them to proceed elsewhere --1ike Austra1ia. 
盆I This is not to say the deve10pers themse1ves found 
ever made a decision to purchase or develop land based upon 
the existance (or lack of it) of such balance. In fact. it 
was rarely worth the effort to go through the procedures for 
making a claim on the fund. 
29. Interestingly enough， the harshest criticism of the system as 
a油 olecame from T. J. Nardecchia who considers the whole 
system both out ・of・dateand cumbersome: "What is urgently 
needed is a simplified system of releasing land for housing 
purposes， and this must be ~旦単語 by the infrastructure. 
You do not release land by drawing lines on a map. You need 




the system faultless. While not all experienced the 
frustration of the Hammerson Group in Salisbury as 
reported by Mr. Ferrada --8 years of negotiations 
after a refusal， and a lost appeal， only to have 
virtually the same plan approved as initially sゅー
mitted --the experience of Richard Coopman appears 
to be typical. His company sought and was denied 
planning permission to develop an office center near 
Oxford， thereby reducing the value of the site from 
200，000 pounds to 50，000 pounds. Coopman does not 
so much resent the decision -- indeed he admits the 
traffic effect on Oxford would be considerable --
but upon taking an appeal to the central government 
at a cost of 35，000 pounds， he reports it took fifteen 
months to obtain a decision! J. J. Walker figures 
that even on a relatively simple appeal from a local 
authority decision it will take six months to a year 
to get a hearing before an inspector， an additional 
six months to a year to get a decision. 
Another common complaint is the competence and 
authority of local planning officers. While negotia-
tions must first be carried out with these staff people， 
the decision is ultimately made by the planning com-
mittee of the local authority. J. J. Walker reported 
an instance where after spending eight months working 
out differences with respect to a development with the 
local planning staff， he was turned down cold by the 
committee anyway. Messrs. East and Wade agreed that 
the ability of a local planning officer to ・carryhis 
committee" was often in doubt. Moreover， according to 
Sanderson， sometimes the local planner himself is tech-
nically incompetent or inarticulate， particularly if 
the local pay scale is too low to attract good men. 
Often， the developers agreed， the problems resulted 
from the obstinacy or incompetence of the people sitting 
on the local committee. As M. F. Sancerson of Bovis put 
it: 
"The Planning Committee will 
often fail to examine the site of a 
proposed development until主主主主主 all
the work has been done on a plan. 
Z単旦 itwill go out and chalk-mark 
trees that absolutely must be pre-
served. " 
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But on the whole， we were left with the distinct 
impression that the developer was pleased with what 
appears to all intents and purposes to be a very re-
strictive system. Why? We wondered if there were more 
to the development story， so we ・also ta1ked with a number 
of England・smore prominent and/or experienced planning 
officers and conservationists.辺/
First of a1l， the planners agreed that there is 
virtually no practical method of obtaining compensation 
for a denia1 of p1anning permission other than the 
serving of a purchase notice: and if this was a rela-
tive1y minor consideration for the deve1oper， it appears 
to be of even less importance to the loca1 authority --
especia1ly in the major urban regions. Thus， whi1e 
Liverpoo1， a city of about 600，000 people， may be served 
with approximately !wo hundre~ purchase notices per year 
(most of which are pursued tοa conc1usion --usual1y 
confirmed) causing an annua1 outlay of between 1.25 and 
2.50 mil1ion dollars， this is a very sma11 portion ー田
.6% to 1. 3%ーー of the city's 187.5 mil1ion do11ar budget.llI 
30. Ian Campbe11. Secretary. Commons. Open Spaces and Footpaths 
Preservation Society; Graham Ashworth. Director of the Civic 
Trust for the Northwest. President-E1ect of the Roya1 Town 
P1anning Institute and Professor of Urban Studies. University 
of Sa1ford; Dennis Browne. Director of Development. London 
Borough of Hammersmith; Sir Desmond Heap. Control1er and City 
Solicitor. London. and President of the Law Society; F. J. C. 
Amos. City P 1anning Officer. Liverpool. and past President of 
the Roya1 Town P1anning Institute; A1fred Wood. County P1an-
ning Officer， Worcestershire， and former City Planning 
Officer. Norwich; David Hal1. Director， Town and Country 
P1anning Association. 
31. Moreover. according to Amos. near1y half are "invited" purchase 
notices. in order to facilitate the acquisition of land by 
Liverpoo1. The price paid for the land n祖 ybe determined by 
a "district va1uer" while the city may have litt1e to say 
about how he wil1 fix the va1ue， it does usua11y serve a 
certificate of alternative use what the land wou1d be used 
for if the city were to grant planning permission --and 
the va1uer generally works from this basis. 
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The situation is apparent1y different in sma11er 
urban areas， such as Norwich (popu1ation 1ess than 
50，000)， which was successfu11y served with but a sing1e 
purchase notice between 1967 and 1972， and that one cost 
the city a mere宇10，000. Again， the payment of such 
compensation cou1d hard1y be ca11ed a prob1em for the 
1oca1 authority. 
A unique situation appears to arise in London itse1f. 
Due to skyrocketing 1and va1ues in the London area it 
is so difficu1t to carry the burden of demonstrating 
that denia1 of p1anning permission renders 1and incapab1e 
of reasonab1y beneficia1 use in its existing state that 
in the Borough of Hammersmith， near centra1 London， for 
examp1e， not a sing1e purchase notice has been success-
fu11y served in the past 2-1/2 years. 
Simi1ar1y， it wou1d seem that under most circum-
stances， a11 agreed the deve1oper's on1y "lever" with 
the municipa1ity is a threatened appea1 to the Secretary 
of State for the Environment or the serving of a purchase 
notice (which must be confirmed by that Secretary) shou1d 
the 10ca1 authority deny p1anning permission for deve1op-
ment. But this is time consuming and cost1y. 16/ In 
fact， the deve10per wi11 usua11y attempt to ascertain 
what the sticky points are from the 1oca1 p1anning offi-
cer註 foreforma11y seeking p1anning permission - though 
sometimes it is not unti1 after it is denied that he is 
taken aside and wised up， as it were. A possib1e ex-
ception to the 1ack of 1evers may occur when the deve1-
oper is in partnership with the 10ca1 authority to de-
ve10p a city center. As the 1oca1 authority clear1y 
豆竺主主主 deve10pmentat that point， the deve1oper.starts 
with the toughest part of his battle over. 111 It is 
worth noting genera11y at this point that 1and use des-
ignations on a development p1an are a good dea1 1ess 
32. In some situations there is one other lever， when land is 
Ib1ighted" with undesirable structures， a developer will often 
offer to clear them away for some concessions on permitted 
development. 
33. Indeed， it has been suggested perhaps the average citizen 
is not best served by such partnerships as the relationship 
between the local authority and the developer becomes con-
siderably less than arms ・length.
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precise than on an American Zoning map. Land may very 
we11 be designated "cαmnercia1・ in such p1ans， but 
whether that means it is suitab1e for， say， hote1s or 
not is another matter， and mere1y because a 10ca1 au-
thority desires p1anning permission for some specific， 
admitted1y cαmnercia1 use on 1and so designated wi11 
not assure a deve10per of a successfu1 appea1 to the 
Secretary. 
Of considerab1e interest is the changing pattern 
of deve10pment in green be1t 1and. Long a sacred pre-
serve of open space constituting as much a hedge against 
future deve10pment than the much-vaunted "green 1ung" 
for the cities， Eng1and・sgreen be1ts are under fresh 
assau1t --principa11y because of recent actions by， 
of a11 peop1e， the centra1 government which saw to their 
creation in the first p1ace. 
Previous1y， even the addition of more than a house 
or two to an existing sett1ement or the construction of 
agricu1tura1 bui1dings was the best for which a 1and-
owner cou1d hope. Not that the deve10pers didn't try --
for the rewards cou1d be enormous as the 1and cou1d be 
optioned cheap1y because the chance of success 、wasso 
remote. Standard deve1opers' arguments inc1uded: 
(1) there is a shortage of housing (especia11y in London 
and the southeast): (2) there is high unemp10yment 
(especia11y in the southeast and north): (3) this 1and 
is "gray・ --more or 1ess dere1ict and not rea11y green: 
(4) this 1and is on the edge of urban deve1opment: (5) 
we must exp10it existing uti1ity faci1ities: (6) deve1op-
ment wi11 increase the tax base thereby enab1ing the 
10ca1 authority to upgrade the qua1ity of 1ife for its 
citizens.当/
34. David 8all of the Town and Country Plannlng Associatlon offers 
ready responses to many of these: there wi 11 always be an "edge" 
of other development some wherej yes， there is a need for more 
housing but the whole point of comprehensive planning is to 
declde where they ought best to be put --presumably the decision 
was 回 deno主tosituate it on green belt landj to ca11 land "gray" 
begs the question. Ian Campbell further suggests that jobs are 
often ephemeralj there is work while construction is going on， 
but often not thereafter. 8e cltes an example from a North Sea 
development project which was supposed to provide 200・300jobs in 
a town wlth 40% unemployment. But once the construction was finished. 
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Until recently the applications for development 
were regularly turned down， and the Department of Envi-
ronment could be counted upon to back up decisions.主/
Even when the local government unit was won over by hard 
lobbying， in most rural areas the planning authority 
over green belt land was in the hands of the f旦盟主主 plan-
ning authority， which was generally not subject to such 
pressure. 
The prospects for development in the green belt 
brightened considerably in April of 1~73 with the pub-
lication by the central government of a "white paper" 
on housing当/advocating the release of 2000 acres for 
housing in the London green belt alone. 111 As it is 
that central government， via the Secretary of State for 
Environment， to which appeals are made frαn local plan-
ning decisions， the .implication is clear. It is widely 
expected that many local authorities in the southeast 
will immediately begin releasing land for residential 
development in the southeast of England. 
Undoubtedly a system of statutory standards for 
compensation adapted to United States needs would differ 
in many major respects from the current English model. 
主/ Nevertheless， the English example provides encour-
aging grounds for experimenting with statutory criteria 
for defining cases in which cαnpensation should be paid. 
As the Task Force on Land Use and Urban Growth recently 
pointed out: 
the facility employed exactly 9 men --on three shifts --
largely as button-pushers. 
35. But there are exceptions. Thus in County Kent in the London 
green belt， a developer successfully sou酔 tplanning permission 
to create a "new village" for 6000 people. Unfortunately--
or fortunately， depending on your viewpoint ・ the developers 
of "New Ash Green" went bankrupt before their project was 
sufficiently under way. 
36. "Widening百四 Choice: The Next Step in Housing' Cmnd. 5280 
(London: H. M. S. O. ). 
37. !豆.， at para. 16， p. 5. 
38. Màndelker，型~， 49包よ・ .b~旦・ 699 ， 740. 主.&.， Profes駒 E
Mandelker notes general difficulties， few of油 ichhave been 
cured by time. 
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"It is this system of land-use 
controls that has enabled the English 
to preserve large amounts of open space 
in metropolitan greenbelts and in open 
283. 
country without paying compensation."話/
Moreover， the standard of "no reasonably beneficial use" 
that appears in the English system might provide a work-
able starting point for any such program.三Q/
39. Citizens' Advisory Committee on Environmenta1 Qua1ity Task 
Force on Urban Growth， !he Use of LanQ 171 (1973). 
40. In addition， it is possib1e that American co叫rtscou1d examine 
the Eng1ish precedents and reach somewhat simi1ar resu1ts 




50UND EVIDENCE AND CAREFUL DRAFTING 
A basic change in the 1aw， either through new court 
interpretations or new statutes， wou1d fortify the govern-
ment's position in taking cases. But even under existing 
1aw much can be accomp1ished by basing 1egis1ation on 
persuasive scientific evidence and drafting it with the 
ear1ier interpretations of the taking c1ause in mind. 
切1ecomp1exity of the evidentiary issues and the 
1ega1 techniques defy simp1ification， and a few examp1es 
must suffice. The brevity with which these issues are 
summarized shou1d not cause an underestimation of the 
importance of these questions. 
1. T'he 工mportanceof Evidence 
Facts are of paramount importance in any 1itigation. 
They are particu1ar1y important when the 1ega1 issue is 
as diffuse as the ba1ancing test that has been Justice 
Holmes' 1egacy to us，" .. a pragmatic， case-by-case 
res01ution of the p01icy-conf1ict which he perceived to 
1ie at the heart of the prob1em --the conf1ict between 
pub1ic need and private 10ss." 11 
Our modern concept of the proper way to dea1 with 
cases inv01ving complex factua1 issues was pioneered by 
the dissenter in Pennsvlvania Coa 1， Justice Brandeis. 
Before he was nominated to the bench， Louis Brandeis 
was already one of the most famous attorneys of the 
early Twentieth Century. As a Boston lawyer he succeeded 
in convincing previously hostile courts to uph01d the 
pioneering social legislation of the day. He presented 
the factual evidence of the working conditions in sweat-
shops and mines so clearly and convincingly that the 
courts for the first time uphe1d legis1ative 1imitations 
on hours of labor. 




The technique of obtaining judicial approval of 
social legislation through a detailed and carefully 
prepared factual presentation became so widely emulated 
that it still bears the name of "the Brandeis brief." 
The analogy between the social legislation of Brandeis' 
day and today・senvironmental legislation is suffi-
ciently significant that it seems appropriate to quote 
briefly the description of Brandeis・firstbrief to the 
Supreme Court by his biographer Thomas Mason: 
"Brandeis then outlined the 
material needed for his brief. The 
legal part he would himself cover in 
a few pages. For the economic and 
social data showing the evil of long 
hours and the possible benefits from 
legislative limitation， he would look 
to his sister-in-law. It was on these 
materials， not on the legal argument， 
that he would base his case. 三/
Reliance on facts rather than traditional precedents was 
a new technique: 
"This was a bold innovation. 
No one knew whether or not the Court 
would notice a brief so unconven-
tional. But， Brandeis noted， in all 
the cases in which social legisla-
tion had been set aside， the judges， 
by recourse to abstract logic， had 
confidently denied any 'reasonable' 
relation between the legislation 
and the stated objective of improved 
public health. 50metimes the Court 
more modestly suggested that if any 
such 'reasonable' relation did exist， 
it had not in fact been shown. The 
inference was， therefore， that if 
the reasonable relation could be 
proved， the Court would be forced 
2. l110mas Mason. ~randeis: A Free Man・sLif~. 248 (1946). 
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to accept it. 50 far no lawyer had 
dared to furnish the requisite social 
and economic statistics， to demon-
strate this 'reasonable ・relation.
No lawyer had confidence in his ability 
to !!.豆主 the judges see the 'reasonable' 
relation， whether they wanted to see 
it or not. 官latis， no lawyer had this 
confidence in the judges or in himself 
--except Brandeis • . • 
Brandeis ・brief-makingenormously 
extended the bounds of common knowledge 
and compelled the Court to ・take judicial 
notice ・ofthis extension. In the Muller 
brief only two scant pages were given to 
conventional legal arguments. Over one 
hundred pages were devoted to the new 
kind of evidence drawn from hundreds of 
reports， both domestic and foreign， of 
committees， statistical bureaus， com-
missioners of hygiene， and factory in-
spectors --all' proving that long hours 
a re as a matter of fac t.dangerous to 
women ・shealth， safety and morals， that 
short hours result in social and eco-
nomic benefits. ・・・ y
工n the case of Muller v. Oreqon，主/the Court upheld the 
ten hour law for women， relying heavily on Brandeis・
brief， and spawned a whole new style of constitutional 
litigation. 
"Here for the first time the 
5upreme Court was recognizing the 
need for facts to establish the rea-
sonableness or unreasonableness of 
social legislation. For the time 
being the Court had rejected its own 
freedom-of-contract fiction as re-























































followed up this advantage tmrnediately. 
After the Muller case he appeared for 
oral arg四nentin defense of other labor 
laws and sent briefs to sαne fourteen 
different courts." y 
287. 
America now stands at a similar point in its history 
with regard to environmental legislation as it stood 
with regard to social legislation at the time of Louis 
Brandeis. Our knowledge of the social， economic and 
environmental relationships of various uses of land has 
become increasingly sophisticated and complex， but un-
less this knowledge is brought to the attention of courts 
and legislatures they will make decisions on the basis 
of outmoded concepts dating from a simpler age. Does 
the proposed development look like other development 
in the area? Does it have any resemblance to the types 
of land use that have been considered to be "nuisances" 
since the early days of the common law? These tradi-
tional tests seem just as inadequate to resolve complex 
ecological questions as t;he Supreme Court's "freedom-
of-contract fiction" was inadequate to resolve the旦込詮王
case. But unless the courts are presented with sound 
factual evidence supporting the need for land use regu-
lations it is these ancient tests that are likely t。
prevail. 
Many of the recent cases in which environmental 
regulations have been upheld demonstrate the value of 
careful evidentiary preparation. Thus， for example， 
in potomac Sand and Gravel Co.. v. Governor of Marvland， 
岳I the Court summarized extensively the state's evidence 
regarding the biological condition of the wetlands in 
question and the ecological advantages of their preser-
vation. 
Mattawoman Creek is one of ten 
main spawning streams supporting 
anadromous fish in the drainage sys-
5. Hason. ~randeis: A Free Han's Lif~. 251 (1946). 
6. 266 Md. 358. 293 A. 2d 241.盟主主・昼旦.41 L主主旦巴!.3309 (1972). 
Di日l凶 byGoogle
288. 
tem of the Potomac River. It is one 
of the finest freshwater marshes in 
the Upper Potomac Estuary. and is 
the only area along the Maryland 
shores where the rare native lotus 
(water lily) and [zizania aquaticaJ 
(wild rice) are to be found. Its 
aquatic plants act as a rinsing 
agent by absorbing and using in 
their biological process pollutants. 
suspended dirt particles. and other 
inorganic materials that. in exces-
sive amounts. cause conditions of 
aquatic overfertilization. The 
vegetation is an important source 
of dissolved oxygen. food. and 
protection necessary for anadromous 
fish which utilize the marshes for 
resting and spawning each spring. 
Mattawoman Creek is a spawning 
area for yellow perch. white perch. 
striped bass and herring: in addition. 
sunfish. pike. shad. and catfish can 
be found there. It is also a habitat 
for the bald eagle. black duck. 
mallard duck. deer. rabbit. mink. 
otter. beaver. and has one of the 
larger wood duck roosts. 11 
Contrast on the other hand the case of Sturdv Homes 
Inc.. v. Township of Redforcl.皐Iwhere the Court refused 
to uphold a flood plain zoning ordinance because the 
town had failed to prove that the land was subject to 
flooding: 
"It is uncontested that the 
plaintiff・sland has never flooded 
. . The claims of the defendant 
are. essentially. merely that nearby 
7. 293 A. 2d a t 243・244.
8. 30 Mich. App. 53， 186 N.W. 2d 43 (1971). 
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areas flood . • . The danger to 
plaintiff's property is not so 
great as to justify a zoning ordi-
nance which deprives that plaintiff 
of any use of his property." y 
289. 
Or consider the case of Spiegle v. Borouqh of Beach 
盈浬旦辺Iwhere the New Jersey Supreme Court approved 
a beach set四 backregulation， citing at 1ength the care-
ful documentation of the hazards to safety as d四 lon-
strated by the town's engineering evidence. 
"The borough， on the other hand， 
adduced unrebutted proof that it wou1d 
be unsafe to construct houses ocean-
ward of the bui1ding 1ine (apparent1y 
the only use to which lands simi1arly 
10cated in defendant municipality have 
been put)， because of the possibility 
that they would be destroyed during a 
severe storm --a result which occurred 
during the storm of March， 1962. Addi-
tionally， defendant sUbmitted proof 
that there was great peril to life and 
hea1th arising through the 1ikely de-
struction of streets， sewer， water and 
gas mains， and e1ectric power lines in 
the proscribed area in an ordinary 
storm. 賢官 gistof this testimony 
was that such regulation prescribed 
only such conduct as good husbandry 
would dictate that p1aintiffs should 
themselves impose on the use of their 
own lands. Consequently， we find that 
p1aintiffs did not sustain the burden 
of proving that the ordinance resulted 
in a taking of any beneficial economic 
use of their lands." 且/
9. 186 N.W. 2d at 46. 
10. 46 N.J. 479， 218 A. 2d 129 (1966). 
11. 218 A. 2d at 137. 
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Compare， on the other hand， the case of 1yon Sand 
and Gravel Co.. v. Town of Oaklan<1，辺/where the land-
owner ・sextensive evidence about the economic value of 
the gravel and its need for various construction pur-
poses outweighed the township's failure to present any 
significant planning evidence. 
The importance of a sound factual presentation is 
apparent in the urban context as well. The town of 
Ramapo， on the outskirts of the New York Metropolitan 
area， successful1y defended a growth control ordinance 
before New York ・shighest court with success due in no 
small part to a thorough presentation of their case. 
In their defense they had to rebut contentions based 
on a number of recent cases exhibiting hostility and 
sharp judicial criticism of similar controls in other 
communities. 
明letown was able to present a vast array of plan四
ning data in their defense. 主n its statement of the 
facts in Golden v. Planninq Board of the Town of RamaD0， 
iνthe Court of Appeals pointed to the Town Master 
Plan， whose "preparation included a four volume study 
of the existing land uses， public facilities， trans-
portation， industry and commerce housing needs， and 
projected population trends. * * * Additional sewage 
district and drainage studies were undertaken which 
culminated in the adoption of a Capital Budget... " 
当/ Thus， not only could the town rely upon a large 
number of formal municipal actions， adoption of a 
Master Plan， a Capital Budget， zoning and subdivision 
ordinances and the like， but they could also document 
each with thorough and detailed planning studies. 
This impressive detail allowed the Court to open 
its consideration of legal issues on the premises that: 
"The undisputed effect of these 
integrated efforts in land use plan-
12. 33 Mich. App. 614， 190 N.W. 2d 354 (1971). 
13. 30 N.Y. 2d 359， 334 N.Y.S. 2d 138， 285 N.E. 2d 291 (1972). 
14. 285 N.E. 2d at 294. 
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ning and deve10pment is to provide 
an overa11 program of order1y growth 
and adequate faci1ities through a 
sequentia1 deve10pment po1icy com-
mensurate with progressing avai1-
abi1ity and capacity of pub1ic 
faci1ities." 旦/
291. 
Thus the Court cou1d at the outset of its discussion of 
the taking issue， term the program reasonab1e， "both in 
its inception and its imp1ementation."当/
They reached these pre1iminary conc1usions in spite 
of a number of cases from the 1ate 1950・sand 1960・s
disp1aying great judicia1 hosti1ity towards exc1usionary 
regu1ations. Aationa1 Land Investment Co. v. Kohn，立/
is representative， where the Court he1d: 
"Zoning is a means by which a 
governmenta1 body can p1an for the 
future -- it may not be used as a 
means to deny the future 
Zoning provisions may not be used 
• to avoid the increased re-
sponsibi1ities and economic burdens 
which time and economic growth bring." 
よ島/
The town of Ramapo， however， gave the Court a sur-
plusage of facts to dea1 with such arg切nentsre1ating 
to improper pub1ic purposes. Turning to the narrower 
taking issue， the Court gave it rather summary treat-
ment. A1though the growth phasing program cou1d b10ck 
deve10pment for as 10ng as eighteen years for some 1and， 
the Court noted that: 
"The hardship of ho1ding unpro-
ductive property for some time might 
15. 285 N.E. 2d at 296. 
16. 285 N.E. 2d at 303. 
17. 419 Pa. 504， 215 A. 2d 597 (1965). 
18. 215 A. 2d at 610. 
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be compensated for by the u1timate 
benefit insuring to the individua1 
owner in the form of a sUbstantia工
increase in va1uation: or， for that 
matter， the 1andowner might be com-
pe11ed to chafe under the temporary 
restriction， without the benefit of 
such compensation， when the burden 
serves to promote the pUb1ic good.M 
Ramapo had extensive1y documented its position on both 
issues from the outset of its growth contro1 program， 
a fact which was not 10st before the Court of Appea1s. 
As emphasized in Chapter 13， the ana1ytica1 frame-
work suggested by Profe$sors Sax and Dunham suggests 
that the government emphasize facts showing that harm 
to pub1ic rights or interests wou1d resu1t from the 
use being prohibitted. But one need not depend on any 
particu1ar ana1ytica1 approach to recognize the impor-
tance of factua1 preparation in environmenta1 cases. 
Anyone reading a few cases might we11 conc1ude that 
courts are deciding cases under the taking c1ause by a 
very simp1e sense of equity. They examine how much 
va1ue the regu1ation appears to have， and how much harm 
it causes the p1aintiff， and then they either say it is 
a11 right or it isn・t. As Professor Van A1styne puts . 
it: 
"With some exceptions the deci-
siona1 1aw is 1arge1y characterized 
by confusing and incompatib1e resu1ts， 
often exp1ained in conc1usionary 
termino1ogy， circu1ar reasoning， and 
empty rhetoric [usua11y accompaniedJ 
by the frequent1y reiterated judicia1 
dec1aration that each case must be 
decided on its own facts." 旦/
19. Arvo Van A1styne， "Taking or Damaging by Police Power: 質問




The absence of clear theoretical guidelines rnakes 
the主主主主主 becornernuch rnore irnportant than the law. What 
goes into the balance is rnore irnportant than the process 
of balancing. Both in drafting and defending land use 
regulations careful factual preparation is called for. 
The Task Force on Land Use and Urban Growth recently 
rnade a nurnber of irnportant recornrnendations to govern-
rnental agencies regarding the developrnent of factual 
data: 
Extensive case preparation is 
necessary to demonstrate the consti-
tutional validity and public benefit 
of land-use regulations. To facilitate 
that preparation， the trend toward 
"environmental divisions" within the 
offices of state attorneys general 
and county and rnunicipal attorneys 
should continue， and attorneys in 
those divisions should be urged to 
devote a substantial share of their 
efforts to land-use regulation. 
Existing non-profit organiza-
tions should be supported and appro-
priate additional organizations 
established that will provide govern-
rnent attorneys with the expert testi-
rnony， research assistance， and skilled 
tactical advice needed to prepare for 
irnportant land-use cases. 担/
For the private landowner sirnilar advise is appro-
priate. Fewer and fewer cases are going to be decided 
by ernotional appeals to the rnyth of the taking clause. 
More and rnore are going to depend on highly complex 
factual issues that rnay involve a number of scientific 
disciplines. The side which best rnasters the facts is 
likely to succeed. 
20. Citizens' Advisory Committee on Environmenta1 Qua1ity Task Force 
on Land Use and Urban Growth， The Use of Lan~， 172・173(1973). 
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2. The Need for Carefu1 Draftsmanship 
The cases discussed in the ear1ier chapters of this 
book provide many examp1es of regu1ations that stood or 
fe11 1arge1y on the basis of the qua1ity of their drafts-
manship. The need for carefu1 drafting seems so obvious 
that it need not be be1abored. A few examp1es will 
suffice. 
Obvious1y， the more that a 1andowner is al10wed to 
make use of his property the 1ess he is 1ike1y to raise 
a taking issue. The carefu1 draftsman will search di1i-
gent1y to insure that the regu1ations permit as much 
deve10pment as can be a110wed consistent with the pur-
pose of the regu1ation. 工fstrict performance standards 
are app1ied to the use of 1and the carefu1 draftsman 
often finds that many more types of deve10pment cou1d 
be permitted than an i~itia1 reaction might have suggested. 
Professor Danie1 Wi1kes argues that even a sa1t 
marsh --typica11y thought of as usab1e on1y if fil1ed --
may be ab1e to generate economic gain through a variety 
of Iharm1ess" uses: 
I11ustrative of activities which 
might be offered to estab1ish the eco四
nomic "rent" va1ue of a marsh or of a 
restricted coastal area of scenic beauty 
are: (1) Permission for bio1ogy class 
use on fie1d trips on payment by a 
schoo1 district of an annua1 fee， per-
haps set by proof of schoo1 expenses 
incurred in trips to museums with 
adequate sUbstitute experiences: 
(2) entrance fees for tourist access 
to wa1kways bui1t over the marsh， as 
has been done at the Corne11 Bird 
Sanctuary in Ithaca， New York: (3) 
va1ue of marshes a1ready acquired for 
sanctuary purposes to ensure migratory 
birds for hunting citizens in terms of 
what citizen groups wou1d have to pay 
Di日l凶 byGoogle
alternative1y to "import" a 1ike 
number of birds to sUbstitute for 
the marsh-feeding popu1ation: (4) 
access fees across marshes to non-
motored boat marinas beyond the 
marsh: (5) rental of a marsh to 
commercia1 scientific 1aboratories 
for contro11ed study under unique 
conditions: (6) rent va1ue for movie 
and te1evision site locations: (7) 
reasonab1e fees which 1oca1 fisher-
men might find economical to pay for 
marsh enrichment through sprat seeding， 
nursing， or hatching of new species， 
imported 1arvae， or the 1ike: and， 
(8) commercia1 va1ue of the marsh as 
an adjunct to border1ands whose 10t 
va1ues are enhanced by unobstructed 
marsh views. 込/
295. 
Lest this argument seem far-fetched， consider the 
uses per官¥itted in the Marinette County shore1and pro-
tection ordinance cha11enged in ~ust v. Marinette 
三2盟主工 w
"3.41 permitted Uses. 
(1) Harvesting of any wi1d crop 
such as marsh hay， ferns， moss， wi1d 
rice， berries， tree fruits and tree 
seeds. 
(2) Sustained yie1d forestry 
subject to the provisions of Section 
5.0 re1ating to remova1 of shore 
cover. 
21. Danie1 Wi1kes， "Constitutiona1 Di1emnas Posed by State Po1icies 
Against Marine Po11ution ーTheMaine Examp1e，" 23単担三 L・主z・
143， 152 (1971). 
22. 56 Wis. 2d 7， 201 N.W. 2d 761 (1972). 
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(3) uti1ities such as， but not 
restricted to， te1ephone， te1egraph 
and power transmission 1ines. 
(4) Hunting， fishing， preserva-
tion of scenic， historic and scientific 
areas and wi1d1ife preserves. 
(5) Non-resident bui1dings used 
sole1y in conjunction with raising water 
fow1， minnows， and other simi1ar 1ow-
1and anima1s， fow1 or fish. 
(6) Hiking trai1s and brid1e paths. 
(7) Accessory Uses. 
(8) Signs， subject to the re-
striction of Section 2.0." 
"3.42 Conditiona1 Uses. 
The fo11owing uses are permitted 
upon issuance of a Conditiona1 Use 
Permit as provided in Section 9.0 and 
issuance of a Department of Resource 
Deve10pment permit where required by 
Section 30.11， 30.12， 30.19， 30.195 
and 31.05 of the Wisconsin Statutes. 
(1) Genera1 farming provided 
farm anima1s sha11 be kept one hundred 
feet from any non-farm residence. 
(2) Dams， power p1ants， f10wages 
and ponds. 
(3) Re1ocation of any water 
course. 
(4) Fi11ing， drainage or dredging 
of wet1ands according to the provisions 
of Section 5.0 of this Ordinance. 
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(5) Removal of top soil or peat. 
(6) Cranberry bogs. 
(7) Piers， docks， boathouses." 
包/
The plaintiff applied for a conditional use permit 
to fill his land under S3.42 (4) but was refused. On 
appeal the court found the other uses permitted under 
the ordinance to be sufficient to avoid unconstitution-
ality. 
工n contrast， consider the attitude of the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey toward a similar attempt to draft 
a list of permitted uses for wetlands in a township in 
that state: 
工n addition， it will be noted 
that many of the previously listed 
permitted uses in the zone are public 
or quasi-public in nature， rather than 
of the type available to the ordinary 
private landowner as a reasonable means 
of obtaining a return from his prop-
erty， i.e.， outdoor recreational uses 
to be operated only by some govern-
mental unit， conservation uses and 
activities， township sewage treatment 
plants and water facilities and public 
utility transmission lines， substations 
and radio and television transmitting 
stations and towers. All in all， about 
the only practical use which can be 
made of property in the zone is a hunt-
ing or fishing preserve or a wildlife 
sanctuary， none of which can be con-
sidered productive. 
* * * 
23. 201 N.W. 2d at 765. 
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It is equa11y obvious from the 
proofs， and 1ega11y of the highest 
significance， that the main purpose 
of enacting regu1ations with the 
practica1 effect of retaining the 
meadows in their natura1 state was 
for a pub1ic benefit. 
* * * 
This prime pub1ic， rather than 
private uti1ization can be c1ear1y 
imp1ied from the purpose sections of 
the zone regu1ations previous1y quoted. 
And it is estab1ished beyond any 
question by the testimony of the 
township ・sown witnesses. 主主/
Enumeration of permitted uses is not the on1y avenue 
in which draftsmanship p1ays a part. State and 1oca1 
regu1ations trying to preserve historic 1andmarks are 
often vu1nerab1e to a number of constitutiona1 attacks， 
inc1uding the taking issue. Carefu1 draftsmenship may 
significant1y aid in court presentation of arguments 
exp10ring the purposes and effect of such 1and use re-
gu1ation and rebutting these arg凶 nents.
In 1966 old Metropo1itan Opera House was vacated 
after 83 years of use by the Metropo1itan Opera Associ-
ation due to the Association・smove to new faci1ities 
in Linco1n Center. On May 10， 1966， a new tenant ob-
tained possession of the property and on May 16 it fi1ed 
an app1ication for a permit to demo1ish the bui1ding. 
On the same day the app1ication for a demo1ition 
permit was received， the state 1egis1ature adopted a 
statute creating a corporation to acquire the bui1ding 
for the "recreationa1 and cu1tura1 needs of the citizens 
of this state." The corporation he1d the power of 
eminent domain and cou1d request a 180 day de1ay in 
issuance of demo1ition certificates. 
24. M，orris County Land Improvement Co. v. ParsippanY=Jroy Hills 
Z盟盟主主， 40 N.J. 539， 193 A. 2d 232， 240 (1963). 
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Some six weeks 1ater the Governor approved the 
statute and in August the corporation posted a two 
hundred thousand do11ar bond to cover any damages the 
new tenant might suffer during the 180 day de1ay. The 
1egis1ature 1eft the new corporation to re1y on its own 
resources (the good wi11 of the peop1e of New York) as 
a source of funds for the acquisition of the bui1ding. 
Short1y after the Governor approved the "preservation" 
measure， the new tenant， Keystone Associates， Inc.， be-
gan an action to compe1 the issuance of the demo1ition 
certificate and dec1are the statute unconstitutiona1 槌
an uncompensated "taking" of property. Winning in both 
the 10wer courts， Keystone presented their case t。
New York's highest court in December of 1966.主/
The corporation argued that the six month de1ay 
(technica11y imposed by the city) was a reasonab1e 
exercise of the po1ice power， and that even if there 
was a "taking，" just compensation was provided. 
The Court of Appea1s was unimpressed. Looking to 
the statute as drafted， it noted: 
"It seems perfect1y c1ear that 
the purpose of this statute is the 
appropriation of the • • • property 
to a pub1ic use." 話/
The Court went on: 
"The statute was c1ear1y not 
intended to protect the p曲 1ichea1th， 
safety， and we1fare， as those terms 
are understood." 
Unab1e to find a determination of necessity of preser-
vation for historic purposes， nor one indicating "a 
shortage of such auditoriums， " the Court conc1uded that 
25. Keystone Associates v. Moerd1e~. 19 N.Y. 2d 78， 278 N.Y.S. 2d 
185 (1966). 
26. 278 N.Y.S. 2d at 187. 
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the legislature had drawn a condemnation statute which 
did not provide just compensation. 
"The statute here in questioning 
constituted an attempt to indulge those 
citizens --among whom is included the 
writer of this opinion --who desire 
the preservation of this grand old 
building for the staging of opera. How-
ever， that purpose may not be achieved 
by the appropriation of the property 
of other citizens. If dedication and 
use for a public purpose is desired， 
then just compensation must be paid， 
that is the conunand of our Constitution." 
三ジ
At the same time， the City of New York was beginning 
implementation of its landmarks Preservation law， an Act 
carefully drawn by the city to provide for designation 
and protection of New York City・sprincipal historic 
1andmarks and landmark districts. The statute pro・
hibits changes in the exterior of buildings without a 
certificate of "no exterior effect" from the landmarks 
conunission or proof that there is no economic use for 
the existing structure and inc1udes a number of pro-
cedura1 protections for 1andmark owners. Contrast the 
reaction of the Appe11ate Division of one of the state ・s
10wer courts in 1968.担 /
"We deem certa in of the bas ic 
questions raised to be no 10nger 
arguable. In this category is the 
right， within power 1imitations， of 
the state to p1ace restrictions on 
the use to be made by an owner of 
his own property for the cu1tura1 
and aesthetic benefit of the com-
munity." 包/
27. 278 N.Y.S. 2d at 190. 
28. Trustees of Sai10rs Snug Harbor v. P1at ~， 29 A.D. 2d 376， 
288 N.Y.S. 2d 314 (1968). 
29. 288 N.Y.S. 2d at 315. 
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The Landmarks Preservation Commission had designated 
buildings owned by Sailor ・sSnug Harbor as landmarks. 
官lesailors・organizationoperated the buildings as a 
home for seafaring men beyond the age of active duty. 
When challenged in the court proceeding the Commission 
convinced the court that the group of buildings was one 
of the two best examples of Greek Revival architecture 
in the country. 
No conclusion was reached on the taking issue due 
to an absence of sufficient facts on which to base a 
judgment. As in the旦単語詮王 case. the challenge had 
been brought at the onset of the administrative pro-
ceedings under the law. Unlike旦旦単語王. however. the 
Preservation Law survived. As noted in the first chapter. 
it is currently challenged as applied in one case. the 
Grand Central Terminal. but in the interim careful drafts-
menship has smoothed the way for its implementation and 
acceptance in a number of other situations. 
Throughout the cases discussed in Part III will be 
found many other examples where draftsmenship played 






The safest way to avoid the taking issue is t。
avoid using regu1ation as a means of enforcing strict 
1imitations on the use of 1and. 工f the government 
obtains tit1e to a11 1and on which deve10pment is to 
be prohibited it can contro1 deve10pment without ever 
raising the taking issue. 
The government cou1d obtain such a property inter-
est in at 1east three ways: (1) by creating a system 
of compensab1e regu1ations under which the government 
compensates the regu1ated 1andowner: (2) by demonstrating 
a preexisting government property interest in the 1and: 
or (3) by buying a11 the 1and on which deve10pment is 
to be severe1y restricted. 
1. Compensab1e Requ1ations 
Systems of compensab1e regu1ations have often been 
discussed but rare1y tried as a means of dea1ing with 
the taking issue. 工n substance， a system of compen-
sab1e regu1ations is a means of va1idating 1and use 
regu1ations that are so restrictive that the courts 
wou1d ho1d them to be a taking in the absence of com-
pensation paid to the 1andowner. If enough compensa-
tion is paid to avoid the unconstitutiona1ity then 
the regu1ation remains va1id. 工n effect compensab1e 
regu1ations attempt to steer a midd1e course between 
regu1ation under the po1ice power and taking under 
eminent domain. 11 
Under existing systems of 1and regu1ation the 1and-
owner cha11enges a regu1ation by seeking an injunction 
1. Jan Krasnowiecki and Ann Louise Strong， "Compensab1e Re思lla-




against its enforcement or a declaration of its invalid-
ity. If he succeeds the court permits him to undertake 
the development he proposes. If he fails the regulation 
is held valid. But traditional legal doctrines rarely 
allow the court to strike a middle ground by awarding 
the landowner such compensation as is necessary to pre-
vent the regulation fr側 beingheld unconstitutional. ~ 
As an example. a community surrounding a military 
airfield wants to prevent intensive development of the 
land in the vicinity of the airfield. knowing that if 
intense development is permitted the complaints about 
noise and fear of accidents will create sufficient 
political pressure to persuade the government to shut 
down the airfield. thereby eliminating one of the major 
employers in the community. Based on an existing court 
decision. however. the community knows that an ordinance 
that restricted all land in the vicinity of the airport 
to low-density housing might be held invalid as a taking 
of property withoutjust compensation. 
Therefore. the community passes an ordinance re-
stricting most of the land to low-density uses but pro-
viding an administrative procedure whereby claims can 
be filed alleging an unconstitutional taking. If a 
taking is proven the governments are responsible either 
to raise sufficient funds to compensate the lando制ner
for the unconstitutional damage or to allow the proposed 
development to take place. Such a system of regulation 
is in effect in the Dayton. Ohio area in response t。
the earlier court decision in Haqeman v. Trustees of 
Wavneでrownshi2.II 
The tentative drafts of the American Law Institute・s
Model Land Development Code propose a system under which 
the local government could choose to pay compensation 
for any land use regulation held to be invalid as a 
taking. 世leproposed code provides that whenever a 
2. See， Le1and Bad1er， "Municipa1 Zoning Liabi1ity in Damages，" 
5 Urban Lawve!" 25 (1973). 
3. 20-Ohio App. 2d 13， 259 N.E. 2d 162 (1968). 
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regulation is challenged in court and the court finds 
that the regulation would constitute a taking in the 
absence of compensation， it may withhold relief until 
the local government has had an opportunity to provide 
compensation. 
"If the complainant is a land-
owner challenging the validity of 
an order， rule or ordinance appli-
cable to his land and if the court 
is satisfied that as applied to his 
land the order， rule or ordinance 
constitutes a taking of his property 
without just compensation， the court 
shall retain jurisdiction if it 
further determines that the limita-
tion on development could be law-
fully imposed if compensation were 
paid and request the local govern-
ment to determine whether it wishes 
to institute proceedings • • • to 
pay compensation." 全/
The proposed code goes on to authorize the local 
government to pay compensation whenever necessary to 
enable a regulation enacted for a valid purpose to re-
main effective. It may pay this compensation through 
the purchase or condemnation of a development right or 
other interest in the affected land， paying the land-
owner the value of the interest acquired: 
A local government may， when 
reasonably necessary， acquire an 
interest in land toachieve the 
objectives of a state or local Land 
Development Plan or the' objectives 
of permissible regulation under this 
Code including the following purposes: 
4. Tentative Draft #3， American Law Institute Model Land Develop-
ment Code， Section 9・111(3). The drafts have been pub1ished 
for discussion purposes on1y and have not been approved by the 
ALI. 
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(1) TO protect or improve envi-
ronmenta1 va1ues inc1uding eco1ogica1 
ba1ance: 
(2) To preserve historica1 or 
archeo1ogica1 structures or sites: 
(3) To minimize potentia1 damage 
from f1oods， earthquakes， hurricanes 
or other natura1 disasters: 
(4) To protect existing scenic 
or recreationa1 va1ues or to preserve 
open space: 
(5) To faci1itate the future con-
305. 
struction of， or the continued usefu1ness 
of， needed pub1ic faci1ities. ユ/
Un1ike programs of 1and acquisition which require 
1arge quantities of front money， programs of compensab1e 
regu1ation postpone payment unti1 after the need for 
payment has been determined. And the ear1ier chapters 
of this book suggest that the need may be decreasing: 
Krasnowiecki and Strong observed the same trend ten years 
ago when they proposed a system of compensab1e regu1a-
tions: 
Most advocates of an approach 
through compensation point to the 
constitutiona1 restraint upon the 
5. Tentative Draft #5， American Law Institute Model Land Develop-
ment Code， Section 4-205 (1973). In the commentary to the 
Model Code the draftsmen discussed the purposes behind their 
system: This code attempts to accomplish a merger of the pur-
poses for which regulation and land acquisition can be used. 
The choice of whether to regulate or acquire land should be 
determined by a weighing of the equities in each case rather 
than by the arbitrary statutory limitations on existing powers 
of acquisition and regulation. This section grants a power 
of acquisition comparable in scope to the powers of regulation 
authorized by the Code. 主昼.， at 21. 
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use of the police power: zoning and 
related controls， however reasonable 
and necessary， may not be carried to 
the point of a "taking" of private 
property without just compensation. 
While the significance of this 
l幻nitationshould not be minimized， 
few are aware that the decisions of 
the courts show a remarkable elas-
ticity in the concept of "taking." 
The more reasonable and necessary 
the regulation seems， the more wil1-
ing have the courts shown themse1ves 
to permit the resulting 10ss in va1ue 
to the property • 
Given an urgent pub1ic need and 
procedures， inc1uding comprehensive 
planning， guaranteeing its rationa1 
expression， there is rea11y no knowing 
what zoning contro1s the courts may 
approve. 三/
Most systems of compensab1e regu1ation have assumed 
that compensation wou1d be paid in the form of money. 
There has been increasing interest， however， in systems 
of "density transfer" which wou1d provide compensation 
in the form of f10ating rights to a share in the profits 
from other property. Thus the owner of severe1y re-
stricted wetlands might be entit1ed to a variance to 
obtain greater density on other property he owns. 
Transfer systems create comp1ex property re1ation-
ships that require sophisticated mechanisms for imp1e-
mentation. To date their use has been 1imited but con-
siderable experimentation is proceeding. A proposa1 by 
Professor Costonis of the University of I11inois Law 
Schoo1 for a transfer system for historic preservation 
has attracted considerab1e attention. 11 
6. Krasnowiecki and Strong， 呈旦旦主主， at 89. 
7. John J. Costonis， "Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the 
Preservation of Urban Landmarks." 85単2・1.匙y.574 (1972). 
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In the early part of this century， when the taking 
clause was being given its broadest interpretation， 
there was substantial debate between those who thought 
comprehensive zoning could be enforced by the police 
power and those who thought it required eminent domain. 
y The Supr回 e Court's decision in Village of Euclid 
v. Arnbler Realtv CQ.， 21 settled the fact that local 
governments could validly impose most land use regula-
tions without the payment of compensation， and compen-
sation is now used only very rarely to supplement 
zoning regulations.担/
The Courts have occasionally chosen to award com-
pensation without specific statutory authorization，且/
particularly where it is apparent that invalidation of 
the regulation would have very serious effects beyond 
the boundary of the immediate land in question because 
8. See 1 Lewis， The Law of Eminent Domai!!.， 386・390(2d ed.， 1900); 
Freund， The Po1ice Powe!:.， 162・164，546・551(1904); and Nicho1s， 
me Power of Eminent Domai!!.， 39・42(1st ed.， 1909). 主主主担旦，
Parker v. Commonwea1t!l， 178 Mass. 199， 59 N.E. 634 (1901); 23 
N.W. 831 (1930); fiper v. Eker!!.， 180 Wis. 586， 194 N.W. 159 (1923). 
9. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
10. See， ~itv of Kansas Citv v. Kind1~， 446 S.W. 2d 807 (Mo. 1969); 
担旦.41 A.L.R. 3d 636. The Congress has undertaken to provide 
compensation for bi11board owners when the demo1ition of their 
signs is required under beautification regu1ations. See， The 
Federa1-Aid Highway Act， 23 USCA Section 131 (g). 
11. See，!!yd10n v. United State~， 175 F. Supp. 891 (Ct. C1. 1959) 
(Compensation awarded to 0叩 ersof f1y-in resorts in the 
Minnesota Nationa1 Forest whose businesses were destroyed by 
a federa1 prohibition of airp1ane 1andings in the forest); 
Lomarch Corp. v. Mayor of Eng1ewoo~， 51 N.J. 108， 237 A. 2d 
881 (1968) (Compensation awarded to owner of parce1 of 1and 
which the municipa1ity， acting under a state statute regu1ating 
subdivision p1anning， had reserved as park site and thereby 
prevented its deve10pment for one year); fetition of C1inton 
W'ater District of Is1and County， 36 Wash. 2d 284， 218 P. 2d 
309 (1950) (Regu1ation by water district converting a 1ake 
into a reservoir and preventing swimming or boating he1d to 
constitute a taking of the riparian rights of the surrounding 
summer-home owners). 主主， F. P. Bosse1man， ~1ternatives to 
Urban Spraw!.， 28・29 (1968); Badler， 豆旦E主主2 o. 1. 
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the new development would "characterize" the surrounding 
area in a manner that makes it practically impossible 
to deny other proposals for similar development. 
The tentative drafts of the American Law Institute・s
Model Code emphasize that the government need not always 
acquire the fee title in order to accomplish its purpose: 
This Article authorizes either 
permanent or temporary acquisition of 
development rights， scenic easements 
or other partial interests in land. 
There are a number of advantages to 
acquiring the development rights as 
opposed to the fee simple. First， 
if future public improvement of the 
property is demonstrable， acquisi-
tion of the development rights would 
prevent private development in the 
interim which would cause public ac-
quisition of improved rather than un-
developed property. Second， if no 
future public development is contem-
plated， but planning objectives re-
quire that the land development would 
permit the government to prohibit 
development while at the same time 
allowing the owner to remain in posses-
sion and to use the land for any un-
improved purpose compatible with 
those objectives. In both cases， the 
land would not be idle but would con-
tinue to generate income for the owner 
and tax revenue for the government. 旦/
Proposals for compensable regulations have evoked 
some concern that open-ended financial liabilities 
might be created. The National Commission on Urban 
Problems， although endorsing such a system， expressed 
such concerns: 
12. Tentative Draft #5， supra， note to Section 4・205.
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As an adjunct to regulations， 
provisions to compensate property-
owners can be of substantial benefit 
in assuring that achievement of a 
desirable result does not offend 
constitutional or other requirements 
of fairness. Of course， unsatisfac-
tory relaxation of regulations could 
sometimes occur if compensation were 
required in too many situations. The 
"fiscal" preoccupation of regulating 
governments in the United States makes 
the dangers of this unusually great. 
Where this is a real danger， localities 
might well experiment with compensative 
regulation on a limited basis --e.g.， 
allowing it only for aesthetic and 
open space regulations and for elimi-
nation of nonconforming uses without 
allowing a legally sufficient period 
of amortization. 且/
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Proponents of compensable regulations respond， however， 
that courts should award compensation only in cases in 
which the regulations would otherwise be held invalid， 
so that the government can always amend the regulation 
to eliminate the invalidity， avoiding the expense of 
compensation and being at least no worse off than be-
fore. 
2. Preexistinq Title 
In some cases governmental agencies can avoid the 
taking issue， not through the acquisition of new title 
to the land in question， but by reestablishing a pre-
existing state interest in the land. The techniques 
and property law doctrines vary from state to state but 
claims of preexisting title have been most prevalent 
13. Nationa1 Commission on Urban Prob1ems. ~uilding the American 
E主I..251 (1968). 
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a10ng the ocean shores， both for sandy beaches and tida1 
1ands. 
As noted ear1ier， the state of Oregon has 100ked 
to custom， the concept of a practice so 10ngstanding 
that ・the mind of man runneth not to the contrary，" t。
affirm state ownership of the foreshore or dry sand area 
of their beaches. The Thor旦包旦 caseaffirming the Oregon 
1egis1ature・sdec1aration of the pub1ic right and inter由
est in its beach 1ands exp10res severa1 theories supporting 
the "creation" of property interests in the pub1ic as 
we11. It is interesting to note that in reaching their 
conc1usions the Oregon Court dismissed a 1935 United 
States Supreme Court decision ho1ding that federa1 grants 
of 1and (as in Oregon) granted record tit1e to the 1ine 
of mean high tide， as inapp1icab1e in view of pub1ic 
usage of virtua11y a11 of Oregon's beach 1and.当/
A Ca1ifornia case has app1ied a simi1ar doctrine 
on a narrower basis to find that under certain circum-
stances pub1ic rights in the recreationa1 use of 1and 
may arise through imp1ied dedication of 1and to the pub-
1ic. The Court a1so 100ked to 10ngstanding free pub1ic 
use， municipa1 improvements and simi1ar factors in 
reaching their conc1usion.担/
A different approach has been taken with respect 
to tida1 wet1ands. It was an estab1ished princip1e in 
the ear1y Nineteenth Century that tit1e to these 1ands 
has been reserved to the states with the creation of 
the federa1 union. Tracing the passage of tit1e to 
1ands from the British Crown through the origina1 co1onies， 
the Supreme Court in 1842 he1d: 
14. State ex rel Thornton v. HaY. 254 Ore. 584. 562 P. 2d 671 (1969). 
The 1935 decision did not resolve conflicts between federal 
and state governments over which control1ed submerged lands. 
This issue has been the subject of both 1itigation and legis-
1ation throughout this century as offshore oi1 became a signi-
ficant resource. 
15. Gion v. City of Santa Cru~， 2 Cal. 3d 29. 84 Cal. Rptr. 162， 
465 P. 2d 50 (1970). 
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For when the Revo1ution took 
p1ace， the peop1e of each state 
became themse1ves sovereign: and 
in that character ho1d the abso-
1ute right to a11 their navigab1e 
waters and the soi1s under them 
for their own common use， subject 
on1y to the rights since surrendered 
by the Constitution to the genera1 
governmen t. 当/
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The Court denied that an ear1ier grant of 1and to private 
persons granted an abso1ute interest in the property in 
view of the paramount pub1ic rights invo1ved. 
In genera1， it is argued that actua1 tit1e to tida1 
wet1ands r四国insin the states because the state ho1ds 
that tit1e "for the pub1ic trust." Important qua1ifi-
cations exist， since the state may grant rights of usage 
ordinari1y associated with ownership such as wharfage 
and excavation.立/ While the parameters governing the 
pub1ic trust in tida1 wet1ands are fuzzy， Mary1and・s
highest court has approved 1egis1ation reasserting state 
tit1e in "lands under the navigab1e waters of the state 
be10w the mean high tide， which are affected by the 
regu1ar rise and fa11 of the tide.・ よ旦/ Looking to the 
rights held by riparian owners， they found there was no 
inherent right to dredge sand and gravel from the tidal 
lands which cou1d not be abso1ute1y prohibited by the 
state to preserve the states natural resources. 
New Jersey presents another example of the appli-
cation of these princip1es. The State ・sEnvironmental 
16. Martin et a1. v. Wadde11， 41 U.S. (16 Peters) 367， 410 (1842). 
17. See， Shive1y v. Bowlley， 152 U.S. 1 (1893); ~orax. Ltd. v. 10s 
担足並呈， 296 U.S. 10 (1935); ~100m v. Water Resources Commissio!!.， 
157 Comm. 528， 254 A. 2d 884 (1969). As noted in note 14， 豆旦主主主，
there is a federa1-state as we11 as a state-private issue in 
the "tit1e" and "trust" arguments. 主主.~abe1 v. Tab~， 430 F. 
2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970). 
18. Potomac Sand & Grave1 Co. v. Governor of Harv1an!!. 266 Md. 358， 
293 A. 2d 241. 243 (1972) (盟旦・昼盟主昼 41LW 3309， Dec. 4， 1972). 
Di日l凶 byGoogle
312. 
Protection Department is comp1eting tida1 f10w maps 
drawn from current surveys， old tax records and maps 
drawn before extensive fi11ing took place which will 
form the basis for challenges to private ownership of 
property in a number of areas of the state. The Envi-
ronmental Protection Commissioner， Richard J. Sullivan， 
notes that the state will "1et the chips fall where 
they may， and we expect the state to receive fair market 
value for the land it acquires and decides to sell.・ 旦/
Proceeds from these sales will go to the New Jersey 
public School Fund. 
More limited legal efforts to restore filled lands 
are taking place in other areas as well. In Tampa， the 
United States beat the state's Internal Improvement 
Fund to court to initiate a suit to restore 60 acres of 
land which had been filled in the Tampa area on the 
Gulf of Mexico.辺/
Simi1ar arguments are made by the Attorney General 
of the State of Georgia in a memorandum from the State 
Law Department expressing a position "which the Depart-
ment intends to pursue in the future concerning the 
marsh1ands of Georgia." The Georgia Attorney concludes: 
Extensive research into the legal 
ramifications of both the proposed uses 
and the claims to legal ownership have 
convinced the Attorney General that the 
state of Georgia is the !eqal owner to 
much， if not a11， of the coastal marsh-
land now beinq privatelv claimed. In 
addition， the development of the legal 
ramifications surrounding the State ・s
ownership has indicated the existence 
of a public trust administered bv the 
S tate and coverinq the marshlands of 
the State which imposes upon the owner-
ship of such lands various ~urdens in 
favor of the general public. As a re-
19. New York Time~. March 15. 1973. p. 1 at col. 2. 
20. Miami Heral~. April 5. 1973. p. 20A at col. 1. 
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su1t， it is the position of the Attorney 
Genera1 that the marsh1ands of Georgia 
are not susceptib1e to private exp1oi-
tation or conservation without regard 
to the common-1aw trust purposes to 
which these 1ands have been 10ng ded-
icated. 込/
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ln some states， a pub1ic trust approach to in1and 
wet1ands may a1so find roots in older doctrines govern-
ing navigab1e waters， fisheries and riparian property 
rights. One such state is Wisconsin where the recent 
case of Just v. Marinette Countv invo1ved a reassess-
ment of such doctrines in 1ight of new state regu1ations 
for shore1ine zoning. W Noting that "[t]he active 
pub1ic trust duty of the state of Wisconsin in respect 
to navigab1e waters requires the state not on1y to pro-
mote navigation but a1so to protect and preserve those 
waters for fishing， recreation， and scenic beauty，" the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court approved stringent shore1ine 
regu1ations.包/
Professor Joseph Sax has discussed at 1ength this 
concept of property "as an interdependent network of 
competing uses" in articu1ating an expanded theory of 
the pub1ic trust inherent in property.訟/ Obvious1y 
the possibi1ity of c1aiming such paramourit tit1e inter-
ests is usefu1 on1y in regard to particu1ar types of 
property， but where avai1ab1e may be the easiest method 
of avoiding the taking issue. 
3. Land Acauisition 
工n the absence of a c1aim of preexisting tit1e the 
21. Press Release， State Department'of Law， Georgia， March 16， 1970. 
22. 201 N.W. 2d 761 (1972). 
23. 201 N.W. 2d at 768. 
24. Sax， "Takings， Private Property and Public Rights，" 81主主主
1・:!. 149， 140 (1971). 
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government can assert a proprietary interest in the land 
only through the acquisition of the fee or 5αne fonn of 
deve10pment rights. On the surface， at least， such a 
system sounds inheritently equitab1e. A1l landowners 
wou1d receive compensation for their reasonable expec-
tations as to future economic gain from their land， and 
the public would obtain the benefits of sound land use 
po1icies without causing any individua1 hann. 
It might be suggested， however， that any such pro-
gram would encourage rampant land specu1ation and stimu-
1ate rapid increases in land prices. Moreover， the eco-
nomic costs of using land acquisition to accomplish the 
purposes of regu1ation must be foreseen. 
Take for example the goal of wet1and preservation. 
In the State of F10rida a10ne the Coasta1 Coordinating 
Council has identified a1most a million acres of coastal 
wetlands now in private hands that should be preserved. 
主/ When one considers the high specu1ative va1ues p1aced 
on many wetlands for dredge and fill deve1opment， it is 
obvious that the cost of acquiring a1l the necessary land 
is staggering.詮/
The preservation of green belts around urban areas 
is another important land use goal. A Committee of the 
National Academy of Sciences and National Academy of 
Engineering recently estimated cost of land in major 
metropo1itan areas as follows: I1I 
25. Testimony of Bruce Johnson， Executive Director， Coasta1 
Coordinating Counci1， before the F10rida Environme~ta1 Land 
Management Study Committee， January 31， 1973. 
26. Purchasing deve10pment rights on1y wou1d not significant1y 
reduce the cost since the on1y va1ue of wet1ands on the 
open market is for deve10p百提ntpurposes thus deve10pment 
rights wou1d cost approximate1y the same as the fee tit1e. 
27. Urban Growth and Land Deve1opment: The Land Conversion 
E王丘三三三， Report of the Land Use Subcommittee of the 
Advisory Committee to the Department of Housing and 
Urban Deve1opment， Nationa1 Academy of Sciences， Nationa1 
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Given the size of these metropo1itan areas it can be 
seen that the cost of 1and acquisition necessary t。
provide any substantia1 amount of additiona1 open space 
wou1d be overwhe1ming. 
Neverthe1ess， a number of 1eading scho1ars have 
advocated pub1ic ownership of 1and as a more effective 
method of contro1 than present regu1atory methods. 工n
the 1930・sLewis Mumford proposed "a sound 1and policy 
which sha11 vest ownership in the community， and guarantee 
tenure， for definitely assigned periods， to those who 
work the land thriftily and pay their communal taxes. 
This po1icy can be put into effect piecemeal， by per-
mitting cities to buy up 1and necessary for their de-
velopment and to ho1d it permanently: an indispensable 
aid in four-dimensional planning."担/
More recently John Reps has proposed emulation of 
the Scandanavian system under which central cities pur-
chase large tracts of open land in the suburban areas， 
some of which are then used as sites for future deve1op-
ment: 
The proposed method of directing 
urban expansion would promote contiguous 
28. Mumford， 1:he Culture of Cities 330 (1938). 主主主主主主. Comment， 
"The Pub1ic Land伽 nership，"52主主 1.l. 634 (1943). 
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development rather than the wasteful， 
discontinuous pattern which now pre-
vai1s and which results very largely 
from the whimsica1 characteristics of 
the peripheral land market. In order 
to find land on which to build， the 
deve10per must often leap-frog over 
near-in tracts which are held off the 
market for one reason or another. 
The expense of public services and 
facilities becomes unnecessarily 
high， and the cost to individua1s 
in time and money is increased by 
this useless and unessential dis-
persal. The proposed system would 
normally p1ace on the market only 
land contiguous to the existing 
network of services， but it could 
a1so be emp10yed to create new 
town or detached satellites where 
this is found desirable. 包/
Char1es Haar， former Assistant HUD Secretary for 
Metropolitan Development and authority on land use law， 
has also advocated large scale land acquisition pro-
grams.旦/
It can be seen that the cost of 1and acquisition 
as a means of accomplishing the goals now being achieved 
by regu1ation wou1d be so high that， given the various 
demands of other governmental programs， persuading the 
29. J. Reps， "百leFuture of American P1anning: Requiem or 
Renascence?，" 1967旦担且誼 47，52. 
30. C. H. Haar， "Wanted: Two Federa1 Levers for Urban Land Use --
Land Banks and Urbank，" in fapers Submitted to subcommittee 
on Housing Pane1s. Committee on Banking and Currency. House 
of Representative~， 927， 935 (1971). 主主主担b 単且盟主i
Commission of Urban Prob1ems， Bui1ding the American CitY. 
251 (1968). !!旦主主主主， Sy1van Kamm， "Land Banking: Public 
Policy A1ternatives and Di1emmas，" 11 (Urban Institute 
Paper No. 112・128，1970) Nationa1 Academy of Sciences and 




pub1ic to expend funds in that manner wou1d be difficu1t. 
Neverthe1ess， such a program offers a way of accomp1isn-
ing environmenta1 goa1s with the 1east disruption t。
1andowners ・expectations，and to the extent that funds 
are avai1ab1e may be usefu1 in solving some of the most 




SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The founding fathers p1aced in the Constitution 
the fo11owing words: 
-・.. . nor sha11 private property 
be taken for pub1ic use without just 
compensation." よ/
明leapp1ication of this "taking c1ause" to 1and use re-
gu1ation is the subject of this book. 
Why do these twe1ve words deserve so much study? 
Because any system of 1and use regulation wi11 work 
on1y if it satisfies each and every link in a chain of 
interconnected tests. It must be po1itica1ly feasib1e; 
it must make sense economica11y:. • • and it must hold 
up in court. The taking issue is an important link in 
that chain， because if the courts find the system of 
regu1ation so severe that it constitutes a taking， the 
who1e system co1lapses. 
Our survey of land use problems around the country 
(Chapters 1-4) found that the similarities between the 
various sections of the country are greater than the 
differences. 工t is true that there are fewer land use 
prob1ems in those states that are experiencing litt1e 
growth pressure， and there are more problems in those 
states that have a particu1ar1y fragi1e environment. 
But throughout the country attempts are being made to 
regu1ate the use of 1and in new ways --and throughout 
the country these regu1ations are being inf1uenced by 
concern over the taking issue. 
Our strongest impression from this survey is that 
the fear of the taking issue is stronger than the taking 
c1ause itself. It is an American fable or myth that a 
man can use his 1and any way he pleases regardless of 
1. U. S. Constitution， Amendment V. 
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his neighbors. The myth survives， indeed thrives， even 
though unsupported by the pattern of court decisions. 
Thus， attempts to reso1ve 1and use controversies must 
dea1 not on1y with the 1aw， but with the myth as we11. 
1. The Historv of the Takinq Issue 
How did a constitutiona1 c1ause concerned with the 
主主担~ of 1and become app1icab1e to the ~equ1ation of 
1and anyway? Origina11y it wasn't. The "taking" c1ause 
derived from the Eng1ish nob1es ・fearof the King・s
seizures of 1and for his own use， a fear that was re-
f1ected in the'Magna Carta: 
"No free man sha11 be deprived 
of his freeho1d . . • un1ess 
by the 1awfu1 judgment of his peers 
and by the 1aw of the 1and." 三/
But the use of 1and was being regu1ated --often 
very severe1y regu1ated --throughout Eng1ish and ear1y 
American history. On1y around the turn of the Twentieth 
Century did judges and 1ega1 scho1ars popu1arize the 
notion that if regu1ation of the use of 1and became 
excessive， it cou1d amount to the equiva1ent of a taking. 
Chapter 5 sets out the ear1y 1and use conf1icts in 
medieva1 Eng1and. It discusses the various statutes and 
proc1amations which attempted to contro1 the growth and 
bui1ding of London and its environs， and high1ights the 
movement towards the fencing of Eng1ish common 1and be-
tween the Thirteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. Fina11y， 
the Chapter c10ses with a summary of the attitudes toward 
property of Coke and B1ackstone --phi1osophies which 
affected property concepts carried to the New Wor1d. 
Chapter 6 picks up the story in Co1onia1 America. 
An examination and ana1ysis of co1onia1 regu1ations 
shows that the prevai1ing pattern of 1and use regu1ation 
was quite simi1ar to that in Eng1and. Compensation was 
2. The C1ause is sometimes ca11ed Artic1e 39 because the 
origina1 1215 Magna Carta contained 63 artic1es， of which 
the above was Artic1e 39. By 1225， the Charter consisted 
of 37 Artic1es as the origina1 63 were pared down and con-
solidated， of which the aforementioned was number 29. 
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generally provided for physical takings of developed 
property， but literally hundreds of regulations of the 
use of land were enforced without any compensation to 
the landowner. 
Nor was the issue of compensation for land use re-
gulation raised either during the revolutionary period 
or in the drafting of the Constitution or Bill of Rights. 
Rather the draftsmen of the taking clause seem to have 
carried over the historic British concern over arbitrary 
seizure of land by the King，ー-perhaps as reflected in 
seizures during the then recent revolutionary war --and 
to have applied that concern to actions of the new Federal 
Government. 
The courts have insisted that the taking clause be 
strictly observed. Whenever the government has needed 
land for some public purpose it has either purchased the 
land on the open market or exercised the power of con-
demnation， paying the owner the fair market value of 
his land. 
Court decisions during the entire first half of the 
Nineteenth Century (Chapter 7) find courts construing 
the taking clause strictly. To paraphrase a wel1-known 
commentator of the period writing in 1857， in order for 
an owner to be entitled to protection under the taking 
clause his property must have been actually taken in the 
physical sense of the word. No indirect or consequentia1 
damage， no matter how serious， warranted compensation. 
The last half of the Nineteenth Century led to a 
certain ambivalence on the part of the courts， as the 
country ・s tremendous economic expansion inevitab1y pro-
duced conflicts with vested interests. Nonethe1ess， 
1ate in the Nineteenth Century the Supreme Court handed 
down cases such as Powe11 v. Pennsv1vani2. .，Vand旦坦詮王
v. Kansa~ !I which denied compensation to the owners of 
3. 127 U.5. 393 (1922). 
4. 123 U.5. 623， 8 5. Ct. 273 (1887). 
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business properties that became virtua11y va1ue1ess be-
cause of state regu1atory statutes. These statutes 
were he1d to be va1id po1ice regu1ations， not takings 
of property within the meaning of the constitutiona1 
prohibition. 
But Justice Holmes was soon to change the Court ・s
direction， as Chapter 8 points out. On1y two years 
after Muq1er v. Kansa~ ， Holmes wrote from the bench of 
the Massachusetts Supr四 eCourt in Rideout v. Kno~21 
that the power of 四 inentdomain (the power to acquire 
1and) and the po1ice power (the power to regu1ate 1and) 
differed on1y in degree and no c1ear 1ine cou1d be drawn 
between them. He continued to deve10p this phi1osophy 
in subsequent decisions and inf1uenced a number of 
1eading scho1ars of the period. 
Then， in Decemlコerof 1922， in the now famous case 
of Pennsv1vania Coa1 Companv v. Maho~ ， Holmes announced 
his famous ru1e: 
"The genera1 ru1e at 1east is， 
that whi1e property may be regu1ated 
to a certain extent， if regu1ation 
goes too far it wi11 be recognized 
as a taking." 豆/
When a diminution of property va1ues reaches a 
certain magnitude， he said， a taking occurs. Thus， 
Ho1mes dec1ared Pennsy1vania ・sKoh1er Act， passed t。
prevent coa1 mine subsidence from destroying wh01e towns， 
unconstitutiona1 as an undue regu1ation of the property 
of the coa1 cαnpany. 
Based on H01mes ・reasoningthe courts have continued 
to use a ba1ancing test --a weighing of the pub1ic bene-
fits of the regu1ation against the extent of 10ss of prop-
erty va1ues. The Supreme Court 10st interest in the issue 
soon after Pennsv1vania Coa 1 and has refused to hear cases 
arising under the taking c1ause except in very rare in-
stances. As a resu1t， the app1ication of the Court's 
5. 148 Mass. 368， 19 N.E. 390 (1889). 
6. 260 U.S. at 415. 
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ba1ancing test has been 1eft to the 10wer Federa1 Courts 
--and especia11y to the state courts， in which most 
1and use regu1ation cases arise. 
2. The State of the Current Law 
Over the 1ast fifty years the state courts have 
decided 1itera11y hundreds of cases， each of which de-
termines whether the va1ue of a particu1ar 1and use re-
gu1ation does or does not outweigh the 10ss of property 
value to a particu1ar 1andowner. As might be expected， 
given the 1ack of 1eadership from a common centra1 court， 
this mass of decisions has often been characterized as 
"chaotic." Since no state court fee1s itse1f particu1ar1y 
bound by the decisions of the courts of a different state， 
interpretations of the taking c1ause vary considerab1y. 
Chapters 9， 10 and 11 100k at these state court 
decisions from three different perspectives. Chapter 9 
categorizes the cases in re1ation to various types of 
1and use regu1ation that are inv01ved. This c1assifica-
tion is particular1y usefu1 for peop1e concerned with 
specific regu1ations for such purposes as wet1and pro-
tection， historic preservation， etc. 工ngenera1 this 
Chapter shows a genera1 tendency of the courts to uph01d 
we11 thoughtout regu1ations， though there are very few 
subjects on which one cannot find cases going both ways 
on very similar facts. 
Chapter 10 reviews the 1ega1 1iterature on the re-
1ationship between 1and use regu1ation and the taking 
c1ause. Most of the sch01ars.who have studied this 
subject have found that there are no universa1 princi-
p1es which wi11 consistent1y exp1ain the resu1ts of the 
cases. Each case is decided on its own facts， as the 
courts frequent1y point out. Neverthe1ess， the com-
mentators have found a few tendencies worth noting. 
The one most often described is the tendency of the 
courts to prefer regu1ations that contr01 those uses 
of 1and that were treated as "nuisances" under the 
traditiona1 common 1aw. 
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Commentators have a1so tried to find some corre-
1ation between the amount that property va1ues are 
reduced by a regu1ation and the wi11ingness of the 
courts to find the regu1ation constitutiona1. For the 
most part， this attempt to find some numerica1 corre-
1ation appears not to have proven usefu1 in predicting 
the outcome of future decisions. 
A dramatic upsurge of concern over the environment 
took p1ace in the 1ate ・60・sand ear1y ・70・s. We won-
dered whether this "new mood" wou1d affect the judiciary， 
so we cu11ed out the taking cases decided after January 1， 
1970， and examined them separate1y in Chapter 11. 
We discovered an interesting trend. A1though the 
number of cases is sti11 sma11， there is a strong tendency 
on the part of the courts to approve 1and use regu1ations 
if the purpose of the regu1ation is statewide or regiona1 
in nature rather than mere1y 10ca1. A1though the courts 
are a1so supporting 10ca1 1and use regu1ations with a 
reasonab1e degree of consistency， they show an obvious 
preference for regu1ations having broad mu1ti-purpose 
goa1s. 
3. Strateqies for the Future: The 工mportanceof the Myth 
The court decisions form on1y the visib1e surface 
of the 1aw. Be10w the surface 1ies the myth of the 
taking c1ause圃- a powerfu1 pub1ic perception of the 
c1ause as the embodiment of every m~n's right to buy 
and se11 1and for a profit. As the Task Force on Land 
Use and Urban Growth put it， "The popu1ar impression of 
the takings c1ause may be even more out of date than 
some court opinions." 11 
Land use regu1ation is predominant1y a function of 
10ca1 government --over ten thousand separate 10ca1 
7. Citizens ・AdvisoryCo四nitteeon Environmenta1 Qua1ity Task Force 
on Land Use and Urban Growth，司、eUse of Lan~， 147・148(1973). 
Di日l凶 byGoogle
324. 
governrnents， each exercising control over the land within 
its particular jurisdiction. Since the "rnyth" of the 
taking clause assurnes that less can be regulated than 
the court decisions actually perrnit， rnany local govern-
rnents fail to exercise their powers --or if they do， 
they back down easily when challenged. Other local 
governments despair of reaching any reasonable accom-
rnodation with landowners and decide to prohibit every-
thing， leaving the issue up to the courts to resolve. 
Why has the myth of the taking clause made land 
values so much more sacrosanct than a reading of the 
court decisions would actually suggest? We suspect a 
nurnber of causes inherent in the structure of American 
local government. 
明、ernyth of the taking clause is inhibiting the 
sort of reasonable regulatory action that is needed to 
protect the environment while respecting the position 
of individual landowners. In weighing strategies to 
deal with the taking issue， therefore， we begin with 
awareness that a new legal doctrine will have little 
impact unless it filters down to where the action is. 
The law in this area is what local officials think it 
is. While it is important to establish sound legal 
principles， it is equally important to communicate these 
principles to the people who are making the decisions. 
4. Strateqies for Dealinq with the Takinq工ssue:
Experience. Not uコqic
The taking clause has bedeviled some of our brightest 
and rnost lucid legal scholars. A number of excellent 
articles have appeared in our legal periodicals over the 
past ten years. We were impressed with the profound 
logic by which each author attempted to make sense out 
of the confused body of cases --at least until we read 
the next article in which a new author convincingly de-
molished the logic of his predecessor and expounded a 
new and even more convincing system of analysis. 
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We eventua11y came away with a sense of frustration， 
convinced that the wor1d did not need one more ana1yti-
ca11y good， true and beautifu1 s01ution to the taking 
prob1em. H01mes' own observation that experience， not 
10gic， governed the 1aw， seemed most appropriate here. 
We began by arraying five portentia1 strategies for 
approaching the taking issue， ranging from one end of 
the spectrum to the other. Chapter 12 presents the 
argument that the courts shou1d discard the idea that a 
regu1ation of the use of 1and can constitute a "taking." 
It suggests that the idea of a regu1atory taking was a 
judicia1 fiction of the ear1y 1900・s，wh011y inconsistent 
with the tradition of the founding fathers. 工trecommends 
a return to the strict construction of the taking c1ause 
in the manner in which it was origina11y conceived. Such 
an approach wou1d subject 1and use regu1ations to the 
same standards of judicia1 review that now app1y to other 
government regu1ations. 
Chapter 13 proposes a 1ess direct approach. It 
points out that many courts have apparent1y treated the 
idea of regu1atory taking more as a hypothetica1 possi-
bi1ity than a rea1 one. The Supreme Court of Ca1ifornia， 
for examp1e， appears un1ike1y to h01d any regu1ation 
inva1id under the taking c1ause. 明、eUnited States 
Supreme Court itse1f (the 1ast time it ru1ed on the 
issue) 1eft some doubt whether any regu1ation cou1d con-
stitute a taking as 10ng as the court was convinced that 
the pub1ic purpose served by the regu1ation was impor-
tant. This suggests an emphasis on demonstrating the 
importance of the purpose behind 1and use regu1ations. 
Chapter 14 discusses another approach to the taking 
issue， one that ha been suggested by a number of com-
mentators: the drafting of statutory standards to de-
termine when compensation is required. A1though the 
taking test is a constitutiona1 one which is u1timate1y 
in the hands of the courts， the courts have genera11y 
accepted 1egis1ative determinations in simi1ar situations. 
The Eng1ish have for years used a system of statu-
tory standards for determining whether compensation must 
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be paid to a person affected by a 1and use regu1ation. 
工ngenera1， compensation is paid on1y if the 1and is 
capab1e of "no reasonab1y beneficia1 use，" under the 
regu1ation. But even then compensation is not paid 
if the regu1ation is designed to promote certain 1isted 
purposes (~・ g. ， f100d contro1， adequacy of sewerage 
services， etc.). Surprising1y， the British system 
appears to p1ease both deve1oper， administrator and 
environmenta1ist. It might be studied in more depth 
as a mode1 for statutory standards to be adopted here. 
The first three strategies have sought some change 
in the substantive 1aw. Chapter 15 suggests that even 
if the existing 1aw remains unchanged most 1and use re-
gu1ations can survive attack in the courts if they are 
based on sound factua1 evidence and are carefu11y drafted. 
This Chapter discusses some examp1es to i11ustrate these 
points. 
Fina11y， Chapter 16 exp10res the a1ternative of 
providing compensation whenever possib1e to forec1ose 
attacks on 1and use regu1ations under the taking c1ause. 
It discusses various suggestions for systems of com-
pensab1e regu1ations inc1uding the one new1y proposed 
to the American Law Institute. It a1so points out the 
possibi1ity of using massive 1and acquisition programs 
in 1ieu of regu1ation， but does not discuss this a1ter-
native extensive1y because the cost appears to make such 
a program impractica1. 
5. Eva1uatinq the Strateqies 
Having examined a range of possib1e strategies we 
conc1uded that it was impossib1e to recommend one sing1e 
strategy to dea1 with the taking issue. The taking issue 
represents an inevitab1e conf1ict between two va1id and 
important interests: the need for a 1ivab1e environment 
and the importance of private property rights. No magic 
words wi11 make the conf1ict disappear. 
A dramatic overru1ing of the Rennsv1vania Coa1 case 
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would help deflate the myth that now makes the taking 
clause so powerful. But courts would still evaluate 
regulations against their own standards of reasonable-
ness， and if the purpose of the regulation appears 
doubtful the extent of individual losses will surely 
affect a judge・ssense of what is reasonable. 
Much can be accomplished by expanding the courts・
awareness of the important purposes that lie behind land 
use regulations. Judges suspect that a parochial view-
point motivates many local zoning decisions. This sus-
picion can often be allayed by showing that the regula-
tion is consistent with an important policy that tran-
scends local boundaries. The work of Professors Dunham， 
Sax and Van Alstyne is helpful in providing a framework 
for the necessary factual presentation. 
We were impressed with the success of the British 
system of providing statutory standards to determine 
when compensation should be paid. Any system that seems 
to please developers， environmentalists and planning 
officials deserves further study. Experむnentswith 
similar systems deserve a trial in this country. 
But in the long run the strategy that would con-
tribute most to a more equitable resolution of the 
taking cases would be simply to spend more time in the 
drafting of regulations and the presentation of facts 
supporting --or opposing --them. Too often these 
regulations take the form of sweeping prohibitions and 
blanket indictments of all development simply because 
no one has taken the time to study the problem in depth 
and work out a reasonable compromise between the needs 
of the environment and the rights of the individuals. 
Finally， state and local governments should under-
take experiments with new methods to provide compensa-
tion to landowners. 切lesystem of compensable regula-
tions proposed for the American Law Institute's Model 
Land Development Code is an example of such a system. 
Density transfer systems such as those proposed by Pro-
fessor Costonis also may provide a way of furnishing 
landowners the equivalent of compensation. 
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We doubt that any of these strategies will provide 
an answer for all situations. It will be necessary to 
pick and choose a strategy or combination of strategies 
to deal with each set of problerns as they arise. Only 
an approach that rejects the two extrernes --stop-growth 
and full-speed-ahead --will provide a long range solution 
to the problerns posed by the taking issue. 
6.Uqhliqhts 
In final s山市nary.we were rnost struck by the following: 
A. The taking clause is a serious problern wherever 
there is substantial pressure for urban growth. and parti-
cularly where the environrnent is sensitive. 
B. The popular fear of the taking clause is an even 
rnore serious problern than actual court decisions. 
C. There is little historical basis for the idea 
that a regulation of the use of land can constitute a 
taking of the land. 
D. The rnost recent court decisions， those of the 
・70・s，strongly support land use regulations based on 
overall state or regional goals --regulations of the 
type we discussed in ~he Quiet Revolution in Land Use 
Control. .!V 
E. More thorough consideration should be given 
to the possibility of statutory standards to deterrnine 
when cornpensation rnust be paid. The British have found 
their experience with such standards highly satisfactory. 
F. Finally， there is a great deal that a good 
lawyer can do working within existing laws if he has 
access to good factual evidence and if he practices 
careful draftsrnanship.τ~ese subjects deserve rnore 
8. Fred Bosse1n国 nand David Ca11ies.百leQuiet Revo1ution in 
und Use Contro!. (1971). 
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detailed consideration in order to provide attorneys 
with the kind of expert assistance they need. 
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